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I. OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
A. Integration as a Condition for Immigration: the Act on Integration 
Abroad
THIS BOOK ASKS if states, and the Netherlands in particular, may enact integration tests as a condition for the admission of aliens. Such a test was introduced in the Dutch Act on Integration Abroad 
(Wet inburgering buitenland), which entered into force on 15 March 2006.1 
Since then, several groups of immigrants – in particular family migrants 
from non-Western countries – have only been granted admission to the 
Netherlands if they can demonstrate proficiency in the Dutch language 
and a certain amount of knowledge about the country. Their ability to do 
so is assessed by means of the integration exam abroad (inburgeringsexa-
men in het buitenland), which is taken in their country of origin before the 
visa application is made.
The Act on Integration Abroad (AIA) is an instrument of Dutch integra-
tion policy. This policy seeks to ensure that, among the Dutch population, 
there exist a level of social cohesion and a degree of economic participa-
tion that are considered necessary for the continued viability of the wel-
fare state as a political and economic institution. From the late 1970s until 
approximately the turn of the century, Dutch integration policy was pri-
marily directed towards persons who had already been admitted. It aimed 
to achieve an equal position for these immigrants compared to that of the 
non-immigrant population and, at a later stage, to ensure their active par-
ticipation in various domains of mainstream society, notably education 
and the labour market. For the past 10 years, however, integration meas-
ures have increasingly been directed towards excluding immigrants of 
whom it is expected that they will not successfully integrate.2 This new 
1 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2006, 28; entry into force Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2006, 75.
2 Schinkel points out that the term ‘integration’ necessarily refers to a process involving 
different actors or elements; hence it would be wrong to state that a single person can either 
integrate or not integrate (Schinkel 2008, 39–40). In fact, what is required will often be a 
certain degree of participation, adjustment or adaptation, depending on how the concept 
of integration is understood at the time. Although I subscribe to this view, I was unable to 
find a suitable term to replace ‘integration’ as a general descriptor of what states expect 
2 Introduction
line of thinking has been described as a ‘reversal of citizenship concepts’: 
whereas integration (in the sense of learning the language of the host state 
and developing a commitment towards its society) was previously 
expected to follow admission and the granting of rights, the current 
understanding is that immigrants should integrate before they are admit-
ted or access to rights is granted.3 At the same time, integration policy 
became increasingly directed towards cultural adaptation of immigrants 
and their identification with Dutch society. 
Besides the AIA, the augmented prevalence of this new perspective on 
integration has inspired several new measures, including an (advanced) 
integration exam which also serves as a condition for the acquisition of a 
permanent residence permit (the Integration Act 2007), a naturalisation 
test (introduced in 2003) and a legislative proposal to make the granting 
of social assistance dependent on demonstrated proficiency in the Dutch 
language.4 Similar developments can be seen in other European countries, 
which have also introduced integration conditions into their immigration 
and nationality legislation.5 In particular Germany, France, Denmark, the 
United Kingdom and Austria have introduced integration tests as a con-
dition for the admission of family or other migrants.6 The possibility 
of making residence rights dependent on integration requirements has 
also been expressly included in a number of EU migration directives 
(notably the Family Reunification Directive and the Long-term Residents 
Directive).7 
With the introduction of the AIA and similar measures in other coun-
tries, language proficiency and country knowledge have become part of 
the criteria used to determine whether immigrants, and specifically fam-
ily migrants, are granted the right of admission to the territory of the 
states concerned. Within liberal democracies, the use of such criteria can 
be seen as a democratically legitimated expression of self-determination, 
aiming to preserve unity and solidarity within the state. On the other 
hand, integration requirements can be at odds with the principles of indi-
vidual freedom and equality, to which liberal democratic states are also 
immigrants to do (or be). I therefore continue to refer to ‘integration’ as something that 
immigrants can do, although I try to minimise this use of the term. For reasons of readability 
I refrain from using quotation marks.
3 Vermeulen 2010a, 87–89. See also Groenendijk 2004, 111–13 and Carrera and Wiesbrock 
2009, 2. 
4 On the introduction of the naturalisation test see Van Oers 2010, 60–62. The proposal to 
introduce an integration requirement into the Social Assistance Act (Wet werk en bijstand) was 
submitted by the Liberal Party (VVD) in 2010 and was still pending before the Dutch 
Parliament at the time of writing, see Parliamentary Papers II, No 32, 328.
5 Guild et al 2009a; Van Oers et al 2010a; Groenendijk 2011.
6 Groenendijk 2011, 9–20. The Austrian requirement is laid down in Art 21a of the 
Settlement and Residence Act (Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetz), see www.bmi.gv.at. 
7 Groenendijk 2004, 117–25; Carrera 2009, 145–225; Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009, 5–11; 
Groenendijk 2011, 5–9.
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committed. These principles, which are considered to be of a universal 
nature, may stand in the way of erecting barriers for the admission of 
immigrants and distinguishing between those who are and those who are 
not considered capable of successful integration. They also impose limita-
tions on the extent to which immigrants are asked to conform to the inte-
gration norms of the receiving state, in particular where culture and moral 
values are concerned.8 This book aims to see how the law, both at the 
national and international level, finds a balance between these competing 
claims. More specifically, it clarifies the legal framework concerning inte-
gration requirements for the admission of immigrants and identifies the 
criteria determining their legality. To do this, relevant legal instruments 
are analysed and suggestions offered for their interpretation. Throughout 
the investigation, the Dutch Act on Integration Abroad serves as a point of 
departure and conclusions are drawn as to its lawfulness.
B. Approach
This book is divided into two parts. The first part, which can be read sepa-
rately or as a prelude to the second part, investigates the integration exam 
abroad and its role in Dutch integration policy. It gives a description of the 
Act on Integration Abroad, including the target group, the contents of the 
exam and the effects measured to date, and explains the historical and 
political context in which the Act was introduced. To this end, a historical 
overview is given of Dutch integration policy, with particular attention 
being paid to the introduction and development of language courses and 
civic education for immigrants. An analysis of parliamentary documents 
focuses more directly on the objectives of integration policy, as defined by 
the Dutch legislator, and the changes in the Dutch concept of integration. 
At the end of this analysis, both the integration objectives pursued and 
the suitability of the AIA as a means to achieve them are made subject to 
some preliminary objections. 
The second part of this study examines the legal norms and standards 
with which integration requirements must comply. This part of the inves-
tigation addresses the legal effect of integration tests, which is the tempo-
rary and sometimes even permanent exclusion of immigrants seeking to 
enter a state of which they are not nationals. The specific question exam-
ined is which standards are set by (mostly international) immigration 
rules regarding non-admission of aliens on the grounds that they have 
8 On the inherent contradiction between the principles of self-determination and freedom 
and equality see, eg, Tholen 1997; Bosniak 2006, esp 1–9; Joppke 2008, 533–36 and Vermeulen 
2010, 46. See also Benhabib, who describes this stand-off as ‘the constitutive dilemma at the 
heart of liberal democracies: between sovereign self-determination claims on the one hand 
and adherence to universal human rights principles on the other’, Benhabib 2004, 2.
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failed to meet an integration requirement. The examination covers vari-
ous areas of immigration law, including legal rules on family reunifica-
tion, labour migration and the right to free movement in the EU. Legal 
instruments on asylum are not included, the reason being that there is 
clearly no scope for states to enact integration requirements in relation to 
requests for international protection.9 In the Netherlands, as in other states 
where integration is a prerequisite for admission, asylum seekers have 
been excluded from this condition. On the other hand, as religious serv-
ants form a specific target group of the Act on Integration Abroad, the 
relevance of the right to freedom of religion for the admission of aliens is 
considered. Lastly, given that the AIA does not apply to all immigrants 
alike, integration requirements are assessed in relation to the right to 
equal treatment.
The objective of the above examination is twofold. The first aim is to 
describe and analyse the legal standards that states, and the Netherlands 
in particular, must take into account when enacting integration require-
ments as part of their immigration rules. A second but related aim is to 
construct a comprehensive argument concerning the lawfulness of the 
AIA in relation to relevant norms of international and Dutch constitu-
tional law. To the extent that such lawfulness is found to be lacking, 
adjustments to the Act, or its application, will be needed to ensure that the 
legal obligations assumed by the Netherlands are duly respected and 
the rights of immigrants protected. 
As part of the objective of this study is to evaluate the lawfulness of the 
AIA, the scope and contents of the examination in the second part of the 
book are, to a large extent, determined in relation to this Act. By taking 
the (Dutch) integration exam abroad as a point of reference, it will be pos-
sible to formulate more specific legal standards (concerning, for example, 
the target group or the contents of the test) than if a more abstract defini-
tion of integration requirements were to be used. Nonetheless, much of 
the legal framework developed in this study is equally applicable to inte-
gration requirements adopted or to be adopted by other states. In particu-
lar, the interpretation of various provisions of human rights treaties 
– including the European Convention on Human Rights – and the EU 
migration directives will be equally pertinent to other EU Member States. 
It is hoped, therefore, that the relevance of this study will not remain lim-
ited to the national context of the Netherlands. 
9 For an overview of relevant instruments and their contents see Boeles et al 2009, 253–
361.
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C. Relation to Other Research
Developments in the integration policy and legislation of various EU 
Member States and at the EU level over the past 10 years have formed 
an important topic of academic research. One matter that has attracted 
considerable attention has been the redefining of the concept of citizen-
ship in various EU states and the manifestation of these changes in actual 
integration measures, in particular naturalisation tests.10 A prevailing 
theoretical perspective in this literature concerns the compatibility of 
these developments with liberal political theories on citizenship and inte-
gration.11
As far as the Netherlands is concerned, the evolution of the concept of 
citizenship has been quite extensively described and evaluated by differ-
ent authors.12 This literature mostly analyses the normative conception of 
citizenship or integration as it has been formulated in the Dutch political 
debate. An important strand of criticism expressed in various publica-
tions concerns the shift that has taken place, especially since 2003, towards 
the unilateral adaptation by immigrants to the cultural norms and values 
of the majority population and the presentation of these norms and values 
as forming part of a static and exclusive national identity. Another, related 
objection formulated by various researchers concerns the fact that respon-
sibility for a successful integration process has been placed wholly or 
largely on the immigrant population.13
Given their close connection to the topic of this study, this book also 
includes an analysis and assessment of the conceptualisation of citizen-
ship and integration in the Dutch political debate. The findings from the 
abovementioned literature are thereby taken into account. Adding to the 
developments that have already been described, this study also explains 
how the concept of integration continued to evolve between 2007 and 
2011, with special attention being paid to the relationship between the 
political or ideological concept of integration in the Netherlands and the 
legal requirements of the Act on Integration Abroad. Lastly, while mind-
ful of the comments that have already been made, this study aims to 
provide a brief individual assessment of the objectives of Dutch integra-
tion policy and the suitability of the AIA as a means to achieve these 
objectives.
10 Michalowski 2011; Guild et al 2009a; Van Oers et al 2010a. 
11 See, esp, Joppke 2008; Michalowski 2011; Guild et al 2009a; Bauböck and Joppke 2010. 
12 Spijkerboer 2007; Driouichi 2007; WRR 2007; Schinkel 2008; Klaver and Odé 2009; 
Fermin 2009; Van Gunsteren 2009 and Vermeulen 2010. For earlier analyses see also Fermin 
2000 and Van Blom and Van Schilt-Mol 2001, 21–31.
13 See, esp, Driouichi 2007; Klaver and Odé 2009 and Vermeulen 2010. See also Fermin 
2006.
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Meanwhile another strand of academic research concerns the reinforced 
connection between integration and immigration measures in Europe. 
This linkage has been seen to represent a key development in integration 
policies, both at the EU level and in various Member States (including 
the Netherlands).14 The introduction of integration requirements for the 
acquisition of residence rights and nationality has been criticised by sev-
eral authors on the grounds that the objective and/or effect of such 
requirements is to function as instruments of exclusion and immigration 
control rather than as a tool for integration.15
This study argues that the predominant purpose of the AIA is indeed to 
function as a selection criterion and thus to exclude those immigrants 
who do not pass the integration exam abroad. It then attempts to take the 
discussion one step further by asking whether this ‘exclusive’ conception 
of integration is acceptable in view of the competing interests of the resi-
dents of the receiving state and those of the immigrants seeking admis-
sion. As mentioned above, a primary objective of this study is also to 
assess the legality of integration requirements for the admission of aliens 
and specifically of the Act on Integration Abroad. 
Although the issue of legality has been raised on various occasions,16 a 
comprehensive legal framework regarding integration requirements has 
not yet been formulated. Thus far the available literature has mostly pro-
vided a limited evaluation of the compatibility of integration require-
ments with the right to family life, the prohibition of discrimination and 
the EU migration directives.17 Naturally the results that emerged from 
these previous inquiries have been included in this study. The legal 
description and analysis presented in this book are, however, more 
encompassing and produce a number of different outcomes.
Finally, an important question concerning integration requirements is 
whether those requirements actually contribute to achieving the objec-
tives for which they were introduced. Although this is an empirical ques-
tion that does not as such pertain to the object of this study, we will see 
that the effectiveness of the AIA is a relevant factor in determining both 
the political legitimacy of the integration exam abroad and its legal valid-
ity. An evaluation of these effects was conducted in 2009, three years after 
the Act entered into force.18 In the same year Klaver and Odé provided a 
more general overview of the effects of various integration measures 
14 See notably Groenendijk 2004; Carrera 2009; Vermeulen 2010.
15 Carrera 2009; Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009; Van Oers et al 2010; Groenendijk 2011. For a 
different view, see Vermeulen 2010.
16 eg, Guild et al 2009b, 9–11; Van Oers et al 2010b, 326–29.
17 See notably ACVZ 2004a; Oosterom-Staples 2004; Groenendijk 2004; Boeles and Lodder 
2005; De Vries 2006; Groenendijk 2006b; Groenendijk 2011; Van Dam 2008; Human Rights 
Watch 2008; Carrera 2009; Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009; Lodder 2009 and Vermeulen 2010.
18 Brink et al 2009.
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adopted in the Netherlands.19 This book includes the outcomes of both 
studies. 
II. INTEGRATION REQUIREMENTS AND  
LEGAL RULES ON THE ADMISSION OF ALIENS
A. Scope of the Investigation 
As mentioned above, the primary purpose of this book is to describe and 
analyse the legal standards applying to the Act on Integration Abroad and 
to determine whether the Act is in compliance with these standards. To 
this end this study examines legal instruments that are of relevance to 
immigration law and the admission of aliens. Limitations to the power of 
states to control immigration can be found in human rights treaties, as 
well as in the law of the European Union. Also relevant are bi- and multi-
lateral treaties containing agreements between states on the admission of 
each other’s nationals. As far as international instruments are concerned, 
the investigation is limited to treaties to which the Netherlands is a party. 
Finally, restrictions to the Dutch legislator’s power to regulate immigra-
tion can be found in the human rights provisions of the Dutch Constitution. 
The question of whether the admission of aliens to the Netherlands 
may be conditioned upon fulfilment of integration requirements is pre-
ceded by the question of whether any right to admission exists at all. Such 
a right is expressly laid down in several legal instruments, in particular in 
the field of EU law (see, for example, Art 21 TFEU). In many other situa-
tions, however, the existence of a right of admission is not self-evident. 
This is the case, for instance, with regard to most of the human rights pro-
visions discussed in this study, as well as in the Association Agreement 
concluded between the EU (then EEC) and Turkey. To give an example 
from the human rights arena, it is not immediately evident whether 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which 
protects the right to respect for family life, also includes a right of admis-
sion for aliens in situations where the members of one family do not share 
the same nationality. A relatively large part of the examination in the sec-
ond part of this book consequently focuses on determining the scope of 
the provisions under investigation. Only when it has been established 
that a right to admission exists is it necessary to determine whether this 
right may be restricted and, if so, whether an integration exam in the 
country of origin constitutes a lawful restriction.
19 Klaver and Odé 2009.
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B. Sources of Immigration Rules
As stated above, legal rules regarding the admission of aliens can be 
found in different instruments of national and international law. The 
sources of immigration rules addressed in this study are listed below, 
together with some general remarks on their interpretation and legal 
effect. A distinction is made between instruments of international law, EU 
law and Dutch constitutional law. 
i. International Law
a. Instruments
For the purpose of this study, the main sources of immigration rules in 
international law are the human rights treaties concluded at the level 
of the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe (CoE). These include 
the ECHR and the (revised) European Social Charter (ESC), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). None of these treaties are 
directly concerned with the admission of aliens. Nevertheless, some provi-
sions can be (or have been) interpreted to include admission rights. 
Furthermore, the equality norms laid down in some of the above treaties, 
including the CERD, are also applicable in the field of immigration. In 
addition to the above instruments, some relevant legal standards can be 
found in treaties that are more specifically concerned with the regulation of 
international migration. These include the European Convention relating 
to the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (ECMW) and various bilateral trea-
ties concluded between the Netherlands and other states. 
b. Legal Effect
Self-executing provisions (een ieder verbindende bepalingen) of international 
law have direct effect in the legal order of the Netherlands and take prec-
edence over national law.20 This means that such provisions may be relied 
upon by individuals before Dutch courts and administrative bodies and 
can provide grounds for invalidating Dutch immigration legislation and 
any decisions based upon it. Whether an international provision is self-
executing is ultimately determined by the court before which it is invoked. 
The criterion that has traditionally been applied in this respect is whether 
the provision is formulated sufficiently specifically to allow it to be 
20 Arts 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution.
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applied without prior intervention by the legislator.21 To date, the Dutch 
courts have labelled most of the relevant provisions in the above treaties 
(including the provisions in the ECHR and ICCPR) as self-executing. 
Where, however, this is not the case, the existence of direct effect has been 
assessed separately. 
c. Interpretation
The meaning of the above treaty provisions has been determined in 
accordance with the interpretation rules laid down in Articles 31 to 33 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).22 In itself this 
Convention applies only to treaties concluded after it entered into force 
for the states concerned.23 However, its rules on treaty interpretation are 
generally regarded as corresponding to rules of customary international 
law.24 The same rules may therefore be applied to treaties concluded 
before the VCLT entered into force.
Where available, decisions and comments by treaty-monitoring bodies 
have been taken into account to aid the process of interpretation. In this 
regard the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
been especially significant.25 Final judgments by the ECtHR are legally 
binding on the State Parties involved in the particular case.26 In addition, 
it has been assumed for the purpose of this study that all State Parties to 
the ECHR are legally bound by the Court’s interpretations of the 
Convention’s provisions. This seems reasonably to follow from the fact 
that the Court is ultimately authorised to decide whether the Convention 
has been correctly interpreted and applied.27 To take an example from 
chapter 4 of this study, the ECtHR has repeatedly held that Article 8 ECHR 
(on the right to respect for family life) may give rise to an obligation to 
admit aliens for the purpose of family reunification. Given this case law, it 
would appear rather pointless (from a legal perspective) for a State Party 
not involved in these proceedings to maintain that it is not bound by such 
an obligation until such time as the Court decides otherwise. In this 
21 Dutch Supreme Court 3 May 1986, case no 12698, LJN: AC9402 (Spoorwegstaking), para 
3.2; Dutch Supreme Court 14 April 1989, case no 13822, LJN: AD5725 (Harmonisatiewet), para 
5.3.
22 UNTS Vol 1155, 331, Treaty Series (Traktatenblad) 1972, 51 and following, entry into force 
for the Netherlands on 9 May 1985.
23 Art 4 VCLT. 
24 Dixon and McCorquodale 2003, 64. See also Battjes 2006, 14–15 with references to rele-
vant case law.
25 Before 1998 the admissibility of complaints about violations of the ECHR was decided 
by the European Commission of Human Rights (EComHR), see Harris et al 2009, 5. In this 
study some references are made to EComHR decisions.
26 Art 46(1) ECHR. 
27 cp Battjes 2006, 23–24 and Gerards 2010, 231–33. Battjes claims that the binding effect of 
the interpretations provided by the ECtHR is supported by state practice (23).
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connection it is also relevant to note that the ECtHR considers itself bound 
to follow its own case law unless there are ‘cogent reasons’ to the contra-
ry.28 This being said, it is often not easy to determine the extent to which 
previous interpretations by the Court are also relevant with regard to new 
and different situations. This requires careful consideration of the judg-
ments and the arguments and formulations employed, which is precisely 
what this study sets out to do.29 Inevitably, the interpretations provided 
will be subject to discussion. However, whatever the content of these 
interpretations, it follows from the above that failure by the State Parties 
to the ECHR to respect the provisions of the Convention will be consid-
ered a failure to comply with a legally binding obligation. 
Other interpretations by treaty-monitoring bodies that have been used 
to clarify the provisions discussed in this study include the general com-
ments and recommendations, communications and concluding observa-
tions issued by the Human Rights Committee (for the ICCPR), the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (for the CERD) 
and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (for the CRC).30 None of the 
aforementioned treaties provides for these statements to be legally bind-
ing, and so state actions cannot be considered violations of these treaties 
solely on the grounds that they are not in accordance with the interpreta-
tions of the monitoring bodies. Nevertheless, the specific function and 
expertise of these bodies endow them with a guiding role in establishing 
the meaning of the various treaty provisions. For this reason it may be 
assumed that any divergence from the interpretations proposed by the 
treaty-monitoring bodies needs to be explicitly substantiated.31 
ii. European Union Law
a. Instruments
At the time of writing, European Union (EU) law has become one – if not 
the most – important source of rights for immigrants to the Netherlands 
(and to other EU Member States). Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into 
force on 1 December 2009, the core of EU law has been formed by the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU).32 The latter contains provisions concerning both 
the free movement of EU citizens and third-country nationals within the 
28 Battjes 2006, 23; Harris et al 2009, 17–18.
29 As Harris et al put it: ‘Any statement by way of interpretation of the Convention by the 
Court, and formerly the Commission, is significant, although inevitably the level of general-
ity at which it is expressed or its centrality to the decision on the material facts of the case 
will affect the weight and influence of any pronouncement’. Harris et al 2009, 17.
30 The competence of these treaty-monitoring bodies is laid down in Art 40(4) ICCPR, Art 
5(4) Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Arts 9(2) and 14(7)(b) CERD and Art 45(d) CRC.
31 cp Battjes 2006, 22.
32 [2010] OJEU C 83.
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EU and the immigration of third-country nationals from outside the 
Union.33 In addition to these treaty provisions, various instruments of sec-
ondary EU law have been adopted in these areas.34 For the purpose of this 
study, the main instruments of secondary law discussed are the Family 
Reunification Directive, the Long-term Residents Directive, the Residence 
Directive and the Blue Card Directive.35 
For some categories of immigrants, entitlement to admission and resi-
dence stems from international agreements concluded between the EU 
(sometimes together with the Member States) and third countries. This 
study considers those agreements that most closely reflect the provisions 
of the TFEU concerning the free movement of persons. These include, first 
of all, the Agreement on the European Economic Area and the 
EC-Switzerland Agreement on the free movement of persons. Account is 
also taken of the provisions of the Association Agreement between the 
EEC and Turkey (including its Additional Protocol and the decisions 
adopted on the basis of the Agreement) and the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements concluded with several Western Balkan coun-
tries (Macedonia, Croatia, Albania and Montenegro).
When investigating EU law as a source of rules concerning integration 
requirements and the admission of aliens, account must also be taken of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and the general principles of 
EU law. The CFR gained legally binding force in 2009 with the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty.36 Its scope of application is limited to the sphere 
of EU law: the CFR is directed towards the EU institutions as well as to the 
Member States when they are implementing EU law.37 Article 6(1) TEU 
explicitly states that ‘the provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any 
way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties’.38 It can be 
inferred from this clause that individuals cannot, for example, rely on the 
freedom of assembly as protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
33 The term ‘third-country nationals’ is used here to indicate persons with a nationality of 
a state that is not a Member State of the European Union.
34 Under Art 79(4) TFEU, the EU also has competence to enact measures to provide incen-
tives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration 
of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories. However this provision has not 
served as a legal basis for any instruments of secondary law examined as part of this study.
35 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunifica-
tion, [2003] OJ L251/12; Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003, [2004] OJ 
L16/44, as amended by Directive 2011/51/EU of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 11 May 2011, [2011] OJ L132/1; Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, [2004] OJ L158/77 and 
Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, [2009] OJ L155/17.
36 Art 6(1) TEU.
37 Art 51(1) CFR.
38 See also Art 51(2) CFR, which states that ‘The Charter does not extend the field of appli-
cation of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for 
the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the treaties’.
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to invoke a right to admission where such a right does not already have a 
legal basis elsewhere in EU law. Where, however, the Union does have 
competence to act, it will have to do so in accordance with the Charter. In 
addition, the EU institutions and the Member States, when acting within 
the scope of application of EU law, must respect the general principles of 
EU law established in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CoJ).39 These general principles include the fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the ECHR and as resulting from the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States.40 At the time of writing, it is still 
unclear as to whether the fundamental rights as general principles of EU 
law will remain of significance in addition to the guarantees laid down in 
the CFR.41 At present, however, it seems plausible that the CoJ case law 
with regard to these rights will serve as a point of departure for interpret-
ing the corresponding CFR provisions.
Lastly, the general principles of EU law also include several principles 
regarding good governance or administrative legality. The principle of 
most relevance to this study is the principle of proportionality. At a gen-
eral level, the requirement of proportionality requires measures adopted 
by the EU institutions, or by the Member States when acting within the 
scope of EU law, to be suitable and necessary to achieve the objective pur-
sued and not to impose an excessive burden on the individual concerned. 
The contents of the principle vary, however, depending on the nature of 
the case and the interests involved.42 It must also be observed that, like the 
rights laid down in the CFR, the general principles of EU law do not con-
stitute an independent source of rights for individuals, including aliens 
seeking admission. Instead they are viewed in this study as interpretative 
guidelines for establishing the meaning of the above provisions of pri-
mary and secondary EU law and EU agreements with third countries.
b. Legal Effect 
Regarding the legal effect of the above instruments, the CoJ has long since 
held that EU law constitutes an autonomous legal order that applies in the 
39 The question of when exactly a member state is ‘acting within the scope of application 
of EU law’ is still subject to discussion. Part of this discussion concerns the relationship of 
this criterion to the seemingly narrower criterion used in Art 51(1) CFR (‘the member states 
when implementing EU law’). For an overview, see Toner 2004, 125–27; Craig and De Búrca 
2008, 395–402 and Chalmers et al 2010, 252–56.
40 Art 6(3) TEU.
41 According to its preamble, the CFR ‘reaffirms’ both the rights that result from the con-
stitutional traditions of the Member States and those laid down in the ECHR, as well as the 
case law of the ECtHR. Moreover, where overlap exists between the rights protected by the 
Charter and those laid down in the ECHR or resulting from the constitutional traditions of 
the Member States, the Charter itself stipulates that it is not to be interpreted in a more 
restrictive way (Art 52 CFR).
42 Craig and De Búrca 2008, 544–51; Chalmers et al 2010, 367–72.
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Member States of its own accord (regardless of the constitutional arrange-
ments of those states) and takes precedence over national law.43 This 
stance is accepted by the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) of the Netherlands.44 
Provisions of EU law have direct effect, providing they are sufficiently 
clear, precise and unconditional, in which case individuals may rely on 
them before the national courts of the Member States to challenge national 
measures concerning integration requirements. As far as directives are 
concerned, the possibility of direct effect occurs when the time limit for 
their implementation has expired and no adequate implementation has 
taken place.45 
With regard to the above international agreements between the EU and 
third countries, the CoJ has held that they belong to the EU legal order.46 
Consequently these agreements also form part of the domestic legal 
orders of the Member States in the same way as other EU law and take 
precedence over national law. The agreements examined in this study can 
moreover be considered as agreements creating ‘special relations of inte-
gration’ with the EU.47 According to the CoJ, the provisions of such agree-
ments can be directly effective, providing they meet the above criterion of 
being sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional.48
c. Interpretation
While the national courts of the EU Member States are competent and 
even obliged to apply EU law, the responsibility for interpreting EU law 
ultimately lies with the Court of Justice of the European Union.49 The 
Court itself has held that, at least in the context of preliminary rulings, its 
judgments establish the meaning of EU legal instruments from the 
moment of their entry into force. These interpretations must therefore be 
followed by the national authorities of the Member States, to the extent 
that these authorities are bound by the legal instruments concerned.50 
As regards the means of interpretation, the CoJ has determined that the 
EU does not constitute a regular treaty-based organisation, but instead a 
43 CoJ 15 July 1964, C-6/64 [1964] ECR 585 (Costa/ENEL), 593–94.
44 Dutch Supreme Court 2 November 2004, case no 00156/04E, LJN: AR1797, para 3.6.
45 Craig and De Búrca 2008, 268–303.
46 CoJ 30 April 1974, C-181/73 [1974] ECR 449 (Haegeman), para 5.
47 CoJ 23 November 1999, C-149/96 [1999] ECR I-8395 (Portugal v Council), para 42.
48 Craig and De Búrca 2008, 206–13.
49 Arts 267 and 274 TFEU, cp Chalmers et al 2010, 149–50. The Court of Justice of the EU 
comprises the Court of Justice, the General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance) and 
the specialised courts (Art 19(1) TEU). Cases resulting in interpretations relevant for this 
study will normally be decided by the Court of Justice. Often such cases will concern pre-
liminary rulings requested by national courts (Art 267 TFEU). Relevant interpretations of 
questions of EU law can also, however, be given in the context of enforcement actions 
brought by the Commission or other Member States (Arts 258 and 259 TFEU) or requests for 
judicial review (Art 263 TFEU).
50 Craig and De Búrca 2008, 466–74; Chalmers et al 2010, 169–71.
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‘new legal order’, characterised by a (limited) transfer of sovereignty by 
the Member States.51 Consequently the CoJ does not apply the interpreta-
tion rules of Articles 31–33 VCLT (see above) when explaining EU law, 
except in regard to international agreements between the EU and third 
countries.52 Instead the Court applies a combination of textual, contextual 
(or systematic), historical and teleological arguments to support its expla-
nations of provisions of EU law.53 In general the CoJ tends to put consider-
able emphasis on the purpose of the instrument or provision concerned. 
Nevertheless, when faced with more detailed provisions (especially in 
secondary legislation) it is easier for the Court also to rely on textual 
and contextual arguments.54 Moreover, as commented above, instruments 
of EU law need to be interpreted in conformity with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the general principles of EU law.
To determine the purpose of instruments of secondary EU law (includ-
ing the directives examined in this study) regard may be had to the text of 
those instruments, including the considerations of the preamble, as well 
as to the underlying treaty provisions.55 Contextual arguments may be 
drawn from a variety of sources, specifically including the preamble, ref-
erences to instruments of international law or systematic interpretations 
in relation to other provisions (within the same directive or in other direc-
tives relating to the same subject matter).56 Furthermore, regard may be 
had to the preparatory acts (travaux préparatoires) of instruments of EU 
law, where available, as a means of historical interpretation.57 Such acts 
function as subsidiary means of interpretation and are mostly used to 
confirm interpretations reached on the basis of other arguments.58 Their 
use is possible only if the content of the preparatory acts is reflected in the 
actual text of the instruments concerned.59 If, however, these preparatory 
51 CoJ 5 February 1963, C-26/62 [1963] ECR 1 (Van Gend & Loos).
52 Battjes 2006, 42; Dhondt and Geursen 2008, 282.
53 Battjes 2006, 42–46; Dhondt and Geursen 2008, 282–83.
54 Dhondt and Geursen 2008, 283. See, eg, CoJ (Grand Chamber) 25 July 2008, C-127/08 
[2008] ECR I-6241 (Metock and others), paras 49–54 and 82–90 and CoJ 4 March 2010, C-578/08 
[2010] ECR I-01839 (Chakroun), paras 42–48 and 59–62.
55 It will often be possible to discern multiple objectives, some of which will be formulated 
at different levels of abstraction. See, eg, the case of Metock and others, where the CoJ referred 
both to the objective of ‘strengthening the right of free movement and residence of all Union 
citizens’ (as laid down in the preamble to the Residence Directive) and to the broader aim of 
creating an internal market (formulated in Art 3(1)(c) of the EC Treaty). In such situations, 
the outcome of the interpretation exercise is obviously likely to be influenced by the objec-
tive chosen as a point of reference. Where multiple objectives are available, it is arguably up 
to the interpreting body (or scholar) to decide which interpretation is the most persuasive, 
taking into account the various objectives and other means of interpretation. 
56 See, eg, Metock and others (n 54), paras 52–53, 69 and 83; CoJ (Grand Chamber) 23 
February 2010, C-310/08 [2010] ECR I-01065 (Ibrahim), paras 45–46, 48 and 56–57 and CoJ 4 
March 2010, C-578/08 [2010] ECR I-01839 (Chakroun), paras 48 and 62.
57 For an overview of relevant documents, see Battjes 2006, 44-45.
58 cp Ibrahim (n 56), para 47 and Chakroun (n 56), para 62.
59 Battjes 2006, 45 and Dhondt and Geursen 2008, 282–83, both with reference to case law.
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acts are to be relied on, the information derived from them must be suffi-
ciently clear and unambiguous. The mere fact, for instance, that a Member 
State has either supported or objected to a particular interpretation of a 
term in a directive is insufficient to confirm or dismiss that interpretation 
if the reaction of the other Members States remains unknown. 
As a final remark, it should be noted that the different language ver-
sions of EU legal instruments are equally authentic.60 Interpretations must 
take these different versions into account; where disparities occur, these 
must be reconciled in the light of the ‘purpose and general scheme’ of the 
instrument concerned.61 Where necessary, this study has compared the 
different language versions within the limits of my linguistic capabilities.
iii. The Dutch Constitution
Integration requirements in the immigration legislation of the Netherlands 
must also remain within the limits set by the Dutch Constitution 
(Grondwet). The relevance of this instrument for the purposes of this study 
is, however, rather limited. The Constitution does not contain any mate-
rial norms regarding the admission of aliens, nor does it lay down a fun-
damental right to respect for family life (which is one of the main legal 
standards examined in this book). Two constitutional norms are neverthe-
less discussed in this study: the right to equal treatment and the prohibi-
tion of discrimination (Art 1 Constitution) and the right to freedom of 
religion and belief (Art 6 Constitution). 
According to Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution, laws enacted by the 
parliament and government acting together as the national legislator 
(wetten in formele zin) are not subject to judicial review. Instead the com-
patibility of this legislation, which includes the AIA, with the Constitution 
is decided by the legislator itself. As a result, there is no extensive body of 
case law in which the meaning of the above constitutional provisions is 
explained in relation to individual situations. The fact that the legislator 
has adopted the AIA also implies that it has thereby interpreted the 
Constitution, in a legally binding manner, so as to allow for the conditions 
laid down in that Act. This study examines how this interpretation fits 
into the broader legal context of the relevant provisions. To this end, 
where possible, it examines how the said provisions have been interpreted 
in related situations. In addition consideration is given to interpretive 
statements by the Dutch government and to relevant case law of the Dutch 
courts (concerning legislation not enacted by the national legislator). 
60 Art 55(1) TEU and Art 358 TFEU.
61 Battjes 2006, 45–46, with reference to case law.
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III. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK 
The first part of this study, concerning Dutch integration policy and the 
Act on Integration Abroad, is made up of chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 con-
tains a description of the AIA and of the effects measured to date. This 
same chapter includes a historical overview of integration programmes in 
the Netherlands, which has thus far largely not been provided.62 Chapter 
3 focuses on the objectives of Dutch integration policy (including the inte-
gration exam abroad) and the reasons why integration has been made 
into a requirement for admission. 
The second part of the book focuses on formulating legal standards for 
integration requirements in immigration law and on assessing the Act on 
Integration Abroad in relation to these standards. Section A examines 
various provisions of international human rights treaties, as well as 
corresponding provisions of EU law and the Dutch Constitution. These 
provisions concern the right to family life and family reunification 
(chapter 4) and the right to freedom of religion (chapter 5). 
Section B concerns integration requirements in relation to EU law and 
other international agreements. It addresses the rules of EU law on the 
right to free movement of EU nationals, their family members and (other) 
third-country nationals (chapter 6). Given their close connection to these 
rules, the EEA Agreement and the EC-Switzerland Agreement on the free 
movement of persons are discussed in the same chapter. Chapter 7 then 
examines a number of international agreements concluded at a European 
or Dutch national level and containing rules on the entry and/or resi-
dence of aliens, including the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement. 
Thirdly, Section C reviews integration requirements in relation to the 
right to equal treatment as guaranteed in international human rights trea-
ties, EU law and the Dutch Constitution. As well as explaining the general 
legal framework regarding equal treatment, chapter 8 sets out specific 
standards regarding direct differential treatment on the grounds of nation-
ality and residence purpose. Chapter 9 addresses indirect differential 
treatment on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. Lastly, chapter 10 
examines the issue of ‘reverse discrimination’ that arises when nationals 
of one EU Member State have fewer rights than nationals of other EU 
Member States due to the workings of EU law. Chapter 11 concludes.
As noted above, this study sets out to evaluate the lawfulness of the Act 
on Integration Abroad and to formulate legal standards regarding inte-
gration requirements for the admission of aliens that are also relevant out-
62 An exception concerns the report of the parliamentary committee of enquiry that inves-
tigated the Dutch integration policy in 2003 (Commissie Blok), Parliamentary Papers II 2003–
2004, 28 689, No 9. An abridged version of this history can also be found in Odé and De Vries 
2010, 15–17.
 Structure of the Book 17
side the Dutch context. For this reason the chapters in the second part of 
this book mainly begin with a general assessment of the legal norms 
under examination and their relevance to integration requirements. The 
compatibility of the AIA with these norms is then addressed in a separate 
section.
The book manuscript was concluded on 31 August 2012. Later develop-
ments could only be taken into account in exceptional cases. 

PART I
Integration and Immigration  
in the Netherlands 

2 
Dutch Integration Policy and  
the Act on Integration Abroad
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS CHAPTER PROVIDES a brief historical account of Dutch integration policy, as well as a description of the Act on Integration Abroad (AIA). Its aim is to serve as background information for the 
examination conducted in the rest of this study. Sections II to V present an 
outline of the main developments in Dutch integration policy since the 
Second World War, with special attention being paid to measures and 
events paving the way for the introduction of the integration exam abroad, 
in particular measures relating to language teaching and the reception of 
new immigrants. 
The historical description of the integration policy is divided into dif-
ferent time periods, corresponding to the developments that took place. 
Until 1979 the only integration policy in the Netherlands was the assimi-
lation policy for Indonesian-Dutch repatriates (section II). Subsequently, 
in the 1980s, an integration policy was devised for a number of immigrant 
groups, the so-called ‘ethnic minorities’ (section III). After a while various 
language courses and other educational programmes designed specifi-
cally for immigrants were developed. Once these programmes were in 
place, the idea of making them compulsory began to gain ground. This 
occurred against the background of a new vision, outlined in 1994, on the 
integration of ethnic minorities, in which citizenship became a central 
theme (section IV). Eventually, the policy of compulsory ‘civic integra-
tion’ (inburgering) for immigrants led to the enactment of the Newcomers 
Integration Act (Wet inburgering nieuwkomers) in 1998 and the Act on 
Integration Abroad (Wet inburgering buitenland) in 2006 (section V).
Following this description of Dutch integration policy, section VI 
addresses the Act on Integration Abroad, with attention being paid to the 
target group and the integration exam, as well as to the effects identified 
thus far. An analysis of the objectives of the Act and the concepts of 
integration and citizenship in the Dutch context is not included in this 
chapter, but can be found in chapter 3.
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II. BEFORE 1979: AN AMBIGUOUS APPROACH TO INTEGRATION
A. Immigration to the Netherlands
In the period immediately following the Second World War, the 
Netherlands was primarily an emigration country. Between 1945 and 1961 
many Dutch nationals left the Netherlands, actively supported by the 
government, to try their luck overseas in countries such as Australia, 
Canada and the United States. Nevertheless some immigrants also came 
to the Netherlands1 as post-colonial migration brought in new residents 
from the former Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia), followed by immi-
grants from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. Immigration from 
‘the West’ initially occurred only on a small scale, but became more sub-
stantial in the 1970s (Suriname) and 1980s (Netherlands Antilles).2 
Apart from post-colonial immigration, the Netherlands also received 
people coming for political or economic reasons. Refugees arrived pri-
marily from Eastern Europe, but only in small numbers.3 Numerically 
more important was the arrival of guest workers, who were recruited to 
compensate for shortages of Dutch labour, firstly from Spain and Italy 
and later from other countries including Turkey and Morocco. Such 
recruitment ended in 1973 because of the oil crisis, but was followed by 
the immigration of guest workers’ family members, mostly from Turkey 
and Morocco, which reached its peak in 1980.4 Lastly, there were also 
noticeable influxes of immigrants from other Member States of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), as well as from the United States, 
Canada and Japan.5
B. Integration or Return Migration?
The various immigrant groups mentioned above were subject to diver-
gent policies with regard to their reception or integration.6 Most of the 
immigrants were expected to be in the Netherlands only temporarily, and 
therefore a policy aimed at their integration or assimilation was not con-
1 Here I use ‘the Netherlands’ to refer to the European part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, which, after Indonesian independence, also included Dutch New Guinea (until 
1962), Suriname (until 1975) and the Netherlands Antilles. 
2 On migration to and from the Netherlands after 1945, see, eg,  Entzinger 1984, 71–83 and 
Lucassen and Penninx 1994, 10 and 39–44. On post-colonial migration, see Jones 2007, 106–
16, 137–67, 198–252 and 270–99. 
3 Lucassen and Penninx 1994, 44–46.
4 Entzinger 1984, 78–94; Lucassen and Penninx 1994, 57.
5 Penninx 1979, 5; Lucassen and Penninx 1994, 27 and 60.
6 Van Praag 1973; Lucassen and Penninx 1994, 140–41; WRR 2001a, 168.
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sidered necessary. The main exception to this rule concerned the repatri-
ates from the former Dutch East Indies, who were subjected to an active 
assimilation policy.7 
The assimilation policy stood in stark contrast to the approach taken 
towards the Moluccan immigrants, who were housed in camps separated 
from the Dutch population. The segregation policy adopted towards them 
was founded on the belief, both on the part of the government and of the 
Moluccans themselves, that their stay would be temporary.8 This pre-
sumption of temporariness also existed with regard to guest workers and 
immigrants from the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname.9 As it was 
expected that these immigrants would eventually return home, the gov-
ernment limited its involvement to providing certain reception facilities, 
such as housing and social work services. Meanwhile, immigrants from 
the EEC and non-European industrialised countries were not subject to 
any policy on reception or integration.10
In 1970, the Dutch government still took the view that the Netherlands 
was not an immigration country.11 In the years to come, however, it 
became more and more clear that many immigrants were in fact there to 
stay. This led the government to pursue a two-track policy: facilitating 
participation in Dutch society, while at the same time encouraging return 
migration.12 The objective of this policy was to integrate immigrants, while 
at the same time helping them to maintain their (assumed) ethnic or cul-
tural identity. A typical policy measure in this respect was the introduc-
tion of ‘Native Language and Culture’ courses (Onderwijs in eigen taal en 
cultuur or OETC) as part of the school curriculum for immigrant children. 
Such measures were primarily perceived as a means to facilitate the immi-
grants’ return to their countries of origin.13 However, they could also be 
construed as supporting their integration into Dutch society through col-
lective emancipation. This ambiguity blurred the direction of the govern-
ment’s policy on immigrant integration towards the end of the 1970s and 
allowed the presumption of return migration to co-exist alongside the 
growing awareness that most immigrants would stay.14
Despite the above support for immigrant groups to preserve their 
own identity, the reception facilities also included Dutch language les-
sons.15 Such lessons were usually provided by volunteers and migrant 
7 On this policy, see Godeschalk 1990, Mak 2000 and Jones 2007, 173–77.
8 Entzinger 1984, 76; Lucassen and Penninx 1994, 141; Jones 2007, 116–22.
9 Entzinger 1984, 78–79 and 85–86; Lucassen and Penninx 1994, 140; WRR 2001a, 168.
10 Penninx 1979, 6.
11 Nota Buitenlandse Werknemers, Parliamentary Papers II 1969–1970, 10 504, Nos 1–2, 9.
12 Entzinger 1984, 87–92; Struijs 1998, 11.
13 Lucassen and Penninx 1994, 140.
14 Penninx 1979, 148–52; Entzinger 1984, 88. 
15 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 28 689, Nos 8–9 (Rapport Commissie Blok), 110–12; 
WRR 2001b, 46.
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organisations such as the Interdenominational Contact Committee for 
Moluccans (Interkerkelijk Contact Comité Ambon-Nederland) or the Dutch 
Refugee Council (VluchtelingenWerk Nederland), whereas language courses 
for guest workers were also provided by their employers. Subsidies for 
the courses could be obtained from the Department of Social Work.
III. AN INTEGRATION POLICY FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES (1979–1989)
A. Developments in the Fields of Immigration and Integration
In 1979, the Dutch government abandoned the assumption that the pres-
ence of many immigrants in the Netherlands was merely temporary and 
decided to adopt a policy which, though still mindful of the cultural iden-
tities of immigrants, was univocally geared towards integration and no 
longer towards return.16 This policy became known as the Ethnic Minorities 
policy (Etnische Minderhedenbeleid) and was coordinated by the Home 
Affairs Minister.17 The policy comprised a number of measures and pro-
grammes designed to ensure equal access to different segments of Dutch 
society, including health care, housing, education and the labour market.18 
The Ethnic Minorities policy replaced the group-specific reception and 
assimilation policies described earlier. It was directed towards a number 
of ethnic and/or immigrant communities in the Netherlands that were 
considered to experience comparable social problems, such as discrimina-
tion, high unemployment and a weak legal position.19 These communities 
were henceforth referred to as ‘ethnic minorities’. The largest groups 
affected by the policy were guest workers and their families (over 200,000 
people), Surinamese (around 130,000 people), Antilleans (some 25,000 
people) and Moluccans (around 32,000 people). Also included were sev-
eral smaller groups, including refugees, caravan dwellers and gypsies, 
who were considered to experience problems similar to those of the larger 
groups.20 Despite various discussions, Chinese immigrants were never 
included in the Ethnic Minorities policy.21 The policy also did not apply to 
16 Parliamentary Papers II 1980–1981, 16 102, No 6, 4–7. These changes were prompted by a 
report prepared by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) on the basis of a 
preparatory study conducted by Penninx (WRR 1979).
17 After an elaborate draft published in 1981 by the Department of Home Affairs (Ontwerp-
minderhedennota), the Ethnic Minorities policy was eventually outlined in Parliamentary 
Papers II 1982–1983, 16 102, No 21 (Minderhedennota). 
18 For an overview of these measures and programmes, see the Ontwerp-minderhedennota 
and Minderhedennota (n 17). The integration objectives of the Ethnic Minorities policy are 
discussed in ch 3.
19 WRR 1979, X. 
20 Minderhedennota (n 17), 11. 
21 See Parliamentary Papers II 1984–1985, 16 102, No 89, 3 and Parliamentary Papers II 1988–
1989, 20 856, No 2, 7. 
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immigrants from EEC Member States and other industrialised countries. 
Meanwhile, again following the recommendations of the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy (WRR), the Dutch government subscribed 
to the need to pursue a restrictive policy on immigration.22 While the gov-
ernment did not wish to limit the reunification of existing families, there 
was concern about the fact that ethnic minority youths were starting new 
families by bringing over partners from their countries of origin. It was 
claimed that these partners arrived at an age at which it was difficult for 
them to participate in education or the labour market. Their chances of 
becoming structurally unemployed were high and their arrival thus put 
pressure on the integration process of ethnic minorities already in the 
Netherlands and of future generations.23 As seen in chapter 3, the same 
argument was used more than 20 years later to support the introduction 
of the Act on Integration Abroad. As yet, however, family reunification 
was not subjected to specific integration requirements. 
B. A Patchwork of Language Courses
One concrete proposal made by the WRR in 1979 was to offer Dutch lan-
guage courses to foreign workers and their families. The WRR considered 
the existing courses on offer to be too non-committal and not suited to the 
situation of the guest workers, who often worked in shifts and performed 
heavy labour. It was suggested to follow the example of Sweden, where 
foreign workers were granted paid leave in order to learn the language. 
Another proposal was to provide ‘orientation courses’ for new immi-
grants upon their arrival so as to ‘acquaint them with the elementary 
characteristics of the receiving society’. Educational facilities were also 
deemed necessary for the wives of foreign workers who did not have jobs 
and, according to the WRR, risked becoming socially isolated.24 
The notion that immigrants should learn Dutch and become acquainted 
with Dutch society was also put forward by the Dutch government, which 
recognised that the motivation of immigrants to learn Dutch could well 
have been restrained by the presumption – both on the part of the govern-
ment and of the immigrants – that their stay would be temporary.25 In 
the 1980s, the rejection of this presumption made way for the realisation 
that an insufficient command of the Dutch language could form a barrier 
22 eg, Parliamentary Papers II 1980–1981, 16 102, No 6, 14; Minderhedennota (n 17), 144–50. 
For the WRR’s proposals on immigration see WRR 1979, XXXV–XXXVIII.
23 Minderhedennota (n 17), 148–50. The relationship between the Dutch policy on family 
migration and considerations relating to integration during the period in question is 
described in more detail in Van Walsum 2008, 169–76. 
24 WRR 1979, XXXIII.
25 Ontwerp-minderhedennota (n 17), 22. 
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preventing immigrants from participating in education, the labour mar-
ket and society at large. 
The WRR’s suggestion to organise language courses was not followed, 
however.26 Instead, during the first half of the 1980s, the provision of adult 
education to members of ethnic minority groups was mainly character-
ised by a lack of structure and infrastructure. The extensive array of 
courses existing at the time has been described as a ‘patchwork’ or even 
an ‘inextricable jumble’.27 Most of these courses included Dutch lessons 
(in some form) and/or some kind of social orientation. Many differences 
existed however, including with regard to content, objectives, duration 
and educational methods. Some projects also received government fund-
ing, whereas others depended on private financing. Examples of projects 
run in the 1980s included literacy training and educational activities tar-
geted specifically towards ethnic minorities,28 as well as the ‘Dutch on the 
work floor’ (Nederlands op de werkvloer) project, where in-company lan-
guage courses were provided for foreign workers. Melkunie, for example, 
a large Dutch dairy company, provided language classes for its foreign 
employees between 1982 and 1984.29 Yet, despite the variety, the availabil-
ity of the language courses on offer was insufficient to meet the demand.30 
This problem persisted into the 1990s and became a major bottleneck in 
Dutch integration policy. 
In 1986, the system for basic adult education became more streamlined 
due to the adoption of the Regulation concerning Basic Education 
(Rijksregeling Basiseducatie).31 Under this regulation, municipalities could 
obtain contributions from the central government for implementing and 
supporting basic adult education.32 Although the regulation was not 
directed specifically at ethnic minorities, they constituted an important 
target group. Literacy courses and educational activities for ethnic minor-
ities were continued on the basis of this regulation. The introduction of 
this regulation furthered the professionalisation of this type of education: 
henceforth courses could only be given by or under the supervision of 
licensed instructors.33 
26 During the parliamentary debate of the government’s reaction to the WRR report, a 
representative of the Reformed Political Alliance (GPV) asked if the government would con-
sider imposing an obligation for immigrants to receive education in Dutch language, history 
and form of government. This question remained unanswered, see Parliamentary Papers II 
1980–1981, 16 102, No 5, 6.
27 WRR 2001b, 47 and Verhallen 1986, 203. The latter provides an extensive overview of 
the available courses.
28 Van den Berg 1992, 10–18; see also Minderhedennota (n 17), 36.
29 Verhallen 1986, 182–89; see also Minderhedennota (n 17), 60.
30 Minderhedennota (n 17), 36–37; Van den Berg 1992, 16.
31 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1986, 433; for a detailed description of this regulation and 
how it came about, see Van den Berg 1992, 3–8.
32 Parliamentary Papers II 1986–1987, 19 705, No 2, 16; Parliamentary Papers II 1987–1988, 20 
260, No 2, 23.
33 Van den Berg 1992, 34.
 1979–1989 27
C. Reception of Refugees and Other Protected Persons
In addition to the courses and educational facilities described above, inte-
gration courses were also offered as part of the measures for receiving 
refugees and other protected persons.34 In the early 1980s the Department 
of Welfare developed a special programme, the ‘in-house model’ (in-huis-
model), for receiving resettled refugees.35 Under this programme refugees 
were hosted at a central reception centre for a maximum of three months, 
during which time they had to follow an introduction programme con-
sisting of Dutch lessons and social orientation. 
The aim of the programme was to help the refugees to become self-
reliant. An educational programme (‘Zeg nu zelf ’) was developed specifi-
cally for this purpose: topics covered included ‘introducing oneself’, ‘the 
market’, ‘shopping’, ‘the post office’, ‘the bank’, ‘public transport’ and 
‘health care’. Information was also provided on social security legislation, 
the educational system, cultural differences, contacts with various 
agencies and other topics suggested by the refugees themselves. The pro-
gramme entailed 25 hours of tuition a week, over a period of six weeks. 
Normally refugees would leave the reception centre after this period and 
move into permanent, independent accommodation. However, if no such 
accommodation was available, the refugee would continue the introduc-
tion programme at the reception centre. A second module would then be 
started, covering the topics of ‘living’, ‘the weather’, ‘budgeting’, ‘educa-
tion’, ‘employment’, ‘recreation’ and ‘traffic’.36 
Responsibility for receiving other refugees and protected persons was 
vested in the municipalities.37 The municipal reception tasks included 
organising various activities, such as language and literacy courses, 
coaching and social orientation.38 A financial contribution was available 
from the Department of Welfare, providing the municipal reception pro-
grammes included social orientation, as well as 480 hours of literacy 
courses (in Dutch) for illiterate participants or 400 hours of Dutch lessons 
for literate participants.39 Several volunteer organisations, such as the 
34 The term ‘other protected persons’ is used to indicate aliens who did not qualify as refu-
gees, but who had been granted residence permits on humanitarian grounds (B-status); see 
Art 1(2) of the Regulation concerning Welfare Facilities for Minorities (Rijksregeling welzijn 
minderheden), Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1985, 68.
35 Between 1981 and 1989 several thousands of refugees, including many Vietnamese 
‘boat people’, were admitted to the Netherlands for resettlement. See Lucassen and Penninx 
1994, 46–47.
36 Parliamentary Papers II 1983–1984, 18 100 XVI, No 150, 3–7; Parliamentary Papers II 1985–
1986, 19 637, No 2, 31–32.
37 Parliamentary Papers II 1983–1984, 18 100 XVI, No 150, 8; Parliamentary Papers II 1985–
1986, 19 637, No 2, 34. 
38 Parliamentary Papers II 1985–1986, 19 637, No 2, 35.
39 This was stipulated in Art 12(4) of the Regulation concerning Welfare Facilities for 
Minorities. Before this regulation entered into force, contributions were granted on the basis 
28 Dutch Integration Policy and the AIA
Association of Vietnamese Refugees in the Netherlands (Associatie van 
Vietnamese Vluchtelingen in Nederland) and the Dutch Refugee Council 
(VluchtelingenWerk Nederland), were involved in implementing the recep-
tion programmes, both in the centres and in the municipalities.40
Lastly, integration courses were not made available to asylum seekers. 
The number of asylum applications in the Netherlands rose sharply 
throughout the 1980s, from 832 in 1981 to 13,898 in 1989. Asylum seekers 
came from many different countries around the world, including 
Suriname, Pakistan, Turkey, Ghana, Somalia, Romania and Sri Lanka.41 
Their exclusion from the reception programmes was motivated by the 
argument that participation in integration activities would create false 
expectations concerning their chances of being allowed to stay in the 
Netherlands and thus interfere with the immigration policy.42
IV. PREPARING THE GROUND FOR  
A COMPULSORY INTEGRATION POLICY (1989–1998) 
A. Developments in the Fields of Immigration and Integration
In 1989 the WRR reported that the Netherlands had 623,537 foreign 
nationals, of whom 160,448 were from other Member States of the 
European Community (EC). The largest group of aliens consisted of 
Turkish nationals (177,297), followed by Moroccans (139,749). The report 
also mentioned the presence of 210,000 Surinamese (including 194,189 
with Dutch nationality), 66,000 persons from the Netherlands Antilles and 
Aruba and 40,000 Moluccans.43 Ten years after the introduction of the 
Ethnic Minorities policy, the WRR observed not only that those who had 
arrived in the 1960s and 1970s were still there, but also that the immigrant 
population would continue to grow in the future, despite a restrictive 
admission policy.44 
Despite the efforts made in the 1980s, the social position of many mem-
bers of ethnic minority groups was still found to be far from satisfactory. 
In 1993, the Social and Cultural Planning Office (Sociaal en Cultureel 
Planbureau, SCP) issued a report on the position of the four main minority 
groups in the Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans) 
of the Regulation concerning Facilities for Refugees (Faciliteitenregeling vluchtelingen), 
Government Gazette 1983, 99.
40 Parliamentary Papers II 1983–1984, 18 100 XVI, No 150, 15–16; Parliamentary Papers II 
1985–1986, 19 637, No 2, 36.
41 Lucassen and Penninx 1994, 46–48; Puts 1995 (34) mentions somewhat different (mostly 
higher) numbers.
42 Parliamentary Papers II 1985–1986, 19 637, No 2, 43; see also Puts 1995, 37.
43 WRR 1989, 67; all figures are as at 1 January 1989.
44 ibid, 19–20.
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in the fields of employment, education and housing.45 This report con-
cluded that disadvantages continued to exist among minority groups in 
each of the investigated areas. Although there were some positive devel-
opments, these were often blurred by the persistent influx of new immi-
grants. While the number of family migrants was slightly declining, the 
number of asylum seekers had increased. With regard to labour market 
participation, minorities’ disadvantaged position was reinforced by the 
disappearance of the low-skilled jobs they had traditionally occupied.46
B. A New Integration Policy
In view of the above developments, the need for an effective approach to 
immigrant integration was felt to remain high. For several years after 
publication of the 1989 WRR report, the integration policy was subject to 
debate both in and outside parliament.47 In retrospect, the years 1989 to 
1994 can be seen as a transitional period, during which the government 
moved away from the Ethnic Minorities policy of the 1980s towards the 
so-called ‘Integration policy’,48 the outlines of which were formulated in 
1994.49 Compared to the Ethnic Minorities policy, the new approach put a 
stronger emphasis on achieving active participation in society and indi-
vidual self-reliance (see section III.A. of chapter 3). Henceforth the princi-
pal focus was on achieving socio-economic integration, with enhanced 
efforts being made primarily in the fields of (adult) education and employ-
ment.50 Meanwhile policy measures actively supporting cultural expres-
sions of ethnic minorities were no longer foreseen. This change in focus 
was based on the presumption that successful socio-economic integration 
would allow ethnic minority groups to express their cultural identities on 
an equal basis with the majority population.51
It is against the background of the principles formulated in the 1994 
policy paper that compulsory language and social orientation courses 
were eventually advocated and implemented. During the same period the 
groundwork for these measures in terms of infrastructure was also laid. 
45 SCP 1993.
46 ibid, 241–67.
47 For the parliamentary discussion see, eg, Proceedings II 1993, UCV 19.
48 Van Walsum 2000, 113–14.
49 Parliamentary Papers II 1993–1994, 23 684, No 2 (Contourennota Integratiebeleid etnische 
minderheden).
50 Parliamentary Papers II 1989–1990, 21 472, No 2, 14–29. See also the policy paper 
‘Investing in integration’ (Investeren in integreren), published by the Department of Welfare in 
1994. In addition to supporting integration through work and education this paper also 
stressed the need to intervene, in the very first phase of the integration process, and address 
young immigrants or those who had only just arrived in the Netherlands (1–7).
51 Parliamentary Papers II 1989–1990, 21 472, No 2, 33–34. This approach had been advo-
cated by the WRR, see WRR 1989, 13, 23–24 and 49–50.
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Important developments included the institutionalisation and profession-
alisation of opportunities for adult education, specifically in Dutch as a 
second language, and the creation of a reception structure for newly 
arrived immigrants. The experience gained during this period was used 
to shape the policy on ‘civic integration’ (inburgering) that was imple-
mented in 1996 and eventually led in 1998 to the adoption of the 
Newcomers Integration Act (Wet inburgering nieuwkomers) in 1998. These 
developments are described in more detail in sections IV.C and IV.D 
below.
With regard to the target group of the integration policy, the WRR had 
recommended adopting a policy addressing not only designated ethnic 
minorities, but all ‘foreign born persons’ (allochtonen).52 The Dutch gov-
ernment chose not to follow this suggestion. Instead the policy continued 
to be directed towards specific ethnic minority groups ‘for the admission 
of which the Dutch government bore a particular responsibility, or who 
were tied to the Netherlands by our colonial past’. Nationals of other EC 
Member States, however, were no longer targeted by the integration pol-
icy because they were not in a disadvantaged position.53 In other words, 
guest workers from Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain were no longer 
deemed to be in need of special consideration.
Lastly, it was decided to maintain a restrictive policy on immigration, 
particularly with regard to labour migrants.54 In respect of family reunifi-
cation the WRR had stated that additional limitations on this form of 
migration could substantially lower the number of immigrants to the 
Netherlands. However, introduction of such restrictions was opposed on 
the grounds that this would negatively affect the integration process (see 
also section II.A of chapter 3). For the same reason it was also considered 
undesirable to impose admission criteria relating to new immigrants’ 
ability to integrate. Instead, unskilled spouses or children who were not 
ready to participate in the Dutch labour market would have to be allowed 
to benefit from reception facilities in the Netherlands.55
C. Learning Dutch as a Second Language: Towards Compulsory 
Education for Adult Immigrants
The WRR specified proficiency in Dutch as an absolute condition for 
successful integration of immigrants. Lack of language proficiency was 
considered a problem, especially among first-generation Turkish and 
52 By this term, the WRR meant all immigrants, as well as their offspring (up to the third 
generation, as long as they defined themselves as ‘foreign born’). See WRR 1989, 10, 24–25.
53 Parliamentary Papers II 1989–1990, 21 472, No 2, 8–9.
54 ibid, 9–10.
55 WRR 1989, 89. 
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Moroccan immigrants and youths who had not been born in the 
Netherlands.56 In order to address this problem it was specifically pro-
posed entitling all adult members of ethnic minority groups to free basic 
education, in particular Dutch lessons and an introductory course on 
Dutch society. For some immigrants, it was added, this entitlement should 
be complemented by an obligation to obtain a basic level of education 
(basiseducatieplicht). Such an obligation was primarily to be targeted 
towards immigrants with little education and receiving social security 
benefits.57 
The Dutch government recognised that education and language train-
ing in particular were important for improving the position of ethnic 
minorities, also on the labour market.58 Meanwhile members of ethnic 
minority groups continued to participate increasingly in both basic and 
secondary adult education.59 Throughout the 1990s various efforts were 
made to increase the adult education on offer and to eliminate the waiting 
lists for Dutch language courses.60 Additional financial means were 
provided to municipalities for this purpose, on the condition that they 
created a differentiated range of language courses to suit participants’ 
varying needs. It was also suggested introducing contracts in which 
participants would undertake to take part in the courses, while the munic-
ipalities would guarantee their availability.61 
Meanwhile, the realisation occurred that teaching Dutch as a second 
language (Nederlands als tweede taal or NT2) required specific expertise 
and that the existing infrastructure needed to be improved. A project 
group was set up in 1989 for this purpose, teachers were trained and new 
56 ibid, 22 and 115.
57 ibid, 43–45.
58 Parliamentary Papers II 1989–1990, 21 472, No 2, 3 and 19–20.
59 Parliamentary Papers II 1989–1990, 21 301, No 2, 16; Parliamentary Papers II 1990–1991, 21 
971, No 2, 9–10. At the time the activities in the field of adult education could be divided into 
four categories: basic education (basiseducatie), secondary education at evening schools 
(Voortgezet Avondonderwijs voor volwassenen, VAVO), vocational education (scholing) and 
socio-cultural education (vormings- en ontwikkelingswerk), see WRR 1989, 166–72. Basic edu-
cation was primarily meant for adults who had had a maximum of two years of secondary 
education; those who had already had education above the basic level were expected to 
enrol in secondary education institutions, where they could obtain a diploma (MAVO, 
HAVO, VWO), see Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 22 809, No 9, 7–8.
60 Parliamentary Papers II 1989–1990, 21 472, No 2, 20; Parliamentary Papers II 1995–1996, 24 
401, No 2, 40 and especially Parliamentary Papers II 1991–1992, 22 656, No 1 (Notitie ‘Weg met 
de wachtlijsten’). The issue of waiting lists became an important topic of debate in parliament, 
specifically in respect of the availability of courses for immigrants who had been in the 
Netherlands for longer periods of time. These immigrants did not fall under the reception 
policy discussed in section IV.D and risked being ‘pushed off the waiting lists’ by the new-
comers. See, eg, Parliamentary Papers II 1994–1995, 23 901, No 20, 4–5 and 7; Parliamentary 
Papers II 1996–1997, 25 001, No 11, 32–33 and Proceedings II 1997, No 14, 978–79 and 983–84. 
An evaluation in 1997 showed that this effect did indeed occur in some municipalities, but 
others managed to reduce waiting lists by using funds left over from the reception policy to 
fund the cost of educating resident immigrants (Brink et al 1997, 120–21).
61 Notitie ‘Weg met de wachtlijsten’ (n 60), 10–13. 
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educational methods developed.62 Another important advancement was 
the creation of NT2 certificates, which non-native speakers could use to 
prove that they had reached a certain level of proficiency in Dutch.63 
The first NT2 certificates were issued in July 1992.64 As of 1 January 1996 
NT2 courses were provided by so-called ‘Regional Education Centres’ 
(Regionale Opleidingen Centra) under the Act on Adult and Vocational 
Education (Wet educatie en beroepsonderwijs).65 
Despite these efforts, the Dutch government rejected the WRR’s pro-
posal to make basic education obligatory for certain groups of immi-
grants. It argued that no obligation could be imposed as long as the 
availability of language courses was insufficient to meet the demand.66 
The then Home Affairs Minister, Ien Dales, also believed that most mem-
bers of ethnic minority groups were eager to learn Dutch and that it was 
unnecessary to create an obligation.67 Finally, the government declared 
that the existing legislation provided enough sanctions for those refusing 
to participate in the labour market or in activation programmes and that 
directing such coercion towards one specific section of the population 
(ethnic minorities, KV) would be unacceptable.68
Notwithstanding these arguments the idea of obligatory Dutch lan-
guage education for adult immigrants steadily gained support. It became 
commonly accepted among the various factions in the Dutch Parliament 
that members of ethnic minorities had a personal responsibility to obtain 
the necessary skills and qualifications to participate in Dutch society.69 
The primary target group in this respect was that identified earlier by 
the WRR: unemployed people in receipt of social security benefits and 
lacking basic education.70 For the time being, however, the government 
declined to introduce new measures on the grounds that the proposed 
obligations could already be imposed under existing social security 
legislation.71
62 Parliamentary Papers II 1989–1990, 21 472, No 2, 16; Parliamentary Papers II 1990–1991, 21 
971, No 2, 12 and Parliamentary Papers II 1991–1992, 22 314, No 2, 17.
63 Parliamentary Papers II 1991–1992, 22 314, No 2, 17 and No 4, 7.
64 Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 22 809, No 3, 19.
65 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1995, 501.
66 Proceedings II 1990, UCV 48, 45–46 and 69.
67 Proceedings II 1991, UCV 13, 28.
68 Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 22 809, No 3, 9; see also Parliamentary Papers II 1989–
1990, 21 472 and 20 941, No 5, 23 and Parliamentary Papers II 1993–1994, 23 409, No 2, 18.
69 See, eg, Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 22 809, No 3, 9; Proceedings II 1990, UCV 
48, 18–19, 24, 27 and 57 and Proceedings II 1991, UCV 38, 8–9, 11, 26 and 30.
70 Proceedings II 1990, UCV 48, 27. It was added that, if necessary, the obligation would 
also extend to persons belonging to the Dutch majority.
71 Proceedings 1990, UCV 48, 67 and Proceedings II 1992, UCV 11, 29. See also Parliamentary 
Papers II 1992–1993, 22 800 VIII and 22 656, No 26, 11.
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D. Reception and Integration of Newly Arrived Immigrants
In the late 1980s, several proposals were made to set up a reception pro-
gramme for newly arrived immigrants (other than refugees or other pro-
tected persons).72 These proposals were inspired by concerns about the 
integration of those expected to come to the Netherlands in the coming 
years for family reunification purposes, especially from Turkey and 
Morocco. It was suggested setting up an introductory programme for 
immigrants, including a Dutch language course. The WRR again pro-
posed making the programme obligatory for those who had become 
dependent on the state in any way and who had not received the equiva-
lent of Dutch basic education. Such an obligation was felt to be justified by 
the fact that many immigrants had not received the 12 years of compul-
sory education that they would have received in the Netherlands and had 
arrived without the necessary skills and knowledge to find employment. 
For immigrants who were not dependent on the state, the WRR suggested 
making introduction programmes available on a voluntary basis.73
i. Building up Experience: Reception Programmes between 1990 and 1995
The reception of new immigrants subsequently became a task of the 
Department of Welfare, together with the Dutch municipalities. It was 
decided that new immigrants should be contacted as soon as possible 
after their arrival so that their needs could be assessed and they could be 
directed towards relevant service providers in the fields of education, 
employment or welfare. Additionally, newcomers would be offered 
courses, including Dutch as a second language and an introduction to 
Dutch society.74 Two experimental reception projects were started in 1990 
in the municipalities of Tilburg and The Hague.75 Over the subsequent 
years the number of projects increased substantially.76 As, however, the 
reception projects drew on existing facilities in the field of adult educa-
tion, they were equally affected by the problem of waiting lists (see 
72 Parliamentary Papers II 1988–1989, 20 941, No 2, 14–15; WRR 1989, 44–47.
73 WRR 1989, 44–47.
74 Parliamentary Papers II 1989–1990, 21 472, No 2, 12–13.
75 Parliamentary Papers II 1989–1990, 21 301, No 2, 24. See also Parliamentary Papers II 1989–
1990, 21 301, No 8, 23, Parliamentary Papers II 1990–1991, 21 971, No 15, 2–3 and Parliamentary 
Papers II 1991–1992, 22 456, No 1, 27. 
76 By 1994, 235 of the 289 municipalities were offering reception programmes to newcom-
ers. However the largest cities, which received most of the new immigrants, showed quite 
diverse pictures: in Rotterdam 75% of newcomers were offered a programme, versus 25% in 
The Hague (Parliamentary Papers II 1994–1995, 23 901, No 2, 10 and 79–81). Throughout the 
first half of the 1990s, the Welfare Minister was hard-pressed to expand the number of recep-
tion programmes and to make them available on a structural basis. See Proceedings II 1991, 
UCVs 13, 38 and 55; Proceedings II 1992, UCV 11 and Proceedings II 1993, UCV 19.
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section IV.B).77 The success of the reception policy depended partly, there-
fore, on the efforts made to reduce these lists.
As mentioned above, one of the main functions of the reception pro-
grammes was to redirect newly arrived immigrants to other service pro-
viders in the fields of adult education, labour market orientation and 
welfare.78 After their arrival newcomers were contacted and invited for an 
intake interview, during which their needs and capabilities were assessed. 
If necessary, a personal reception plan was drawn up and individual 
coaching (trajectbegeleiding) provided. Coaches were expected to motivate 
newcomers, to arrange social support (through, for example, voluntary 
organisations) and to signal problems (in, for example, the domestic 
sphere) that could cause newcomers to quit the programmes.79 
Once their reception plans had been completed, newcomers started 
their introduction programme with a social orientation course in their 
own language. This course could include an introduction into ‘Western 
concepts and ways of thinking’, as well as information on topics such as 
child support, social security, education, health care and the labour mar-
ket. Next came a Dutch language course (NT2), combined with social and 
labour market orientation. The average duration of the introduction pro-
grammes was initially set at 400 course hours and later increased to 500 
hours.80 The level to be achieved within this time depended on newcom-
ers’ starting levels and their personal objectives. Three final levels were 
distinguished: educational self-reliance (for those wishing to pursue some 
form of additional education), professional self-reliance (for those seeking 
employment) and social self-reliance (for elderly newcomers or those car-
ing for a family). Newcomers pursuing social self-reliance had to learn 
Dutch to at least level CITO-2, whereas educational or professional self-
reliance required level CITO-3 as a minimum.81 For those opting for edu-
cational or professional self-reliance, the final phase of the reception 
programme involved transferring to an educational institute or to the 
labour market. The entire programme took an average of two years to 
complete,82 although implementation of the reception projects varied con-
siderably from one municipality to another.83
77 Parliamentary Papers II 1990–1991, 21 971, No 15, 6.
78 An overview of the reception model developed was presented to parliament in February 
1995, as an Annex to Parliamentary Papers II 1994–1995, 23 901, No 10.
79 Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 22 809, No 9, 17.
80 Parliamentary Papers II 1990–1991, 21 971, No 11, 2 and Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 
22 809, No 9, 10 and 15–16.
81 CITO stands for the Central Institute for Test Development (Centraal Instituut voor 
Toetsontwikkeling). In 1986 this institute, together with the University of Nijmegen, devel-
oped an entry test for Dutch as a second language. This test could be taken at five levels, 
ranging from CITO-1 to CITO-5. See WRR 2001b, 68–69.
82 Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 22 809, No 9, 10.
83 Brink et al 1997.
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ii. The Introduction of Integration Contracts . . . 
The reception policy continued being further developed and improved in 
the second half of the 1990s.84 As was the case with regard to adult educa-
tion (section IV.C), the question of whether participation in the reception 
programmes should be made obligatory for newcomers (or some groups 
of them) was widely discussed. Again, it was argued that no obligations 
should be imposed as long as the availability of language courses was 
insufficient to meet the demand.85 Although it had been announced in 
1996 that the length of the waiting lists had declined and that the problem 
was ‘under control’, some 11,000 people were then still waiting for a 
course.86 Waiting lists thus remained a concern, and the government was 
continuously being pushed to make more financial resources available.87 
At the end of 1997 the battle against the waiting lists was integrated into 
the reception policy, which had by then become known as the policy on 
‘civic integration’ (inburgering).88 
Despite the waiting lists, the idea of making reception programmes 
obligatory gained widespread support.89 In May 1994 the Home Affairs 
Minister commissioned an advisory report by two experts, professors 
Entzinger and Van der Zwan.90 This report contained a proposal for an 
integration programme (inburgeringstraject) for new immigrants, includ-
ing mandatory integration contracts. Although the government did not 
adopt the proposal in its entirety, integration contracts were eventually 
introduced on 1 January 1996. In these contracts, municipalities under-
took to offer integration programmes including social orientation, Dutch 
as a second language, labour orientation and counselling. In return, new-
comers committed themselves to participating in the integration pro-
grammes. The contracts were expected to provide more clarity, ensure an 
adequate range of courses on the part of the municipalities and prevent 
participants from dropping out halfway through the programme.91 
84 Parliamentary Papers II 1994–1995, 23 901, No 2, 81; Parliamentary Papers II 1995–1996, 24 
401, No 2, 63–64; Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 001, No 2, 22–23; Parliamentary Papers 
II 1997–1998, 25 601, No 2, 20–23.
85 Proceedings II 1991, UCV 13, 15; 1993, UCV 19, 5.
86 Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 001, No 2, 56–57.
87 Parliamentary Papers II 1994–1995, 23 901, No 20; Parliamentary Papers II 1995–1996, 24 
401, No 15 and Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 001, No 11, 7–8, 32–33 and 52–53.
88 Parliamentary Papers II 1997–1998, 25 601, No 2, 59.
89 Proceedings II 1990, UCV 48, 24; Proceedings II 1991, UCV 13, 15, 21 and 34 and UCV 55, 
13–14; Proceedings II 1993, UCV 19, 25; Parliamentary Papers II 1993–1994, 23 409, No 6, 1–5. 
90 Van der Zwan and Entzinger 1994.
91 Parliamentary Papers II 1994–1995, 23 901, No 10, 5–6. From 1 January 1996, funding for 
integration programmes was also available under the Welfare Regulation on Civic Integration 
for Newcomers (Welzijnsregeling inburgering nieuwkomers, Government Gazette 1995, 246) and 
the Education Regulation on Civic Integration for Newcomers 1996 (Onderwijsregeling inbur-
gering nieuwkomers 1996, Explanatory Notes 1995, No 31a, later replaced by the Onderwijsregeling 
inburgering nieuwkomers 1997, Government Gazette 1996, 225).
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The government had intended to introduce integration contracts for all 
newcomers at risk of ending up in a disadvantaged position. However 
mandatory contracts, enforced by sanctions, could not be imposed with-
out a sufficient legal basis. At the time, such a legal basis existed only with 
regard to newcomers who were dependent on social assistance. Under the 
Social Assistance Act (Algemene Bijstandswet), benefit recipients could be 
forced to undertake labour activation activities, including participating in 
an integration programme. If they refused, the municipal social services 
could reduce or even suspend payment of their benefits. For other new-
comers, however, no similar sanctions could be imposed.92 
iii. . . . and the First Integration Act
In 1997 the reception policy – by then known as the civic integration pol-
icy – was evaluated. An important outcome of this evaluation was that the 
introduction of mandatory integration contracts could not be established 
to have positively influenced the participation of newcomers. Most 
municipalities did not actively enforce the contracts, on the grounds that 
most newcomers who dropped out of the programme had a legitimate 
reason for doing so, such as illness, pregnancy, moving to a different 
municipality or finding a job. Only 15 out of 120 ‘drop-outs’ indicated that 
they were simply not interested in following the programme.93 The evalu-
ation also showed that the effects of the civic integration policy had thus 
far been limited: it was estimated that only 45 to 60 per cent of the target 
group finished the entire integration programme, with most participants 
not reaching the minimum level of language proficiency required for pro-
fessional self-reliance (see section IV.D.i).94
The results of the evaluation did not, however, preclude the adoption of 
an Act providing a legal basis for making the integration programme 
compulsory for all newcomers, including those not covered by the 
Social Assistance Act. In November 1996 a legislative proposal for the 
Newcomers Integration Act (Wet inburgering nieuwkomers or ‘Win’) was 
submitted to parliament.95 Under this Act, integration contracts would be 
replaced by administrative decisions taken by municipalities. 
The procedure laid down in the Act was very similar to that developed 
in the course of the reception policy. After their arrival newcomers were 
required to report to the municipal administration for an intake interview, 
during which it would be established whether they were at risk of ending 
up in a ‘disadvantaged position’. This would be determined on the basis 
of criteria such as the newcomer’s proficiency in the Dutch language and 
92 Parliamentary Papers II 1994–1995, 23 901, No 10, 6–7 and No 16, 1–3.
93 Brink et al 1997, 38, 96–97 and 102–06.
94 Brink et al 1997, 108–10.
95 Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 114, Nos 1–2.
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knowledge about Dutch society and the Dutch labour market. Those con-
sidered to be in need of assistance would have to participate in an integra-
tion programme. Within a year after enrolment newcomers would be 
given the opportunity to take a test, which was not set at a particular level, 
but was meant to determine the participant’s progress. 
By the time the Newcomers Integration Act was discussed in parlia-
ment, there was barely any opposition to the idea that participation in the 
integration programmes should be obligatory and subject to sanctions.96 
The Newcomers Integration Act allowed an administrative fine to be 
imposed on newcomers who did not report to the municipal administra-
tion or did not participate in the integration programme.97 The option to 
impose sanctions on residence rights or naturalisation was nevertheless 
rejected98 as it was argued that such sanctions would be difficult to enforce 
and that a clear distinction had to be maintained between immigration and 
integration.99 Residence-related sanctions were also considered unsuitable 
because they would not affect all newcomers in the same way.100
The Newcomers Integration Act was eventually adopted in April 1998 
and entered into force on 30 September that year.101
iv. Target Group of the Reception and Civic Integration Policy
The reception programmes set up in the first half of the 1990s initially tar-
geted newcomers aged 18 or older and legally staying in the Netherlands. 
Immigrants were designated as ‘newcomers’ if they had been in the 
Netherlands for less than one year and were expected to stay permanent-
ly.102 A memorandum issued in late 1992 specified that the reception pro-
jects were primarily meant for people without a high level of education 
and unable to find their way in the Netherlands by themselves.103 The 
number of newcomers considered to be in need of reception was esti-
mated at 12,000 in 1991 and 20,000 in 1993.104
The majority of those addressed by the reception programmes belonged 
to the four main immigrant groups, originating from Turkey, Morocco, 
96 The only faction in parliament to express doubts on this point was the Green party 
(GroenLinks), Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 114, No 5, 4–5. 
97 The level of the fine was specified in the Decree concerning Fines for the Civic 
Integration of Newcomers (Boetebesluit inburgering nieuwkomers), Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 
1998, 330.
98 Parliamentary Papers II 1994–1995, 23 684 and 23 901, No 3, 7.
99 Parliamentary Papers II 1994–1995, 23 901, No 20, 2–3, 10.
100 Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 114, No 6, 65.
101 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1998, 261; entry into force Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1998, 
533.
102 Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 22 809, No 7, 13.
103 Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 22 809, No 9, 3.
104 Parliamentary Papers II 1990–1991, 21 971, No 11, 2 and Parliamentary Papers II 1992–
1993, 22 809, No 9, 4–6.
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Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Although there were 
several thousand other newcomers from countries such as the United 
States, Peru, Sweden, Indonesia and Japan, most of these immigrants 
were not considered in need of reception. The same was true with regard 
to immigrants from other EU Member States.105 How target groups were 
determined also varied from one municipality to another.106
When the Newcomers Integration Act was subsequently enacted the 
delineation of the target group gave rise to debate. These discussions spe-
cifically concerned the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants from the 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (who are Dutch nationals) and citizens of 
other EU states. In the end, the definition of ‘newcomers’ was made to 
include all aliens and Dutch nationals who had reached the age of 18 and 
were first-time residents of the Netherlands. An exemption applied to 
aliens whose residence purpose was defined as temporary (such as stu-
dents and labour migrants). EU citizens were also exempted, on the 
grounds that the obligation to participate in an integration programme 
would be contrary to EU law and because most of these individuals were 
not in disadvantaged positions.107 Lastly, with regard to Antilleans and 
Arubans, it was decided that highly educated immigrants would be 
exempted from the integration programme because they, too, were not at 
risk of marginalisation.108 In practice, the target group consisted mostly of 
family migrants from outside Europe and Dutch citizens from the Antilles 
or Aruba. 
E. Reception of Refugees and Other Protected Persons
The reception programmes developed during the first half of the 1990s 
did not involve refugees or other protected persons. Section III.C describes 
how reception programmes for refugees in the 1980s were organised 
through the ‘in-house model’. In 1990 the Netherlands Court of Audit 
(Algemene Rekenkamer) reported that this model did not sufficiently pre-
pare all refugees for continued education or for the labour market. Various 
improvements were thereupon realised: the introduction of a qualifica-
tion structure (for Dutch as a second language and for social orientation), 
105 Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 22 809, No 9, 4–6.
106 Brink et al 1997, 65. Some municipalities only targeted immigrants from Morocco, 
Turkey and Suriname, whereas others excluded newcomers who had a Dutch partner or 
came from OECD countries.
107 Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 114, No 6, 8. Meanwhile, some members of parlia-
ment queried whether the exclusion of EU citizens was compatible with the prohibition of 
discrimination and encouraged the government to make integration programmes available 
to these citizens on a voluntary basis. This discussion served to illustrate the ambiguity of 
the Act, which treated the integration programme as an obligation, as well as an instrument 
for improving immigrants’ position in society.
108 Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 114, No 9.
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the development of a social orientation course and the combination of 
Dutch lessons with jobs so that refugees could apply their knowledge in 
practice.109 Overall, the reception programme was intended to focus more 
on education, vocational training and employment.110 Lastly, the reception 
programme developed for refugees was also made available to other pro-
tected persons (holders of a permanent residence permit; vergunning tot 
verblijf or VTV).111 Since these persons were not accommodated in central 
reception centres (section III.C) the reception programme was to be imple-
mented by municipalities at a local level. 
Given the many similarities existing between them, the Department of 
Welfare encouraged municipalities to merge the reception facilities for 
refugees and protected persons with those for other newcomers.112 The 
integration contracts introduced in 1996 could also be entered into with 
refugees and protected persons. Refugees and protected persons were 
subsequently included in the target group of the Newcomers Integration 
Act in 1998.
The numbers of asylum applications remained high throughout the 
period described in this section, with 21,208 applications in 1990 and 
21,615 in 1991.113 In 1992 a new reception system was introduced whereby 
asylum seekers would initially be accommodated in a central reception 
centre (onderzoek- en opvangcentrum, OC). From there, only those whose 
claims were likely to be accepted would be transferred to an asylum seek-
ers’ centre (asielzoekerscentrum or AZC), where education and integration 
activities were organised to prepare the asylum seekers to participate in 
Dutch society.114 In May 1993 the government announced that Dutch les-
sons were given in all asylum seekers’ centres, with the help of volunteer 
109 Parliamentary Papers II 1989–1990, 19 637, No 69, 11–13, and No 77, 16.
110 Parliamentary Papers II 1989–1990, 21 301, No 2, 24; Parliamentary Papers II 1989–1990, 19 
637, No 60, 13–14 and No 62, 9–11; Parliamentary Papers II 1990–1991, 21 971, No 2, 19. From 
September 1993 onwards funding for the reception of refugees and other protected persons 
was granted under the Regulation concerning Contributions for Reception Programmes for 
Protected Persons (Bijdrageregeling opvangprogramma’s verblijfsgerechtigden), Government 
Gazette 1993, 165. The term ‘reception programmes’ was later replaced by ‘integration pro-
grammes’ (integratieprogramma’s) so as to align the terminology with that of the Welfare Act 
(Welzijnswet); see Government Gazette 1994, 177.
111 In 1993 the reception programme was also extended to people holding a conditional 
residence permit (voorwaardelijke vergunning tot verblijf, VVTV): asylum seekers who were 
not eligible for protection, but who could not be deported because of the situation in their 
country of origin. Their reception was originally financed under the Regulation for the 
Reception of Asylum Seekers (Regeling opvang asielzoekers, Government Gazette 1994, 10), but 
was later integrated into the Regulation for Protected Persons (n 110); see Government Gazette 
1994, 177. When the Newcomers Integration Act was adopted it was decided that holders of 
a VVTV would become eligible for the integration programmes once they received a perma-
nent residence permit. See Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 114, No 14 and Proceedings II 
1997, No 22, 1666.
112 Parliamentary Papers II 1991–1992, 19 637, No 82, 21; Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 
22 809, No 2, 39–40 and No 14, 14.
113 Parliamentary Papers II 1991–1992, 19 637, No 82, 14. 
114 Parliamentary Papers II 1991–1992, 19 637, No 80, 18 and No 82, 17–18.
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organisations.115 Later, in 1997, asylum seekers residing in the centres 
became entitled to a daily programme of activities, including Dutch lan-
guage and social orientation lessons.116 Apparently the idea that asylum 
seekers’ uncertain residence status should bar them from any activities 
aimed at integration had been abandoned. Instead, it was considered 
more important to prevent integration backlogs among those asylum 
seekers who would eventually be allowed to stay.117
F. Integration in the Country of Origin
In addition to the policy measures described above, one idea that arose in 
the period under discussion was that immigrants had to be informed 
about the Netherlands before they were admitted. In 1991, the Dutch 
government issued a brochure containing information to be distributed 
to (potential) immigrants in Turkey and later also Morocco.118 It was 
explained that the brochure was designed to provide ‘a realistic picture of 
the possibilities and impossibilities that existed in the Netherlands in the 
fields of education, employment, living and welfare’. Immigrants who 
decided to come ‘despite this information’ would be encouraged to learn 
Dutch as soon as possible and become familiar with Dutch society.119 
One member of parliament stated that providing information in the 
country of origin would prevent potential immigrants from having ‘too 
rosy expectations’ about life in the Netherlands. She added that such 
information should also be provided to Antillean youths, who were immi-
grating with ‘exaggerated expectations’.120 In 1997 the government 
announced that it had set up a centre in the Netherlands Antilles to inform 
potential immigrants about life in the Netherlands (Centrum Voorlichting 
Antillianen).121 At the time, the GPV (Reformed Political Alliance) even 
suggested that family migrants wanting to come to the Netherlands 
should be obliged to take a Dutch language course in their country of ori-
gin before immigrating.122 This proposal was rejected as being difficult to 
execute and enforce.123 However, the then Home Affairs Minister, Hans 
115 Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 22 809, No 14, 4.
116 See Art 5 of the Regulation on Facilities for Asylum Seekers and Other Categories of 
Aliens 1997 (Regeling verstrekkingen asielzoekers en andere categorieën vreemdelingen 1997), 
Government Gazette 1997, 246.
117 Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 001, No 8, 4–5.
118 Parliamentary Papers II 1991–1992, 22 314, No 4, 13 and Parliamentary Papers II 1993–
1994, 23 409, No 2, 56–57.
119 Proceedings II 1991, UCV 13, 30.
120 ibid, 11.
121 Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 114, No 6, 12.
122 Proceedings II 1992, No 4, 183 and 214; see also Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 114, 
No 6, 7 and Proceedings II 1997, No 21, 1584.
123 Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 22 809, No 19, 7.
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Dijkstal, indicated that he would investigate the possibility of offering 
integration courses on the Antilles.124 
V. COMPULSORY INTEGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS AND 
ABROAD (1998–2007)
A. Developments in the Fields of Immigration and Integration
Immigration to the Netherlands continued after 1998 and immigrant inte-
gration remained an issue of concern. Between 2000 and 2007, the total 
number of immigrants in the Netherlands (including the second genera-
tion) rose from 2,775,302 to 3,170,406, while the number of ‘non-Western 
allochthones’ (niet-westerse allochtonen) increased from around 1,260,000 
in 1998 to 1,738,452 in 2007.125 Although the traditional ethnic minority 
groups (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans) remained the 
largest groups, the population had become increasingly diverse. New 
minority groups included Iraqis, Afghans and people from the former 
Yugoslavia. In 2004 Statistics Netherlands observed that the influx of 
labour and asylum migrants had decreased in recent years and family 
migration had become the largest immigration category. The majority of 
these family migrants came to the Netherlands to form new families 
(gezinsvorming) rather than for family reunification (gezinshereniging).
While there were signs that the second generation of immigrants was 
doing better than the first, the socio-economic position of those desig-
nated as non-Western allochthones continued to be perceived as problem-
atic. Compared to Western allochthones and to the majority population, 
non-Western allochthones continued to suffer high levels of unemploy-
ment and low levels of labour market participation and to be overrepre-
sented in the lower segments of the education system (vbo/mavo/vmbo). 
Non-Western allochthones belonging to the first generation moreover 
made relatively high use of social assistance and disability benefits.126
In 2003, a parliamentary committee (Commissie Blok) was set up to con-
duct an inquiry about the Dutch integration policy over the previous 30 
years. This committee concluded that the integration of many immigrants 
(‘allochthones’) had been wholly or partly successful, but that it was 
difficult to say whether this was the result of the integration policy. In 
124 Proceedings II 1997, No 21, 1597. 
125 The classification ‘non-Western allochthones’ is used by Statistics Netherlands (Centraal 
Bureau voor de Statistiek or CBS). Countries of origin considered as ‘non-Western’ are Turkey, 
Morocco, Suriname, the Dutch Antilles and Aruba and all other countries in Africa, Asia 
(excluding Indonesia and Japan) or Latin America, whereas the term ‘immigrant’ is used for 
every person with at least one foreign-born parent. See www.cbs.nl. 
126 The data in this section have been derived from the CBS, see CBS 1995–2004 and www.
cbs.nl. 
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general it was advised to continue the integration policy in a way requir-
ing the commitment of all those involved. Interestingly the committee 
also concluded that, for a long time, both parliament and the government 
had underestimated the importance of learning Dutch. In this respect it 
was recommended to improve the implementation of the Newcomers 
Integration Act of 1998 (section V.C.i). In addition to language proficiency, 
the committee also mentioned respect for legally established norms and 
values and a knowledge of unwritten social rules as conditions for suc-
cessful integration.127
B. The ‘New Style’ Integration Policy
During the period discussed here, immigrant integration became one of 
the main topics on the Dutch political agenda and the integration policy 
continued to be subject to new developments.128 In 1998 the second coali-
tion government under Prime Minister Kok (Paars II) outlined the integra-
tion policy for the period 1999–2002.129 Throughout those years, achieving 
active participation of members of ethnic minority groups remained a pri-
mary objective.130 However, the government did not want to focus solely 
on economic participation. In this respect it deviated from the recommen-
dations made by the WRR in 2001.131 
Given the relatively high level of immigration, the increasingly diverse 
population and the need to maintain the welfare state, the WRR had 
repeated its earlier position that integration policy should primarily aim 
to further the economic participation of immigrants rather than their full 
cultural inclusion (section IV.B). Nevertheless the Dutch government also 
sought to address the socio-cultural dimension of the integration process, 
stating that integration required efforts on the part of the host society and 
that it was up to the administration, individuals and institutions of civil 
society to create the circumstances under which immigrants would be 
able to fully develop their capacities. Where necessary, procedures and 
structures would have to be altered to create space for immigrants, while 
active policy measures would be taken with regard to ‘processes of iden-
tity and interaction and the adaptation of existing social structures to the 
127 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 28 689, No 9 (Rapport Commissie Blok) 522–24.
128 This was illustrated by the appointment of a separate minister for the integration port-
folio, which was transferred from the Department of Home Affairs to the Department of 
Justice in 2002, to the Department of Housing and Spatial Planning in 2007 and then back to 
Home Affairs in 2010.
129 This coalition consisted of the Labour Party (PvdA), the Liberals (VVD) and the Liberal 
Democrats (D66).
130 Parliamentary Papers II 1998–1999, 26 333, No 2 (‘Kansen krijgen, kansen pakken’).
131 WRR 2001a.
 1998–2007 43
reality of the multi-ethnic society’.132 Increased consideration was also 
given to the role played in the integration process by religion and other 
beliefs.133 
In 2002 the government announced that integration policy would no 
longer be directed towards designated ethnic minorities. Instead the tar-
get groups of particular policy measures would be determined according 
to the issue at stake, and immigrant minorities would only be specifically 
targeted if their migration background was deemed a relevant factor in 
relation to the problem to be addressed.134 In this respect, it was assumed 
that processes of identification and socio-cultural integration would take 
more time in the case of immigrants ‘at a greater distance from the Western 
culture’.135
Lastly, the government agreed with the WRR that immigration and 
integration policy could not be formulated separately from each other. It 
was therefore proposed that integration policies would henceforth need 
to take account of the continuing influx of new immigrants, while the 
immigration policy should be designed so as to keep the integration pro-
cess manageable.136 
Meanwhile, Dutch language education continued to represent an 
important priority. As far as immigrants were concerned, a command of 
the Dutch language was not seen only as an instrument for socio-eco-
nomic integration, but also as a crucial condition for communication and 
mutual acceptance between different groups in the population.137 Between 
1998 and 2002, therefore, much effort was devoted to consolidating the 
civic integration policy and implementing the Newcomers Integration 
Act 1998. In addition, the increased attention for religion as a factor of 
integration resulted in the compulsory integration programmes being 
extended to religious servants.
However, the revision of integration policy in general and civic integra-
tion policy in particular did not stop there. In 2002 a new government 
took office under the leadership of Prime Minister Balkenende (the 
Balkenende I cabinet, which was soon followed by Balkenende II).138 The 
coalition agreements of 2002 and 2003 proposed making the integration 
policy more coercive and restricting the immigration of family migrants 
132 Nota ‘Kansen krijgen, kansen pakken’ (n 130), 7–9 and Parliamentary Papers II 2001–2002, 28 
198, No 2 (Nota ‘Integratie in het perspectief van immigratie’), 48.
133 Nota ‘Kansen krijgen, kansen pakken’ (n 130), 51 and Parliamentary Papers II 1998–1999, 26 
333, No 13.
134 Nota ‘Integratie in het perspectief van immigratie’ (n 132), 58.
135 Nota ‘Integratie in het perspectief van immigratie’ (n 132), 13–14 and 21.
136 Nota ‘Integratie in het perspectief van immigratie’ (n 132). 
137 Nota ‘Kansen krijgen, kansen pakken’ (n 130), 7–9.
138 The Balkenende I government was a short-lived coalition of the Christian Democratic 
party (CDA), the Liberals and the LPF (the populist party led by Pim Fortuyn) that quickly 
fell apart, due to internal strife, after the elections. It was succeeded by a coalition consisting 
of the CDA, VVD and D66 parties.
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in the interests of integration.139 In 2003 the government also presented a 
renewed integration policy. In what was referred to as the ‘New Style’ 
Integration policy (Integratiebeleid ‘Nieuwe Stijl’), great importance was 
attached to individual responsibility and adherence to basic Dutch norms 
and values (section III.B of chapter 3).140 While it was noted that the posi-
tion of ethnic minorities in the labour market and the education system 
was improving, the government still found too many immigrants to be 
too distanced from Dutch society in both cultural and economic terms. It 
also believed, however, that integration was not something that could be 
achieved through legislation. Responsibility for the integration process 
was therefore attributed primarily to the citizens themselves (immigrants 
and non-immigrants), whereas the government was seen as being respon-
sible for offering incentives and removing obstacles so as to allow civic 
initiatives to succeed.
Despite this emphasis on individual responsibility, the ‘New Style’ 
Integration policy imposed additional obligations and conditions on 
immigrants in and to the Netherlands. This included a complete overhaul 
of the structure for civic integration, which had become the main 
instrument of overall integration policy. A proposal was made for a new 
Integration Act (Wet inburgering), which eventually replaced the 
Newcomers Integration Act of 1998. In 2006 the obligation to pass a basic 
integration exam was also integrated into Dutch immigration law as a 
condition for the admission of certain categories of aliens. This condition, 
which was enacted through the Act on Integration Abroad (Wet inburger-
ing in het buitenland), forms the main object of this study and is therefore 
described in more detail in section VI.
C. Civic Integration between 1998 and 2007
i. Implementation of the Newcomers Integration Act 1998 and Integration 
Contracts for Resident Immigrants
The Newcomers Integration Act eventually entered into force on 30 
September 1998.141 During the initial years, however, the Act did not bring 
about the desired results. In part, this was caused by a lack of cooperation 
between municipalities and the other parties involved in organising the 
integration programmes. Another problem was that the waiting lists 
continued to exist and the integration courses on offer were insufficiently 
tailored to newcomers’ needs, while many newcomers also continued to 
139 Parliamentary Papers II 2001–2002, 28 375, No 5 (Strategisch Akkoord 2002), 15–17 and 
Parliamentary Papers II 2002–2003, 28 637, No 19 (Hoofdlijnenakkoord 2003), 14.
140 Parliamentary Papers 2003–2004, 29 203, No 1.
141 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1998, 533.
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drop out before or during the programme and those who finished often 
failed to meet the minimum level of social self-reliance.142 
In order to address these problems and support the implementation of 
the civic integration policy, a taskforce was instituted in 2000 (Taskforce 
inburgering). Apart from its primary task, which was to eliminate the wait-
ing lists, this taskforce identified several areas of concern (such as the non-
availability of child care) and developed and distributed a series of best 
practices and solutions to common problems. It also encouraged the crea-
tion of ‘dual programmes’ combining language courses with work, voca-
tional training or educational support.143 Projects of this kind were set up 
with various companies.144 The taskforce continued operating until the 
end of 2002, when a final document with recommendations was presented 
to the then Integration Minister, Hilbrand Nawijn. After the taskforce was 
dismantled, its supporting task was taken over by the Front Office for 
Civic Integration (Frontoffice inburgering).
From 1999, civic integration policy was no longer restricted to newcom-
ers, but was expanded to include immigrants who had already been liv-
ing in the Netherlands for longer periods.145 Although they were not new 
residents, these immigrants were considered to be in a disadvantaged 
position due (partly) to a lack of proficiency in Dutch. As the available 
financial resources were limited, priority was given to unemployed 
people and those with school-age children (sections III.B and III.C. of 
chapter 3)146 The lack of a legal basis meant participation in the integration 
programmes could not be made obligatory for all resident immigrants.147 
From 2001, however, integration contracts were introduced, as previously 
with newcomers, to ensure that those who started a programme also 
finished it.148 Several years later, resident immigrants’ participation in 
142 See Brink et al 2002. See also the report on the civic integration policy published by the 
Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer) in 2000: Inburgering en taalonderwijs allochtonen, 
Parliamentary Papers II 1999–2000, 27 275, No 2. 
143 eg, Parliamentary Papers II 2001–2002, 28 006, No 2, 19–20.
144 Brink et al 2002, 62–63. The introduction of dual programmes was proposed in the 1998 
coalition agreement to improve newcomers’ chances on the labour market; see Parliamentary 
Papers II 1997–1998, 26 024, No 10, 68. The WRR also stressed that language acquisition 
would be more effective in a context-related setting, WRR 2001a, 150–55.
145 Integration programmes for these immigrants were funded under a number of differ-
ent regulations (known as oudkomersregelingen). These included the Bijdrageregeling sociale 
integratie en veiligheid G25, Government Gazette 1999, No 162, Bijdrageregeling inburgering 
oudkomers, Government Gazette 1999, No 230 and Bijdrageregeling inburgering oudkomers 12 
gemeenten, Government Gazette 2001, No 44.
146 In 2001 the Social and Cultural Planning Office (Sociaal and Cultureel Planbureau) esti-
mated that this target group consisted of approximately 465,000 people, which was much 
higher than had originally been thought. See SCP 2001, 53.
147 For unemployed people, however, the Unemployment Act (Werkloosheidswet) could 
serve as a legal basis for imposing mandatory integration courses as part of the reintegration 
programme. 
148 See, eg, the Regeling aanvullende bijdrage inburgering oudkomers 54 gemeenten, Government 
Gazette 2001, No 231.
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integration programmes became compulsory under the Integration Act 
2007.
ii. Compulsory Integration for Religious Servants
As indicated in section V.B, the role of religion in the integration process 
was increasingly recognised from 1998 onwards. In the same period con-
cerns were raised about public statements by imams that were considered 
expressions of religious intolerance.149 Religious servants (geestelijke 
bedienaren), such as ministers, other clergymen and teachers of religion, 
were able to exert significant influence on the integration process, and it 
was therefore deemed important that they, too, should participate in inte-
gration programmes.150 
On 1 January 2002, religious servants who immigrated to the 
Netherlands were brought into the target group of the Newcomers 
Integration Act 1998.151 That meant they had to complete the regular 
integration programme, followed by a specific programme geared 
towards their pastoral care activities. Although the amendment applied to 
all religious servants irrespective of their denomination, the majority of 
the target group consisted of imams.152 Soon afterwards the government 
was asked to further extend the civic integration policy to imams already 
resident in the Netherlands.153 A new course, with a strong emphasis on 
the meaning of the Dutch Constitution and the way democracy func-
tioned in the Netherlands, was also requested for this group.154 Both pro-
posals were included in the revision of the civic integration policy (see 
section V.D below).155 In the meantime, religious servants were designated 
a priority group, alongside unemployed people and parents of school-age 
children, under the integration regulations for resident immigrants.156
Before the Newcomers Integration Act was amended, parliament dis-
cussed whether other categories of professionals should also be brought 
under the Act on the grounds that they had a specific role to play in the 
integration process.157 The Council of State had already suggested that this 
149 One well-known example is the case of imam El Moumni, who spoke out against 
homosexuality on Dutch television in 2001. See, eg, NRC Handelsblad of 7 May 2001, ‘Van 
Boxtel wil snel in gesprek met imams’.
150 Parliamentary Papers II 1997–1998, 25 919, No 2, 24; Parliamentary Papers II 1999–2000, 
26 333, No 13, 9 and Parliamentary Papers II 1999–2000, 27 000, No 3, 2.
151 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2001, 351; Government Gazette 2001, No 247.
152 Parliamentary Papers II 1999–2000, 27 000, No 3, 2. In June 2003 it was reported that 18 
imams had participated in the integration programme, of whom 16 had obtained a certificate 
(Parliamentary Papers II 2002–2003, 27 083, No 37, 2).
153 Parliamentary Papers II 2001–2002, 28 006, No 14; Proceedings II 2002, No 91, 5451.
154 Parliamentary Papers II 2002–2003, 27 083, No 30; Proceedings II 2002, No 34, 2538–39.
155 Parliamentary Papers II 2002–2003, 27 083, No 37, 2–3.
156 Art 2 Regeling inburgering oudkomers and Art 2.b Regeling inburgering oudkomers 54 
gemeenten.
157 Parliamentary Papers II 1999–2000, 27 000, No 4, 1–4.
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could be the case with regard to nurses and teachers.158 At the time, how-
ever, the government chose to extend the Act only to religious servants.159
iii. Adjustment of the Course Objectives for Social Orientation
Section IV.D.i describes how the integration programmes included a 
course in social orientation in addition to Dutch as a second language. As 
the goal of this course was to provide newcomers with the necessary 
knowledge and skills to become self-reliant in Dutch society, the main 
focus was on practical information. The social orientation course 
addressed a variety of topics classified as ‘need to know’ and ‘nice to 
know’. The ‘need to know’ topics were ‘legal status’, ‘work and income’, 
‘social security’, ‘housing’, ‘health’, ‘traffic and transport’, ‘education’, 
‘health care’, ‘insurances’, ‘the right to vote’, ‘leisure’, ‘children’ and 
‘taxes’. ‘Nice to know’ topics included information about geography, eco-
nomics, Dutch history, holidays and memorial days and the Dutch popu-
lation.160 In 2002 the overall political opinion, however, was that the 
existing course contents put too much emphasis on self-reliance and not 
enough on participation and citizenship. There was a call to include topics 
such as norms and values, social codes and culture within the ‘need to 
know’ category, together with Dutch history and constitutional law.161 In 
January 2004 a committee of experts (Commissie Franssen) was set up to 
advise on the contents of the integration courses, including social orienta-
tion.162 The committee’s report was later taken into account in the revision 
of the civic integration policy described below (section V.D).
iv. Integration Abroad for Antillean Youths
In 1998, the government signalled that the immigration of disadvantaged 
youths from the Netherlands Antilles was leading to problems in several 
Dutch cities.163 One of the measures proposed to address these problems 
was to set up integration programmes on the Antillean islands. In January 
1999 a ‘cooperation protocol’ was signed with the Antillean government, 
with the aim of introducing a voluntary integration programme on 
the Antilles for youths aged under 25. This programme should include 
realistic information about the Netherlands (‘social orientation’) and 
158 Parliamentary Papers II 1999–2000, 27 000, A, 2.
159 Parliamentary Papers II 1999–2000, 27 000, No 5, 11. Ch 5 of this study examines the posi-
tion of religious servants in the Dutch integration legislation against the background of the 
right to freedom of religion and the right to equal treatment.
160 Brink and Tromp 2003, 9.
161 ibid, 10; Parliamentary Papers II 2002–2003, 28 600 VI, No 48; Proceedings II 2002, No 31, 
2240.
162 Government Gazette 2004, No 14.
163 Parliamentary Papers II 1998–1999, 26 283, No 1, 2.
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Dutch language classes. A pilot project was started in late 1999.164 In reac-
tion to some comments by members of parliament, the Integration 
Minister stated that the measure was not meant to curb immigration, but 
to ensure actual participation of Antilleans in the integration pro-
grammes.165 Nevertheless, the Antillean government refused to adopt the 
legislation needed to make participation in the integration programmes 
compulsory. Alternative plans were then made to include integration 
courses in the compulsory education programme for Antilleans aged 
under 25 who planned to move to the Netherlands, but these, too, were 
never realised. Eventually the Dutch government decided to abandon the 
project and to allocate the reserved funds to the Antillean community 
already present in the Netherlands.166 
D. Reform of the Civic Integration Policy
As early as 2000, when the Newcomers Integration Act had been in force 
for less than two years, calls were heard for substantial changes to be 
made to the civic integration policy. It was proposed replacing the obliga-
tion of effort to participate in a course by an obligation of result (in other 
words, to pass an exam) and requiring integration programmes to start in 
immigrants’ countries of origin.167 Around the same time the government 
was asked to investigate the possibilities of making the granting of a per-
manent residence permit dependent on completion of the integration pro-
gramme, while plans were made to make the partners of family migrants 
bear part of the costs of those programmes.168 The proposed changes were 
inspired by the disappointing results of the Newcomers Integration Act, 
including the high drop-out rates.
Although not initially receiving much support, these proposals eventu-
ally gained ground. In 2003 a thorough revision of the civic integration 
policy was proposed as part of the ‘New Style’ Integration policy.169 As 
well as reflecting the call for more coercive measures, these proposals also 
placed a strong emphasis on the immigrant’s personal responsibility. The 
main features of the reforms are briefly set out below.170
164 Parliamentary Papers II 1999–2000, 26 283, No 6, 6–7.
165 Parliamentary Papers II 1998–1999, 26 283, No 4, 5.
166 Parliamentary Papers II 2000–2001, 26 283, No 10, 5.
167 Proceedings II 2000, Nos 70 and 71, 4713. See also the resolution adopted in 2002 (Motie 
Sterk), in which the government was asked to submit proposals concerning civic integration 
for family migrants in their countries of origin, Parliamentary Papers II 2002–2003, 27 083, No 
25; Proceedings II 2002, No 34, 2538. 
168 Parliamentary Papers II 1999–2000, 26 732, No 77 and Parliamentary Papers II 2001–2002, 
28 198, No 4, 1–2.
169 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 203, No 1. 
170 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 543, No 2 (Contourennota Herziening van het inbur-
geringsstelsel).
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Firstly, they provided for integration to become compulsory for all 
aliens and Dutch citizens – newcomers and resident immigrants – born 
outside the EU/EEA and who came to live in the Netherlands on a non-
temporary basis. This definition of the target group raised a number of 
(legal) problems and could not be maintained.171 In the end, the compul-
sory integration policy would apply only to third-country nationals, with 
a number of exemptions.172
A second reform involved replacing the obligation to participate in an 
integration programme by the obligation to pass an integration exam at a 
certain level. This exam was designed to test applicants’ knowledge of 
Dutch society, as well as their Dutch language proficiency. Anyone who 
did not pass the exam within a set period of time would have to pay an 
administrative fine. The responsibility for obtaining the required skills 
was also placed on the immigrants themselves. Integration programmes 
would no longer be provided by the municipalities and it would be up to 
the immigrants to decide how to prepare for the integration test. They 
would also have to pay the costs of preparing for and taking the exam, 
although under certain conditions a partial refund could be granted. 
Lastly, immigration conditions would firmly link the obligation to 
integrate to the right to reside in the Netherlands. From then on, all those 
applying for an independent or permanent residence permit (vergunning 
voortgezet verblijf or vergunning onbepaalde tijd) would have to show that 
they had passed the above integration exam. In addition, a basic 
integration exam would be introduced for family migrants and religious 
servants in their countries of origin as a condition for admission to the 
Netherlands.
The proposed changes were realised by way of two Acts. The obligation 
to pass the integration exam in the Netherlands was provided for in the 
Integration Act (Wet inburgering), which replaced the Newcomers 
Integration Act on 1 January 2007. This Act also introduced the integra-
tion exam as a condition for independent and permanent residence in 
the Netherlands. In addition, the basic integration exam as a condition 
for the admission of certain categories of aliens (the integration require-
ment abroad) was established through the Act on Integration Abroad 
(Wet inburgering buitenland). The latter Act is discussed in more detail 
below. 
171 For an overview of the various proposals and arguments made concerning the target 
group, see De Vries 2006, 278–80.
172 See Arts 3 and 5 Integration Act 2007.
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VI. THE ACT ON INTEGRATION ABROAD
A. The Requirement of Integration abroad in Dutch Immigration Law
The Act on Integration Abroad (AIA) entered into force on 15 March 
2006.173 This Act does not stand alone but instead constitutes an amend-
ment to the Dutch Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet 2000), which contains the 
main rules concerning the admission of aliens to the Netherlands. Since 
the adoption of the AIA, the Aliens Act sets the requirement of integration 
abroad as a condition for acquisition of a residence permit. This condition 
applies in principle to residence permits issued for the first five years 
of residence on non-asylum-related grounds (verblijfsvergunning bepaalde 
tijd regulier).174 More specific regulations and administrative guidelines 
concerning the integration requirement abroad are laid down in the 
Aliens Decree (Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000), Aliens Regulations (Voorschrift 
Vreemdelingen 2000) and Aliens Circular (Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000).
As a rule, applications for a residence permit can normally be made 
after the applicant has lawfully entered the Netherlands on a long-stay 
visa (machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf ).175 Applications for such visas are 
assessed on the basis of the same conditions as those applying to the resi-
dence permit. It follows in effect that immigrants seeking to obtain a 
Dutch residence permit must first meet the integration requirement 
abroad before they can be admitted. This was also the aim of the Dutch 
legislator, who wanted immigrants to prepare for integration before com-
ing to the Netherlands (section V.D). Once applicants have passed the 
exam and have been admitted to the Netherlands, they do not have to 
take the exam again in order to obtain a residence permit. 
i. A Contested Legal Basis 
In July 2008, the Amsterdam District Court decided that admission could 
not be refused to family migrants on the grounds that they did not meet 
the integration requirement abroad. The Court’s decision was based on 
the grounds that this requirement had insufficient basis in law.176 The 
Court pointed out that the Aliens Act itself did not state that applications 
for residence had to be refused if the applicant had not passed the integra-
tion exam abroad, but merely granted discretionary powers to do so. 
173 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2006, 28; entry into force Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2006, 75.
174 Art 16(1)(h) Aliens Act.
175 Art 16(1)(a) Aliens Act.
176 District Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam 15 July 2008, case no AWB 07/18932, 
LJN: BD7189 and District Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam 15 July 2008, AWB 
07/20102.
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Meanwhile, Article 3.13 of the Aliens Decree stated that residence permits 
for family reunification would be granted if the conditions set out in that 
provision were met. Since the integration requirement abroad was not 
mentioned, the Court concluded that the application of this requirement 
was not based on law. At the same time, it also recognised that it had 
clearly been the legislator’s intention to apply the integration requirement 
in situations involving family reunification. However, the Court found 
that it was unclear as to how the legislator wished to include this require-
ment in the immigration legislation and the lack of a legal basis could not, 
therefore, be repaired by the judiciary.
The Dutch government appealed against the Amsterdam Court’s 
judgments, which were subsequently overruled by the Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak 
Raad van State, hereafter AJD).177 Although the AJD’s judgment did not 
directly address the integration requirement as a condition for a residence 
permit, it found that there was a sufficient legal basis for refusing applica-
tions for long-stay visas on the grounds that applicants had not passed the 
integration exam in their countries of origin. The AJD stated that this legal 
basis could be found in Article 7 of the Royal Decree (Souverein Besluit) of 
1813, in conjunction with Article 1(h) Aliens Act and Article 3.71a(1) 
Aliens Decree, and taking into account the legislative history of the AIA 
and the consistent practice of the Foreign Affairs Minister to apply the 
integration requirement to applications for family reunification.178 In 
practice, the decision by the AJD meant that family migrants would still 
need to meet the integration requirement abroad before being admitted 
to the Netherlands. The decision was confirmed in a number of later 
judgments.179
I previously argued that the reasoning followed by the AJD is not 
entirely convincing.180 Nevertheless, it follows from the above judgment 
that, as a matter of Dutch national law, the requirement of integration 
abroad has a legal basis and can serve as grounds for refusing applica-
tions for family reunification. In my view, the legislative history of the 
AIA also clearly shows both that and how the Dutch legislator intended to 
177 AJD 2 December 2008, case no. 200806120/1.
178 Under Art 7 Royal Decree 1813 aliens entering the Netherlands shall subject their pass-
ports to the visa of the State Secretary; this provision still functions in Dutch immigration 
law as the legal basis for the competence of the Foreign Affairs Minister to decide on visa 
applications. Art 1(h) Aliens Act gives the definition of a long-stay visa (machtiging tot voorlo-
pig verblijf ), whereas under Art 3.71a(1) Aliens Decree aliens are deemed to meet the integra-
tion requirement if they pass the integration exam abroad within one year before submitting 
their visa application. Neither of these provisions states that a visa may be refused because 
the integration requirement has not been fulfilled.
179 eg, AJD 9 February 2009, case No 200806121/1, para 2.2; AJD 2 April 2009, case no 
200808062/1/V1, para 2.2 and District Court of The Hague sitting in Utrecht 29 June 2009, 
case no 08/39827, para 2.12.
180 De Vries 2009, para 5.
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add this requirement to the conditions for the admission of family 
migrants and that the requirement was consistently applied from the 
moment the AIA entered into force. Hence, from the perspective of legal 
certainty and democratic legitimacy, the outcome of the AJD’s judgment 
should not be considered problematic.
B. Personal Scope of the Act on Integration Abroad
i. Main Target Group: Family Migrants from Non-Western Countries
As mentioned above, the requirement of integration abroad applies only 
to aliens wishing to obtain a residence permit on non-asylum-related 
grounds (verblijfsvergunning regulier). This means that asylum seekers do 
not have to meet the requirement as a condition for obtaining interna-
tional protection, whether they are in the Netherlands or abroad. Also 
excluded are aliens whose residence purpose is qualified as temporary 
under Dutch legislation; hence the requirement of integration abroad does 
not apply to inter alia students, highly skilled workers (kennismigranten) 
and other labour migrants.181 This limitation, which also existed under the 
Newcomers Integration Act 1998 (section IV.D.iv), is motivated by the 
consideration that integration is a matter primarily concerning immi-
grants seeking to remain in the Netherlands for a longer or indefinite 
period of time.182 In practice the vast majority of immigrants falling within 
the target group of the AIA are those seeking admission for the purpose of 
family reunification.183 This concerns both new and existing families 
(gezinsvorming and gezinshereniging). As of 1 October 2012, only members 
of the nuclear family are eligible for family reunification. These are 
the spouse or registered partner and minor children belonging to the 
family.184
In addition to the residence purpose, another important criterion used 
to determine the target group of the AIA is nationality. The requirement of 
181 Art 16(1)(h) Aliens Act in conjunction with Art 3(1)(a) Integration Act 2007. As a matter 
of Dutch immigration law, a temporary residence purpose (tijdelijk verblijfsdoel) is not the 
same as a temporary residence permit (verblijfsvergunning bepaalde tijd). Although the two 
may go together, a temporary residence permit may be issued for a non-temporary residence 
purpose (such as international protection). In that case the alien will be able to apply for a 
permanent residence permit after five years, which is not the case if the permit is issued for 
a temporary purpose. A list of residence purposes qualifying as temporary under the 
Integration Act 2007 can be found in Art 2.1(1) Integration Decree (Besluit inburgering) and 
Annex 1 to the Integration Regulations (Regeling inburgering).
182 Parliamentary Papers II 1996–1997, 25 114, No 3, 4–5; Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 
29 700, No 3, 7.
183 See www.ind.nl. 
184 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2012, 148; entry into force Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2012, 
326.
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integration abroad does not apply to aliens who are nationals of an EU or 
EEA Member State, nor to nationals of a select number of economically 
developed countries.185 Nationals of these states do not need a long-term 
visa to be admitted to the Netherlands and are therefore not subject to 
prior control before entering Dutch territory. The Dutch government esti-
mated that subjecting these nationals to the AIA could harm the diplo-
matic and economic relations of the Netherlands. It also declared that the 
above countries were ‘comparable to the Netherlands in social, economic 
and political terms’ so that immigration from these countries would not 
lead to major problems in the field of integration.186 It follows that the 
requirement of integration abroad applies only to aliens who are nationals 
of non-Western countries. In 2010 and 2011, the integration exam abroad 
was most often taken by nationals of Turkey and Morocco, followed by 
China, Thailand and Indonesia (section VI.D).
Lastly, the AIA does not apply to nationals of EU/EEA Member States 
or Switzerland and their family members if they are entitled to free move-
ment within the EU (chapter 6).187 This exclusion ground was included in 
order to ensure respect for the obligations of EU law.188
ii. An Additional Target Group: Religious Servants
In addition to family migrants, the Act on Integration Abroad also 
addresses religious servants.189 According to Article 1(1)(g) of the 
Integration Act 2007, a religious servant is a ‘person who holds a spiritual 
or religious office, who works as a minister, religious teacher or mission-
ary or who conducts activities of a predominantly spiritual, ideological or 
religious nature on behalf of a spiritual or religious congregation’. Section 
V.C.ii explains that religious servants were brought under the Newcomers 
Integration Act of 1998 because of the particular role they were believed to 
play in the integration process.190 For the same reason, religious servants 
were also covered in the AIA even though they are not normally eligible 
for permanent residence in the Netherlands.191 To date, the number of 
185 Art 16(1)(h) in conjunction with Art 17(1)(a) Aliens Act. Apart from the EU/EEA 
Members States, the exempted countries are Australia, Canada, Japan, Monaco, New 
Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, the United States and Vatican City (see the Aliens 
Regulations, Annex 2).
186 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 19 and Parliamentary Papers II 2004–
2005, 29 700, No 6, 31–32. These arguments are discussed in detail in ch 8 on the right to 
equal treatment.
187 Art 16(1)(h) in conjunction with Art 17(1)(b) and Art 1(e) Aliens Act. For nationals of 
the EU/EEA Member States and Switzerland, these grounds for exemption overlap the 
above exemption on the grounds of nationality.
188 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 19.
189 Art 16(1)(h) Aliens Act read in conjunction with Art 3(1)(b) Integration Act 2007.
190 See also Van der Winden 2006, 85–86, with further references.
191 See paras B19/4 and 7 Aliens Circular.
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religious servants seeking admission to the Netherlands has not been 
substantial.192 
iii. Exemptions
Dutch immigration law contains several exceptions to the rule that all 
aliens belonging to the target group of the AIA must pass the integration 
exam abroad. Exemptions may be granted on a categorical or individual 
basis. The grounds for exemption are briefly reviewed below.
a. Categorical Exemptions
The requirement of integration abroad does not apply to nationals of 
Suriname who can demonstrate that they received their primary educa-
tion in Dutch in the Netherlands or in Suriname.193 This exemption was 
added on the grounds that many Surinamese nationals already speak 
Dutch and are familiar with Dutch society.194 
The AIA furthermore does not apply to immigrants who, after arriving 
in the Netherlands, would be exempted under the Integration Act 2007 
from the obligation to pass the advanced integration exam.195 In so far as 
relevant here, these are:
a. people younger than 16 or 65 years or older;196
b. people who resided in the Netherlands – lawfully or unlawfully – for at 
least eight years during the period of compulsory education (5–16 years 
of age);
c. people with a diploma, certificate or other document demonstrating 
that they have already obtained the skills and knowledge needed to 
pass the integration exam;197
d. people subject to compulsory education or training (leerplicht or kwalifi-
catieplicht);
e.  people who cannot be subjected to compulsory integration because of 
provisions of international or EU law.
As regards the ground mentioned above under ‘e’, the Central Appeals 
Tribunal (Centrale Raad van Beroep), the highest Dutch court to rule on the 
application of the Integration Act 2007, decided on 16 August 2011 that 
192 The number of admission applications by religious servants was 55 in 2006, 23 in 2007 
and 46 in 2008. See Lodder 2009, 24.
193 Art 16(3) Aliens Act. See also Art 3.13 Aliens Regulations. 
194 See Van der Winden 2006, 65–67 with further references.
195 Art 16(1)(h) Aliens Act in conjunction with Art 5 Integration Act 2007.
196 Note that persons aged 16 and 17 will necessarily be covered by one of the exemptions 
under Art 5(1)(c) or (d). In practice, therefore, the AIA does not apply to people younger than 
18.
197 A list of relevant documents is included in Art 2.3 Integration Decree and Annex 2 to 
the Integration Regulations.
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Turkish nationals falling under the scope of the EEC-Turkey Association 
Agreement must be exempted from the requirements of that Act.198 In a 
letter to parliament, the Home Affairs Minister (then responsible for 
integration) subsequently confirmed that Turkish nationals were, from 
then on, also exempted from the obligation to pass the integration exam 
abroad.199 According to this letter, the exemption applies to all Turkish 
nationals and their family members.
In addition to the above, Article 3.71a Aliens Decree mentions two more 
exempted categories. First, the requirement of integration abroad does not 
apply if the applicant is a family member of a person who has been 
granted a residence permit in the Netherlands on asylum grounds.200 Also 
exempted are persons who have already complied with an integration 
requirement in another EU Member State in order to acquire the status of 
long-term resident under the EU Long-term Residents Directive (chapter 
6, section VI.C).201 It may be observed that the second exemption is super-
fluous, given that EU long-term residents do not need a long-stay visa to 
be admitted to the Netherlands. Hence, they are in any case exempted 
from the obligation to pass the integration exam abroad even if they have 
not already fulfilled an integration requirement in the first Member State. 
The latter grounds for exemption also apply to the spouse and minor chil-
dren of the long-term resident, providing the family already existed in the 
first Member State.
b. Individual Exemptions
Article 3.71a Aliens Decree also contains an exemption for persons who 
are ‘lastingly unable to take the integration exam due to a mental or phys-
ical disability’.202 Disabilities covered by this provision include, but are 
not limited to, blindness, deafness and deaf-muteness and serious speech 
impediments.203 Case law shows that this ground for exemption does not 
apply if the applicant is illiterate, has had little or very little education 
or has little capacity for learning.204 This does not change when these 
problems occur in combination with medical complaints that are not in 
198 Central Appeals Tribunal 16 August 2011, case nos 10/5248, 10/5249, 10/6123 and 
10/6124, LJN: BR4959). On the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement see further section II of 
ch 7.
199 Parliamentary Papers II 2011–2012, 31 143, No 89.
200 Art 3.71a(2)(a) Aliens Decree.
201 Art 3.71a(2)(b) Aliens Decree. 
202 Art 3.71a(2)(c) Aliens Decree and Art 3.10 Aliens Regulations. On these grounds for 
exemption, see also Van der Winden 2006, 69–73.
203 See also para B1/4.7.1.2 Aliens Circular. The President of the Haarlem District Court 
ruled that disabilities that may warrant an exemption are not limited to those expressly men-
tioned in the Circular, see President District Court of The Hague sitting in Haarlem 10 April 
2008, case no 07/43197, LJN: BE9559, para 2.14.
204 AJD 2 December 2008, case no 200806120/1, para 2.3.2; AJD 9 February 2009, case no 
200806121/1, para 2.4.2. 
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themselves sufficient to necessitate application of the exemption clause,205 
or when it is shown that the lack of education is due to external factors not 
attributable to the applicant’s own choice (in casu, the fact that she was a 
woman raised in a part of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban).206 
As of 1 April 2011, an exemption can be granted if refusal to admit the 
applicant would be evidently unreasonable.207 This ground for exemption 
was added in connection with the introduction of a reading test as part of 
the integration exam abroad (section VI.C.ii). Its applicability is deter-
mined by the Integration Minister on an individual basis. It has been 
announced, however, that exemptions will only be granted in the event of 
very specific individual circumstances that result in the applicant being 
lastingly unable to pass the exam despite having made substantial efforts 
to that effect.208 No case law regarding this ground for exemption is avail-
able to date.
Moreover, several exemptions deserve to be mentioned that are not 
directly related to the requirement of integration abroad but are nonethe-
less relevant to its application. First, persons who are already in the 
Netherlands when applying for a residence permit can, under certain cir-
cumstances, be exempted from the obligation to travel back to their coun-
try of origin in order to obtain a long-stay visa (section VI.A).209 Where 
this exemption applies, applicants are also no longer required to pass the 
integration exam abroad.210 The exemption will be granted, inter alia, if 
applicants can demonstrate that returning to their country of origin would 
separate them from their family members in violation of Article 8 ECHR, 
or if the requirement to return would be ‘decisively unreasonable’.211 
Conversely, applicants who are not exempted will not be able to re-enter 
the Netherlands until they have fulfilled all the conditions for a long-stay 
visa, including the requirement of integration abroad. Dutch case law 
shows several examples of applicants seeking exemption from the long-
205 District Court of The Hague 17 July 2008, case no 08/4788, para 7; District Court of The 
Hague sitting in ’s-Hertogenbosch 12 January 2009, case no 08/7556, LJN: BG9517, paras 
15–18. 
206 AJD 15 August 2011, case no 201007300/1/V2, para 2.2–2.2.2.
207 Art 3.71a(2)(d) Aliens Decree; Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 679; entry into force 
Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 844. The introduction of a hardship clause was one of the 
recommendations made following the evaluation of the AIA in 2009, see the Principal find-
ings and conclusions of the evaluation of the Act on Integration Abroad (Evaluatie Wet inbur-
gering in het buitenland. Centrale bevindingen en conclusies), Annex to Parliamentary Papers II 
2008–2009, 32 005, No 1, 14.
208 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 679, 14.
209 This situation can occur when the applicant has entered the Netherlands unlawfully, or 
has been initially admitted for a purpose other than family reunification (eg on a short-stay 
visa or to seek asylum).
210 Art 16(1)(h) Aliens Act. The grounds for exemption are listed in Art 17(1) Aliens Act 
and Art 3.71(2) Aliens Decree.
211 Art 3.71(2)(l) and 3.71(4) Aliens Decree. Whether the obligation to return to the country 
of origin would be ‘decisively unreasonable’ is to be determined by the minister responsible 
for Aliens Affairs. On Art 8 ECHR see ch 4, section II.
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stay visa requirement mainly or partially because of the efforts involved 
in having to pass – and prepare for – the integration exam abroad.212 In 
each of these cases, however, the refusal to grant an exemption was upheld 
by the courts. 
Article 4:84 of the General Administrative Act (Algemene wet bestuursre-
cht) furthermore grants Dutch administrative bodies a discretionary 
power not to apply administrative regulations (beleidsregels) if, due to 
unforeseen circumstances, the consequences for the individuals con-
cerned would be disproportionate in relation to the aims pursued. This 
also applies to the rule that applications for a long-stay visa must be 
refused if the integration requirement abroad is not met, which is laid 
down the Aliens Circular.213 This exemption clause has been invoked 
before the Dutch courts on several occasions, including on the grounds 
that the applicant was illiterate, the exam could not be taken in the appli-
cant’s country of origin or there were no course materials available for 
preparing for the exam. So far, however, the clause has been interpreted 
restrictively by the courts and the appeals have been rejected.214 Lastly, the 
Aliens Circular also provides that applications for family reunification 
shall not be refused if such refusal would violate Article 8 ECHR.215 In 
these cases, the applicants must be admitted even if they have not passed 
the integration exam abroad. Relevant Dutch case law is discussed in sec-
tion II.E of chapter 4.
To avoid confusion, a schematic overview of the different possibilities 
for individual exemption is included in the table on the next page.
The application of the AIA by the immigration authorities has been sub-
ject to criticism by the Dutch Ombudsman (Nationale ombudsman). In a 
report issued in May 2011, the Ombudsman asserted that the Act was 
enforced too rigidly and the existing possibilities for exemption – other 
than on grounds of disability – were not applied in practice. In particular, 
the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatie- 
d ienst) failed to consider the various circumstances of each case in combi-
nation and so did not get a good picture of the difficulties faced by some 
applicants. The Ombudsman advised the assessment of individual cases 
in a more comprehensive manner, taking into account factors enabling 
applicants to pass the integration exam abroad (including education and 
212 District Court of The Hague sitting in Maastricht 6 October 2010, case nos 09/33430 
and 10/9629; District Court of The Hague sitting in Maastricht 29 December 2010, case nos 
09/38308 and 10/10071; District Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam 8 March 2011, 
case nos 10/23459 and 10/23449, paras 3.2 and 5.3–5.5; District Court of The Hague sitting in 
Rotterdam 22 September 2011, case no 10/31223, para 4.3.2.
213 Para B1/4.7.1 Aliens Circular.
214 eg, District Court of The Hague sitting in Middelburg 16 August 2007, case no 07/30015, 
LJN: BB3524, para 6; District Court of The Hague sitting in Groningen 10 November 2009, 
case no 08/34677, paras 2.14–2.16.
215 Para B2/10 Aliens Circular.
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social support) as well as factors reducing their ability to do so (health 
problems, lack of educational or financial means, etc).216
Table 1. Individual exemptions
Legal basis Ground for exemption Result
Applicant is still abroad
Art 3.71a (c) 
Aliens Decree
mental or physical disability exemption from 
integration exam 
abroad
Art 3.71a (d) 
Aliens Decree
very specific individual circum-
stances; refusal of application 




Art 4:84 General 
Administrative 
Act
obligation to pass exam ‘dispro-





Para B2/10 Aliens 
Circular
violation of Art 8 ECHR (right to 
family life)
failure to pass integra-
tion exam abroad does 
not lead to refusal of 
application
Applicant has already entered the Netherlands
Art 16(1)(h) 
Aliens Act read 
together with Art 
3.71(2)(l) Aliens 
Decree
obligation to return to country of 
origin and pass exam violates 
Art 8 ECHR (right to family life)
exemption from 
long-stay visa require-




Aliens Act read 
together with Art 
3.71(4) Aliens 
Decree
obligation to return to country of 




ment and hence from 
integration exam 
abroad
In response to the Ombudsman report, the Home Affairs Minister (then 
responsible for integration) referred to the new exemption clause enacted 
on 1 April 2011 (see above). The creation of a special ‘decision-making 
team’ to put this clause into operation was also announced. The decision-
making team would apply the assessment criteria suggested by the 
Ombudsman.217 Between 1 April and 31 December 2011, 19 requests for 
exemption were examined, of which seven were granted and seven 
216 Inburgering in het buitenland, report issued by the Dutch Ombudsman (report no 
2011/135), 33–38, available at www.nationaleombudsman.nl.
217 See the Annex to Parliamentary Papers II 2010–2011, 31 143, No 88, 3–4.
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denied. In five more cases an exemption was eventually granted on medi-
cal grounds.218 
C. The Integration Exam Abroad
In order to be granted admission to the Netherlands, aliens belonging to 
the AIA target group and not qualifying for an exemption must demon-
strate that they have a basic knowledge of Dutch language and Dutch 
society. This knowledge is tested by means of an exam (the basic integra-
tion exam or the integration exam abroad), which can be taken at the 
Dutch embassy or consulate in the applicant’s country of origin or habit-
ual residence.219
i. Contents of the Exam before 1 April 2011
Prior to 1 April 2011, the integration exam abroad consisted of two parts: 
a spoken Dutch language test (Toets Gesproken Nederlands) and a test exam-
ining applicants’ knowledge of the Netherlands (Kennis van de Nederlandse 
Samenleving).220 The language test consists of several exercises designed to 
assess applicants’ listening and speaking skills; for instance, the applicant 
has to repeat a number of (simple) phrases spoken in Dutch or answer 
several basic questions. The ‘Knowledge of the Netherlands’ test requires 
applicants to answer 30 out of 100 questions about the film ‘To the 
Netherlands’ (Naar Nederland), which they have to watch before the exam. 
All 100 questions and answers are known in advance and can be learned 
by heart. The questions cover the topics ‘topography, history and the con-
stitutional system of the Netherlands’, ‘housing, education, employment, 
health care and integration’, ‘rights and obligations after arrival in the 
Netherlands’, ‘rights and obligations of others’ and ‘Dutch social norms 
and conventions’. Examples of questions asked in this part of the exam 
include: ‘Where is the Dutch government based?’ (correct answer: The 
Hague), ‘Do newspapers, radio and television enjoy freedom of expres-
sion?’ (correct answer: yes) and ‘Why is it good for children to watch 
Dutch television?’ (correct answer: to learn Dutch).221 
218 See the Monitor of the Integration Exam Abroad (Monitor inburgeringsexamen buitenland) 
of 7 May 2012, published as Annex to Parliamentary Papers II 2011–2012, 32 175, No 32, 41.
219 Art 16(1)(h) Aliens Act and Art 3.71a (1) Aliens Decree.
220 Art 3.98a(2)–(7) Aliens Decree, as they read before 1 April 2011. See also Van der 
Winden 2006, 105–08.
221 An overview of all 100 questions and the different types of exercises included in the 
language test is provided in the exam programme devised by the Integration Minister. This 
programme is included in the preparation package developed by the Dutch government, see 
section VI.C.iv. 
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To pass the exam, applicants needed to be able to speak and understand 
Dutch at the A1-minus level of the Common European Framework of 
Reference (CEFR).222 This is a very basic level, which implies that they can 
use a limited array of words and well-known expressions in contexts 
directly relating to their everyday life. This level was recommended by 
the Committee of experts (Commissie Franssen), which was set up specifi-
cally for this purpose, on the grounds that any higher level would result 
in the exclusion of large groups of persons who were illiterate or had 
received little education. The Committee took into account that the gov-
ernment would not organise preparatory courses in countries of origin 
and that candidates would need to prepare themselves by means of self-
tuition (see also section VI.C.iv). According to the Committee, candidates 
would need between 100 and 300 hours of study to reach the exam level, 
depending on their previous education and the availability of support.223 
The government itself stated that the purpose of the exam was to select 
potential immigrants on the basis of their motivation to integrate, rather 
than on their educational level (see also section II.B.iii of chapter 3). 
Interestingly it was also asserted that a higher exam level could be prob-
lematic in view of international legal norms, in particular Article 8 of the 
ECHR and the EU Family Reunification Directive (chapter 4). While it 
was recognised that the A1-minus level itself would not be sufficient to 
allow immigrants to function independently in the Netherlands, it was 
nevertheless believed that those who passed the exam at this level would 
be better prepared for further integration upon arrival.224 
The ‘Knowledge of the Netherlands’ test is taken in Dutch.225 This goes 
against the recommendations made by the Committee of experts, which 
found such an examination to be ‘unrealistic’. According to the Committee, 
the very basic language level (A1-minus) of the test meant that candidates 
could obtain only ‘very superficial information’ about life in the 
Netherlands, whereas testing candidates in their own language would 
require large investments and increase the possibility of fraud. The 
Committee also pointed out that a cognitive test would not be enough to 
actually familiarise applicants with ‘the Dutch way of life’, as such famili-
arity is gained through experience rather than study. It was consequently 
suggested not to test applicants’ knowledge of the Netherlands, but 
instead to provide them with information (in their own language) prepar-
ing them for their stay.226 This suggestion was not, however, adopted by 
the Dutch government.227 
222 Art 3.98a(3) Aliens Decree, as it read before 1 April 2011.
223 Commissie Franssen 2004, 21–22 and 34–35. See also Van der Winden 2006, 94–97.
224 Van der Winden 2006, 95–97, with references to parliamentary documents. 
225 Art 3.98a(7) Aliens Decree.
226 Commissie Franssen 2004, 40–41.
227 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 13. See also Van der Winden 2006, 
110–11.
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ii. Contents of the Exam after 1 April 2011
Despite the above considerations, the Dutch government decided in late 
2009 to make the integration exam abroad more difficult. The proposed 
changes entered into force on 1 April 2011.228 As of this date the required 
level of language proficiency was raised from A1-minus to A1 of the 
CEFR. Candidates are now also required to pass a reading comprehension 
test (toets Geletterdheid en Begrijpend Lezen) in addition to the other two 
tests. This means that immigrants to the Netherlands must not only dem-
onstrate oral language skills, but must also be able to read and under-
stand Latin script.
In support of the above changes, the government asserted that the 
effects of the AIA had so far been insufficient. Because of the basic level of 
the exam, newcomers who had passed the integration exam abroad still 
had little command of the Dutch language. In addition, the knowledge 
obtained abroad was not retained for long enough to have a positive effect 
on newcomers’ further integration in the Netherlands (section VI.D.ii). It 
was expected that a higher level of proficiency in Dutch and the ability to 
read (Latin script) would enable immigrants to integrate more rapidly 
and participate more easily in the labour market.229 The government 
announced several measures to assist candidates in obtaining the neces-
sary language skills, including the development of additional study mate-
rials to support the introduction of the reading test (section VI.C.iv).230
In the government’s view, the increased exam requirements would not 
result in large groups of family migrants being excluded from immigra-
tion to the Netherlands. It was stated that, given the availability of extra 
preparation facilities, the majority of applicants, including illiterate per-
sons and those with very little education, would have ‘a reasonable 
chance’ of passing the exam. By way of illustration, the government 
pointed out that prior to the changes almost 74 per cent of exam candi-
dates passed the test at the A1 level. Lastly, it was claimed that the AIA left 
enough scope for individual exemptions in situations where the integra-
tion exam abroad would make family reunification permanently impos-
sible.231 Hence, contrary to what it had said earlier (section VI.C.i), the 
government now claimed that a more difficult exam was not incompatible 
with Article 8 ECHR or the Family Reunification Directive.232 
228 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 679; entry into force Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 
844. The new exam programme is published in Government Gazette 2011, 1433.
229 Parliamentary Papers II 2009–2010, 32 175, No 1, 9; Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 679, 
3 and 5.
230 Parliamentary Papers II 2009–2010, 32 175, No 1, 22; Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 679, 9–10.
231 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 679, 4–6 and 9–11.
232 ibid, 10–12. The government stated that the wish not to exclude large groups of family 
migrants was one reason why it had chosen not to introduce a written test, see Bulletin of 
Acts and Decrees 2010, 679, 7–8. 
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Before the more difficult integration exam was introduced, objections to 
the proposed changes were raised by the Advisory Committee on Aliens 
Affairs (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken or ACVZ) and the Council 
of State (Raad van State). In particular the ACVZ stated that little informa-
tion was as yet available about the effects of the AIA, both on the integra-
tion process in the Netherlands and on the extent to which the Act resulted 
in the exclusion of family migrants. The Committee consequently claimed 
that no changes to the Act should be made without further research.233 The 
Council of State, moreover, was not convinced that the proposed changes 
would not have the effect of a priori excluding certain groups of immi-
grants, in particular those who were illiterate or unfamiliar with Latin 
script, given also that the government offered only minimal support to 
candidates wishing to prepare themselves for the exam and that adequate 
Dutch language tuition was not always available in countries of origin 
(section VI.C.iv). In view of these objections, the Council of State doubted 
whether the new exam would be consistent with the Family Reunification 
Directive.234 
iii. The Examination
The integration exam abroad is conducted on a computer equipped with 
speech recognition technology.235 Each attempt to take the exam costs 
€350.236 The exam can be taken at Dutch embassies and consulates in 
immigrants’ countries of origin.237 In 2009 the exam could be taken at 119 
locations around the world. In some countries, including several coun-
tries whose nationals are not exempted from the AIA (Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Qatar and Pakistan, for example), there was no opportunity to take the 
exam.238 Applicants who cannot take the exam at an embassy or consulate 
in their own country have to travel to a neighbouring country and take 
the exam there.239
The results of the integration exam abroad are also determined by 
the computer and no appeal is possible.240 Applicants can, however, 
appeal against the decision on their application for admission to the 
233 ACVZ 2010a, 4–5. See also ACVZ 2010b.
234 Government Gazette 2010, 13998, 14–16.
235 Art 3.98c(2) Aliens Decree. For a detailed discussion of the exam and the technology 
used, see Van der Winden 2006, 87–119.
236 Art 3.98b(2) Aliens Decree. The evaluation conducted in 2009 showed that candidates 
spent an average of €721 on the exam, including preparations; see the Principal findings and 
conclusions of the evaluation of the Act on Integration Abroad (Evaluatie Wet inburgering in 
het buitenland. Centrale bevindingen en conclusies), Annex to Parliamentary Papers II 2008–2009, 
32 005, No1, 8.
237 Art 3.98c(1) and (2) Aliens Decree.
238 Lodder 2009, 18–19.
239 See www.minbuza.nl.
240 Art 3.98c(3) and Art 3.98d(1) Aliens Decree.
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Netherlands.241 In this procedure they can also address the requirement of 
integration abroad. There is no limit on the number of times applicants 
can retake the exam.242
iv. Preparing for the Exam
Before the AIA was adopted, the Committee of experts advising on the 
exam requirements (Commissie Franssen) had warned that the availability 
of Dutch language courses and study materials in countries of origin was 
still limited, especially for those with little education, and that course pro-
viders in the Netherlands did not seem very eager to close this gap. The 
Committee also found that many study materials were available in the 
Netherlands, but that these were not suitable for learning Dutch abroad or 
without the guidance of a language teacher.243 It advised the government 
to develop adequate course materials and argued that the integration 
exam abroad could not be introduced without sufficient facilities to make 
it reasonably possible for candidates to prepare for the exam.244 Similar 
concerns were voiced by the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs and 
the Council of State, which argued that the government should ensure the 
availability of suitable study materials in countries of origin or at least 
monitor their development by private actors.245 
These recommendations, however, were not followed by the govern-
ment. As mentioned in section V.D, one of the principles behind the 
reform of the civic integration policy and the introduction of the Act on 
Integration Abroad was that immigrants to the Netherlands are primarily 
responsible for their own integration. The government consequently 
decided not to take responsibility for the availability of integration pro-
grammes or study materials in countries of origin and to leave this to the 
market. Exam candidates could choose from the courses or materials 
already available or that would be developed to meet their needs. Where 
necessary they could be helped by family members in the Netherlands or, 
in the case of religious servants, by the organisation seeking their admis-
sion.246 The government did, nevertheless, develop a preparation package 
to inform candidates about the requirements of the exam. This also con-
tains the film ‘To the Netherlands’ (Naar Nederland) and a photo book that 
241 Art 72(2) Aliens Act. 
242 Art 3.98d(2) Aliens Decree.
243 Commissie Franssen 2004, 22–23.
244 ibid, 26.
245 ACVZ 2004a, 44–45 and Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 4, 4–5. In this 
respect the Council of State referred to Art 19(6) of the European Social Charter, which states 
that the Contracting Parties shall facilitate the family reunification of migrant workers. On 
this provision see section IV.C of ch 7. 
246 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 13–14; Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 
29 700, No 6, 18 and 27–30. See also Van der Winden 2006, 97–100.
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candidates can use to prepare for the ‘Knowledge of the Netherlands’ test 
(section VI.C.i). The package was first made available in 13 and later 18 
languages and can be bought in bookshops in the Netherlands and on the 
internet at a cost of €63.90.247
The 2009 evaluation showed that integration courses had been set up in 
immigrants’ main countries of origin, including Turkey and Morocco. Of 
the candidates, 41 per cent indicated that they had taken a course in their 
own country; however, the quality of these programmes was said to vary 
from professional language training to ‘inferior classes taught in some-
one’s living room’.248 A majority of the candidates (87 per cent) used the 
preparation package devised by the government to study for the exam. 
This package was generally found to provide adequate preparation for 
the ‘Knowledge of the Netherlands’ test, but less so for the Dutch lan-
guage test. Interestingly some candidates found that the package did not 
prepare them sufficiently for the language test, whereas others found the 
level of the test to be too low.249 Finally, some candidates (15 per cent) pre-
pared themselves by taking an integration course in the Netherlands. 
While some of these candidates had already resided in the Netherlands at 
an earlier stage, others requested admission on a short-stay visa so as to 
be able to study for the exam.250 Although the available case law shows 
that such requests may be successful, in other cases requests for visas 
were denied because candidates were found to have insufficiently dem-
onstrated their intention to return home.251 
As far as the time required for preparation is concerned, the majority of 
applicants stated that they had studied for less than three months (40 per 
cent) or between three and six months (35 per cent), while 7 per cent 
indicated that they had prepared for more than one year. Two-thirds of 
the candidates stated that they found preparation to be ‘difficult’ or ‘very 
difficult’, whereas the others stated that it was ‘not so difficult’.252
It can be concluded that the opportunities to prepare for the integration 
exam abroad differ depending on a number of factors. Some candidates 
can prepare themselves by taking an integration course in the Netherlands 
or in their country of origin. For others, however, such courses may not be 
available or may be too costly or of insufficient quality. The preparation 
package alone also does not seem sufficient to prepare candidates for the 
language test, particularly those with little previous education. One of the 
247 Art 3.11 Aliens Decree. See also the website www.naarnederland.nl. 
248 Brink et al 2009, 23–25.
249 ibid, 25–27.
250 ibid, 24–25.
251 See President District Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam 28 May 2009, case no 
08/34330, LJN: BI8787 (admission granted in appeal) and President District Court of The 
Hague sitting in Amsterdam 17 September 2009, case nos 09/29111 and 09/25711, LJN: 
BJ9690 (admission denied). 
252 Brink et al 2009, 27.
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recommendations made following the above evaluation was that the gov-
ernment could do more to make adequate preparation facilities available 
to those wishing to take the integration exam abroad.253
Case law to date contains several examples of applicants who requested 
to be exempted from the integration exam abroad on the grounds that 
they could not prepare for it. In these cases the applicants claimed that 
they did not have access to integration courses or study materials (includ-
ing a computer) and/or that no preparation materials were available in 
their own language. Nevertheless all the appeals were rejected on the 
grounds that preparation for the exam was the responsibility of the appli-
cants.254 In one case, the District Court of The Hague stated that applicants 
could ask others to help them and to translate the preparation package 
into a language they could understand.255 
On 1 April 2011 the level of the integration exam abroad was increased 
and a reading test introduced. In view of these changes the government 
decided to make additional preparation materials available in order to 
increase the effect of the integration exam and ensure that it would not 
result in the exclusion of large groups of family migrants (section 
VI.C.ii).256 In particular, a language module, consisting of instructions, an 
illustrated exercise book, a CD and an e-learning tool, was added to the 
existing preparation package. There are two varieties of the module, one 
specifically designed for people who are illiterate or cannot read Latin 
script. It was also stated that candidates without a computer could pre-
pare themselves equally well using the exercise book and the CD.257 Lastly, 
the government announced that it would improve the supply of informa-
tion about available preparation materials and seek to promote new 
initiatives for learning Dutch abroad. It continued to maintain, however, 
that preparation for the exam remained the primary responsibility of 
applicants and that it was not the government’s responsibility to set up 
integration courses abroad.258
253 Principal findings and conclusions of the evaluation of the Act on Integration Abroad 
(Evaluatie Wet inburgering in het buitenland. Centrale bevindingen en conclusies), Annex to 
Parliamentary Papers II 2008–2009, 32 005, No 1, 13. 
254 District Court of The Hague sitting in Middelburg 16 August 2007, case nos 07/30015 
and 07/31032, LJN: BB3524; District Court of The Hague sitting in Breda 13 November 2007, 
case no 07/18500; District Court of The Hague 21 October 2009, case no 09/5145, LJN: 
BK5782; District Court of The Hague sitting in Groningen 10 November 2009, 08/34677; 
District Court of The Hague sitting in Maastricht 6 October 2012, case nos 09/33430 and 
10/9629. In the latter case the applicant was already in the Netherlands and claimed an 
exemption from the long-stay visa requirement. 
255 District Court of The Hague 21 October 2009, case no 09/5145, LJN: BK5782, para 6.2.
256 Parliamentary Papers II 2009–2010, 32 175, No 1, 9–10 and 22; Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 
2010, 679, 4. 
257 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 679, 9–10. 
258 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 679, 4 and 10.
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D. Effects of the Act on Integration Abroad
To the extent that information is available, this section briefly addresses the 
effects to date of the Act on Integration Abroad. The impact and effects of 
the Act were measured in an evaluation conducted in 2009 and covering 
the period between 15 March 2006 and 1 September 2008.259 Additional data 
are available from the Monitor of the Integration Exam Abroad (Monitor 
inburgeringsexamen buitenland), which has been regularly published since 
the AIA entered into force.260 The Monitor shows that, between 15 March 
2006 and 31 December 2011, the integration exam abroad was taken 45,954 
times by some 42,951 candidates.261 Most of the candidates are women: 
between 2006 and 2011 the share of female participants rose from 60 to 72 
per cent. About half of the candidates were between 26 and 35 years of age. 
Older candidates are less well represented, with only around 5 per cent of 
candidates being older than 46. In terms of education, the share of candi-
dates having received some form of secondary schooling varied between 43 
and 52 per cent, whereas 26–29 per cent was highly educated and 20–25 per 
cent had had no more than primary education. The available data do not 
show how many candidates were illiterate. After 1 April 2011, when the 
reading comprehension test was introduced (section VI.C.ii), the share of 
highly educated candidates rose to 35 per cent. The most common nation-
alities taking the exam were Turkish (+/–21 per cent), Moroccan (+/– 15 
per cent), Chinese (+/– 6 per cent) and Thai (+/– 6 per cent).262 
In so far as the effects of the AIA are concerned, a distinction can be 
made between the effects on the level and nature of immigration to the 
Netherlands and the effects on further integration after arrival. Both are 
discussed below.
i. Effects on Immigration
As explained above, the obligation to pass the integration exam abroad 
functions as a condition for admission to the Netherlands. Those who fail 
the exam are not allowed to immigrate. In addition, some people who 
may have wanted to come to the Netherlands may decide not to take the 
exam at all, either because they do not expect to pass or because they are 
not prepared to make the effort. 
259 Brink et al 2009, esp 35–70.
260 The Monitors are available from the Immigration and Naturalisation Service website 
(www.ind.nl) or as annexes to the Parliamentary Papers.
261 The Monitors for 2007 and 2008 do not indicate whether the candidates had already 
taken the exam in a previous year; some candidates may therefore have been counted more 
than once.
262 As of September 2011 Turkish nationals no longer belong to the target group of the 
AIA, see section VI.B.iii.
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Between 15 March 2006 and 1 September 2008, 96 per cent of the exam 
candidates passed the integration exam abroad, with 91 per cent of them 
passing on their first attempt. The latter percentage fell to 88 per cent in 
2009, then rose to 92 per cent in the first quarter of 2011. The pass rates for 
the ‘Knowledge of the Netherlands’ test are up to 5 per cent higher than 
those for the language test. After the introduction of the reading compre-
hension test, the share of candidates passing the exam at their first attempt 
dropped significantly, to 75 per cent in the period between 1 April and 31 
December 2011. The chances of passing the exam are not heavily affected 
by the age, gender, nationality or educational level of the candidate. 
However, candidates with no or only primary schooling are somewhat 
less likely to pass the exam than candidates with secondary or higher edu-
cation. The same is true for older compared to younger candidates. After 
1 April 2011, an increased divergence can be observed between candidates 
with no or little education (pass rate of 61 per cent) and highly educated 
candidates (pass rate of 87 per cent). The available data moreover show 
variation between candidates of different nationalities, ranging from 74 
per cent (Yugoslavians [?, KV] in 2010) to 100 per cent (South Africans in 
2011). As mentioned above, the results achieved by illiterate exam candi-
dates are not indicated separately, which makes it impossible to say 
whether this group is in effect excluded from family migration to the 
Netherlands.
The number of applications for admission to the Netherlands decreased 
strongly following the introduction of the Act on Integration Abroad, 
from 20,221 in 2005 to 13,796 in 2006.263 It rose again after 2006, but thus 
far has not reached the same level as before the AIA entered into force: the 
available data show that 18,621 applications were made in 2010 and 15,540 
in 2011.264 The introduction of the AIA has not resulted in any significant 
shifts in the composition of immigrant groups, specifically with regard to 
age, gender, nationality or level of education. Again, however, there is evi-
dence that those who applied for admission after 15 March 2006 were 
slightly younger and better educated than those applying before. This 
could indicate a certain level of self-selection among older persons and 
those with less education.265 In 2009, the committee appointed to evaluate 
263 Lodder 2009, 21. For the year 2006, the numbers cited by this author are somewhat 
lower than those provided in the Monitor of the Integration Exam Abroad (14,230).
264 These figures concern applications for admission by applicants belonging to the target 
group of the AIA. As of 2009, more specific data are available, indicating the number of 
applicants belonging to the target group of the AIA and who are not subject to exemptions 
(section VI.B.iii). These figures show a total of 13,679 applications in 2010 and 10,553 in 2011; 
however, a comparison with the situation before 2009 cannot be made.
265 Brink et al 2009, 60–62. In order to measure these differences, researchers made a com-
parison with immigrants applying for admission before 15 March 2006. The comparison 
concerned immigrants who, given their residence purpose and nationality, would have 
fallen within the target group of the AIA if they had applied after the Act entered into force 
(Brink et al 2009, 45–47). On the effect of ‘self-selection’ see also Odé 2009, 289–90.
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the AIA concluded that the introduction of the integration exam abroad 
had thus far not had a ‘strong or unacceptable’ selective effect on potential 
immigrants.266 However, in the second half of 2011, after the exam require-
ments had been raised (section VI.C.ii), the number of applications by 
persons belonging to the target group of the AIA dropped by one-third, 
from approximately 1500 to 1000 applications per month. It remains to be 
seen whether this trend will persist, and whether the tougher exam 
requirements will result in a decreased share of applicants who are illiter-
ate or have little education.
ii. Effects on Further Integration in the Netherlands
With regard to further integration in the Netherlands, the studies con-
ducted to date have not been able to establish any effects. As the AIA was 
introduced fairly recently, most of the immigrants who took the integra-
tion exam abroad have not yet taken the advanced integration exam in the 
Netherlands and it is not possible to say whether they will do better than 
immigrants who did not study Dutch before their admission.267 It is also 
still too early to examine whether those who passed the exam abroad have 
done better in terms of participating in society, for instance in terms of 
labour market participation or employment levels.268 Any assessment of 
the effects of the AIA on further integration will clearly also raise compli-
cated questions of how ‘integration’ or ‘participation’ should be defined 
and measured.269 
What has been shown thus far is that candidates who obtain high 
results on the integration exam abroad also do better when they are tested 
again upon arrival. The latter results tend, however, to be lower than 
those obtained in the exam abroad, which may indicate that knowledge 
acquired in the country of origin dwindles rapidly. In addition, immi-
grants who pass the exam abroad hardly perform better upon arrival in 
terms of oral language skills (listening and speaking) than those who did 
not take the exam, which can be attributed to the very basic level of the 
exam (until 1 April 2011). Interestingly, however, they do slightly better in 
terms of written skills (reading and writing), which, at the time of the 
evaluation, were not tested under the AIA. According to the researchers, 
266 Principal findings and conclusions of the evaluation of the Act on Integration Abroad 
(Evaluatie Wet inburgering in het buitenland. Centrale bevindingen en conclusies), Annex to 
Parliamentary Papers II 2008–2009, 32 005, No 1, 10. 
267 Under the Integration Act 2007 (section V.D) immigrants to the Netherlands must pass 
an advanced integration exam within 3.5 years of being granted a residence permit.
268 Brink et al 2009, 48–49. The same goes, a fortiori, for the effects of the changes intro-
duced on 1 April 2011 (section VI.C.ii). 
269 See, eg, the report of the pilot investigation into the effects of the civic integration 
policy, Eindrapport Pilotonderzoek Volgsysteem inburgering, effect van inburgering op participatie 
(Annex to Parliamentary Papers II 2010–2011, 32 321, No 3).
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this may be an effect of the preparation for the test or the fact that immi-
grants who took the exam were better educated than those who did not 
(section VI.D.i).270 Candidates themselves indicated that they expected the 
exam to help them with their further integration, but that their language 
proficiency was still too limited to make a real difference.271
The effects of the AIA on immigrant integration to date appear overall 
to have been mostly of an intangible nature. Professionals involved in 
implementing the AIA and  integration programmes in the Netherlands 
have indicated that immigrants are now better prepared for their arrival 
and that family members in the Netherlands have become more involved 
in the integration process. Candidates also state that they are motivated to 
continue studying Dutch after they have been admitted. According to the 
committee that conducted the evaluation, these signals could translate 
into more active participation of immigrants in the Netherlands. The com-
mittee warned, however, that immigrants need to be able to enrol on an 
integration programme soon after arriving, whereas long waiting periods 
will reduce the motivation of newcomers, as well as their freshly acquired 
language skills.272
VII. SUMMARY
This chapter traces the history of the Dutch policy on immigrant integra-
tion, with a focus on the events that eventually led to the adoption of the 
Act on Integration Abroad in 2006. Notwithstanding variations in num-
bers, residence purposes and countries of origin, immigrants came to the 
Netherlands throughout the period described above. From the 1970s 
onwards there was a growing awareness that immigrants would remain 
in the Netherlands and that they needed to be included in the Dutch soci-
ety. This resulted in the formulation of the Ethnic Minorities policy in the 
1980s, later followed by the Integration policy and the ‘New Style’ 
Integration policy. For the most part, Dutch integration policy has not 
been directed towards all immigrants, but towards those whose socio-
economic and/or socio-cultural integration was perceived as problematic 
(the so-called ethnic minorities, later referred to as ‘non-Western alloch-
thones’).
Ever since the Ethnic Minorities policy came into existence, language 
education and social orientation for immigrants formed part of the Dutch 
270 Brink et al 2009, 62–68. 
271 Principal findings and conclusions of the evaluation of the Act on Integration Abroad 
(Evaluatie Wet inburgering in het buitenland. Centrale bevindingen en conclusies), Annex to 
Parliamentary Papers II 2008–2009, 32 005, No 1, 8. 
272 Brink et al 2009, 69–70; Principal findings and conclusions of the evaluation of the Act 
on Integration Abroad (Evaluatie Wet inburgering in het buitenland. Centrale bevindingen en con-
clusies), Annex to Parliamentary Papers II 2008–2009, 32 005, No 1, 8–9 and 14.
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approach towards integration. Over time, however, these elements gained 
importance and more policy measures were taken to support them. In the 
1980s, no organised structure for immigrant adult education existed other 
than the reception programmes for refugees and other protected persons. 
At the time, language and social orientation courses were taught on an ad 
hoc basis by a variety of institutions and with a variety of methods. 
Meanwhile the courses on offer were insufficient to meet the demand. In 
the early 1990s the structure for adult basic education became more 
streamlined and specific facilities – including a state exam – were estab-
lished for education in Dutch as a second language (NT2). Around this 
time the government also began developing reception programmes for 
newcomers other than refugees with the aim of making these people 
more self-reliant. This aim tied in well with the new vision on immigrant 
integration, formulated in 1994, which emphasised the need for active 
participation of all citizens. 
As the reception policy developed further (and became known as the 
civic integration policy), it became generally accepted that participation 
in the reception programmes had to be mandatory. A legal basis for such 
mandatory participation was eventually introduced in 1998 in the form of 
the Newcomers Integration Act. Several years later, with the introduction 
of the ‘New Style’ Integration policy, the approach towards immigrant 
integration became yet more stringent and integration conditions were 
also introduced into immigration policy as a condition for admission and 
permanent or independent residence in the Netherlands. The integration 
exam abroad as a condition for admission was laid down in the Act on 
Integration Abroad, which entered into force on 15 March 2006.
The AIA is discussed in detail in section VI of this chapter. As outlined 
there, the target group of the Act consists mostly of family migrants from 
non-Western countries. In addition, religious servants are also subject to 
the condition of integration prior to admission. Although several exemp-
tion grounds are available, until recently individual exemptions were 
never or rarely granted for illiteracy or other forms of hardship. It is the 
responsibility of the candidates themselves (and their family members) to 
prepare for the integration exam abroad; some study materials are pro-
vided by the Dutch government, but these are not available in all lan-
guages and – until recently – did not prepare for the language test. While 
the requirements of the integration exam abroad were originally rather 
basic, the level was raised on 1 April 2011 and a reading comprehension 
test introduced to complement the examination of candidates’ oral lan-
guage skills.
After the introduction of the AIA, the number of immigrants in the tar-
get group remained lower than before. There are no signs as yet that the 
exam has the effect of excluding particular groups of persons, although 
older and less educated immigrants tend to be less well represented and 
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no information is available regarding the effects on illiterate persons. It is, 
furthermore, still too early to say whether the AIA has had a positive 
effect on the integration process in the Netherlands. The evaluation con-
ducted in 2009 shows that immigrants who pass the exam tend to be more 
prepared and motivated and have slightly better written language skills 
than those who came before the AIA entered into force. It remains to be 
seen, however, whether these results will also have an effect in the longer 
term, and how the above results will be affected by the increased exam 
requirements. 
3
Concepts of Integration and  
Citizenship in the Netherlands
I. INTRODUCTION
THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER gave an overview of Dutch integra-tion policy up until the adoption of the Act on Integration Abroad. Since the early 1990s the objective of this policy has often been for-
mulated in terms of citizenship. Yet both citizenship and integration are 
rather abstract concepts that lend themselves to differing interpretations.1 
It is worthwhile, therefore, to analyse in more detail the meaning given to 
these concepts in Dutch integration and immigration policies. This analy-
sis serves two aims. The first is to show how the Dutch understanding of 
integration and citizenship has developed over time. The second is to gain 
better insight into the objectives pursued by the Act on Integration 
Abroad. 
This chapter focuses on two distinct themes. One concerns the relation-
ship between immigration and integration policy and the construction 
of integration as an exclusionary concept. Section II explains how the inte-
gration exam abroad, as a requirement for admission, is expected to contrib-
ute to better integration in the Netherlands. The second theme is the 
changing meaning of integration throughout different stages of Dutch 
integration policy. Section III traces developments in the definition of 
integration, and hence in the objectives of the integration policy, both 
before and after the introduction of the Act on Integration Abroad. At the 
end of each section, a limited normative assessment is provided of the 
Dutch integration objectives and of the integration exam abroad as an 
instrument to achieve them.
The findings presented in this chapter are primarily based on parlia-
mentary documents expressing the views of the Dutch government. 
Where useful, other sources, such as the reports of the Scientific Council 
for Government Policy (WRR), are used to illustrate specific develop-
ments. 
1 See, amongst others, Fermin 2000, 17–25; Bosniak 2006, 19–20; Klaver and Odé 2009, 
13–24.
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II. INTEGRATION AS AN ADMISSION REQUIREMENT
A. Integration as a Ground for Exclusion before 2003
Before the proposal for the Act on Integration Abroad was submitted in 
2003, considerations of integration policy already played a role in the for-
mulation of Dutch immigration rules. Under the Ethnic Minorities policy 
(chapter 2, section III), a restrictive policy on immigration was seen as a 
condition for successful integration.2 This position was confirmed in a 
2001 policy paper, where the Dutch government stated that the number of 
immigrants that could be admitted was limited by the capacity of Dutch 
society to absorb new arrivals. This capacity was said to be ‘dependent on 
many factors, including employment opportunities, social infrastructures, 
the availability of reception and housing, but also the mental prepared-
ness of Dutch nationals to live together with new citizens’.3 The paper 
moreover highlighted the potentially negative economic and social conse-
quences of immigration, especially with regard to immigrants who were 
‘at a larger distance from Western culture’.4 This illustrates that both the 
scope and nature of immigration flows were considered relevant factors 
in determining the impact of immigration on the integration process. 
Initially, however, considerations of integration did not point unequiv-
ocally in the direction of a restrictive immigration policy. Specifically 
where family migration was concerned, it was also recognised that family 
reunification could have a positive effect on the well-being of migrants 
already living in the Netherlands.5 From this perspective, the right to fam-
ily reunification was viewed as an element of a strong legal status and in 
turn as a prerequisite for successful integration.6 Nevertheless, family 
reunification and especially family formation were at the same time also 
perceived as both symptom and cause of a faltering integration process. 
The fact that some immigrants in the Netherlands chose to marry some-
one from their country of origin was seen as a sign that they were not 
oriented towards the Netherlands. Concerns were also raised about a lack 
of participation of family migrants in Dutch society and the effects of this 
on their children.7 These concerns eventually resulted in the introduction 
of new criteria for regulating family migration, including age and income 
2 Van Walsum 2008, 169–70. 
3 Parliamentary Papers II 2001–2002, 28 198, No 2 (Nota ‘Integratie in het perspectief van immi-
gratie’), 7. In the same vein, see Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 28 689, No 17 (Kabinetsreactie 
rapport Commissie Blok), 15.
4 Nota ‘Integratie in het perspectief van immigratie’ (n 3), 13–14.
5 ibid, 45–46; WRR 2001a, 225.
6 Van Walsum 2008, 226–27.
7 WRR 2001a, 75 and 225; Nota ‘Integratie in het perspectief van immigratie’ (n 3), 45–46.
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requirements.8 Some years later these requirements were followed by the 
integration exam abroad, which is discussed below.
B. The Act on Integration Abroad: from Inclusion to Exclusion
i. Inclusion: Preparing for Life in the Netherlands
The idea for the integration exam abroad was introduced in 2003 as part 
of the ‘New Style’ Integration policy (section V.D of chapter 2). Initially, 
the exam was presented primarily as an instrument for the inclusion of 
newcomers. It was argued that integration abroad would enable immi-
grants to be better prepared for their future life in the Netherlands and to 
experience a greater degree of autonomy immediately upon their arrival.9 
Clearly, this argument was based on the assumption that those having to 
take the exam would eventually be admitted. In the government’s view, 
taking the integration exam abroad would allow the integration process 
to start earlier: before being admitted, immigrants would already be 
obliged to obtain basic knowledge of the Dutch language and society. It 
was anticipated that this early preparation would make their integration 
in the Netherlands both faster and more effective. This connection 
between integration abroad and further integration in the Netherlands is 
also reflected in the target group of the AIA. According to the govern-
ment, ‘it would not be useful to impose the integration exam abroad on 
aliens who will not be subject to integration obligations in the 
Netherlands’.10 Consequently, the Act applies only to immigrants who 
will also be subject to compulsory integration after being admitted. 
The integration exam abroad – and the sanction of non-admission for 
those failing the exam – was thus originally seen as an incentive for those 
who would not prepare themselves for life in the Netherlands of their 
own accord.11 It may be recalled in this respect that one of the principal 
features of the ‘New Style’ Integration policy was a strong emphasis on 
individual responsibility (chapter 2, section V.B). Implicit in the view of 
the exam as an ‘incentive’, however, is that all applicants for admission 
can eventually pass and enter the Netherlands. Yet, as was pointed out by 
the Dutch Council of State, application of the AIA would also result in the 
8 Van Walsum 2008, 226–38.
9 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 543, No 2 (Contourennota ‘Herziening van het inbur-
geringsstelsel’), 5–6; Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 4, 6 and 16; Parliamentary 
Papers II 2004–2005, 29 700, No 6, 1–2, 8, 11 and 13.
10 Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 700, No 6, 33.
11 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 203, No 1, (Brief Integratiebeleid Nieuwe Stijl), 16; 
Contourennota ‘Herziening van het inburgeringsstelsel’ (n 9), 7; Parliamentary Papers II 2004–
2005, 29 700, No 6.
 Integration as an Admission Requirement 75
exclusion of those immigrants who would not pass the exam.12 The 
explanatory memorandum to the AIA (memorie van toelichting) was subse-
quently revised so as to include reasons why failure to pass the exam 
should result in non-admission.
ii. Exclusion: the Threat of Continuing Immigration 
In the above memorandum the government reinforced its earlier stance 
that immigration could cause problems in the field of integration (section 
II.A), claiming that the continuing immigration to the Netherlands 
resulted in a constant repetition of the integration process ‘at the macro 
level’ as all new immigrants had to start their integration from the begin-
ning. This was deemed to have a negative influence on social cohesion in 
Dutch society, as well as on the resident population’s acceptance of new 
migrants.13 Additionally, it was feared that continual immigration and 
delayed integration would marginalise certain groups in the population 
and result in their having a reduced capacity for social participation, poor 
opportunities in the labour market and structural dependence on social 
security benefits. Such marginalisation could in turn increase the chances 
of immigrants turning away from society and becoming susceptible to 
anti-Western feelings or radical ideologies. Lastly, since many new immi-
grants were family migrants who would raise their children in the 
Netherlands, there were concerns that these problems would be trans-
ferred from one generation to the next.14 
Against the background of these expected problems, the integration 
exam abroad was proposed as a selection criterion for distinguishing 
between those immigrants whose integration into Dutch society was 
likely to be successful and others who would likely prove unable to inte-
grate successfully.15 Even as an immigration requirement, therefore, the 
exam still pursued an integration objective. However, whereas the earlier 
arguments in support of the AIA were based on the assumption that 
applicants for admission would eventually be included, the current argu-
ment assumes that unsuccessful immigrants will be excluded. In this rea-
soning, the integration of those already present in the Netherlands will 
improve because others, who could disturb this process, will be kept out. 
The lasting influence of this line of argumentation on Dutch immigration 
policy was illustrated several years after the AIA had been adopted. While 
recognising that immigration to the Netherlands is unavoidable and 
12 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 4, 1.
13 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 3; Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 
700, No 6, 3.
14 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 4; Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 
700, No 6, 4. 
15 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 6.
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sometimes also desirable (notably in the case of labour migration), the 
government nevertheless asserted that 
the arrival of migrants whose convictions and behaviour differ from, and some-
times clash heavily with, the convictions and behaviour of resident Dutch citi-
zens has led to social tensions and discussions. The everyday effect of cultural 
diversity, in combination with the arrival of low-educated migrants who are 
insufficiently equipped for life in the Dutch society, has exerted severe pressure 
on the quality of life particularly in the larger cities.16 
The need for a selective immigration policy was subsequently recon-
firmed, together with the intention to increase the level of the integration 
exam abroad.17
iii. Selection: from Motivation to Education
It was submitted in section II.A that both the scope and nature of family 
migration to the Netherlands gave rise to concerns with regard to integra-
tion. Contrary to what has been asserted by other authors, however, the 
legislative history of the AIA shows that the integration exam abroad was 
primarily intended to act as a selection mechanism rather than as a mere 
barrier to immigration.18 As explained above, the purpose of the exam is 
to select those immigrants for admission whose integration in the 
Netherlands is likely to be successful. Meanwhile, it was acknowledged 
that introducing the AIA would also have the effect of restricting immi-
gration.19 However reducing the number of immigrants was not presented 
as a goal in itself. In the words of the Dutch government:
16 Parliamentary Papers II 2009–2010, 31 268, No 25 (Integratiebrief ) , 2.
17 Parliamentary Papers II 2009–2010, 32 175, No 1 (Kabinetsaanpak huwelijks- en gezinsmigra-
tie). See also, more recently, Parliamentary Papers II 2010–2011, 32 824, No 1 (Nota ‘Integratie, 
binding, burgerschap’), 5 and 12–13. 
18 See Spijkerboer 2007, 30–31 and Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009, 12–13. The latter authors 
argue that a reduction in the number of immigrants was a ‘hidden’ but nonetheless ‘crucial’ 
objective of the AIA. They claim, first of all, that the exclusionary effects of the AIA were not 
explicitly addressed by the Dutch legislator in the explanatory memorandum (memorie van 
toelichting) to the Act. In support of this statement the authors refer to the advisory opinion 
of the Dutch Council of State (section II.B.i). However, this opinion concerned the draft 
explanatory memorandum (ontwerp-memorie van toelichting), which is sent to the Council of 
State before being made public (Art 15(1)(a) of the Act on the Council of State (Wet op de Raad 
van State)). By contrast, the final memorandum, to which the authors also refer, includes the 
comments of the Council of State and expressly acknowledges the exclusionary effects of the 
AIA (Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3). In another argument the authors state 
that the level of the integration exam abroad was raised in March 2008 because ‘candidates 
had a higher level of language proficiency than expected’, which resulted in ‘too many 
applicants’ passing the test. From the parliamentary documents, however, it appears that the 
exam was adjusted not because the pass rate was considered too high, but because the test 
turned out to measure a lower level of language proficiency than agreed on before the AIA 
entered into force (Parliamentary Papers II 2006–2007, 29 700, No 40, 5–6).
19 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 15.
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The new integration requirement does not primarily aim to reduce the influx of 
new immigrants. The most desirable situation would be one in which every 
potential immigrant would become sufficiently acquainted, in the country of 
origin, with the language and the society of the country in which he wishes to 
settle.20 
From this statement it can be concluded that the integration exam abroad 
was regarded as a measure of qualitative rather than quantitative immi-
gration control. While it was expected that the exam would result in a 
reduction of immigration to the Netherlands, this was not presented as a 
solution for integration-related problems or as one of the reasons for the 
enactment of the AIA. Nevertheless, to the extent that this effect remained 
within the limits set by international law, it was considered ‘preferable to 
the situation in which the integration process is hampered immediately 
after [the] arrival [of the immigrant]’.21 In other words, the fact that fewer 
immigrants would be admitted was considered acceptable in view of the 
importance of the integration objective.22 
This being said, the observation that the integration exam abroad was 
intended to act as a selection mechanism raises the question of the selec-
tion criterion to be used. In this respect the Dutch legislator’s position 
appears to have developed since the AIA was adopted. Initially, it was 
suggested that the main criterion for selection would be the immigrant’s 
motivation or determination to successfully integrate. It was claimed that 
the level of the integration exam abroad would be ‘reasonably attainable 
for all those who make sufficient efforts’ and that no one would be a priori 
excluded from coming to the Netherlands.23 To pass the exam immigrants 
would be required to demonstrate their readiness to make substantial 
efforts to integrate in the Netherlands, whereas those not willing to do so 
would not be eligible for admission.24 By contrast, it was expressly stated 
that the purpose of the AIA was not to select immigrants on the basis of 
their education and that both highly skilled and less-educated immigrants 
would be able to pass the integration test.25
Yet, despite the wish to use immigrants’ willingness to integrate as the 
primary selection criterion, the integration exam abroad was formulated 
as an obligation of result.26 Instead of having to complete an integration 
20 Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 700, No 6, 43.
21 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 14.
22 Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 700, No 6, 13 and 41.
23 ibid, 10. See also section VI.C.i of ch 2.
24 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 11 and 16; Parliamentary Papers II 2004–
2005, 29 700, No 6, 7, 11, 17 and 41.
25 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 11; Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 
700, No 6, 10–11, 18, 40 and 44.
26 A nice illustration of the distinction between obligations of effort and obligations of 
result is provided by Bonjour, who compares the Dutch and French systems of ‘integration 
abroad’, Bonjour 2010, 303–07.
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programme or invest a certain number of hours to prepare for life in the 
Netherlands, immigrants are asked to pass an exam at a specified level. 
This means that those with little education or learning capacity will have 
to show more effort and determination than those who are highly edu-
cated or learn easily. Additionally, the level of persistence needed to pass 
the exam depends on other factors, such as the availability of learning 
materials and the candidate’s financial means. These differences were 
accepted on the grounds that the basic knowledge required to pass the 
integration exam abroad was minimally necessary for successful integra-
tion in the Netherlands.27 By setting this standard, however, the legislator 
agreed to a measure that would select immigrants not only on the basis of 
their motivation to integrate, but also on their ability.28 Even if the exam 
was set at such a low level that those without any formal education were 
able to pass, such people still had to make more effort than others and 
were probably more easily deterred from seeking admission at all.
More recently, the government explicitly changed its earlier position 
and claimed that education was an important factor in determining immi-
grants’ chances of successful integration. Towards the end of 2009, several 
years after the AIA entered into force, it was asserted that ‘the long-term 
effects of the integration exam abroad are still limited and 25 per cent of 
family migrants who take the exam have not received more than primary 
education in their country of origin’.29 It was then concluded that the level 
of the exam had to be raised so as to ensure that immigrants who were 
admitted would be better prepared for their further integration in the 
Netherlands. A reading comprehension test was also introduced, on the 
grounds that the ability to read the Latin script also enhanced the pros-
pects of successful integration.30 These changes, which took effect on 
1 April 2011, show that a certain level of education or literacy has replaced 
the motivation to integrate as the primary criterion for selection under the 
AIA. 
C. The Legitimacy of Exclusion: a Balancing of Interests
The previous subsections describe how the notion of integration has 
been conceptualised in relation to the admission of immigrants to the 
27 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 11 and 14.
28 It appears that this was also recognised by the Dutch government, which stated at one 
point that the exam would entail ‘a selection of persons who are willing and able to invest in 
their own integration’ (emphasis added), Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 700, No 6, 17. 
The distinction between education and motivation as grounds for selecting family migrants 
is also noted by Spijkerboer in his analysis of the political debate that preceded the adoption 
of the AIA, see Spijkerboer 2007, 31–32.
29 Kabinetsaanpak huwelijks- en gezinsmigratie (n 17), 3.
30 ibid, 3 and 9–10. See also ch 2, section VI.C.ii.
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Netherlands and demonstrate that the integration exam abroad, as a 
requirement for admission, has been supported largely by arguments of 
exclusion. For immigrants eventually admitted to the Netherlands, prepa-
ration for the exam can be seen as a first step in the integration process. 
However, the exam mainly functions as a requirement for admission on 
the assumption that the integration process in the Netherlands will bene-
fit from a selective immigration policy. 
The exclusionary purpose and effects of the AIA led Groenendijk to 
conclude that the integration exam abroad aims to control immigration 
rather than facilitate integration.31 However, these objectives do not neces-
sarily contradict each other. Instead, as the above analysis shows, the aim 
of integration, as understood in the context of the AIA, includes facilitat-
ing a smooth integration process within the Netherlands that is not inter-
rupted by the arrival of new immigrants whose prospects for integration 
are considered problematic.32 The aim of the integration exam abroad can 
thus be described as ‘integration through exclusion’. Arguably this is not 
merely a terminological issue. By recognising that certain immigrants are 
excluded in order to make integration easier for those who are already in 
the Netherlands, the interests of the receiving state are made visible. The 
question to be asked, then, is not if the aim of the AIA is to enable integra-
tion, but whether the Act constitutes a suitable measure to achieve this 
aim and whether the interests of the receiving state outweigh those of the 
individuals (immigrants and their family members) who are seeking 
admission.
Regarding the latter question, different authors have argued that the 
acceptability of immigration conditions must be determined by balancing 
the competing interests (the interest of the state versus that of the indi-
vidual), with an important consideration being the reasons for which 
admission is sought. Vermeulen has submitted that the case for admission 
is particularly strong in situations where a person seeks international pro-
tection – thus leaving little or no room for requirements in the field of 
integration. On the other hand, states have a greater amount of discretion 
in cases of labour migration or family reunification, to decide the terms 
under which admission may be granted. In the latter type of cases, such 
requirements may be imposed as are necessary to protect national inter-
ests, including the interest of social unity or integration.33 
31 Groenendijk 2011, 27–28. 
32 cp Bonjour 2010, 307, who states that the AIA is intended to ‘assuage the “problem” of 
social cohesion by reducing the inflow of “problematic” migrants’.
33 Vermeulen 2010a, 140–42. See also Benhabib 2004, 137; ACVZ 2004b, 20–21 and Tholen 
1997, 194–95. The latter author, while not explicitly pleading for the admission of asylum 
seekers, refers to a ‘responsibility to offer help’ as a criterion for the just regulation of 
immigration. It may be assumed that application of this principle will also result in a prior-
itisation of those seeking international protection. Lastly, see Groenendijk 2011, 29–30, who 
states that language requirements may well be legitimate for selecting labour migrants or 
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In my view it is indeed plausible to maintain that the legitimacy of inte-
gration conditions depends, to a large extent, on the grounds on which 
admission is sought. It can also be accepted that states are entitled to a 
certain amount of discretion where the regulation of family migration is 
concerned. Nevertheless, the individual interest involved in cases of fam-
ily reunification should not be underestimated. Family reunification cases 
differ from asylum cases in that the family members will usually also 
have the opportunity to live together in their country of origin, in which 
case denying admission will not impact on the freedom to live as a family. 
However, people have a strong interest in being able to live together with 
their (immediate) family in the state of which they are nationals or with 
which they otherwise have strong ties.34 It is submitted that the Dutch 
legislator, in adopting the Act on Integration Abroad, has failed to give 
this interest sufficient weight. The extent to which integration require-
ments for the admission of family members fit into the legal framework 
for family reunification is addressed in chapter 4 of this study.
Lastly, it is argued that the legitimacy of integration requirements for the 
admission of immigrants is greater if it can be established that such require-
ments actually contribute to the realisation or preservation of social unity. 
In most cases it is obviously not possible to establish the effect of integra-
tion measures before they are adopted. However, the longer these meas-
ures have been in force, the more weight has to be given to evidence 
(positive or negative) of their effectiveness. Thus, when considering the 
legitimacy of the AIA, the results of the 2009 evaluation (and further evalu-
ations) must be taken into account (see chapter 2, section VI.D).
III. THE INTEGRATION EXAM ABROAD  
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CITIZENSHIP
A. Integration and Citizenship in the Netherlands before the 
Introduction of the Act on Integration Abroad35
Chapter 2 explained that the issue of immigrant integration in the 
Netherlands was first comprehensively addressed in the Ethnic Minorities 
co-ethnics (persons belonging to an ethnic group with strong ties to the host state, such as 
the German Aussiedler), but is more critical as regards language or integration requirements 
in the case of family reunification. 
34 See also De Hart 2009, 251 and Groenendijk 2011 (n 33).
35 The description and analysis in the following subsections (III.A–III.C) are based on pri-
mary sources, mainly parliamentary documents and reports by public advisory bodies. The 
developments signalled largely correspond to those described by other authors; see notably 
Driouichi 2007, 18–47; Spijkerboer 2007, 13–17; Klaver and Odé 2009, 42–55; Fermin 2009, 
16–19 and 22–25 and Van Gunsteren 2009. Where applicable, references to this literature are 
made to support or complement the analysis in this chapter or to highlight relevant differ-
ences.
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policy, which came into being in the 1980s. In terms of integration objec-
tives, this policy primarily sought to improve the legal and socio-economic 
position of immigrants compared to Dutch residents and to further their 
political engagement by granting them voting rights at a local level and 
adopting lenient laws on citizenship.36 At the same time, although mem-
bers of ethnic minority groups were expected to respect ‘basic Dutch norms 
and values’ and make efforts to learn Dutch, these aspects of the integra-
tion process received relatively little attention. As far as ethnic minorities’ 
cultural identities were concerned, the Dutch government rejected both 
forced assimilation and segregation as possible policy approaches. Instead 
it was claimed that minority groups had to be enabled to experience and 
develop their identity in relation to Dutch society, which in turn would be 
changed by these new cultural influences. The government saw it as its 
task to create the conditions for this interaction to take place.37
In the early 1990s the concept of ‘integration’ – and consequently of the 
objectives of the integration policy – was reconsidered (chapter 2, section 
IV.B). This reconsideration was inspired by continuing concerns about 
immigration and the position of migrant minorities, as well as the ongo-
ing restructuring of the welfare state and a changing philosophy on the 
relationship between the state and its citizens.38 The reformulated integra-
tion policy emphasised that integration was not only a matter of rights, 
but also of duties, and that the objective of integration (thereafter referred 
to as ‘citizenship’) required active participation in the public domain. As 
the government put it, citizens were ‘free, autonomous and active human 
beings who have a responsibility for their own well-being as well as for 
the society in which they live’.39 Concern was expressed that the Ethnic 
Minorities policy had treated immigrants too much as ‘needy categories’, 
thus making them dependent on the state.40 By contrast, the notion of ‘cit-
izenship’ entailed immigrants being expected to ‘become judicious and 
mature citizens able to cope in the competitive Dutch society’.41 
36 Parliamentary Papers II 1993–1994, 23 684, No 2 (Contourennota Integratiebeleid etnische 
minderheden), 10.
37 Draft memorandum on minorities policy published by the Department of Home Affairs 
in 1981 (Ontwerp-minderhedennota), 18–20, 37–38; Parliamentary Papers II 1982–1983, 16 102, 
No 21 (Minderhedennota), 11, 107–108.
38 Fermin 2009, 16. 
39 Contourennota Integratiebeleid etnische minderheden (n 36), 24; Parliamentary Papers II 1998–
1999, 26 333, No 2 (Nota‘Kansen krijgen, kansen pakken’), 3–4 and 8–9. The move towards 
‘active citizenship’ is also visible in two reports published by the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy, see WRR 1989 and WRR 1992.
40 WRR 1989, 17. See also the position paper published by the Department of Welfare enti-
tled ‘Investing in integration’ (Investeren in integreren), in which it was stated that future 
integration policy should aim to reinforce the independent participation of immigrants in 
society (in particular through work and education) in order to prevent their marginalisation 
and dependence on communal facilities (Ministerie van WVC, Investeren in integreren, 1994, 
1–7).
41 Contourennota Integratiebeleid etnische minderheden (n 36), 24–25.
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The notion of ‘citizenship’, as introduced in 1994, also, however, 
assumed a shared commitment of all Dutch residents (immigrant and 
non-immigrant), civil society and the government for the integration 
process. Immigrants’ responsibilities were balanced by responsibilities on 
the part of non-immigrant residents, the government and various social 
institutions and organisations (schools, housing corporations, employ-
ment agencies and so on) to enable immigrant participation by creating 
an open and receptive society.42 Integration was thus perceived as a 
two-sided process. 
The focus of integration policy in the 1990s was primarily on socio- 
economic integration,43 with immigrants’ participation in education and 
the labour market often seen as key factors for achieving the citizenship 
objective. It was in order to achieve such participation that immigrants 
were expected to learn Dutch and to acquire basic knowledge about the 
Netherlands.44 As discussed in the previous chapter, attaining educa-
tional, professional or social self-reliance was also the objective of the 
Newcomers Integration Act adopted in 1998 (chapter 2, section IV.D).45 
In the meantime, cultural expressions by ethnic minorities or interac-
tions between minorities and the majority population did not feature 
prominently in the newly formulated notion of citizenship, especially in 
the first few years after it was introduced. This absence may be explained 
by two factors. Firstly, the idea of government support for ethnic minority 
cultures had been criticised. In September 1991 Frits Bolkestein, a Member 
of Parliament for the liberal VVD party, called for a more ‘daring’ integra-
tion policy, in which cultural relativism made way for the dominance of 
certain liberal principles that Bolkestein claimed to be universal and fun-
damental to the Dutch legal order (notably the separation of church and 
state, freedom of speech, tolerance and non-discrimination). According to 
Bolkestein, these principles had to be defended against what he perceived 
as illiberal practices occurring particularly in Muslim cultures, including 
discrimination of homosexuals, forced marriages and calls for the death of 
the writer Salman Rushdie.46 
Although these remarks spurred a great deal of protest Bolkestein’s 
central thesis – the prevalence of liberal values and principles over cul-
tural relativism – was eventually generally accepted.47 During the ensuing 
‘national integration debate’ (maatschappelijk debat integratie) the Dutch 
Home Affairs Minister (then responsible for integration policy) stated that 
42 ibid, 24–27.
43 Fermin 2009, 16.
44 WRR 1989, 43–47.
45 Fermin also pointed out that, in line with the perspective of the ‘activating welfare 
state’, an important target group of civic integration policy consisted of newcomers depend-
ent on social security benefits. See Fermin 2009, 23.
46 Prins 2000, 27–30; Struijs 1998, 17.
47 Prins 2000, 29; Driouichi 2007, 22; Van Gunsteren 2009, 45.
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certain values were non-negotiable within Dutch society.48 The revised 
Integration policy also stated that citizenship required respect for norms 
described as fundamental to the Dutch constitutional system, including 
the democratic legal order, freedom of expression, the individual right to 
self-determination, equality between the sexes and the separation of 
church and state.49 
The above focus on respect for liberal principles can help explain why 
support for ethnic minority cultural expressions waned. In addition, the 
prevailing view was that socio-cultural integration would come about 
after, and as a result of, successful social-economic integration, which 
would be achieved primarily through labour participation and (language) 
education.50 The stated aim of the integration policy was primarily, there-
fore, to achieve results in these latter fields. As far as civic integration was 
concerned, Dutch history and information on national holidays were 
taught as part of the social orientation course, but only as ‘nice to know’ 
topics.51 It was also expressly stated that members of ethnic minority 
groups were not expected to give up their own (ethnic) identity as this 
was regarded as a matter of personal choice.52 Compared to the Ethnic 
Minorities policy, however, the revised Integration policy did increase the 
pressure on individual immigrants to ‘fit in’ and adapt to mainstream 
society.53
From 1998 onwards, elements of culture and ethnicity began to play a 
more significant role in the way integration was conceptualised in the 
Netherlands.54 Although active citizenship remained the core objective of 
integration policy and responsibility for achieving this objective contin-
ued to be placed on immigrants and the receiving society alike,55 the gov-
ernment also expressed an increased awareness of the role of cultural 
differences – including minority religions – in the integration process.56 
Initially, it was proposed accommodating these differences in the Dutch 
constitutional order, while interaction between different ethnic and cul-
tural groups was to be promoted.57 Gradually, however, the scope for 
48 Parliamentary Papers II 1991–1992, 22 314, No 9, 2.
49 Contourennota Integratiebeleid etnische minderheden (n 36), 25..
50 ibid, 24–25; WRR 1989, 23–24, 49–50. See also Driouichi 2007, 23 and Fermin 2009, 17.
51 Ch 2, section V.C.iii. On the contents of the social orientation course and the way in 
which these topics were taught, see also Van Huis and De Regt 2005, 397–400.
52 Contourennota Integratiebeleid etnische minderheden (n 36), 25.
53 Driouichi 2007, 25 (citing Fermin 1997, 226). This development was also observed by 
Schinkel, see Schinkel 2008, 39–40.
54 See also Van Huis and De Regt 2005, 382–83.
55 Nota ‘Kansen krijgen, kansen pakken’ (n 39). 
56 ibid, 6–7; Parliamentary Papers II 1999–2000, 26 333, No 13. See also section V.B of ch 2. As 
mentioned there, the government’s policy on socio-cultural integration went against the 
approach proposed by the WRR (WRR 2001a).
57 Nota ‘Kansen krijgen, kansen pakken’ (n 39), 7–8; see also Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 
29 614, No 2 (Nota ‘Grondrechten in de pluriforme samenleving’).
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cultural, ethnic and religious differences diminished as a more compre-
hensive concept of citizenship was formulated.58
In 2000, the publicist Paul Scheffer called for more commitment to the 
integration process and for a stronger ‘national consciousness’ that could 
serve as guidance for immigrants seeking to integrate. In the ensuing par-
liamentary debate his ideas were rejected by several (liberal or leftist) 
political parties (GroenLinks, D66 and SP), but defended by the Christian 
Democratic party (CDA).59 After the ‘Scheffer debate’, issues of socio-cul-
tural integration, including processes of identity and interaction, contin-
ued to play an increasingly important role in integration policy. At this 
stage it was reaffirmed that immigrants needed scope to experience their 
own identities. The government also, however, presented a rather wide-
ranging view on what integration entailed, declaring that ‘immigrants 
must learn the Dutch language, adopt Dutch values, norms and social 
codes, qualify for the labour market, internalise the legal order and – most 
importantly – eventually feel at home’.60 
As the notion of citizenship thickened, minority groups’ affiliations 
with their own cultures or religions increasingly came to be seen as an 
obstacle to citizenship, particularly in the case of non-Western immi-
grants, who were considered to be ‘at a greater distance from Western 
culture’, and Muslims.61 This development was reinforced in the years to 
come by events such as the attack on the New York Twin Towers in 2001 
and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim 
extremist in 2004.62
B. The ‘New Style’ Integration Policy: from ‘Active’ to ‘Shared’ 
Citizenship
In 2003, the Dutch government once again reformulated its position on 
integration under the heading of the ‘New Style’ Integration policy (chap-
ter 2, section V.B). At this point the objective of the integration policy, 
which was then labelled as ‘shared citizenship’, was described as a series 
of duties and responsibilities. Rather than fostering or supporting affilia-
tions to minority cultural identities, the government sought to promote 
unity and social cohesion by emphasising commonalities between citi-
58 See also Driouichi 2007, 95–96.
59 Proceedings II 2000, No 70, 4700–28 and No 71, 4731–92. Driouichi notes that an impor-
tant theme in the CDA’s political programme at the time was that of shared ‘norms and val-
ues’ (normen en waarden). After 2002, when the CDA came to power, this theme came to play 
an important role in the integration policy (section III.B). Driouichi 2007, 41–42.
60 Parliamentary Papers II 2001–2002, 28 198, No 2, 13–14. 
61 ibid, 13. See also Fermin 2009, 17–18. In the words of this author ‘problems in the field 
of integration were increasingly defined in terms of cultural conflicts, whereby the Islamic 
religion was perceived as the main source of division’.
62 Spijkerboer 2007, 17; Fermin 2009, 17; Van Gunsteren 2009, 46; Vermeulen 2010a, 85–87.
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zens. To this end, it was asserted, citizens had to actively participate in 
Dutch society, speak Dutch and comply with the Dutch Constitution and 
‘basic Dutch norms’.63 Although no exhaustive account of these norms 
was provided, they were said to include
attempting to sustain oneself financially; complying with laws and regulations; 
caring for one’s environment; respecting the physical integrity of others, includ-
ing within a marriage; accepting the right of every person to freedom of speech; 
accepting the sexual preferences of others and recognising the equality of men 
and women.64 
At the same time, the ideal of ‘shared citizenship’ involved achieving 
individual autonomy and the freedom for citizens to shape their lives as a 
matter of personal choice. However, the prevailing view at the time was 
that such freedom and autonomy could not be accomplished unless the 
above norms were respected.65 
Under the ‘New Style’ Integration policy, immigrant participation in 
education and the labour market continued to be seen as important ele-
ments of integration. Immigrants receiving social security benefits and 
also ‘non-active migrant women’ (often housewives) were consequently 
designated as being specific target groups of the (civic) integration 
policy.66 In addition, immigrants were expected to orientate themselves 
towards Dutch society, to adjust to the dominant social norms, to be aware 
of or even accept the dominant ethical principles and to familiarise them-
selves with elements of Dutch culture (including the history and geogra-
phy of the Netherlands, its constitutional system and the monarchy).67 
63 Brief Integratiebeleid Nieuwe Stijl (n 11), 8–9; see also Parliamentary Papers II 2002–2003, 28 
637, No 19 (Hoofdlijnenakkoord 2003), 14.
64 Brief Integratiebeleid Nieuwe Stijl (n 11), 8–9. See also Kabinetsreactie Rapport Commissie 
Blok (n 3), 7. It may be observed that, throughout the period concerned, the definition of 
‘Dutch norms and values’ remained subject to debate, (also) at the political level. See, eg, 
Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700 VI & 29 203, No 94. There is also evidence that the 
government tried to avoid an essentialist concept of what Dutch culture entailed (Driouichi 
2007, 105–06). However, this did not preclude it from formulating a concept of citizenship in 
which these elements were included.
65 Brief Integratiebeleid Nieuwe Stijl (n 11), 8–9; Contourennota ‘Herziening van het inburge-
ringsstelsel’ (n 9), 1.
66 See, eg, Brief Integratiebeleid Nieuwe Stijl (n 11), 10; Contourennota ‘Herziening van het 
inburgeringsstelsel’ (n 9), 9–10 and 15–16 and Kabinetsreactie Rapport Commissie Blok, 29. The 
aim of getting migrant women to participate in paid labour can be qualified both as a form 
of economic integration and as the setting of a cultural norm reflecting female emancipation 
and sex equality, see also section III.C. Spijkerboer shows how this aim eventually became 
one of the primary stated objectives of the AIA, see Spijkerboer 2007, 35–36.
67 Contourennota ‘Herziening van het inburgeringsstelsel’ (n 9), 2. As Fermin noted, the for-
mulation of a ‘thick public morality’ also entailed abstract moral or constitutional principles 
being translated into specific behavioural norms (see Fermin 2009, 18). Thus, the then 
Integration Minister Verdonk once publicly rebuked an imam who refused to shake her 
hand. In the view of the Minister (and several MPs), the imam’s action demonstrated a lack 
of respect for the principle of equality of the sexes and thus constituted a sign of insufficient 
integration. See NRC Handelsblad 22 November 2004, Imam geeft Verdonk geen hand.
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This new direction was reflected in the contents of the integration pro-
grammes and exams (in the Netherlands and abroad), which subsequently 
included topics such as Dutch history, social norms and conventions and 
the rights and obligations of others.68 Lastly, the need to learn Dutch was 
presented both as a means towards participation in education and the 
labour market and as an element of a common culture that would enable 
social cohesion.69
It follows from the above that, by the time the AIA was enacted, the 
Dutch perception of ‘integration’ or ‘citizenship’ had become more 
encompassing than before and that it became more focused on immi-
grants’ unilateral adaptation to what was portrayed as ‘Dutch culture’ or 
‘the Dutch identity’. A distinct, but related and simultaneous develop-
ment was the shifting of responsibility for the integration process towards 
individual citizens and immigrants in particular. This shift resulted from 
concerns that too much facilitation would reduce the initiative and moti-
vation of individuals to contribute to the integration process. In the words 
of the government, 
A policy that is primarily aimed at providing services carries with it the risk 
that participation will be considered more important than results. This adds to 
an atmosphere with regard to integration in which commitment is lacking [. . .]. 
The emphasis that the government places on the individual responsibility of 
allochthones and autochthones for the integration process is in line with the 
ambition to stop the lack of engagement that has surrounded the integration 
process until this date.70 
Elsewhere it is stated that ‘[We must move] away from the often non-com-
mittal and service-oriented approach, which has diminished the initiative 
of those concerned, by aiming for an obligation of integration that will 
unambiguously activate individual responsibility’.71 
Thus, to become integrated, immigrants not only had to meet the stand-
ards of ‘shared citizenship’, but also had to do so of their own accord and 
without government support. This prompted Driouichi to remark that the 
success of the integration policy was apparently expected to be commen-
surate with the efforts immigrants had to make.72 One practical conse-
quence of this approach was that integration programmes were no longer 
offered, as they had been under the Newcomers Integration Act 1998, 
either abroad or in the Netherlands, except for some specific groups (see 
also section V.D of chapter 2).73 
68 See ch 2, sections V.C.iii. and VI.C.i. On the contents and function of integration pro-
grammes in the Netherlands, see for more detail Van Huis and De Regt 2005.
69 Kabinetsreactie Rapport Commissie Blok (n 3), 9 and 13.
70 ibid, 11.
71 Contourennota ‘Herziening van het inburgeringsstelsel’ (n 9), 1.
72 Driouichi 2007, 90.
73 See also Fermin 2009, 24 and Vermeulen 2010a, 92.
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C. After Enactment of the Act on Integration Abroad: Citizenship in 
Turmoil 
When the AIA entered into force on 15 March 2006, the idea of ‘shared 
citizenship’ still constituted the leading integration objective in the 
Netherlands. As shown above, this objective was reflected in the contents 
of the integration exam abroad and in the fact that the government did 
not organise any integration programmes to prepare candidates for the 
exam. However, the meaning of citizenship, as the leading concept of the 
integration policy, continued evolving after the Act was adopted, pushed 
by the rapidly shifting political climate. In 2007, a centre-left government 
(Balkenende IV) took office, consisting of the Christian Democratic party 
(CDA), the Labour Party (PvdA) and the smaller Social-Christian 
ChristenUnie. In 2010, this coalition was succeeded by a right-wing gov-
ernment (Rutte I), including the Liberal (VVD) and Christian Democratic 
parties and relying for majority support on the far-right Freedom Party 
(PVV). Both coalitions put forward a vision on integration in which par-
ticipation and social cohesion were key objectives to be achieved. Clearly 
different attitudes were taken, however, regarding the room allowed for 
cultural diversity and the role of immigrants in the integration process.
The integration policy of the Balkenende IV coalition in many ways ech-
oed the concept of ‘active citizenship’ devised in the 1990s, but with addi-
tional attention for commonality and immigrants’ identification with the 
Netherlands.74 Immigrants were still expected to learn Dutch and to par-
ticipate in education and the labour market, besides actively contributing 
to the communal interest through volunteer work, political participation 
or other forms of community involvement.75 With respect to cultural 
adaptation, however, greater emphasis was placed on reciprocity instead 
of unilateral adaptation to a dominant ‘Dutch identity’, with the ‘norms 
and values’ of the majority population being presented as objects of dis-
cussion and not as benchmarks for migrant minorities.76 Although a 
strong focus on unity remained from the previous period, this time unity 
was defined primarily in terms of ‘a shared commitment to common 
interests such as safety, the education of children and care for fellow 
residents’.77 Thereby the existence of cultural and religious differences 
were considered less of an obstacle to integration than it had been before. 
Also, a return could be observed to the idea of integration as a two-sided 
74 Parliamentary Papers II 2007–2008, 31 268, No 2 (Integratienota 2007–2011) and 
Integratiebrief (n 16). See also Fermin 2009, 18 and Van Gunsteren 2009, 49. 
75 Integratienota 2007–2011 (n 74), 18.
76 ibid. This turn in the integration policy was likely inspired by the report of the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy issued in 2007, entitled Identificatie met Nederland 
(‘Identification with the Netherlands’), WRR 2007.
77 Integratienota 2007-2011 (n 74), 17–18.
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process, engaging the responsibility of immigrants as well as the govern-
ment and the receiving society. This approach was translated into a 
renewed commitment by the government to improving the organisation 
of integration programmes under the Integration Act 2007.78
Of course the above change of direction was not absolute. Concerns 
remained that too much facilitation would result in a lack of commitment 
to the integration process; hence, the individual responsibility of immi-
grants continued to be stressed.79 In some areas a call for immigrants to 
adapt to dominant social norms could also still be heard. It was asserted, 
for instance, that the principle of equality of the sexes did not allow for the 
creation of separate facilities for men and women, including where inte-
gration programmes were concerned.80 In the context of family migration, 
traditional marriage patterns whereby the wife stays at home and is finan-
cially dependent on the husband were described as irreconcilable with 
‘the Dutch principle of equality within marriage’.81 Lastly, a strong focus 
was put on the role of citizens as the educators of the next generation. 
Citizens (and immigrants in particular) were expected to overcome the 
barriers to their own participation so as not to pass them on to their chil-
dren.82 Overall, however, between 2007 and 2011 the tone of the integra-
tion policy was more relaxed and the ideal of citizenship more open and 
attainable for immigrants with different means and backgrounds. 
By contrast, the integration memorandum of the Rutte I-coalition sig-
nalled a return to a monocultural idea of citizenship and a coercive inte-
gration policy, with a renewed emphasis on immigrants’ ‘individual 
responsibility’ for the integration process.83 More explicitly than before, 
the Dutch government renounced multiculturalism as the leading model 
for integration policy. Instead, Dutch society was posited as a historically 
determined society to which immigrants would have to adapt:
The fundamentals shaping social life in the Netherlands are historically deter-
mined and form markers of identification that are shared by many Dutch peo-
ple and cannot be given up. . . . Integration means integration into Dutch society. 
A society that was formed through the dedication, the efforts, the expectations 
78 See notably Parliamentary Papers II 2006–2007, 31 143, No 1 (Deltaplan inburgering). See 
also Fermin 2009, 24 and Vermeulen 2010a, 137–38.
79 Integratienota 2007–2011 (n 74), 20–21.
80 Integratiebrief (n 16), 7. 
81 Kabinetsaanpak huwelijks- en gezinsmigratie (n 17), 4–5. To a large extent the problems 
signalled in this paper concern acts prohibited by Dutch law, notably polygamy, forced mar-
riage and domestic violence. However, the paper also addresses situations not involving 
unlawful behaviour, such as women assuming a subservient role in relation to their hus-
bands or not engaging in any activities outside the home. Despite the ‘grey area’ often exist-
ing, the objective of the integration policy in these cases is clearly not limited to compliance 
with legal norms. 
82 Integratiebrief (n 16), 6; Kabinetsaanpak huwelijks- en gezinsmigratie (n 17), 4–5. The above 
concerns became more pronounced as of 2009, when Integration Minister Ella Vogelaar was 
replaced by Eberhard van der Laan. 
83 Nota ‘Integratie, binding, burgerschap’ (n 17). 
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and convictions of the generations that preceded us, which are also the founda-
tions on which it will further develop through the dedication, efforts, expecta-
tions and convictions of all who seek to turn our society into a lasting home. 
Despite the unmistakable presence of social change and cultural development, 
society is based on a fundamental continuity of values, beliefs, institutions and 
customs that form the leading culture of Dutch society and are co-determining 
of its recognisability. [my translation, KV]84 
As the ‘markers of identification’ of Dutch society the government 
mentioned not only the core values of the Dutch Constitution, but also 
historically or culturally defined elements such as the Dutch language, 
monuments and architecture and unwritten behavioural codes. 
Immigrants were expected to know the Dutch language and customs and 
to respect and share the Dutch constitutional values of freedom, responsi-
bility, equality, tolerance and solidarity. These demands came together 
with the recognition that Dutch society would change, partially as a con-
sequence of migration. It was stated that assimilation or the realisation of 
a uniform identity were not objectives of the integration policy and that 
room for diversity and plurality were among the achievements of the 
Dutch Constitution.85 It remains unclear, however, what this room for 
diversity still entailed and where it was to be found. 
In addition to the above, the integration memorandum put great 
emphasis on autonomy, commitment and solidarity, and on the duty of all 
citizens to participate and contribute to the common interest. The govern-
ment claimed, however, that the envisaged ideal of citizenship would not 
come about by itself. A coercive civic integration policy was therefore 
considered justified, to prevent social segregation and a sense of non-
belonging.86 As regards the Integration Act 2007, the revised notion of citi-
zenship informed proposals to discontinue government support for civic 
integration and to make all immigrants fully responsible for paying and 
organising their own integration course. In addition, it was confirmed 
that a requirement to learn Dutch would be introduced into the Social 
Assistance Act (chapter 1, section I.A) and it was proposed to revoke the 
(non-permanent) right of residence of immigrants who did not pass the 
advanced integration exam within the statutory period.87 As of 1 July 
2011, one of the course objectives for civic integration programmes in the 
Netherlands is that participants must be able to recognise the Dutch 
national anthem.88 
As mentioned earlier, the above redefinitions of the Dutch concept of 
citizenship occurred after the AIA entered into force. For the most part, 
84 ibid, 7–8.
85 ibid, 7–9.
86 ibid, 9–10, 16–20.
87 ibid, 11–12.
88 Government Gazette 2011, 7426.
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however, they did not result in actual changes to the integration exam 
abroad. For instance, the renewed recognition of the government’s (par-
tial) responsibility for the integration process, between 2007 and 2011, did 
not result in additional preparation facilities or in integration programmes 
being set up in countries of origin.89 The contents of the ‘Knowledge of the 
Netherlands’ test also remained the same. Nevertheless, the language 
requirements were increased on 1 April 2011 (chapter 2, section VI.C.ii), 
while, as of 2009, the integration exam abroad appears mainly to have 
been positioned as a means of ensuring that (family) migrants coming to 
the Netherlands are able to actively participate in the labour market and 
in other areas of the public domain.90 This fits with the objective of improv-
ing the socio-economic position of migrant minorities, but also with a cul-
turally defined norm that expects married women to get out of the house 
and not be dependent on their partner. Lastly, seen within the context of 
the 2011 integration memorandum, passing the integration exam abroad 
also becomes the first step in the immigrant’s adaptation to a more encom-
passing, historically determined Dutch identity.
D. Assessment: Citizenship in the Netherlands and the Act on 
Integration Abroad
The previous subsections describe how Dutch thinking on integration 
evolved from the 1980s until 2011. During this period the concept of inte-
gration, or ‘citizenship’, as it was termed after 1994, was endowed with 
different meanings: from participation in education and the labour mar-
ket, to adaptation to a ‘Dutch identity’ primarily defined in relation to 
certain designated norms and values and to a shared commitment to com-
mon interests such as safety and child education. Different perspectives 
also prevailed with regard to the responsibility for successful integration, 
which was sometimes seen as a burden shared between immigrants and 
the receiving society and sometimes as something of concern to immi-
grants alone.
The various dimensions of Dutch citizenship are discussed and assessed 
below. Firstly, this assessment includes an evaluation of the integration 
89 In 2010 the Dutch government announced that it would expand the existing prepara-
tion package and stimulate initiatives for learning Dutch abroad; see section VI.C.iv of ch 2. 
However, this occurred after it had been established that, without such changes, many can-
didates would not be able to pass the exam (which became more difficult on 1 April 2011); 
this was considered problematic, partly because of the applicable legal norms. Meanwhile 
the government has consistently maintained that preparation for the integration exam 
abroad is primarily a responsibility of the candidates themselves and their family members 
in the Netherlands. See Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 679, 10.
90 Kabinetsaanpak huwelijks- en gezinsmigratie (n 17), 3–5 and 9; Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 
2010, 679, 3. See also Nota ‘Integratie, binding, burgerschap’ (n 17), 12–13.
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objectives encountered (section III.D.i). The Dutch approach to integra-
tion has been criticised recently for its exclusive potential and perceived 
tendency towards a model of cultural assimilation. Where applicable, the 
discussion includes the arguments made by other authors in this regard. 
Secondly, section III.D.ii considers whether and to what extent the realisa-
tion of the above integration objectives is likely to be furthered by the Act 
on Integration Abroad.
i. Citizenship in the Netherlands
a. Cultural Adaptation
A first dimension to be distinguished in the Dutch conception of citizen-
ship concerns adaptation to various aspects of national culture: legal 
norms, but also moral values, customs and unwritten social rules. This 
dimension is especially prevalent in the notion of ‘shared citizenship’, 
developed in 2003 and which has been quite widely criticised as being too 
‘thick’ or amounting to a form of ‘cultural assimilation’,91 and in the 
monocultural ideal of citizenship defended in the latest integration 
memorandum. It is not entirely clear as to what extent the Dutch govern-
ment expects immigrants to adapt in order to become proper citizens, in 
particular whether immigrants are actually expected to internalise partic-
ular values or norms or to accept them as being morally correct.92 Clearly 
this is something a liberal state cannot demand. After all, the principle of 
individual freedom on which liberal democracies are based means that 
people are free to determine their own aims in accordance with their 
moral perception of ‘how to live’.93 As there is no objective, external source 
for such moral beliefs, they cannot be prescribed by the state.
Beyond the impossibility of requiring acceptance of moral principles, 
however, lies a greyer area as far as cultural adaptation is concerned. May 
a state seek to enforce cultural unity by demanding that citizens know 
about the dominant norms and values of the receiving society or that they 
act in accordance with them (actively or passively)? The answer to these 
questions seems less straightforward. To start, a state may of course 
require its citizens to respect its laws, which presupposes (fictitiously or 
not) that they are familiar with the content of those laws. This require-
ment would obviously apply not only to immigrants, but to all citizens 
alike. On the other hand, it would be less evident to ask citizens to respect 
norms or conventions that are based only on social consensus. Examples 
would include shaking hands with members of the opposite sex, role 
91 eg, Driouichi 2007, 96–99; Spijkerboer 2007, 67–72; Fermin 2009, 25–26 and Vermeulen 
2010a, 136–39.
92 Spijkerboer 2007, 39–41, with references to parliamentary documents.
93 Joppke 2008, 541–42; Vermeulen 2010a, 137.
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patterns that families ought to comply with or caring for one’s physical 
environment. Arguably, the enforcement of such conventions in the form 
of integration requirements goes beyond what is necessary to maintain 
public order.94 Moreover, a liberal state cannot enforce certain norms 
or forms of behaviour on the grounds that they are morally superior to 
others.95 
To be distinguished from the above is the situation where citizens are 
not asked to behave in a particular way, but merely asked to acquire cer-
tain knowledge. This may be awareness that certain norms or values are 
supported by a majority of the population, but also knowledge about the 
receiving country’s history, geography, customs and so on. It could be 
argued that a merely cognitive concept of integration is not as such at 
odds with the above requirements of liberalism. On the other hand, the 
value of mere common knowledge as an integration objective may be 
queried (what is actually gained by all citizens knowing who William of 
Orange was?).96 There is also a risk that cognitive integration require-
ments relating, for example, to prevailing values and social conventions 
will nevertheless obtain a certain normative function in practice.97
Lastly, a different but related problem with regard to cultural adapta-
tion as an integration objective is that it is based on an essentialist under-
standing of culture.98 By designating certain norms or values that 
immigrants must respect or at least be aware of, the disagreement that 
exists about those norms and values among members of the non-immi-
grant population is disregarded. Another related risk is that setting ‘cul-
tural benchmarks’ for integration, whether behavioural or cognitive, will 
always have an exclusionary effect towards those who do not comply or 
do not have the right knowledge and who are consequently marked as 
‘not integrated’. This occurs especially when the norm for cultural adap-
tation is formulated in terms of what immigrants are not (for example, 
94 Vermeulen speaks in this respect of ‘ideological paternalism’; see Vermeulen 2010a, 143.
95 Spijkerboer 2007, 67–72. The impossibility of saying that certain rules are right from a 
moral point of view obviously applies to legal norms as well as to non-legal conventions. 
Such legal norms constitute reflections of what is considered right by a majority of the popu-
lation at a particular time. However since laws do restrict the freedom of all those falling 
under their jurisdiction, they should also not go any further than is necessary to set the con-
ditions for secure and fair interaction between citizens. Also, (migrant) minorities should be 
able to participate in the law-making process. It follows that the requirement of compliance 
with legislation is perhaps not as self-evident as suggested above. Nevertheless, compared 
to social conventions, legal norms do have a stronger degree of objectivity, consistency and 
accessibility.
96 cp Vermeulen 2010a, 138.
97 Michalowski 2011, 759–60. By way of example this author mentions certain elements of 
the Dutch naturalisation test whereby candidates must show that they are aware of unwrit-
ten social rules, such as that people are expected to keep their front garden tidy and should 
know that the way in which certain women are dressed in public should not be misunder-
stood as unchaste or inviting. 
98 Driouichi 2007, 97–99.
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Western, non-religious or non-Islamic). The description in the previous 
sections shows that the Dutch vision on integration has tended to fall foul 
of this trap, in particular around the turn of the century. By definition, 
such developments result in the exclusion of minorities rather than the 
creation of unity.99
It can be concluded that respect for, or knowledge of, particular cultural 
elements (norms, values, conventions, history and so on) is not to be rec-
ommended as an integration objective in itself. Nevertheless, a certain 
amount of knowledge or awareness about the receiving society can serve 
other objectives of integration, such as economic participation or a com-
mitment to the host country, and this possibility is included in the discus-
sion below.
b. (Economic) Participation
Besides cultural adaptation, another aspect of the Dutch concept of inte-
gration is participation: in the labour market, in education or in other 
domains of social life. This integration objective also includes maintaining 
contacts with fellow citizens belonging to other ethnic, cultural or reli-
gious groups of the population (interethnic contacts). In one way or 
another, the objective of participation has played an important role in the 
Dutch vision on citizenship since it was first introduced in the mid-1990s.
Compared to cultural adaptation, the objective of participation has 
been subject to less criticism in academic literature. Here, too, however, 
care must be exercised as participation requires citizens to actively con-
tribute to the general interest and as such interferes with their freedom to 
arrange their lives as they see fit. Participation is also not a culturally neu-
tral concept. This was seen above, for example, where it was stated that 
the requirement for migrant women to find work reflects a cultural norm 
that rejects traditional role patterns within the family (section III.C).100
It is submitted that the objective of economic participation is acceptable 
to the extent that such participation is necessary to maintain the viability 
of the welfare state.101 This means that citizens may in principle be required 
to be financially self-reliant and to contribute to the institutions of the 
welfare state by paying taxes. In addition, it is submitted that the capacity 
for financial self-reliance is so strongly influenced by having at least 
a minimum level of education and by the ability to speak the (or a) com-
mon language of the host society that requirements may also be imposed 
with regard to these factors. Empirical research shows that both education 
and language proficiency are important factors in enabling economic 
99 Spijkerboer 2007, 63–64; Schinkel 2008, 43–48; Fermin 2009, 25. 
100 Compare also the illuminating analysis by Van Walsum (Van Walsum 2008).
101 See also WRR 2001a, 228 and following; Vermeulen 2010a, 138.
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participation.102 Nonetheless, education and language proficiency do not 
form integration objectives in and of themselves; integration measures 
should therefore provide exemptions for citizens able to be self-reliant 
even though they do not possess these assets. Groenendijk points out, for 
example, that in some situations knowledge of English may be more con-
ducive to economic participation in the Netherlands than proficiency in 
Dutch.103 Finally, finding a job is likely to be easier if the person concerned 
is acquainted with certain institutions, facilities and conventions of the 
labour market (how to apply for jobs, what to wear to a job interview, etc). 
In this respect the purpose of economic participation may be served by 
cognitive integration requirements.
A more difficult issue concerns other forms of participation, in particu-
lar maintaining contacts with people from different groups of the popula-
tion. It seems realistic to suppose that states with a high level of segregation 
have a greater risk of conflicts and perhaps even of falling apart. The 
existence of social networks is also a factor influencing the economic par-
ticipation of minority groups.104 However, interethnic contacts and social 
cohesion are not objectives that easily lend themselves to being translated 
into demands on individual citizens. Rather they place a responsibility on 
the government and on the institutions of the civil society to ensure acces-
sibility for minorities and to erase barriers such as the occurrence of ethnic 
discrimination.
c. Commitment
A third dimension of the Dutch concept of citizenship, which has become 
increasingly dominant from 2007 onwards, concerns a sense of commit-
ment to or emotional identification with the state and the community of 
people living in it. This is the least tangible element of citizenship, which 
arises at the psychological level and consists of a feeling of belonging to a 
particular group and being connected to other citizens in a consequential 
way, despite the absence of actual interpersonal contacts.105 The existence 
of such a connection is of course highly subjective and difficult to meas-
ure, as is its influence on citizens’ actual behaviour or on the condition of 
society as a whole.
It does not seem unreasonable to assume that citizens’ emotional iden-
tification with the national community (and the ensuing feelings of loy-
alty and solidarity) will have a positive effect on the experience of living 
together, as well as fostering support for social security structures, 
preventing interethnic tensions and conflicts, aiding the observance of 
102 Klaver and Odé 2009, 39–40 and 185–87. 
103 Groenendijk 2011, 28.
104 Klaver and Odé 2009, 40.
105 cp Anderson 2006, 6–7.
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state laws and more generally endowing the state with a certain level of 
authority. However, this form of commitment is also something belonging 
to the emotional or moral domain of the individual and which the liberal 
state should not seek to enforce (regardless of whether that would be pos-
sible). In the words of Van Gunsteren, such enforcement would come 
down to a form of ‘brainwashing’ or ‘mind control’ characteristic of totali-
tarian states.106 Another related objection is that a liberal state may not 
demand its citizens to forfeit their commitment to other communities 
(such as the national community of the country of origin or cultural or 
religious communities). In this respect, it is unfortunate that a call for a 
unilateral commitment to the national community of the Netherlands 
seems to echo in the Dutch debate on multiple nationalities.107 Finally, 
it may be observed here again (as with regard to demands for cultural 
adaptation), that a requirement for (exclusive) commitment to the 
receiving state risks resulting in the exclusion rather than the inclusion of 
immigrants, since the existence of emotional ties is not something that 
individuals can change at will.108
Despite the above, states may seek to foster emotional identification 
and commitment through non-coercive means, for example through dia-
logue and education (including about national history and traditions) or 
through rituals (such as citizenship ceremonies or commemoration of 
historical events).109 Indeed, prior to 2007, various authors claimed that 
integration policy would be more effective if more attention were paid to 
the role of emotional ties with the Netherlands.110 However, an obligation 
of emotional identification is at odds with the principles of citizenship in 
a liberal state.111
d. Individual Responsibility
We have seen that, from the mid-1990s onwards and especially since 2003, 
the Dutch conception of citizenship has placed strong emphasis on the 
individual responsibility of immigrants for successful integration. At a 
theoretical level, this approach can be criticised because it fails to recog-
nise the equality of all citizens. Another point of criticism is that the one-
sided focus on the role of immigrants is not likely to make the integration 
process more effective. The chances that migrant minorities will partici-
pate in various domains of public life and feel committed to the receiving 
society are increased if efforts are also made by the non-immigrant 
106 Van Gunsteren 2009, 48.
107 eg, Vermeulen 2010a, 135.
108 eg, Driouichi 2007, 97–99.
109 Vermeulen 2010a, 143.
110 Driouichi 2007, 102–07, with further references.
111 Van Gunsteren 2009, 49.
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population and facilities are provided by the government or non- 
governmental institutions.112 Furthermore, as seen above, some aspects of 
integration (notably interethnic contacts and mutual acceptation) simply 
cannot be achieved by immigrants alone. It would consequently be better 
to perceive integration as a two-sided process.113 
ii. The Act on Integration Abroad as an Instrument of Citizenship
The foregoing provides a review of the concepts of citizenship that have 
inspired Dutch integration policy. Next, I discuss the extent to which the 
Act on Integration Abroad, as a tool of that integration policy, is a suitable 
instrument to achieve the envisaged integration objectives, while taking 
into account that the integration exam abroad can work both as an instru-
ment of inclusion and of exclusion (section II.B).
Firstly, it may be observed that the main function of the integration 
exam abroad is to assess the fulfilment of certain cognitive requirements. 
It was argued above that liberal states should not seek to make their citi-
zens accept the moral rightness of legal or social norms or ethical princi-
ples or require them to feel emotionally attached to the national 
community. It is also impossible to test such moral views or feelings by 
means of an exam, as such testing would necessarily remain limited to 
testing the candidates’ awareness of culturally defined norms and values 
or, perhaps, their capacity to learn things by heart. While such awareness 
may eventually contribute to creating a sense of belonging, ‘giving the 
right answers’ in a social orientation test is not as such proof of normative 
or emotional identification.114 In the same vein, an integration exam also 
does not constitute an adequate instrument to test or predict individual 
behaviour. Again, what can be tested is whether candidates are aware of 
the existence or prevalence of certain social and legal norms. However, 
such awareness does not guarantee that candidates will act accordingly 
outside the exam situation. When asked about their own behaviour in 
particular situations, candidates may also be tempted to provide socially 
desirable answers.115
It follows that the scope of the integration exam abroad is by and large 
limited to testing the possession of cognitive skills, which, as submitted 
earlier, do not constitute a very relevant integration objective. It was also 
assumed, however, that having certain knowledge about the host country 
may contribute to achieving other objectives. Education and language 
112 Klaver and Odé 2009, 86.
113 See also Vermeulen 2010a, 136.
114 Driouichi 2007, 108. 
115 ibid, 43–44; Klaver and Odé 2009, 88. Before the AIA was enacted, the committee that 
advised on the exam requirements (Commissie Franssen) had already warned that the impact 
of the integration exam abroad on the behaviour of immigrants would be only limited, 
Commissie Franssen 2004, 37.
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proficiency are important factors in determining a person’s chances of 
economic participation. Arguably, the same is true with regard to knowl-
edge about the structure and conventions of the Dutch labour market. For 
this reason, excluding immigrants with little education, language profi-
ciency or prior awareness of the Dutch labour market may well increase 
the rates of economic participation in the Netherlands and reduce the 
numbers of immigrants who are not financially self-reliant. In this sense, 
the integration exam abroad could potentially constitute a relevant instru-
ment of citizenship. 
Two remarks deserve to be made, however. Firstly, the available empir-
ical research shows that the effects of the Act on Integration Abroad have 
thus far been rather limited (section VI.D of chapter 2). In general, immi-
grants who were admitted to the Netherlands after the AIA entered into 
force had slightly higher levels of education than those arriving before. 
However, the exam had only a very limited effect on their level of Dutch 
language proficiency, which moreover tended to disappear quickly. 
Meanwhile no evidence is yet available regarding the long-term effects of 
the Act, including on the level of immigrants’ economic participation. 
With regard to civic integration in the Netherlands, however, Klaver and 
Odé showed that integration programmes have only a limited effect on 
the integration process. These authors have warned that successful 
integration results from a combination of factors, including the facilities 
provided by the government and the attitude of the receiving society, and 
that not too much should be expected of integration programmes and 
exams alone.116
A second remark concerns the potential negative effects on the integra-
tion process that may result from excluding immigrants who are unable to 
pass the integration exam abroad. The non-admission of unsuccessful 
applicants creates a disadvantage for Dutch residents (nationals and non-
nationals), who face significant obstacles to the exercise of their family life 
(or, in the case of religious servants, their religious freedom). This may 
well have repercussions for their sense of inclusion and their commitment 
to the Netherlands,117 especially if it is felt that the exam (in particular the 
‘Knowledge of the Netherlands’ test) is designed to reflect the cultural 
norms of the majority population and does not take minority perspectives 
into account.
Presumably, the effects of the integration exam abroad are influenced 
by its contents. Thus, the selection of immigrants who will participate 
successfully in the labour market will likely be more effective if the level 
of the exam is raised, as occurred on 1 April 2011 (section VI.C.ii of 
chapter 2). However, more stringent requirements will also increase the 
116 Klaver and Odé 2009, 179 and 185–87. See also Bloemraad 2006 and Groenendijk 2011, 
24.
117 Groenendijk 2011, 27–28.
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exclusionary effect of the exam and thus strengthen the negative effects 
on the dimension of emotional identification. It was remarked earlier that 
knowledge of certain characteristics of the host country (such as its his-
tory and geography) may help foster a sense of belonging. Such knowl-
edge cannot, however, be properly taught at a very low level of language 
proficiency.118 A study of integration programmes in the Netherlands has 
also shown that participants with higher levels of education tend to be 
more interested in topics without immediate practical relevance than 
those who are less educated.119
Apart from testing cognitive skills, the integration exam abroad can be 
seen as an instrument for testing immigrants’ willingness and determina-
tion to make an effort towards successful integration in the Netherlands 
(section II.B.iii). Seen from this perspective, it is not so much the contents 
of the exam that count, but rather the process of preparation and partici-
pation that shows candidates’ motivation to succeed. As the previous 
chapter shows, this perception also explains why, in Dutch case law on 
the AIA, the existence of obstacles or difficulties on the part of the appli-
cant is not readily qualified as grounds for exemptions (section VI.B.iii of 
chapter 2).
Although the assumption that the integration exam abroad functions as 
a ‘motivation test’ is not implausible in itself, it has not yet been shown 
that excluding non-motivated immigrants also has a positive effect on the 
integration process in the Netherlands. Moreover, the effort needed to 
pass the exam will vary greatly among candidates, depending, for exam-
ple, on their education and learning capacity and on the circumstances in 
their country of origin. It follows that, as a motivation test, the integration 
exam abroad does not set the same standard for all applicants. Hence, to 
the extent that the exam is indeed meant to test candidates’ willingness to 
integrate, it is not the most suitable instrument. Other alternatives, such 
as the obligation to participate in an integration course or an exam 
designed to test the progress someone has made, would be more appro-
priate in this respect.
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This chapter describes and, to a certain extent, assesses the conceptualisa-
tion of integration and citizenship in the Netherlands. The description 
and assessment focus firstly on the connection created between immigra-
tion and integration policy. It was established that the Act on Integration 
Abroad was designed to further the integration process in the Netherlands, 
118 Commissie Franssen 2004, 40–41.
119 Brink and Tromp 2003, 31–44.
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through the exclusion of new immigrants with poor prospects for integra-
tion. The exclusionary effect of the Act was further emphasised when the 
exam requirements were raised on 1 April 2011, with the result that the 
integration exam abroad is now used primarily to test the educational 
level or literacy of candidates rather than their willingness to integrate. 
The fact that the integration requirement is formulated as an obligation of 
result also corresponds to its purpose of selection.
As an instrument of exclusion rather than inclusion, the Act on 
Integration Abroad marks an important change in the thinking on 
integration. As regards the desirability of this change, it has been argued 
that the appropriateness of an exclusive policy depends (at least in part) 
on the reason why admission is sought. With regard to people looking for 
international protection, there is no or very little scope to make admission 
dependent on considerations relating to the interests of the host state. 
With regard to family or labour migration, the host state has more 
discretion. Nevertheless, it has been submitted that this discretion should 
also be limited in family migration situations where the person (or 
persons) residing in the receiving state has close ties to it, be it through 
nationality, long-term residence or other relevant factors. The question 
to what extent integration requirements for family reunification are 
compatible with the legally guaranteed right to family life will be 
addressed in the following chapter.
Section III investigates how the ideal of an integrated society has been 
depicted in the Dutch political debate. This investigation showed that the 
concept of integration (or citizenship) has been continually subject to 
change and re-interpretation. From 1994 onwards, however, the citizenship 
concept has always been rather ‘thick’, encompassing not only entitlements 
and rights, but also the duty to actively contribute to society.
One danger of this ‘thick’ ideal of citizenship is that the Dutch state 
risks infringing upon one of the fundamental principles of its own political 
system, namely the liberal principle that a state should not interfere with 
the individual freedom of its citizens to hold their own moral views and 
to arrange their life accordingly. This risk is inherent in all obligations 
imposed by the state (including the obligation to abide by the law), all of 
which necessarily entail a certain normative component, but increases as 
those obligations become more encompassing. Furthermore, formulating 
norms of good citizenship always carries the risk of neglecting differences 
existing among the population and excluding those who do not conform 
to the norm and are subsequently regarded as ‘non-integrated’.
Given these objections, it has been argued that the objective of the inte-
gration policy should go no further than is necessary to maintain public 
order and to enable the continuation of the welfare state. This implies that 
demands may be made with regard to the economic self-reliance of 
citizens, as well as the qualifications necessary to enable this (notably 
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education, linguistic skills and an understanding of the labour market, 
and also maybe an awareness of prevailing social conventions). However, 
a state may not require its citizens to morally subscribe to certain norms 
or values, to be emotionally committed to the national community or to 
give up their commitment to other (cultural, ethnic or religious) commu-
nities. Another problematic issue is the requirement to act in accordance 
with social norms or conventions other than those prescribed by law. 
Lastly, it is submitted that the equality of all citizens requires the responsi-
bility for successful integration not to be placed solely on the migrant 
population. The focus on the ‘individual responsibility’ of immigrants has 
played a significant role in the Dutch conception of citizenship from 2003 
onwards, and even more so in the past year.
The introduction of integration requirements in the form of conditions 
for admission is not necessarily tied to one particular conception of 
citizenship. Depending on the contents of the exam and the choice for 
an obligation of effort or result, such integration requirements may be 
directed towards achieving various integration objectives. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the Act on Integration Abroad has remained in 
force despite the changes affecting the Dutch conception of citizenship 
after 2006. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the integration exam abroad as a 
means to achieve the Dutch integration objectives is arguably only lim-
ited. In any case, the exam does not represent an adequate instrument for 
testing the moral opinions or behaviour of potential future citizens. 
Although it is plausible that the exam can be used to assess whether immi-
grants possess certain knowledge or skills that will increase their chances 
of successful economic participation, results achieved so far have not 
proved the exam to be very effective. Additionally, the emotional identifi-
cation of people within the Netherlands may be negatively affected by the 
exam preventing them from bringing in their family members or, even 
more generally, by the perception that ‘(certain) immigrants are not wel-
come’. Lastly, to the extent that the integration exam abroad is meant to 
test candidates’ willingness to integrate, it was submitted that an obliga-
tion of effort would be a more suitable instrument than an obligation of 
result.
PART II
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Family Life and Family Reunification
I. INTRODUCTION
IN THE NETHERLANDS family migrants make up the majority of the target group of the Act on Integration Abroad. If a family member fails to pass the integration exam and is consequently denied admis-
sion, both he or she and the family member(s) in the Netherlands are 
obstructed in the enjoyment of their family life. This chapter examines 
whether this situation is in accordance with the right to family life, as pro-
tected by various human rights treaties. Firstly the legal standards that 
can be derived from these treaties with regard to the admission of aliens 
for the purpose of family reunification are examined. The initial issue 
addressed in this respect is whether the right to family life includes a right 
for family members to be admitted to the state where the rest of their fam-
ily is living. Where such a right is found to exist, the next question exam-
ined is whether its exercise may lawfully be made subject to the fulfilment 
of integration requirements.
The provisions examined in the course of this chapter include, first and 
foremost, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).1 European Court of Human Rights case law has with some regu-
larity addressed the question of whether refusing to grant legal residence 
to an alien violates the right to respect for family life. This case law is dis-
cussed in section II. The right to family life is also protected by Articles 17 
and 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).2 While these provisions have not given rise to the same amount 
of interpretative activity by international monitoring bodies as Article 8 
ECHR, the Human Rights Committee has been asked on several occasions 
to comment on Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR in immigration contexts (section 
III). Thirdly, standards concerning the admission of family migrants 
can be found in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).3 In 
1 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
CETS No 5; Treaty Series 1951, 154 and following, entry into force for the Netherlands on 31 
August 1954. 
2 UNTS Vol 999, 171; Treaty Series 1969, 99 and following, entry into force for the 
Netherlands on 11 March 1979. 
3 UNTS Vol 1577, 3, entry into force on 2 September 1990; Treaty Series 1990, 46 and follow-
ing, entry into force for the Netherlands on 2 September 1990.
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particular, Articles 9 and 10 CRC guarantee the right of children not to be 
separated from their parents, which may also be at stake in immigration 
cases (section IV).
In addition to the above guarantees a right to family reunification is laid 
down in the EU Directive on Family Reunification (section V).4 Unlike the 
above human rights provisions, the Family Reunification Directive (FRD) 
explicitly mentions the possibility of imposing integration requirements. 
The examination of this directive therefore focuses on determining the 
possible contents of such requirements, as well as the criteria relating to 
their application. 
Where available and relevant, Dutch case law with regard to the Act on 
Integration Abroad is taken into account in relation to each of the legal 
instruments discussed in this chapter. Section VI gives a summary of the 
legal standards encountered. Next, section VII examines whether the Act 
on Integration Abroad is in accordance with these standards. The chapter 
closes with some concluding observations on integration requirements 
and the right to family life. 
II. ARTICLE 8 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION  
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that every-
one has the right to respect for their family life. This provision is espe-
cially relevant for the Netherlands as the right to family life is not 
mentioned as such in the Dutch Constitution. Its relevance has moreover 
increased as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has clarified 
the scope and meaning of Article 8 ECHR in what has become a substan-
tial body of case law. The following examination focuses on those cases in 
which the Court was asked to decide whether a Contracting State’s refusal 
to admit family members of legal residents in that state violated the right 
to family life as protected by Article 8 ECHR (hereafter referred to as 
‘admission cases’). Given the purpose of this study, this examination aims 
to determine whether and under which circumstances violation of Article 
8 ECHR could occur if admission is refused on the grounds that the per-
son concerned has not complied with integration requirements set by the 
Contracting State. To answer this question, it is necessary to describe the 
Court’s approach to admission cases in some detail.
4 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003, [2003] OJ L251/12.
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A. Scope of Article 8 ECHR – Family Life 
Before considering the significance of Article 8 ECHR for admission cases, 
some general remarks regarding the scope of this provision are in order. 
The concept of ‘family life’ has been defined by the ECtHR in rather broad 
terms, referring to factual rather than legal relationships between family 
members.5 As far as couples are concerned, family life is considered to exist 
between unmarried as well as married partners, providing the relationship 
has a certain degree of intensity and durability.6 Family life is furthermore 
taken to exist between parents and minor children from the moment of the 
child’s birth, save in exceptional circumstances.7 Relationships other than 
those between partners or parents and minor children (the ‘core family’) 
may also qualify as ‘family life’ under Article 8 ECHR. However, the 
ECtHR has held that, in immigration cases, there is no family life between 
parents and adult children unless ‘additional elements of dependence’ sur-
passing the existence of ‘normal emotional ties’ are demonstrated.8
As to the contents of the right to family life, Article 8 ECHR clearly 
encompasses the right to live together and to enjoy each other’s compa-
ny.9 In situations where parents live separated from the children, for 
example after a divorce, they are nevertheless entitled to maintain access 
to their children in the form of regular contacts and visits.10 In both cases 
it follows that the exercise of family life may be hindered if one of the fam-
ily members is not admitted to a Contracting State in which another fam-
ily member is living. This was recognised for the first time in the case of 
Abdulaziz, which concerned three women who were lawful residents of 
the United Kingdom and sought to be reunited with their husbands in 
that country. The ECtHR acknowledged that, under certain circumstances, 
‘measures taken in the field of immigration may affect the right to respect 
for family life’.11 However, as demonstrated below, this does not mean 
that the right to family life also implies a right for family members to be 
admitted to the territory of a Contracting State.
5 For a detailed discussion, see Boeles et al 2009, 145–48, with references to further case 
law. See also Forder 2003, 4.
6 ECtHR 20 June 2002, app no 50963/99 (Al-Nashif), para 112.
7 ECtHR 21 June 1988, app no 10730/84 (Berrehab), para 21.
8 ECtHR 7 November 2000 (admissibility decision), app no 31519/96 (Kwakye-Nti & 
Dufie) (‘l’existence d’éléments supplémentaires de dépendence, autres que les liens affectifs 
normaux’); ECtHR 9 October 2003, app no 48321/99 (Slivenko), para 97 and ECtHR 12 
January 2010, app no 47486/06 (A.W. Khan), para 32. In the absence of an explanation by the 
Court, it seems rather odd that the concept of ‘family life’ is defined differently in immigra-
tion cases than in other contexts. 
9 eg, ECtHR 28 May 1985, app nos 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81 (Abdulaziz, Cabales & 
Balkandali), para 62; ECtHR 27 June 1996, app no 17383/90 (Johansen), para 52.
10 eg, ECtHR 21 June 1988, app no 10730/84 (Berrehab), paras 22–23. See also Forder 2005, 
49–54, with references to further case law.
11 Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali (n 9), para 60.
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B. Family Life and the Admission of Aliens: the Approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights
ECtHR case law on the right to family life has consistently held that states 
have the right to control the entry of non-nationals into their territory and 
that Article 8 ECHR does not impose a general obligation on states to 
respect the choice by married couples of the country of their matrimonial 
residence.12 Article 8 ECHR does not, therefore, entail a general right to 
family reunification in the state where one of the family members is liv-
ing. However, this has not precluded the ECtHR from examining, in the 
cases brought before it, whether there existed special circumstances that 
meant that a Contracting State’s refusal to admit the family members of 
lawful residents constituted a violation of Article 8 ECHR. The Court’s 
approach in these cases is set out below. For a better understanding of the 
case law, some attention is paid first to the distinction between ‘positive’ 
and ‘negative’ obligations and the criteria applied by the ECtHR to deter-
mine whether Article 8 ECHR has been violated.
i. Positive or Negative Obligation, Fair Balance or Necessity?
Conceptually, a distinction can be made between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
obligations, both of which are inherent in a state’s duty to safeguard 
human rights. A negative obligation is usually defined as a duty on the 
part of the state to abstain from acting where such action would interfere 
with the exercise by individuals (or groups of individuals) of their human 
rights (such as the obligation not to break up a demonstration). By con-
trast, a positive obligation entails a duty on the state to take action to 
ensure that human rights are effectively secured (such as the obligation to 
hold regular elections).13 
Related to the distinction between positive and negative obligations, at 
least in the context of Article 8 ECHR, is the way in which the ECtHR 
approaches the question of whether the Convention has been violated. 
Where a negative obligation is involved, the Court first establishes 
whether the state has interfered with this obligation (by, for example, tak-
ing children out of the family and placing them in a home). If interference 
is found, the Court then examines whether this interference is justified 
because it complies with the criteria in the second paragraph of Article 8 
(in which case there has been no violation). These criteria entail that the 
interference must be prescribed by law and must be ‘necessary in a demo-
12 eg, Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali (n 9), paras 67–68; ECtHR 1 December 2005, app no 
60665/00 (Tuquabo-Tekle and others), para 43; ECtHR 28 June  2011, app no 55597/09 (Nunez), 
paras 66 and 70.
13 Harris et al 2009, 18–19. 
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cratic society’ in order to achieve one of the legitimate aims mentioned in 
the provision (the ‘necessity test’). It is up to the respondent state to show 
that sufficient justification is available.
On the other hand, where a positive obligation is at stake, the ECtHR 
does not seek to establish whether there has been an interference, nor 
whether the alleged lack of state action is justified under Article 8(2) 
ECHR.14 Instead the existence or non-existence of a positive obligation 
is determined by the ‘fair balance’ test, whereby the interests of the 
individual applicant(s) are weighed against the general interests of the 
Contracting State. Where the latter outweigh the former, the Court will 
conclude that the state was not under a positive obligation to secure the 
right to family life. By contrast, where the individual interest prevails it 
will be concluded that there was a positive obligation that was not ful-
filled and that the right to family life has been violated. Hence, unlike in 
the case of a negative obligation, the extent of the state’s obligation and 
the existence of justification are determined by means of a single test,15 
with the criterion being that a fair balance must be struck between the 
general and the individual interests.
Both the above tests require there to be a certain relationship of propor-
tionality between the interests of the state and the obstacle created for 
individuals in enjoying their family life. Nevertheless, the ‘fair balance’ 
test is less precise than the necessity test because it does not specify which 
state interests can justify interference with the right to family life and does 
not require the respondent state to demonstrate that the interference was 
necessary to achieve a ‘pressing social need’ (which is part of the ‘neces-
sary in a democratic society’ criterion). Perhaps even more significant is 
that, under the fair balance test, the Court does not conduct the propor-
tionality test on the assumption that the interests of the individual amount 
to a fundamental right. For these reasons, it is generally contended that a 
violation is less likely to be found when the ‘fair balance’ test is used and, 
therefore, that this test offers a lower level of protection to those applying 
to the Court.16
ii. Admission of Family Members: Still Searching for the Right Approach
The distinction between positive and negative obligations is not always 
easy to make in practice: often a decision taken by state authorities can be 
defined both as an action and as a refusal to act. With regard to admission 
14 ECtHR 13 June 1979, app no 6833/74 (Marckx), para 31.
15 See the Court’s often repeated formula in admission cases that ‘the extent of a State’s 
obligation to admit to its territory relatives of settled immigrants will vary according to the 
particular circumstances of the persons involved and the general interest’. eg, ECtHR 28 
October 1996, app no 21702/93 (Ahmut), para 67.
16 Forder 1992, 624 and 630; Lawson 1995a, 566–67 and Lawson 1995b, 728.
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cases this is due in part to factual circumstances. To illustrate this, com-
pare the situation of a person who is outside the state where his or her 
family lives and is seeking to be admitted with the situation of a person 
who is already present illegally within the state and is asking not to be 
removed. While the latter case can more readily be portrayed as one 
involving a negative obligation, both applicants are in essence seeking the 
same thing, namely leave to reside. However, the problem also exists on a 
more fundamental level as, theoretically, requiring people to ask for per-
mission to reside in a particular state can be considered as the creation of 
an impediment to such residence, while refusing to grant permission can 
be seen as a failure to enable it.17 
It is perhaps, therefore, no surprise that the ECtHR has thus far steered 
a rather wobbly course concerning both the determination of the nature of 
the obligations involved in admission cases and the test to be applied. 
Originally, the Court treated these cases as involving a potential positive 
obligation on the part of the Contracting State and refrained from testing 
whether the lack of state action was justified under the second paragraph 
of Article 8 ECHR.18 This approach, however, was subject to criticism both 
in and outside the Court.19 Later ECtHR judgments have often – though 
not always – refrained from qualifying obligations to admit family mem-
bers as either negative or positive, stating instead that ‘the boundaries 
between [both types of obligation] do not lend themselves to precise defi-
nition’. To this the Court has added that the ‘applicable principles’ are, 
nevertheless, similar:
In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck 
between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a 
whole; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation.20
As could be seen above, however, the fair balance test can be distinguished 
from the necessity test in several ways. From an analysis of the case law, it 
appears that the ECtHR most often decides admission cases using some 
form of the fair balance test. With only a few exceptions, the Court has 
consistently established that the relationship between the family mem-
bers constituted family life for the purpose of Article 8 ECHR and then 
proceeded directly to balancing the different interests involved, without 
17 See also Forder 1992, 619–22.
18 Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali (n 9), para 67.
19 See the concurring opinion of Judge Bernhardt in Abdulaziz, para 1 and Forder 1992, 
630–31. Also illustrative is the dissenting opinion of Judge Martens in the case of Gül (where 
the Court had already changed its approach): ECtHR 19 February 1996, app no 23218/94, 
diss opinion para 7.
20 eg, ECtHR 19 February 1996, app no 23218/94 (Gül), para 38; ECtHR 6 November 2001 
(admissibility decision), app no 50568/99 (Adnane); Tuquabo-Tekle and others (n 12), para 42; 
ECtHR 14 February 2012, app no 26940/10 (Antwi and others), para 89. 
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establishing the existence of an interference.21 In 2008, after the majority of 
the Court had found an interference in the case of Omoregie, Judge Jebens 
issued a concurring opinion in which he argued that, in cases where the 
person concerned had not been granted lawful residence, the Court 
should always frame the case in terms of failure to comply with a positive 
obligation and refrain from applying the necessity test.22 This approach 
was subsequently followed by the Court in the case of Narenji Haghighi.23 
Since then, however, it seems that the Court increasingly mingles the two 
tests. Recent case law shows several examples where the ECtHR applied 
the fair balance test, but also checked whether the impugned measure 
was ‘prescribed by law’ and served one of the ‘legitimate aims’ of Article 
8, paragraph 2.24 
In summary, the ECtHR is still searching for the right way to qualify 
and examine the claims of aliens seeking admission for the purpose of 
family reunification. This seems to result from unwillingness on the part 
of the Court to recognise a right to family reunification as part of the right 
to family life, while at the same time not wanting to exclude entirely the 
possibility that a claim for family reunification could come within the 
scope of the Convention. This has led to a somewhat muddled approach, 
at the core of which the fair balance test can nonetheless be distinguished 
as the instrument most often used for examining admission cases (even 
where the obligation at stake is not expressly identified as positive). 
Section II.C examines the arguments used by the Court to determine 
whether a fair balance has been struck between the interests of the 
individual and those of the community in family reunification cases. In 
this way it attempts to establish a better idea of how to conduct the fair 
balance test in situations where the admission of family members is made 
subject to integration requirements. Firstly, however, the margin of appre-
ciation is considered.
21 Cases in which an interference was found are ECtHR 5 September 2000 (admissibility 
decision), app no 44328/98 (Solomon); ECtHR 31 July 2008, app no 265/07 (Darren Omoregie 
and others), para 55 and ECtHR 15 May 2012, app no 16567/10 (Nacic and others), paras 73–76. 
In the latter case, the finding of an interference was related to the fact that the applicants 
were already living together as a family before they entered the respondent state. It is note-
worthy that, in each of the above cases, the fair balance test was still applied at the propor-
tionality stage: instead of examining whether the interference had been ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’, the Court checked whether a fair balance had been struck between the 
different interests involved.
22 Darren Omoregie and others (n 21), concurring opinion of Judge Jebens.
23 ECtHR 14 April 2009 (admissibility decision), app no 38165/07 (Narenji Haghighi). In 
this judgment the ECtHR repeated its standard formula that ‘in the case of both positive and 
negative obligations the State must strike a fair balance between the competing interests of 
the individual and of the community as a whole’. There is no indication, however, that any-
thing like the necessity test was in fact applied.
24 ECtHR 11 October 2011 (admissibility decision), app no 25579/09 (A.Y. c France); ECtHR 
3 April 2012 (admissibility decision), app no 1722/10 (Biraga), para 56 and ECtHR 10 May 
2012 (admissibility decision), app no 111859/03 (Olgun), para 42 (legitimate aim not speci-
fied). See also Nacic and others (n 21).
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iii. Margin of Appreciation
When applying the fair balance test the ECtHR usually states that 
Contracting States have a ‘certain margin of appreciation’.25 This margin 
serves to determine the intensity of the judicial review conducted by the 
Court: where a margin is granted, the review is less intense and it is left to 
the Contracting State to appraise the various interests at stake. In this 
respect the margin of appreciation doctrine must be distinguished from 
other instruments of interpretation used by the ECtHR, such as the fair 
balance test or the necessity test. Unlike the latter instruments, the margin 
of appreciation doctrine does not set the criteria for determining whether 
a particular state measure is compatible with Article 8 ECHR (for exam-
ple, that there must be a fair balance or that the measure must be neces-
sary in a democratic society). Instead it determines the scope of the review 
to be performed; in other words, whether the Court will conduct an inten-
sive examination or whether it will defer to the judgment of the respond-
ent state.26
Consequently, the margin of appreciation doctrine is not, strictly speak-
ing, relevant to the primary purpose of this section, which is to identify 
the standards governing the application of Article 8 ECHR in relation to 
integration requirements for family reunification. However, it is good to 
be aware that the criteria formulated by the ECtHR are not all-encompass-
ing, but that there is scope for choices to be made by the national authori-
ties of Contracting States. Hence the standards articulated by the ECtHR 
must be perceived as minimum standards.27
The scope of the margin of appreciation is determined by a number of 
different circumstances and can therefore vary from case to case. Relevant 
circumstances include the nature of the right at issue, the nature of the 
aim pursued by the contested measure or of the general interest involved 
and the extent to which there is common ground between the laws of the 
Contracting States concerning the topic before the Court.28 This was con-
firmed by the ECtHR Grand Chamber in two judgments, both of which 
involved positive obligations under Article 8 ECHR.29 
25 eg, Gül (n 20), para 38; Tuquabo-Tekle and others (n 12), para 42 and Narenji Haghighi 
(n 23).
26 On the margin of appreciation, see Schokkenbroek 1996; Schokkenbroek 2000, 18–30; 
Van Dijk and Van Hoof 1998, 82–95 and Arai-Takahashi 2002. Useful reflections on the mar-
gin of appreciation and the intensity of judicial review in general can also be found in 
Gerards 2002, notably 79–100 and 165–97.
27 Gerards 2010, 226.
28 See, eg, Schokkenbroek 1996, 205–09, Van Dijk and Van Hoof 1998, 87–91 and Gerards 
2002, 169–97.
29 In the case of Evans, the Grand Chamber held that ‘a number of factors to be taken into 
account when determining the breadth of the margin of appreciation to be enjoyed by the 
State in any case under Article 8 [include] whether there is at stake a particularly important 
facet of an individual’s existence or identity; whether there is consensus between the 
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The various elements determining the scope of the margin of apprecia-
tion may all point in the same direction. However, it can also occur that 
one element supports the application of a narrow margin, whereas 
another requires a wide margin. With regard to cases involving integra-
tion requirements for family reunification, immigration and integration 
are arguably matters of general policy and a wide margin should, there-
fore, be granted.30 On the other hand, a narrow margin may be appropri-
ate in, for example, cases involving very young children, whose right to 
be with their parents can be considered an essential element of the right to 
family life.31 Where both factors play a role, the applicable margin of 
appreciation will ultimately depend on the particular circumstances of 
the case.32 
C. Balancing Family Life and Immigration Control: the Criteria Used 
by the Court
As stated above, the fair balance test examines whether the impediment to 
applicants’ family life, caused by refusal to allow family reunification, is 
proportionate to the state interest served by this refusal. The lawfulness of 
the state’s decision will therefore depend on the reasons why family reuni-
fication was refused, as well as on the applicants’ personal circumstances 
Member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at 
stake or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly in cases involving sensitive moral 
or ethical issues and whether the State is required to strike a balance between competing 
private and public interests or Convention rights’ (ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 10 April 2007, 
app no 6339/05, para 77). In Hatton and others the Court added that a wide margin of appre-
ciation was to be granted in situations where the interest invoked by the Contracting State 
concerns a ‘matter of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic society may 
reasonably differ widely’, such as environmental policy and social and economic policies 
(ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 8 July 2003, app no 36022/97, paras 97–101). 
30 The ECtHR has found on several occasions that a wide margin of appreciation exists in 
admission cases. See Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali (n 9), para 67. See also ECtHR 12 
February 2008 (admissibility decision), app no 33831/03 (M.F.S. v Bulgaria), para 1. In the 
latter case the Court stated: ‘La Cour rappelle que le mécanisme de sauvegarde des droits 
fondamentaux institué par la Convention revêt un caractère subsidiaire par rapport aux sys-
tèmes nationaux et que ce principe s’applique pleinement en matière d’immigration’. Finally, 
the following passage can be found in a recent decision of the Court regarding an alleged 
violation of Art 10 ECHR (ECtHR 20 April 2010 (admissibility decision), app no 18788/09 (Le 
Pen), para 1): ‘En l’espèce, la Cour note que les propos du requérant s’inscrivent dans le 
cadre du débat d’intérêt général relative aux problèmes liés à l’installation et à l’intégration 
des immigrés dans le pays d’acceuil. Quant au contexte de ce débat en ce qui concerne la 
France, la Cour a précisé [. . .] que [ces problèmes] font actuellement l’objet d’amples débats 
dans les sociétés européennes, tant sur le plan politique que sur le plan médiatique. [. . .] Elle 
a rappelé à cet égard l’ampleur variable des problèmes auxquels les Etats pouvaient faire 
face dans le cadre des politiques d’immigration et d’intégration, qui commande de leur lais-
ser disposer d’une marge d’appréciation assez large pour déterminer l’existence et l’étendue 
de la nécessité de pareille ingérence’.
31 Compare the cases of Sen and Rodrigues Da Silva described in the following section.
32 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 8 July 2003, app no 36022/97 (Hatton and others), para 103.
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and the effect of the refusal on their opportunities to enjoy family life. This 
will also apply if the decision is based on an applicant’s failure to pass an 
integration test. This section analyses ECtHR case law in admission cases 
in an attempt to get more insight into how the Court assesses both indi-
vidual and state interests and weighs them against each other. Firstly, con-
siderations relating to the state’s interests are considered. Next, the interests 
of applicants will be considered, with a distinction being made between 
arguments relating to the situation of the family members and arguments 
relating to the nature and effect of the disputed immigration measures.
i. Interests of the State
The fair balance test requires the interests of the individual applicants to 
be weighed against the general interests of the state. With regard to admis-
sion cases, this would imply that the ECtHR not only examines the situa-
tion of family members, but also the conditions by which family 
reunification is refused or restricted and the reasons underlying these 
conditions. Indeed, the Court has often stated that one of the factors to 
determine whether Article 8 ECHR requires that a family member be 
admitted is ‘whether there are factors of immigration control (eg, a history 
of breaches of immigration law) or considerations of public order weigh-
ing in favour of exclusion’.33 So far, however, the Court has been rather 
reticent in formulating more specific criteria with regard to immigration 
rules applied by Contracting States.
As stated above (section II.B.i), the ‘pure’ fair balance test does not 
involve an examination of whether the state’s refusal to allow family 
reunification serves one of the legitimate aims mentioned in Article 8(2) 
ECHR. Especially in its early case law, the Court often did not explicitly 
consider the grounds on which admission was refused. In the case of Gül, 
for instance, the Court concluded that there was no obstacle preventing 
the family from exercising its family life in the country of origin and then 
immediately went on to find that there had been no violation of Article 8 
ECHR, without mentioning which state interest would be served if the 
son were not admitted.34 In other cases, the Court found – and accepted – 
that refusal of family reunification pursued the rather broadly formulated 
state interest of ‘controlling immigration’, which is not as such mentioned 
33 eg, ECtHR 22 June 1999 (admissibility decision), app no 27663/95 (Ajayi and others); 
Darren Omoregie and others (n 21), para 57; Nunez (n 12), para 70; Olgun (n 24), para 43.
34 Gül (n 20), paras 42–43 (by contrast, see the dissenting opinion of Judges Martens and 
Russo, paras 10–15). Other examples of cases in which the Court did not address the reasons 
underlying the refusal of admission include ECtHR 19 January 1999 (admissibility decision), 
app no 39322/98 (Cincil), ECtHR 9 November 2000 (admissibility decision), app no 50065/99 
(Shebashov) and, more recently, ECtHR 24 June 2008 (admissibility decision), app no 25087/06 
(M. v United Kingdom). This element of the Court’s approach was criticised by Forder for its 
lack of transparency; see Forder 2005, 40.
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in the Convention. It has done so even in cases where the respondent state 
indicated that the immigration measures were taken with regard to one or 
more of the ‘legitimate aims’ of Article 8(2) ECHR.35 
Of late, however, the Court has begun to refer to these aims more explic-
itly. In several, more or less recent, cases, the ECtHR specified that the 
refusal of admission was in the interest of the ‘protection of economic 
well-being’ and/or the ‘prevention of disorder and crime’.36 On some 
occasions, the reference to these aims seems to have been inspired by the 
fact that specific conditions for admission had not been met. For example, 
in Konstatinov, the applicant had been convicted of various criminal 
offences, whereas her partner failed to meet the income requirement set 
by the respondent state (the Netherlands). The Court subsequently held 
that the refusal of admission had been in the interest of ‘controlling immi-
gration and public expenditure and the prevention of disorder or crime’.37 
However, it has also invoked these aims in cases where the refusal appar-
ently resulted from an overall restrictive immigration policy (the appli-
cants simply did not belong to a category of aliens eligible for admission) 
or from the failure to meet a formal requirement (eg the possession of a 
valid visa or passport).38 Specifically, in Nacic and others, the Court clari-
fied that it considered the economic well-being of the respondent state to 
be served by the effective implementation of immigration control.39 
As regards the proportionality of immigration measures in relation to 
the public interest at stake, ECtHR case law provides little guidance: in 
the majority of cases these issues are simply not addressed. Several judg-
ments deserve to be mentioned, however. In the cases of Haydarie and 
Konstatinov, the applicants were refused residence because, inter alia, the 
family members seeking their admission did not meet the income require-
ments imposed by the respondent state. In both cases, the ECtHR stated 
that 
in principle the Court does not consider unreasonable a requirement that an 
alien who seeks family reunion must demonstrate that he/she has sufficient 
35 eg, Ahmut (n 15), para 73 and ECtHR 21 December 2001, app no 31465/96 (Sen), para 41. 
In both cases the respondent state (the Netherlands) argued that it pursued a restrictive 
immigration policy for reasons of inter alia the availability of employment. This aim can eas-
ily be understood as serving the interest of ‘protecting the economic well-being of the coun-
try’.
36 eg, ECtHR 31 January 2006, app no 50435/99 (Rodrigues Da Silva & Hoogkamer), para 44; 
ECtHR 26 April 2007, app no 16351/03 (Konstatinov), para 53; A.Y. c France (n 24) and Biraga 
(n 24), para 56.
37 Konstatinov (n 36), paras 50–51 and 53, I take it that the aim of ‘controlling public 
expenditure’ can be subsumed under ‘protection of the economic well-being’ of the state.
38 eg, Rodrigues Da Silva & Hoogkamer (n 36), para 44; A.Y. c France (n 24)  and Biraga (n 24), 
para 56.
39 Nacic and others (n 21), para 79: ‘The Court further accepts that the legitimate aim pur-
sued was to ensure an effective implementation of immigration control and hence to preserve 
the economic well-being of Sweden’ (emphasis added).
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independent and lasting income, not being welfare benefits, to provide for the 
basic costs of subsistence of his or her family members with whom reunion is 
sought.40
It may be derived that, at least in abstracto, states’ economic interest in not 
having to support family members from abroad is considered sufficiently 
weighty to justify the introduction of the income requirements concerned. 
With regard to the public interest of immigration control, the Court stated 
in Nunez and Antwi that the possibility for states to expel family members 
constitutes an ‘important means of general deterrence against gross or 
repeated violations of the Immigration Act’. Having established that such 
violations existed in the cases concerned, the ECtHR went on to find that 
‘the public interest in favour or ordering the applicant’s expulsion 
weighed heavily in the balance when assessing the issue of proportional-
ity’. Additionally, in Nunez, the Court rejected the argument made by the 
applicant, to the effect that ‘the public interest in an expulsion would be 
preponderant only in instances where the person concerned had been 
convicted of a criminal offence’. Yet, in Antwi, it indicated that longer re-
entry bans can be imposed when the breaches of the state’s immigration 
laws have been more serious in nature.41
On the other hand, in its judgment in Rodrigues Da Silva & Hoogkamer, 
the ECtHR found that the decision by the Netherlands to refuse admis-
sion had been disproportionate. In the Court’s view, the state had indulged 
in ‘excessive formalism’ by attaching ‘paramount importance’ to the fact 
that Mrs Rodrigues had been residing in the Netherlands illegally at the 
time of her daughter’s birth. The Court had regard, therefore, for the fact 
that the Dutch government itself had indicated that Mrs Rodrigues could 
have obtained lawful residence on the basis of her relationship with the 
child’s father, if only she had applied for it.42 Thus, the mere fact that a 
person fails to apply for a residence permit, even though the requirements 
for obtaining such a permit are met, is apparently not regarded by the 
Court as a very important contravention of the state’s immigration rules. 
Given that Mrs Rodrigues was moreover unable to continue her family 
life with her young daughter in her country of origin, the Court decided 
that the interests of the state did not outweigh those of the applicants. A 
similar type of reasoning was followed in the case of Nunez, where the 
ECtHR held it against the respondent state that it had not acted fast 
enough in reacting to Mrs Nunez’ unlawful stay. According to the Court, 
the expulsion of Mrs Nunez did not ‘to any appreciable degree [fulfil] the 
interests of swiftness and efficiency of immigration control that was 
40 ECtHR 20 October 2005 (admissibility decision), app no 8876/04 (Haydarie and others) 
and Konstatinov (n 36), para 50.
41 Nunez (n 12), paras 71–73; Antwi and others (n 20), paras 90 and 104.
42 Rodrigues Da Silva & Hoogkamer (n 36), paras 43–44.
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the intended purpose of such administrative measures’. Consequently, 
the state interest served by the expulsion could not tip the balance.43 
In Biraga, however, the Court again attached rather a lot of weight to the 
respondent state’s interest in compliance with a mainly formal immigra-
tion measure. In this case, a decision had not yet been taken on the appli-
cant’s request for admission, hence it had not been established that she 
failed to meet any of the applicable conditions. She had, however, already 
entered the respondent state (Sweden) as an asylum seeker, whereas 
Swedish immigration law required her to apply for a residence permit for 
family reunion from abroad. The ECtHR found that the applicant’s expul-
sion was not contrary to Article 8 ECHR.44 A comparison with Rodrigues 
Da Silva suggests that the situation in the latter case was really quite 
exceptional, insofar as the mother’s eligibility for a residence permit was 
not disputed. Moreover, in admission cases, the outcome of the fair bal-
ance test is not only determined by the interests of the state but also by 
those of the applicants. The ECtHR’s considerations relating to these 
interests are discussed below. 
ii. Interests of the Applicants
a. Considerations Relating to the Situation of the Family Members
An assessment of admission cases handled by the ECtHR shows that 
many different circumstances play a role in determining the weight to be 
accorded to family members’ interest in establishing or continuing their 
family life in the respondent state. To start with, the Court itself distin-
guishes between ‘those [family members] seeking entry into a country to 
pursue their newly established family life and those who had an estab-
lished family life before one of the spouses obtained settlement in another 
country’.45 In general, the interests of the family members will weigh more 
heavily if family life had already been created before one of them moved 
abroad. This may reflect a reasoning to the effect that, when admitting a 
person who already has a family in his or her country of origin, states can 
expect to be asked to admit that family as well, whereas this is not the case 
if the family did not exist at that time. However, as discussed below, the 
differentiation between family life created before or after migration 
should not be overstated: in both situations the Court has often found 
there to be reasons why Article 8 ECHR does not require family reunifica-
tion in the respondent state.
43 Nunez (n 12 ), paras 82–84. By contrast, see Antwi and others (n 20), para 102.
44 Biraga (n 24).
45 Sen (n 35), para 37; ECtHR 6 July 2006 (admissibility decision), app no 13594/03 (Priya). 
This distinction corresponds to the distinction made in Dutch law between family formation 
(gezinsvorming) and family reunification (gezinshereniging). This chapter uses the term ‘fam-
ily reunification’ or ‘family reunion’ to cover both types of cases, unless otherwise indicated.
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The majority of cases in which family life already existed before migra-
tion concern children left behind in their country of origin when (one of) 
their parents went to settle abroad. The ECtHR held in several of these 
cases that
it may be unreasonable to force the parent to choose between giving up the 
position which they have acquired in the country of settlement or to renounce 
the mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company which con-
stitutes a fundamental element of family life.46 
Yet this is not to say that a right to family reunification always exists in 
such situations. Case law shows that the Court takes various factors into 
account when determining the weight to be given to individual interests, 
including the age of the children and their situation in the country of ori-
gin, the extent to which the children are dependent on their parents, 
whether the separation was the result of a conscious and voluntary deci-
sion by the parents and whether there are any obstacles preventing the 
enjoyment of family life elsewhere.47 
To give some examples, in the cases of Sen and Tuquabo-Tekle the ECtHR 
held that the Netherlands was under a positive obligation to admit the 
children because the rest of the family could not be expected to join them 
in the country of origin. In both cases the parents had not only settled in 
the Netherlands, but also had children who had been born and raised 
there and who had no or only minimal ties to the country of origin.48 The 
Court also held that family reunification was ‘particularly exigent’ in view 
of the young age or otherwise vulnerable position of the children.49 By 
contrast, the ECtHR found no positive obligation for the state in Chandra 
and I.M. because it considered that family life could also be exercised in 
the country of origin, and in Magoke because the applicant was not pre-
vented from maintaining the same degree of family life with his daughter 
as they had enjoyed before his migration.50 
A somewhat different scenario occurred in the case of Nacic and others: 
family life had been created before migration and all the family members 
46 eg, ECtHR 9 January 2001 (admissibility decision), app no 38047/97 (J.M.); ECtHR 6 
November 2001 (admissibility decision), app no 50568/99 (Adnane); ECtHR 18 March 2003 
(admissibility decision), app no 59186/00 (Ismail Ebrahim and Serhan Ebrahim) and Haydarie 
and others (n 40).
47 eg, Ahmut (n 15), paras 69–73; ECtHR 5 September 2000 (admissibility decision), app no 
39003/97 (Knel & Veira); Sen (n 35), paras 37–41; ECtHR 6 July 2004 (admissibility decision), 
app no 53675/00 (Ramos Andrade); ECtHR 5 April 2005 (admissibility decision), app no 
43786/04 (Benamar and others) and Tuquabo-Tekle and others (n 12), paras 44–52.
48 Sen (n 35) and Tuquabo-Tekle and others (n 12).
49 In Tuquabo-Tekle (n 12), the ECtHR considered it relevant that the daughter had been 
taken out of school and had reached an age where she could be married off, contrary to the 
wishes of her mother. 
50 ECtHR 25 March 2003 (admissibility decision), app no 41226/98 (I.M.), ECtHR 13 May 
2003 (admissibility decision), app no53102/99 (Chandra and others) and ECtHR 14 June 2005 
(admissibility decision), app no 12611/03 (Magoke). 
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(the parents and their two sons) had moved to Sweden together to apply 
for asylum. Eventually one son was granted a residence permit on medi-
cal grounds, while the other family members’ applications were rejected. 
The ECtHR treated the case as one involving an interference instead of 
a potential positive obligation (para II.B.ii), but nevertheless found that 
neither the son’s health nor the applicants’ ties to Sweden constituted 
insurmountable obstacles for the family to return the country of origin. As 
a result, the Court concluded that Article 8 ECHR had not been violated.51
The second category of cases under Article 8 ECHR includes those in 
which family life was created after migration. These cases normally 
concern families that were formed in the respondent state while one of the 
parents or partners was residing there illegally or on a temporary resi-
dence permit (for example, while awaiting a decision on an asylum claim). 
In such cases, the circumstances considered by the ECtHR in relation to 
the individual interests of the applicants include ‘the extent to which 
family life is or will be effectively ruptured, the extent of the ties in the 
Contracting State and whether there are insurmountable objective 
obstacles for exercising the family life in the country of origin’. Another 
important element is 
whether family life was created at a time when the persons involved were 
aware that the immigration status of one of them was such that the persistence 
of the family life within the host state would from the outset be precarious.52 
The Court has indicated that, where the latter condition is met, a violation 
of Article 8 ECHR will occur only ‘in the most exceptional circumstances’. 
To date such exceptional circumstances have been found to exist only 
twice. In Rodrigues Da Silva, the respondent state (the Netherlands) sought 
to expel the mother of a very young girl who depended on her care. As the 
parents had separated and custody had been granted to the father, there 
was no possibility for the mother to take her daughter with her to her 
country of origin (Brazil).53 Very similar facts emerged in Nunez, in which 
case the ECtHR also attached relevance to the disruption and stress 
already experienced by the children on account of their parents’ separa-
tion and the pending expulsion of their mother.54 More often, however, 
the Court has found there to be no positive obligation because the family 
relationship started at a time when one of the persons concerned had a 
weak immigration status and/or because family life could also be exer-
cised in the country of origin.55
51 Nacic and others (n 21), notably para 85. A partially dissenting opinion was issued by 
Judges Spielmann and Power-Forde.
52 eg, Ajayi and others (n 33), ECtHR (admissibility decision) 11 April 2006, app no 61291/00 
(Useinov); Darren Omoregie and others (n 21), para 57 and Olgun (n 24), para 43.
53 Rodrigues Da Silva and Hoogkamer (n 36).
54 Nunez (n 12), notably para 84.
55 eg, ECtHR 24 November 1998 (admissibility decision), app no 40447/98 (Mitchell); 
Solomon (n 21); Antwi and others (n 20).
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Looking at the above, three elements seem to play an important role in 
the Court’s evaluation of a family’s situation in admission cases. The first 
is whether family reunification is called for, either in the country of origin 
or in the respondent state. With regard to this point, the Court may con-
sider that reunification is not necessary because the children are no longer 
in need of parental care,56 or because the applicants can maintain their 
family life by means of regular visits across the border. The second ele-
ment concerns the alternative of family reunification in the country of ori-
gin. This is normally considered possible, unless there are particularly 
strong ties binding the family, or some members of it, to the respondent 
state. Although the Court has never stated so explicitly, it seems likely 
that it would also consider family reunification to be precluded in the 
country of origin if one or more family members were at risk of persecu-
tion there.57 Finally, the third element concerns the family members’ own 
role in causing the separation, which may weigh against their claim for 
family reunification. This is reflected in the argument that the parent(s) 
consciously decided to leave their child behind in the country of origin, 
and in the argument that family life was created at a time when the immi-
gration status of one of the family members was precarious.58
b. Considerations Relating to the Effect of Immigration Measures
The extent to which the applicants’ interests are affected also depends on 
the nature of the immigration measures taken by the respondent state. As 
mentioned before, these measures are not often subject to express consid-
eration by the ECtHR. The Court has, however, on several occasions con-
sidered the duration of re-entry bans imposed by the Contracting State, 
whereby it has found temporary re-entry bans of up to five years to be 
acceptable.59 By contrast, in Nunez, the interests of the children put so 
much weight on the scale that a re-entry ban of two years was already 
considered disproportionate.60
56 eg, Knel & Veira (n 47).
57 See, a contrario, the judgment in Gül (n 20), para 41, where the Court held that the rea-
sons why the father had applied for asylum were apparently no longer valid as he had vis-
ited his son in their country of origin several times. Asylum-related grounds probably also 
played a role in the case of Haydarie (n 40), where the Court referred to ‘the possible existence 
of an objective obstacle for the applicants’ return to Afghanistan’.
58 Conversely, in Tuquabo-Tekle (n 12), para 47, the ECtHR considered that ‘it is questiona-
ble to what extent it can be maintained [. . .] that Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle left Mehret behind of 
“her own free will”, bearing in mind that she fled Eritrea in the course of a civil war to seek 
asylum abroad’. This also shows that asylum-related arguments can play a role here, as well 
as in determining whether family life is possible in the country of origin.
59 Konstatinov (n 36), para 52; Darren Omoregie and others (n 21), paras 67–68; Antwi and oth-
ers (n 20), para 104.
60 Nunez (n 12), para 81.
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As regards income requirements, it has already been mentioned that 
the Court does not, in principle, consider it unreasonable for states to 
demand that
an alien who seeks family reunion must demonstrate that he/she has sufficient 
independent and lasting income, not being welfare benefits, to provide for the 
basic costs of subsistence of his or her family members with whom reunion is 
sought.61 
It follows that applicants may normally be expected to make the efforts 
necessary to comply with this requirement. In Konstatinov, the Court con-
sidered that it had not been demonstrated, over a period of eight years, 
that the applicant’s husband in the Netherlands had ever complied or at 
least made any efforts to comply with the minimum income require-
ment.62 A similar situation was found in Haydarie: although it was estab-
lished that the applicant had been taking language and sewing courses, 
which may have increased her employability, there was no indication that 
she had actively sought gainful employment. Instead she had preferred to 
stay at home to care for her disabled sister, which, according to the 
respondent government and the Court, she could also have left to a pro-
fessional agency.63 In both the above cases, the Court concluded that the 
state authorities had not failed to strike a fair balance between the appli-
cant’s interests on the one hand and its own interests in controlling immi-
gration and public expenditure on the other.
In Haydarie the Court did, however, take into account the respondent 
government’s statement that it would not have maintained the income 
requirement if Mrs Haydarie could demonstrate to have made, during a 
period of three years, serious but unsuccessful efforts to find gainful 
employment, ‘also bearing in mind the possible existence of an objective 
obstacle for the applicant’s return to Afghanistan’. This suggests that, at 
least where the option of exercising family life in the country of origin 
does not exist, states may not indefinitely continue to refuse admission to 
applicants who are willing but unable to meet the income requirements 
imposed.
Additional considerations relating to the proportionality of immigra-
tion requirements can be found in the ECtHR’s decision in M.F.S. v 
Bulgaria.64 This case concerned a Ukrainian national, Mrs M.F.S., who 
wished to reside in Bulgaria with her Bulgarian husband. During the first 
two years of her marriage she had to pay between €100 and €250 in 
administrative charges every six months in order to obtain and renew her 
residence permit. The applicant claimed that the annual sum to be paid by 
61 Haydarie and others (n 40) and Konstatinov (n 36), para 50.
62 Konstatinov (n 36), para 50.
63 Haydarie and others (n 40).
64 ECtHR 12 February 2008 (admissibility decision), app no 33831/03 (M.F.S. v Bulgaria).
120 Family Life and Family Reunification
her equalled four times the Bulgarian minimum wage, while at the same 
time she was not permitted to work in Bulgaria. Although the Court held 
that a residence permit allowing a family member to reside in the respond-
ent state was normally an adequate measure to meet the requirements of 
Article 8 ECHR, it nevertheless went on to examine ‘whether the legal and 
factual conditions regarding this residence permit were not such as to dis-
turb the fair balance between the interests of the applicants and those of 
the community’.65 In doing so, it conceded that the amount to be paid by 
Mrs M.F.S. was substantial for Bulgarian standards, but found that she 
had not proven that the financial burden was too heavy, given her per-
sonal circumstances. The Court also recalled that the applicant’s situation 
was temporary, as she would be able to apply for permanent residence 
status after two years. In summary, the Court concluded that the appli-
cant’s interests did not outweigh the financial considerations underlying 
the administrative charges imposed by the respondent state.
iii. Final Observations Regarding the Fair Balance Test in Admission Cases
ECtHR case law regarding admission cases is discussed above, with the 
aim of providing greater insight into how the Court applies the fair bal-
ance test. From this discussion, a number of criteria emerged that are used 
by the Court to assess whether a fair balance has been struck between the 
interests of the applicants and those of the Contracting States. It should be 
noted, however, that the Court’s application of these criteria is highly cas-
uistic and does not follow a fixed argumentative pattern, which means 
that their significance may vary in each individual case. It cannot, for 
example, be deduced from case law how the fact that family reunification 
is not possible in the country of origin will be weighed against the fact 
that family life was started at a time when the residence status of one of 
the partners was insecure, or that the applicant has made too few efforts 
to comply with income requirements.66 It is, furthermore, unclear why the 
Court addresses the proportionality of immigration measures in some 
detail in some cases, but not in others. Lastly, the Court does not always 
seem to act consistently in the way it evaluates the facts of a case. In this 
respect, it is not obvious why the Court found that, in the Sen case, the 
decision by the parents to leave their daughter behind was not meant to 
be final, whereas the same decision was seen as definite and held against 
the parents in Gül and Ahmut.67 
65 ‘Encore faut-il s’assurer que les conséquences de droit et de fait découlant du titre de 
séjour accordé à la personne concernée ne rompent pas le juste équilibre à ménager entre les 
intérêts de l’individu et ceux de la communauté’, M.F.S. v Bulgaria (n 64), para 1.
66 On the latter question cp Boeles et al 2009, 169–79.
67 See Sen (n 35), para 40, Gül (n 20 above), para 41 and Ahmut (n 15 above) para 70. These 
and other inconsistencies in ECtHR case law in admission cases are discussed in Spijkerboer 
2009, 276–80. According to this author, the ‘structural instability’ of the Court’s decision-
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The above inconsistencies and the interplay between the different crite-
ria used by the Court affect the level of certainty with which it can be 
determined whether immigration decisions taken by a Contracting State 
are compatible with Article 8 ECHR. The following section nevertheless 
attempts to establish how Article 8 ECHR affects Contracting States’ com-
petence to make family reunification dependent on the fulfilment of inte-
gration conditions.
D. Article 8 ECHR in Relation to Integration Requirements 
It has been established that, according to the ECtHR’s interpretation, 
Article 8 ECHR does not grant individuals a general right to family reuni-
fication in the territory of a Contracting State. It follows that states are, in 
principle, allowed to make family reunification dependent on the fulfil-
ment of certain conditions and to refuse admission in cases where those 
conditions are not met. Hence, measures aiming to control immigration of 
family members are not a priori incompatible with Article 8 ECHR. 
Nonetheless, a Contracting State may be under an obligation to allow 
family reunification in individual cases, where the interests of the appli-
cants outweigh the general interests of the state. The previous section 
identifies criteria that are relevant for assessing these interests. It is now 
time to apply these criteria to situations where family reunification is 
made subject to integration requirements. 
i. Integration Requirements and the Interest of the State
Thus far, the ECtHR has not been asked to pass judgment in any cases 
involving integration requirements. The Court has consequently not pro-
nounced on the legitimacy of the aim of promoting integration. 
Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that this objective would be deemed 
incompatible with Article 8 ECHR. Possibly, the aims pursued through 
integration requirements can be subsumed under the interests already 
regarded as legitimate by the ECtHR, which are usually formulated in 
rather broad terms. The Court could accept, for example, that integration 
requirements are meant to prevent disorder (for example, by promoting 
peaceful relations between different groups of the population) or to pro-
tect the economic well-being of the country (by encouraging economic 
self-reliance and ensuring that immigrants have the necessary labour 
market skills). Alternatively, given the ECtHR’s reticent attitude in this 
making is inevitable due to the normative conflict between cosmopolitanism and communi-
tarianism and the conflict between the ‘ascending’ and ‘descending’ positions in international 
legal argument. I believe, however, that the existence of these conflicts does not necessarily 
prevent the Court from addressing them in a more structured and consistent way. 
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regard, it is not unlikely that the Court will regard integration as a legiti-
mate public interest in itself, leaving it to the Contracting States to deter-
mine more specifically what this objective entails. Lastly, as demonstrated 
earlier, the Court has accepted that admission requirements are necessary 
to ‘control immigration’, without going into the underlying purpose of 
such immigration control.
There are, nevertheless, some limitations to the objectives that Contracting 
States may pursue through integration measures. These objectives should 
not conflict with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR. 
Consequently, the purpose of integration measures may not be to abolish or 
restrict religious or ethnic pluralism.68 It was also submitted in chapter 3 
(section III.D.i) that states may not seek to make immigrants agree with 
particular moral values or beliefs. Arguably, this criterion translates into a 
legal norm through Article 9 ECHR, which protects the freedom of thought. 
Also relevant in this regard is the ECtHR’s judgment in Kjeldsen, Busk 
Madsen and Pedersen, in which the Court stated that the Contracting States 
were not permitted to pursue an aim of indoctrination. While this case con-
cerned the right to freedom of education as protected in Article 2 of the First 
Protocol to the ECHR, the Court expressly stated that it considered its inter-
pretation to be consistent with ‘Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention and 
with the general spirit of the Convention itself, an instrument designed to 
maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society’.69 It 
moreover held that, to be in conformity with the ECHR, information or 
knowledge included in the curricula of state schools had to be conveyed ‘in 
an objective, critical and pluralistic manner’.70 It is submitted that this crite-
rion may well also be applied in the context of integration requirements.
Another judgment with potential relevance for the issue at hand was 
issued in the case of Tănase. Here, the ECtHR qualified as a legitimate aim 
the need to ensure loyalty to the state. The Court explained that such loy-
alty ‘in principle encompasses respect for the country’s Constitution, 
laws, institutions, independence and territorial integrity’. However, it 
also stated that ‘the notion of respect in this context must be limited to 
requiring that any desire to bring about changes to any of these aspects 
must be pursued in accordance with the laws of the state’.71 The judgment 
68 This is not to deny that restrictions to such pluralism are sometimes allowed in, eg, the 
interest of public order (see Art 9(2) ECHR). However, the abolition or restriction of religious 
or ethnic pluralism as an objective in itself would be incompatible with the ECHR. The 
ECtHR has often indicated that the existence of such pluralism (or diversity) is protected by 
the Convention; see, eg, ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 22 December 2009, app nos 27996/06 and 
34836/06 (Sejdić and Finci), paras 43–44 and ECtHR 10 June 2010, app no 302/02 ( Jehovah’s 
Witnesses of Moscow and others), para 99.
69 ECtHR 7 December 1976, app nos 5095/71, 5920/72 and 5926/72 (Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen 
and Pedersen), para 53. See also, more recently, ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 18 March 2011, app 
no 30814/06 (Lautsi and others), para 62.
70 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen (n 69), para 53.
71 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 27 April 2010, app no 7/08 (Tănase), paras 166–67.
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concerned a complaint under Article 3 First Protocol ECHR (the right to 
free elections), regarding a requirement in the legislation of Moldova that 
precluded citizens with dual nationality from becoming a member of par-
liament. This is, of course, a different context from the one examined in 
this book. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that, where states enact 
integration requirements with the aim of ensuring the loyalty of immi-
grants to the host state (for instance, through a declaration), they should 
at least remain within the limits described above.
Another factor to be considered in relation to the interests of the state is 
the effectiveness of integration requirements in improving immigrant 
integration in the host society. It is observed that, with the exception of the 
Nunez case (section II.C.i), the ECtHR has so far refrained from testing the 
suitability of the immigration measures at stake to realise the public inter-
ests pursued, and it may well be that an assessment of the effectiveness of 
those measures would go beyond the scope of the Court’s review. If, how-
ever, it is established that integration requirements do not have much 
effect, it follows that the interests of the state would not be strongly 
affected if those requirements were to be disregarded. Conversely, if the 
requirements are highly effective, the state interests will clearly benefit 
from their application. Consequently, where evidence of the effectiveness 
of integration requirements is available, it will be relevant to the question 
of whether a ‘fair balance’ has been struck between the interests of the 
state and those of the applicants in the individual case.
ii. Integration Requirements and the Interests of the Applicants
Turning now to the interests of the applicants, it can be inferred from the 
above analysis that these interests must be given increased weight when 
reunification is clearly in the best interests of the children involved 
(because, for instance, the children are still young), when there are obsta-
cles to the exercising of family life in the country of origin and when the 
separation of family members could not be attributed to their own choice 
or to the fact that they started their relationship when the immigration 
status of one of them was precarious. Where one or more of these circum-
stances play a role, there will normally be less scope for a Contracting 
State to refuse to admit a family member on the grounds that he or she has 
not met an integration requirement. 
In addition to the above circumstances, the nature and effect of integra-
tion requirements can play a role. From the ECtHR’s judgments in 
Haydarie, Konstatinov and M.F.S. v Bulgaria, it can be derived that the inter-
ests of the applicants will weigh more heavily when family reunification 
is delayed for a longer period of time or even made permanently impos-
sible. This will depend, to an important extent, on the burden imposed by 
the integration requirements and the efforts required from the applicants. 
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It should be noted that, in each of the above judgments, the ECtHR not 
only considered whether the disputed immigration conditions were 
acceptable in abstracto, but also assessed their effect in the case at hand, 
given the particular circumstances of the applicants. 
While the Court has not yet ruled on this, it is suggested that several 
elements are significant in assessing the extent to which the possibility of 
family reunification is affected by integration requirements, such as the 
contents of the integration exam or programme, the level of knowledge or 
skills required, whether course materials or study facilities are provided 
by the Contracting State and the costs for the applicants. The effect of inte-
gration requirements on the applicants will also be influenced by indi-
vidual circumstances, such as the education and learning capacity of the 
person concerned, the existence of any physical or psychological disabili-
ties and the actual accessibility of course materials and the programme or 
exam (taking into account the financial situation of the applicants, as well 
as possible obstacles existing in the country of origin). Lastly it will make 
a difference whether the immigration regulations of the Contracting State 
contain an exemption clause for applicants who, despite making the nec-
essary efforts, have not been able to comply with the integration require-
ments. As stated in section II.C.ii, the existence of such an exemption 
clause seems to have played a role in the Court’s decision in Haydarie.
In the judgments in M.F.S. and Haydarie, the fact that the applicants 
faced substantive costs or efforts was not enough to render the immigra-
tion measures disproportionate. Translated into integration measures, the 
latter judgment may mean that Article 8 ECHR does not, in principle, pre-
vent Contracting States from requiring the applicant to make an effort to 
meet an integration requirement throughout a fixed period of time (in 
casu three years). Yet, the ECtHR’s reasoning in Haydarie and Rodrigues Da 
Silva & Hoogkamer supports the statement that the level of the demands 
that may be placed on applicants is also determined by the situation of the 
family members (although, in the former case, even the ‘possible exist-
ence of an objective obstacle for the applicant’s return to Afghanistan’ was 
not enough to outweigh the substantial effort imposed on Mrs Haydarie). 
Thus, even where the separation of family members is temporary, the 
admissibility of the integration requirement will depend on the circum-
stances of the case.72
72 Consider, for instance, the situation in Tuquabo-Tekle (n 12), section II.C.ii, where family 
reunification was found necessary because the daughter was about to be married off by her 
grandmother. In such a situation, even a temporary prolongation of the separation would 
have had irreversible consequences for the family life of the applicants. In this connection, 
Van der Winden referred to ECtHR case law stating that delays to family reunification, 
caused by state measures, cannot be such as to result in the de facto termination of family 
life. See Van der Winden 2006, 127.
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E. Dutch Case Law with regard to Article 8 ECHR and Integration 
Requirements 
Unlike the ECtHR, Dutch courts have been asked on several occasions to 
review the compatibility of integration requirements with Article 8 of the 
ECHR. Although case law on this topic is not substantial, some contours 
of the courts’ approach are emerging, as outlined below. The purpose of 
this section is twofold. Its primary aim is to establish how Dutch courts 
interpret Article 8 ECHR in relation to integration requirements and 
which criteria have been developed in this respect. Secondly, the question 
of whether these criteria are compatible with Article 8 ECHR, as inter-
preted by the European Court of Human Rights, is considered.
i. Positive Obligation and Fair Balance Test
Firstly it may be noted that, in the cases examined, the courts have con-
sistently asked whether the refusal to admit a person on the grounds that 
the integration requirement had not been met amounted to a violation of 
a positive obligation under Article 8 ECHR. This approach is motivated 
by the argument that the refusal does not have the effect of withdrawing a 
residence permit that allowed the applicant to exercise his or her family 
life in the Netherlands and, therefore, does not constitute interference 
with the right to family life.73 As seen above, the ECtHR itself does not 
consistently distinguish between positive and negative obligations. 
However, the ‘positive obligation’ doctrine followed by the Dutch courts 
is not as such contrary to Article 8 ECHR. More important is the test that 
is applied.
It was established in section II.B that Article 8 ECHR does not include a 
general right to family reunification in the state where one of the family 
members is living. Whether such a right exists in an individual case 
depends on the interests of the family members, as well as the general 
interests of the state. Like the ECtHR (in most cases), the Dutch courts 
determine the existence of a right to family reunification in a particular 
case by means of the fair balance test.74 The following subsections discuss 
how this test has thus far been conducted in cases concerning integration 
requirements, with attention being paid first to the general interests 
73 eg, AJD 2 December 2008, case no 200806120/1, para 2.4.1; AJD 9 February 2009, case no 
200806121/1, para 2.5.1; District Court of The Hague sitting in ’s-Hertogenbosch 19 May 
2010, case no 09/44517, paras 12–13; District Court of The Hague sitting in Rotterdam 22 
September 2011, case no 10/31223, paras 4.2.1–4.2.2.
74 eg, President District Court of The Hague sitting in Middelburg 16 August 2007, case 
nos 07/30015 and 07/31032, LJN: BB3524, para 8; District Court of The Hague 21 October 
2009, case no 09/5145, LJN: BK5782, para 6.3; AJD 15 August 2011, case no 201007300/1/V2, 
para 2.3.1.
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served by integration requirements. After that, case law on the propor-
tionality of integration requirements is discussed and some consideration 
given to the intensity of the review conducted by the Dutch courts. Lastly, 
the extent to which Dutch case law provides more specific criteria for inte-
gration requirements than ECtHR case law is considered, as is the ques-
tion of whether there are any points on which the approach of the Dutch 
courts may not meet the requirements set by Article 8 ECHR.
ii. State Interests Served by Integration Requirements
Under the fair balance test, the interests of family members have to be 
weighed against the general interests of the state. As far as the latter are 
concerned, it was argued above that integration requirements may pursue 
a variety of more or less specifically formulated state interests. So far, the 
ECtHR has generally accepted that public interests such as ‘controlling 
immigration’ or ‘preserving the economic well-being of the state’ can, in 
principle, justify immigration measures, including expulsion of family 
members or the application of income requirements. In several more 
recent cases, however, the ECtHR did have regard for arguments to the 
effect that the state interests were not deeply affected or served by the 
immigration measure at stake, with the result that they weighed less 
heavily in the balance (section II.C.i).
To date, the Dutch courts’ approach in cases concerning integration 
requirements has been yet more reticent. In the majority of cases brought 
before them, the courts did not address the interests of the state at all, or 
merely claimed that the individual interests had to be weighed against the 
‘general interest’ or the ‘interests of the defendant’, without specifying 
what these entailed. In only two cases was the general interest addressed 
in more detail. In these judgments, the courts, referring to the legislative 
history of the AIA, found that
in this specific case the general interest consists, inter alia, of the need to stop 
the repeating process of lagging integration paired with continuing immigra-
tion so as to diminish the marginalisation of particular groups of the population 
– with all its consequences for the economic well-being of the Netherlands, 
public order and public safety and the rights and freedoms of others.75
Despite the above judgments it can be concluded that, overall, the nature 
of the general interests or the aims pursued by the state are not taken into 
account in the examination conducted by the Dutch courts in cases involv-
ing integration requirements. Consequently, both the definition of the 
general interests involved and the definition of the weight to be attached 
75 District Court of The Hague 21 October 2009, case no 09/5145, LJN: BK5782, para 6.3 
and District Court of The Hague sitting in Haarlem 24 November 2010, case no 10/18883, 
LJN: BO5381, para 2.13.
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thereto are left to the discretion of the legislative and administrative 
authorities. This also implies that it is not assessed whether or to what 
extent the integration exam abroad is a suitable or necessary instrument 
to achieve the aims pursued.
iii. Proportionality of Integration Requirements
From an examination of the available case law on integration require-
ments, the outcome of the fair balance test appears mainly to be deter-
mined by two criteria. One of these criteria, which is also taken into 
account by the ECtHR, is whether family life can be exercised in the coun-
try of origin. To a somewhat lesser extent, the courts also have regard to 
whether the obligation to pass the integration exam abroad makes the 
exercise of family life in the Netherlands permanently impossible.76 With 
regard to the second question, the courts assess whether there are reasons 
to assume that the person seeking admission is lastingly unable to pass 
the integration exam abroad. It was suggested above (section II.D.ii) that 
the latter element could be of relevance in assessing the proportionality of 
integration requirements. 
The Dutch courts use the above criteria to determine whether the obli-
gation to pass an integration exam – and the denial of admission in the 
event of non-compliance – are proportionate to the general interests. 
However, case law shows that the scale does not easily tilt in favour of the 
applicants. To date there have only been two cases in which a court found 
the requirement of integration abroad to be disproportionate, both of 
which were overruled on appeal.77 To illustrate the strictness with which 
the above criteria are applied some of the cases that have been decided 
thus far are described below.
One case that came before the District Court of The Hague (sitting in 
Middelburg) concerned an applicant of Eritrean nationality who sought 
admission for the purpose of family reunification with his Dutch wife.78 
The applicant stated that he was residing illegally in Sudan and that he 
was at risk of being sent back to Eritrea, from where he had previously 
76 eg, AJD 9 February 2009, case no 200806121/1, para 2.5.1; AJD 15 August 2011, case no 
201007300/1/V2, para 2.3.1; District Court of The Hague sitting in Rotterdam 23 April 2008, 
case no 07/35128, JV 2008/282, annotated by K.M. de Vries, para 2; District Court of The 
Hague sitting in ’s-Hertogenbosch 12 January 2009, case no 08/7556, LJN: BG9517, para 42; 
District Court of The Hague sitting in Utrecht 26 June 2009, case no 08/39827, para 2.20 and 
District Court of The Hague sitting in Maastricht 6 October 2010, case nos 09/33430 and 
10/9629.
77 District Court of The Hague sitting in Haarlem 24 November 2010, case no 10/18883, 
LJN: BO5381, overruled by AJD 1 December 2011, case no 201012538/1/V4; District Court of 
The Hague 30 June 2010, case no 09/46478, overruled by AJD 15 August 2011, case no 
201007300/1/V2.
78 President District Court of The Hague sitting in Middelburg 16 August 2007, case nos 
07/30015 and 07/31032, LJN: BB3524.
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fled. The applicant consequently maintained that he could not be expected 
to pass the integration exam abroad within a reasonable time. He also 
stated that no study materials for the exam were available in his mother 
tongue and that he would, therefore, have had to learn English before 
being able to learn Dutch.
Despite these circumstances, the court found that the decision by the 
Foreign Affairs Minister to refuse the applicant’s admission did not fail to 
strike a fair balance between the interests of the applicant and the general 
interest of the state. Thereby the Court considered that the applicant’s 
arguments relating to his situation in Sudan had to be examined in the 
course of an asylum procedure and could not be taken into account under 
Article 8 ECHR. The difficulties faced by the applicant with regard to the 
integration exam appear not to have been considered sufficient to justify 
concluding that he had to be admitted without having to meet the integra-
tion requirement.
A second case concerned a Moroccan applicant wishing to live in the 
Netherlands with her partner. She claimed that she would never be able 
to pass the integration exam abroad because she was illiterate. A residence 
permit had already been granted to the applicant’s two minor children, 
meaning that she was the only member of the family who was not allowed 
to live in the Netherlands. 
The Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (AJD) 
found that the above case presented no special circumstances that made 
the Netherlands obliged to admit the applicant. In reaching this conclu-
sion, it considered that the existence of an objective obstacle to the exer-
cise of family life in the country of origin had not been demonstrated and 
that the applicant had not shown that she was lastingly unable to pass the 
integration exam, which meant that a refusal to exempt her from this 
exam would not permanently deprive her of the possibility to exercise her 
family life in the Netherlands. With regard to the latter consideration, the 
AJD accepted that the exam had been designed by the Dutch legislator in 
such a way that illiterate persons should also be able to pass (chapter 2, 
section VI.C). It did not, however, address the consequences of the appli-
cant’s illiteracy in terms of the efforts and costs that she would be required 
to make and the time that it would take her to reach the level required to 
pass the exam.
The third case concerned two Somali children seeking to be reunited 
with their mother and her husband in the Netherlands.79 The mother had 
previously entered the Netherlands as an asylum seeker and had since 
obtained Dutch nationality. By the time a decision was taken on their 
application, both children were no longer minors. According to reports 
issued by two non-governmental organisations (Defence for Children 
79 District Court of The Hague 21 October 2009, case no 09/5145, LJN: BK5782.
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International and the Red Cross), the applicants were living in dire cir-
cumstances in their country of origin. They did not have a home of their 
own and were living under the overhang of someone else’s house. They 
were living off gifts from other people and did not have a computer or 
money to buy materials to prepare for the exam. It was therefore submit-
ted that the applicants could not reasonably be expected to pass the inte-
gration exam abroad and had to be granted an exemption.
The above case was brought before the District Court of The Hague. 
With regard to the difficulties faced by the applicants in respect of prepar-
ing for the integration exam, the court stated that:
[It is] primarily the responsibility of the applicants and their mother to obtain 
the necessary study materials and the required knowledge of the Dutch lan-
guage and society in the country of origin. Thereby the applicants and their 
mother can let themselves be assisted by the non-governmental organizations 
that have also helped them earlier on in the procedure – by paying the adminis-
trative charges and enabling the application for family reunification to be made 
[. . .]. More specifically, the minister was justified in considering that the fact 
that the applicants do not speak any of the 13 languages in which study materi-
als are available and that they do not have a computer does not present an 
obstacle for imposing the obligation to pass the integration exam. In view of the 
legislative history the applicants may be expected to let themselves be assisted 
by their mother or by third parties, who can arrange the translation of the study 
materials into a language which they do understand. Moreover, it was estab-
lished during the court hearing that a computer is not a necessary asset for the 
preparation for and the participation in the exam [my translation, KV].80 
In view of the above, the court found that the exercise of family life by the 
applicants was not made permanently impossible by the integration 
requirement and that the Minister had provided sufficient reasons why 
the refusal to admit the applicants was not contrary to Article 8 ECHR.81 
The court’s decision was upheld in appeal in a non-reasoned judgment by 
the AJD.82 
The above examples illustrate that the obligation to pass the integration 
exam abroad is not easily found to constitute a violation of Article 8 
ECHR. In particular, Dutch case law shows that substantial efforts may be 
required of applicants and that the existence of specific obstacles – such as 
80 ibid, para 6.2.
81 Later the court also stated that the protection of Art 8 ECHR did not extend to family 
relationships between parents and adult children unless there were ‘more than normal emo-
tional ties’ (cp section II.A). Given this statement, it is submitted that the court should have 
found that Art 8 ECHR was not applicable instead of conducting a fair balance test. 
Meanwhile it is possible that the applicants’ age played a role in the court’s finding that Art 
8 ECHR had not been violated; however, this was not explicitly mentioned.
82 AJD 29 January 2010, case no 200908815/1/V2. Under Art 91(2) Aliens Act the AJD can 
refrain from motivating its judgment if the appeal is unfounded and if the complaints sub-
mitted by the applicant ‘do not raise any questions that need to be answered in the interest 
of the unity or development of the law or of legal protection in general’. 
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illiteracy or the unavailability of study facilities – has not to date led to the 
conclusion that the obligation to pass the exam was disproportionate.83 
As stated earlier, however, the proportionality of the integration exam 
abroad is also influenced by the situation of the family members and 
whether it is possible to exercise family life in the country of origin. In one 
case this situation led the court to conclude that the obligation to pass the 
integration exam abroad was disproportionate. The applicants in this case 
were an Afghan family (the parents and three children), who sought 
admission to join their son or brother who had been admitted to the 
Netherlands on asylum grounds when he was nine-years-old.84 The fam-
ily had been recognised as refugees by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees  and was living irregularly and under very 
difficult circumstances in Turkey. Some of the children were still minors 
and the family had been trying for 10 years to be reunited in the 
Netherlands, where other close relatives were also living. Lastly, it had 
been established that the mother suffered from depression and post-trau-
matic stress syndrome. On the basis of these conditions, the District Court 
found that the interests of the applicants outweighed the integration inter-
est underlying the AIA and ruled that the Netherlands had a positive obli-
gation under Article 8 ECHR to admit the family.85 This judgment was, 
however, overruled by the AJD on procedural grounds.86 Moreover, in at 
least two of the other cases described above there was also no possibility 
of reunification in the country of origin because at least one of the family 
members feared persecution there. Yet this was either disregarded or not 
found substantial enough to conclude that the applicants had to be admit-
ted to the Netherlands. 
iv. Intensity of Review
Just like in cases before the ECtHR, the outcome of proceedings before the 
Dutch courts also depends on the intensity of the review conducted. 
Whereas the ECtHR sometimes leaves a certain margin of appreciation to 
the Contracting States, the national courts can defer to the assessment 
83 See also District Court of The Hague sitting in Rotterdam 23 April 2008, case no 
07/35128, JV 2008/282, annotated by K.M. de Vries; District Court of The Hague sitting in 
Rotterdam 22 September 2011, case no 10/31223; District Court of The Hague sitting in 
Maastricht 6 October 2012, case nos 09/33430 and 10/9629 and District Court of The Hague 
sitting in Amsterdam 8 March 2011, case nos 10/23459 and 10/23449.
84 Several years later the asylum permit was withdrawn and a non-asylum permit was 
granted, which is why the family members were not exempted from the integration exam 
under Art 3.71a (2)(a) Aliens Decree (section VI.B.iii of ch 2).
85 District Court of The Hague sitting in Haarlem 24 November 2010, case no 10/18883, 
LJN: BO5381, paras 2.13–2.14.
86 AJD 1 December 2011, case no 201012538/1/V4. The case was thereafter referred to the 
Immigration Minister to be decided anew; it is unknown whether admission was eventually 
granted. 
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made by the legislature or the administrative authorities. In this respect it 
appears that, at least at the district court level, the Dutch courts’ approach 
to cases involving integration requirements has not always been consist-
ent. Case law provides examples of judgments in which the courts con-
ducted a full review of the decision to refuse admission in the light of 
Article 8 ECHR, as well as judgments in which only a marginal review 
took place.87 
Reviews conducted by the AJD have been somewhere in between full 
and marginal. In the judgments delivered to date in which it assessed the 
AIA in relation to Article 8 ECHR, the Division twice held that ‘the 
Minister was not wrong to find’ that there were no special facts or circum-
stances to justify a finding that Article 8 ECHR had been violated, and 
once that ‘it cannot be maintained that the Minister could not reasonably 
have let [the interests of the Dutch state] prevail over those of [the appli-
cant]’ [my translation, KV].88 In one case, however, the AJD took into 
account that ‘the applicant had not substantiated her statement that the 
medical problems suffered by her spouse effectively constituted an objec-
tive obstacle to the exercise of family life outside the Netherlands’.89 In 
another case the Division added that
it is [furthermore] taken into account that the applicant has not substantiated 
the existence of an objective obstacle to the exercise of family life in the country 
of origin [nor that] she is permanently unable to meet the integration require-
ment; [hence] the refusal to exempt her from this requirements does not imply 
that she will never be able to exercise family life in the Netherlands.90 
It appears from the above considerations that the AJD supplemented the 
balancing of interests conducted by the Minister, indicating that it found 
that the above circumstances should have been taken into account even if 
they did not lead to a different conclusion. This approach is apparently 
confirmed in other case law (not concerning integration requirements), 
where the AJD has repeatedly stated that, when applying the fair balance 
test of Article 8 ECHR, the courts must establish whether the Minister has 
taken all the relevant facts and circumstances into account and whether, 
given the ‘fair balance’ criterion, he was ‘not wrong to find that the inter-
ference with the applicant’s right to respect for family life was justified’ 
[my translation, KV].91
87 Compare, eg, District Court of The Hague sitting in Utrecht 26 June 2009, case no 
08/39827, para 2.20 (full review) and President District Court of The Hague sitting in 
Middelburg 16 August 2007, case nos 07/30015 and 07/31032, LJN: BB3524, para 8 (marginal 
review).
88 See AJD 2 December 2008, case no 200806120/1, para 2.4.1; AJD 9 February 2009, case 
no 200806121/1, para 2.5.1 and AJD 15 August 2011, case no 201007300/1/V2, para 2.3.2.
89 AJD 2 December 2008, case no 200806120/1, para 2.4.1.
90 AJD 9 February 2009, case no 200806121/1, para 2.5.1.
91 eg, AJD 1 May 2012, case no 201101008/1/V1, LJN: BW4897, para 2.4.2. See also the 
annotation by K.E. Geertsema in JV 2012/311.
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v. Approach of the Dutch Courts in Relation to Article 8 ECHR
The above overview shows that the test conducted by the Dutch courts to 
determine whether, in a particular case, a refusal to allow family reunifi-
cation in the Netherlands is compatible with Article 8 ECHR is largely 
similar to the test conducted by the ECtHR. Unlike the ECtHR, however, 
the Dutch courts have been asked on several occasions to rule on cases 
where the refusal of admission was based on the fact that the applicant 
had not passed the integration exam abroad. In determining the propor-
tionality of this particular measure, the Dutch courts took into account the 
personal capacity of the applicants (including illiteracy and learning capa-
bility) and circumstances relating to their preparation for the exam (the 
availability of study materials or a computer, for example), as well as the 
existence of obstacles to reunification outside the Netherlands and other 
conditions amounting to a situation of hardship. Nonetheless, findings of 
disproportionality rarely occurred. It is not yet clear whether there are 
any circumstances that would lead the courts to find that an applicant is 
not able to pass the exam and, if so, what these circumstances would be. It 
also cannot be said with certainty that such a finding would necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that the obligation to pass the exam was dispropor-
tionate in that particular case, or whether this would depend on other 
circumstances as well. 
It is not easy to say whether, overall, the standard of proportionality 
used by the Dutch courts is less strict than that used by the ECtHR (mean-
ing that a violation is less likely to be found) or whether there are specific 
circumstances that the ECtHR clearly weighs differently from the national 
courts. In general, particularities pertaining to the situation of the family 
members seem to be given somewhat less attention in Dutch case law, 
whereas these often play a decisive role in ECtHR case law. This could 
result in judgments at a national level that are incompatible with Article 8 
ECHR. In particular, it is questionable whether sufficient weight is always 
given to the position of settled migrants and the existence of asylum-
related obstacles precluding the exercise of family life in the country of 
origin. It is also submitted that the standard imposed on applicants by the 
Dutch courts in terms of the efforts expected to be made to pass the exam 
is very high. It is not inconceivable that, in some of the situations consid-
ered in section II.E.ii above, the ECtHR would not find it reasonable to 
conclude that applicants could successfully take the exam before being 
admitted. Lastly, whereas the Dutch courts have so far been reticent to 
examine in any detail the public interest served by the Act on Integration 
Abroad, section II.C.i shows that the ECtHR has displayed a tendency 
lately to give more careful consideration to the interests of the state and 
the weight to be attached thereto.
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III. ARTICLES 17 AND 23 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT  
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
The right to family life is also protected in Articles 17 and 23 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 17(1) 
ICCPR provides that ‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his [. . .] family’, while the second paragraph adds that 
‘everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interfer-
ence or attacks’. Article 23(1) ICCPR moreover declares the family to be 
‘the natural and fundamental group unit of society [which] is entitled to 
protection by society and the State’. 
At first sight, these provisions do not indicate whether the right to fam-
ily life also includes a right to family reunification and, if so, whether this 
right may be made dependent on the fulfilment of integration require-
ments. To answer these questions, we need to examine how the above 
articles have been interpreted by the relevant bodies. Unlike the ECHR, 
the ICCPR is not monitored by an international court or other body com-
petent to issue binding decisions on the interpretation and application of 
the Covenant. This means that it is ultimately left to the States Parties 
themselves to determine the contents of the rights and freedoms laid 
down therein. Nevertheless, some important guidelines for interpreting 
the Covenant are provided by the ICCPR monitoring body, the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC).92 The HRC’s jurisprudence on Articles 17 and 
23 ICCPR is examined below, with particular regard to the Committee’s 
General Comments and Communications issued in individual cases.93 
Additionally, case law of the Dutch courts is taken into account. While 
these sources do not, in general, provide more specific criteria with regard 
to integration requirements than those discussed above in relation to 
Article 8 ECHR, they do help to provide a more complete picture. 
A. Scope of Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR – Family Life and Family 
Reunification
With regard to the relationships protected by Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR, 
the HRC supports a broad interpretation that leaves scope for the differ-
ent concepts of the family that may exist in the societies and legal systems 
92 Art 28 and following ICCPR.
93 The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR entitles individuals to the right of complaint before 
the HRC. After the ICCPR has declared a complaint admissible, it issues its views on the 
alleged infringement to the State concerned (Art 5 Optional Protocol ICCPR). General 
Comments and Communications issued by the HRC are not legally binding; see section II.B.i 
of ch 1.
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of the States Parties to the Covenant. Thereby those groups of persons 
regarded as a family by the national legislation and practice of a state are 
in any case entitled to protection of their family life.94 The HRC has deter-
mined that the concept of the family includes the relationships between 
married couples and between parents and their children, the latter con-
tinuing when the parents are divorced.95 However, the Committee has 
also found that the mere existence of these relationships is not enough to 
qualify for protection unless there is some form of actual family life, such 
as life together, economic ties or a regular and intense relationship.96 
An essential element of the right to family life is the right of members of 
a family to live together and to enjoy each other’s company. This has been 
recognised on several occasions by the HRC.97 The Committee has also 
found that this element of the right to family life may be affected by immi-
gration measures adopted by the States Parties to the ICCPR. In its General 
Comment on the position of aliens, the HRC acknowledged that the 
Covenant does not contain a right for aliens to enter or reside in the terri-
tory of a State Party and that in principle states are allowed to decide who 
they will admit to their territory. Nevertheless, the HRC stated that ‘in 
certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant 
even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of 
[. . .] respect for family life arise’.98 The Committee has also issued a num-
ber of views in which it applied Articles 17 and 23(1) ICCPR in immigra-
tion matters, including cases concerning the admission of aliens to a State 
Party for the purpose of family reunification.99 
Nevertheless, not every claim for family reunification automatically 
comes within the scope of Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR. To attract the protec-
tion of the above articles it must be established that the refusal to admit a 
family member either constitutes an interference with the family (under 
Art 17(1) ICCPR) or a failure on the part of the state to provide the neces-
sary level of protection (under Art 23(1)). In this respect, the HRC has 
observed that
there may indeed be cases in which a State Party’s refusal to allow one member 
of a family to remain in its territory would involve interference in that person’s 
94 Joseph et al 2004, 587, with references to General Comments 16, paras 5 and 19, para 2 of 
the HRC.
95 HRC 9 April 1981, No 35/78 (Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and others v Mauritius), para 9.2(b)2(i)1 
and HRC 12 August 1988, No 201/85 (Hendriks v The Netherlands), para 10.3, cited in Joseph 
et al 2004, 587–88.
96 HRC 31 March 1981, No 68/80 (A.S. v Canada), para 8.2(b) and HRC 29 July 1994, No 
417/90 (Balaguer Santacana v Spain), para 10.2, both cases cited in Joseph et al 2004, 588–89.
97 Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and others v Mauritius (n 95), para 9.2(b)2(i)2 and General Comment 
19, para 5.
98 CCPR General Comment No 15 of 11 April 1986, para 5. 
99 See, eg, Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and others v Mauritius (n 95), HRC 16 August 2001, No 
930/2000 (Winata and Li v Australia) and HRC 22 July 2008 (inadmissibility decision), No 
1513/2006 (Vital Maria Fernandes et al v The Netherlands).
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family life. However, the mere fact that one member of a family is entitled to 
remain in the territory of a State Party does not necessarily mean that requiring 
other members of the family to leave involves such interference.100
Thus far, the HRC has not provided a general criterion for deciding 
whether the exclusion of a family member from the territory of a State 
Party does or does not come within the scope of Article 17(1) and/or 
Article 23(1) ICCPR. In both Winata and Li and Madafferi, however, the 
Committee found there to be interference caused by the fact that the 
planned deportation by the State Party of one of the family members 
would necessarily result in ‘substantial changes to long-settled family 
life’.101 These two cases concerned similar situations where the parents (or 
one of the parents) were unlawfully residing in the receiving state, 
whereas one or more children had been born in that state, had lived there 
for more than 10 years and had even obtained that state’s nationality. The 
state’s intention to deport the unlawfully residing parent(s) consequently 
compelled them to choose between leaving their child(ren) behind, thus 
causing a separation of the family, or taking them away from the country 
where they had been born and lived all their lives to be reunited with 
their parents in their country of origin.102
The HRC’s decision in Winata and Li was criticised in a dissenting opin-
ion by a minority of the Committee’s members, who found, amongst 
other things, that there had been no interference because the State Party 
was not forcing the parents to be separated from their child. After all, the 
son could have joined his parents in Indonesia, the country to which they 
were to be returned.103 While the decision in Madafferi shows that this crit-
icism was not followed by the majority, the issue of forced separation did 
play a role in the more recent case of Gonzalez. Here, the Guyanese author-
ities refused to grant a residence permit to the Cuban husband of a 
Guyanese national, as a result of which the couple could not continue to 
live together in Guyana. The HRC found that they could not live in Cuba 
either, while the State Party had not indicated any other place where the 
couple could exercise their family life. Under these circumstances the 
Committee took the view that denying legal residence to the husband also 
constituted interference with the applicants’ family life.104
100 Winata and Li v Australia (n 99), para 7.1 and HRC 26 August 2004, No 1011/2001 
(Madafferi v Australia), para 9.7.
101 Winata and Li v Australia (n 99), para 7.2 and Madafferi v Australia (n 100), para 9.8.
102 Note that these cases show the HRC adopting a different approach to that of the 
ECtHR. Given that the parents in Winata and Madafferi were not legally resident migrants, 
the ECtHR would most likely have treated these cases as involving a potential positive obli-
gation rather than as interference with a negative obligation. For a comparison of ECtHR 
and HRC case law on this point, see also Forder 2003, 9–10.
103 Winata and Li v Australia (n 99), individual (dissenting) opinion by Committee mem-
bers Bhagwati, Khalil, Kretzmer and Yalden, para 3.
104 HRC 25 March 2010, No 1246/2004 (Gonzalez v Guyana), para 14.3. Note also the HRC’s 
decision in Nakrash and Liu Qifen v Sweden (HRC 30 October 2008, No 1540/2007), where the 
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In the above examples, the family members seeking admission were 
already (unlawfully) present within the territory of the receiving state. 
Where this is not the case, however, an issue may also arise under Articles 
17 and/or 23 ICCPR. This follows from the Communication in the case of 
Ngambi and Nébol, which concerned the denial of an entry visa to a woman 
who wanted to join her partner in France. Here the HRC stated that 
‘Article 23 of the Covenant guarantees the protection of family life includ-
ing the interest in family reunification’.105 Nevertheless, the Committee 
found the complaint in Ngambi to be inadmissible because the applicants 
had not demonstrated the existence of a family relationship. 
Meanwhile, it may be observed that the HRC itself does not seem to be 
very strict about whether it treats cases concerning the admission of fam-
ily members under Article 17(1) or 23(1) ICCPR. From the wording of both 
provisions, Article 17(1) appears to contain a negative obligation for the 
state not to interfere with the family, whereas Article 23(1) reflects a posi-
tive obligation to provide protection. However, as remarked in section II 
on Article 8 ECHR, it is not always self-evident whether a state’s duty to 
allow family reunification must be qualified as a negative or a positive 
obligation. It may be observed that the above case of Ngambi & Nébol, in 
which the applicant had not yet entered the territory of the State Party, 
was dealt with under Article 23(1) ICCPR. This could be a sign that the 
HRC regarded the refusal to admit a family member from abroad as a 
failure to comply with a positive obligation rather than as an interference 
under Article 17(1). However, the Committee has also at least once applied 
Article 23(1) in a situation concerning the removal of an unlawfully resid-
ing family member from the receiving state.106 Other admission cases in 
which the family member was already present on the territory of the 
receiving state have been dealt with under Article 17(1) alone107 or under 
Articles 17(1) and 23(1) together.108 
applicants’ claim was found inadmissible because they had not demonstrated that the fam-
ily would be unable to reunite in the country of origin of one of the partners or in a third 
country. Unlike in Winata and Madafferi, the applicants in this case also did not have ‘long-
settled family life’ in the receiving state. The HRC’s decision does not reveal whether the 
finding of inadmissibility was based on the conclusion that there was no interference, or that 
there was an interference which was considered lawful and justified (see para 7.4).
105 HRC 16 July 2004, No 1179/2003 (Ngambi and Nébol v France), para 6.4. See also the 
HRC’s Concluding Comments on Switzerland (UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.70, para 18) and 
Israel (UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93, para 26 and CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para 21), in which it 
criticised these states’ policies on reunification with family members from abroad. All com-
ments are cited in Joseph et al 2004, 591–93.
106 HRC 28 March 2003, No 893/99 (Sahid v New Zealand), para 8.2.
107 eg, Nakrash and Liu Qifen v Sweden (n 104), paras 3.4 and 7.4.
108 eg, Winata and Li v Australia (n 99), para 8.
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B.  Limitations to the Right to Family Reunification
While Articles 17 and 23(1) ICCPR also protect the right to family life in 
situations involving family reunification, these provisions do not entail an 
absolute right to enjoy family life on the territory of a State Party. As far as 
Article 17(1) is concerned, the wording of this provision already indicates 
that it forbids only those interferences with family life that are arbitrary or 
unlawful. The meaning of these standards has been specified to a certain 
extent by the HRC, especially in its General Comment no 16 on the inter-
pretation of Article 17 ICCPR.
According to the Committee, the requirement of lawfulness entails that 
the interference must be envisaged in the law of the State Party and that 
this law must itself comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the 
Covenant. The law must moreover be precise and circumscribed and each 
interference must be based on a decision taken by a designated authority 
on a case-by-case basis.109 With regard to the concept of arbitrariness, the 
Committee stated that this was ‘intended to guarantee that even interfer-
ence provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, 
aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reason-
able in the particular circumstances’.110 Taking into account this General 
Comment, as well as the HRC’s views in individual cases, it can be 
assumed that limitations to family life must in any event pursue a valid 
aim, as well as meet a certain standard of proportionality.111 
With respect to admission cases, the application of a proportionality 
test is also clearly visible in the HRC’s Communication in Madafferi. There 
the Committee stated that
in cases where one part of the family must leave the territory of the State party 
while the other part would be entitled to remain, the relevant criteria for assess-
ing whether or not the specific interference with family life can be objectively 
justified must be considered, on the one hand, in light of the significance of the 
State party’s reasons for the removal of the person concerned and, on the other, 
the degree of hardship the family and its members would encounter as a conse-
quence of such removal.112 
Neither Article 17 nor any other provision of the ICCPR specifically enu-
merates the aims considered legitimate for the purpose of restricting 
the right to family life. However, as mentioned above in section III.A, the 
HRC has taken the view that states are entitled in principle to control the 
entry and residence of aliens. HRC case law does not provide examples of 
109 CCPR General Comment No 16 of 8 April 1988, paras 3 and 8, cited in Joseph et al 2004, 
481.
110 ibid, para 4.
111 Joseph et al 2004, 483–84.
112 Madafferi v Australia (n 100), para 9.8.
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admission cases in which a violation of Article 17(1) ICCPR was found on 
the grounds that the decision not to admit a family member did not pur-
sue a valid objective. 
As far as the proportionality test is concerned, HRC case law indicates 
that states will normally be allowed to deny admission to a family 
member if the conditions for residence are not met.113 Nonetheless, the 
Committee has held that, in extraordinary circumstances, the State Party 
may be required to adduce additional reasons to support its decision. 
Such extraordinary circumstances were deemed to exist in the above case 
of Winata and Li, in which Australia sought to remove the unlawfully 
residing parents of a 13-year-old Australian boy who had lived all his life 
in that country. The HRC stated that
In the present case, both authors have been in Australia for over 14 years. The 
author’s son has grown in Australia from his birth 13 years ago, attending 
Australian schools as an ordinary child would and developing the social rela-
tionships inherent in that. In view of this duration of time, it is incumbent on 
the State Party to demonstrate additional factors justifying the removal of both 
parents that go beyond a simple enforcement of its immigration law in order to 
avoid a characterisation of arbitrariness.114 
The Committee’s decision was not altered by the fact that the parents 
were able to (and also did) apply for ‘parent visas’ which, if granted, 
would have allowed them to return to Australia after a certain period of 
time.115
Other factors that have played a role in HRC case law concerning fam-
ily reunification have been medical or psychological problems suffered by 
one or more of the family members (especially when these result from 
measures taken by the State Party, such as immigration detention), as well 
as difficulties they would face in relation to their integration in the coun-
try of origin.116 The existence of such circumstances will weigh in favour 
of family reunification being allowed in the State Party. Nevertheless the 
difficulties will have to be demonstrated by the applicants; mere state-
ment that relocation would lead to problems is not enough.117
Lastly, the available case law does not provide much information on the 
HRC’s evaluation of the immigration criteria applied by the States Parties 
to the ICCPR. Nevertheless, the interests of the respondent state in 
Madafferi were found to weigh less heavily than the interests of the family 
members. In casu Mr Madafferi had been denied residence on the grounds 
113 See Sahid v New Zealand (n 106), para 8.2 and Vital Maria Fernandes et al v The Netherlands 
(n 99), para 6.3.
114 Winata and Li v Australia (n 99), para 7.3.
115 ibid, para 4.3.
116 Madafferi v Australia (n 100), para 9.8 and HRC 6 November 2003, No 1069/2002 
(Bakhtiyari v Australia), para 9.6.
117 Vital Maria Fernandes et al v The Netherlands (n 99), para 6.3.
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of his illegal presence and his alleged ‘bad character’, as he had commit-
ted several criminal acts in Italy. However the HRC considered that the 
acts had been committed 20 years earlier, that Mr Madafferi’s outstanding 
sentences in his country of origin had been extinguished and there was no 
outstanding warrant for his arrest.118 This decision suggests that the rea-
sons for refusing to admit a family member must represent an actual 
interest and not be of a merely formal nature. 
Unlike Article 17(1), Article 23(1) ICCPR does not expressly indicate the 
extent to which States Parties must protect the family or the conditions 
under which this protection may be limited. It follows, however, from the 
nature of the obligation laid down in this article that such protection can-
not be absolute. This was also acknowledged by the HRC in Aumeeruddy-
Cziffra, where it stated that ‘the legal protection or measures a society or a 
State can afford to the family may vary from country to country and 
depend on different social, economic, political and cultural conditions 
and traditions’.119 In Sahid, the Committee applied the criterion of ‘arbi-
trariness’, as prescribed by Article 17(1), also under Article 23(1).120
C. Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR and Integration Requirements
The previous sections show that a state’s refusal to allow family reunifica-
tion on its territory may come within the scope of the right to family life as 
protected by Articles 17(1) and 23(1) ICCPR. This can also be the case 
when the refusal is based on the grounds that the applicant for family 
reunification has failed to comply with an integration requirement. HRC 
case law indicates, however, that not every refusal to admit a family mem-
ber amounts to interference with the right to family life. Whether this is so 
depends on the circumstances of the case, in particular on whether the 
state’s decision amounts to a disruption of long-settled family life and 
whether it is possible to exercise family life in another country.
Moreover, even if interference has been established, the protection 
afforded to the right to family life under the ICCPR is not absolute. The 
States Parties to the Covenant remain entitled to regulate the entry and 
residence of aliens and to introduce conditions for the admission and 
residence of non-national family members, including in the form of inte-
gration requirements. Such conditions must, however, meet the criteria of 
lawfulness and non-arbitrariness. This means that integration require-
ments must, first of all, have a basis in the legislation of the State Party. 
Although the ICCPR does not specify how or by which body this legisla-
tion is to be drawn up, the HRC has indicated that it must be sufficiently 
118 Madafferi v Australia (n 100), para 9.8.
119 Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and others v Mauritius (n 95), para 9.2(b) 2 (ii) 1.
120 Sahid v New Zealand (n 106), para 8.2.
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precise and circumscribed. A decision to reject a claim for admission 
because of non-compliance with integration requirements must further-
more be taken by a designated authority and on a case-by-case basis. 
In addition to being lawful, integration requirements for the admission 
of family members must also not be arbitrary, which implies that they 
must serve a valid aim and be proportionate in relation to that aim. While 
it could be accepted that integration requirements are necessary to control 
immigration, it was submitted earlier that they could also be taken to 
serve other legitimate general interests, such as the protection of public 
order or the economic well-being of the state or the promotion of immi-
grant integration (section II.D.i). Again the integration objectives pursued 
by the States Parties to the ICCPR must respect the rights and freedoms 
laid down in the Covenant, including the freedom of thought and religion 
(Art 18 ICCPR). In this respect, however, the Covenant does not provide 
any more specific standards.
As to the question of proportionality, this depends on the specific cir-
cumstances of the case. HRC communications show that states are in prin-
ciple entitled to refuse a request for family reunification on the grounds 
that the applicant has not complied with the relevant immigration rules, 
including failure to meet an integration requirement. Nevertheless, in 
each case it has to be assessed whether any exceptional circumstances 
require increased weight to be attached to the interests of the family. On 
the question of which circumstances can be regarded as exceptional, the 
available communications seem to indicate some gradual differences 
between the HRC’s approach and that of the ECtHR and the Dutch courts 
in relation to Article 8 ECHR. It is doubtful, for example, whether the 
ECtHR would also have found a violation of the right to family life in the 
case of Winata and Li, given that the boy concerned was already 13-years-
old and could have moved with his parents to Indonesia.121 The HRC also 
appears to attach more weight to the difficulties that would be faced by 
applicants upon return to their country of origin. 
Where additional weight is given to the interests of the family, the state 
has to put forward stronger reasons to justify its decision to refuse admis-
sion on the grounds of non-compliance with an integration requirement. In 
assessing the proportionality of this decision, however, account must also 
be taken of the immigration measure and the burden it imposes on appli-
cants for family reunification, both in abstracto and in the particular case. In 
this respect neither the ICCPR itself nor the comments and communications 
of the HRC have provided any useful criteria thus far, either with regard to 
121 This case bears some resemblance to the case of Rodrigues Da Silva and Hoogkamer, in 
which the ECtHR found a violation of Art 8 ECHR (section II.C.i). However, in that case the 
Court expressly gave weight to the fact that the child was very young and, because custody 
had been granted to the father, that she could not have moved to Brazil with her mother if 
the latter were to be expelled.
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immigration measures in general or with regard to integration require-
ments. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the various factors mentioned in 
section II.C above (such as costs, the level of the exam and the availability of 
study materials) are equally relevant in relation to the proportionality of 
integration requirements under Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR.
D. Dutch Case Law with Regard to Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR and 
Integration Requirements
Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR have not to date played a significant role in legal 
proceedings in the Netherlands concerning the compatibility of the Act on 
Integration Abroad with the right to family life. In one case before a dis-
trict court, Article 17 ICCPR was invoked, along with Article 8 ECHR, by 
an alien who sought admission for the purpose of family reunification 
and had been refused an entry visa because he had not complied with the 
integration requirement abroad.122 However, in its judgment, the Court 
dealt with the complaint only under Article 8 ECHR and did not address 
Article 17 ICCPR at all. 
In a judgment in a later admission case, which did not concern integra-
tion requirements, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (AJD) of the 
Council of State held that ‘Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR do not give rise to 
any further reaching entitlements than Article 8 ECHR’.123 Although the 
judgment reveals very little about the particular circumstances of the case, 
it clearly involved an alien who claimed the right to reside in the 
Netherlands with his spouse and their minor children. He was subse-
quently asked to apply for an entry visa (machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf), 
which meant he had to return to his home country and would be sepa-
rated from his family at least temporarily. While it is not clear whether the 
AJD’s statement was meant to apply to admission cases in general or only 
to this specific situation, it is submitted that claims for family reunifica-
tion should not be assessed solely in the light of the standards of Article 8 
ECHR. Instead account should also be taken of Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR 
and the interpretations issued by the HRC. 
IV. ARTICLES 3, 9 AND 10 OF THE CONVENTION  
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
As explained above, the mutual enjoyment by children and their parents 
of each other’s company is foremost among the forms of family life 
122 President District Court of The Hague sitting in Middelburg 16 August 2007, case nos 
07/30015 and 07/31032, LJN: BB3524, para 3.
123 AJD 17 March 2008, case no 200706542/1, LJN: BC8001, para 2.4.1.
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protected by the ECHR and the ICCPR. In addition, specific protection for 
the family life of children can be found in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC). Article 7 of this Convention proclaims that ‘the child 
shall . . . have . . . as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by 
his or her parents’. This rather generally formulated right is made more 
specific by Articles 9 and 10 CRC, which concern the right of children not 
to be separated from their parents and the issue of family reunification.124 
Also relevant is the general obligation laid down in Article 3(1) CRC, 
which proclaims that the best interests of the child shall be a primary con-
sideration in all actions concerning children.125
The implementation of the CRC by the States Parties is monitored by 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the Committee).126 This 
Committee is not entitled to receive individual complaints concerning 
violations of the Convention. However, it may issue suggestions and gen-
eral recommendations to the States Parties on the basis of the information 
presented to it in accordance with the CRC (including through state 
reports).127 Where relevant, the comments provided by the Committee 
will be taken into account in interpreting the meaning of Articles 3, 9 and 
124 Art 9(1) CRC reads: 
States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents 
against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review deter-
mine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is neces-
sary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a 
particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one 
where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child’s 
place of residence. 
Art 10(1) CRC reads:
In accordance with the obligation of States Parties under article 9, paragraph 1, applica-
tions by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for the purpose 
of family reunification shall be dealt with by States Parties in a positive, humane and 
expeditious manner. States Parties shall further ensure that the submission of such a 
request shall entail no adverse consequences for the applicants and for the members of 
their family.
In addition, Art 10(2) provides that children whose parents reside in different states shall 
have the right to maintain personal relations and direct contacts with both parents. While 
this provision may create an obligation for the state to admit a child or his or her parents to 
enable the contact to take place, such visits will by their nature be temporary. It is therefore 
not necessary to consider Art 10(2) CRC further in the course of this study.
125 A very similar provision can be found in Art 24(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which states that: ‘In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public author-
ities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration’. Thus 
far the EU Court of Justice has not provided any interpretations of this provision that would 
be of particular relevance to the topic of this study, see Reneman 2011, 356–58. The obligation 
to let the best interests of the child form a primary consideration has however been imple-
mented (at least partly) in provisions of secondary EU law, including in Art 5(5) Family 
Reunification Directive. The directive will be discussed in section V.
126 Art 43 CRC. 
127 Art 44 and 45 CRC.
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10 CRC with regard to integration requirements for family reunification. 
Case law of the Dutch courts is discussed in section IV.F.
A. Scope of Articles 9 and 10 CRC – the Right of Children not to be 
Separated from their Parents and Family Reunification
i. Applicability of Article 9 CRC to Immigration Cases
According to Article 9(1) CRC the States Parties to the CRC must ensure 
that children shall not be separated from their parents against their will 
unless this is necessary for the best interests of the child. The issue of fam-
ily reunification is expressly covered in Article 10(1) CRC, which states 
that applications for admission by children or their parents shall be dealt 
with by States Parties in a ‘positive, humane and expeditious manner’. 
From a declaration made by the chair of the open-ended Working 
Group that drafted the CRC, it can be derived that only Article 10 was 
intended to apply to immigration matters, whereas it was considered that 
domestic situations would be covered by Article 9.128 However, there are 
good reasons why this interpretation cannot be maintained. This is 
because Article 10 concerns only applications to enter (or leave) a State 
Party for the purpose of family reunification and thus applies only to situ-
ations where the child or the parents have not yet been lawfully admitted. 
Yet, a separation between children and parents may also occur when one 
of them is expelled after having held legal residence (for reasons of public 
order or economic well-being, for instance). 
The latter situation (expulsion after termination of legal residence) is 
clearly not addressed by Article 10 CRC. However, the idea that the 
Convention offers protection against separation in admission cases, but 
not in cases involving expulsion would seem an unlikely assumption. 
Such a result would be difficult to reconcile with the core obligation, 
under Article 9(1) CRC, not to separate children from their parents, as 
well as with the standards laid down in other human rights instruments, 
including the ECHR and the ICCPR.129 In this respect, ECtHR case law 
indicates that Article 8 ECHR affords a higher level of protection to family 
128 Detrick 1992, 181. The declaration, which was made after Art 9 had been adopted in its 
current form, reads as follows:
It is the understanding of the Working Group that article 6 [Art 9, KV] of this Convention 
is intended to apply to separations that arise in domestic situations, whereas article 6 bis 
[Art 10, KV] is intended to apply to separations involving different countries and relating 
to cases of family reunification. Article 6 bis is not intended to affect the general right of 
States to establish and regulate their respective immigration laws in accordance with 
their international obligations. 
129 See also Forder 2005, 31.
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members who have already been lawfully admitted than to those for 
whom this is not the case.130
In light of the foregoing, it is submitted that Article 9(1) CRC applies 
also to immigration cases, in particular to cases involving the expulsion of 
legally resident aliens.131 Given this assumption, it is not immediately 
clear whether the situation of aliens (children or parents) who are on the 
territory of a State Party, but who have not been lawfully admitted would 
fall under Article 9 or 10 CRC. While their removal would amount to a de 
facto separation within the meaning of the former provision, it is also 
argued that distinguishing between a claim to be admitted and a claim 
not to be removed may be rather arbitrary (section II.B.ii). It is conse-
quently submitted that applications made by unlawfully residing aliens 
should be treated under Article 10(1) CRC. 
ii. The Right not to be Separated
At the essence of Articles 9 and 10 CRC is the right of children not to be 
separated from their parents against their will. As far as Article 10(1) is 
concerned, the words ‘in accordance with the obligation of States Parties 
under Article 9 (1)’ indicate that the obligation to treat applications for 
family reunification in a positive, humane and expeditious manner is one 
way of ensuring that separation does not take place.
This right not to be separated is formulated in nearly absolute terms, 
subject only to the exception that the separation is in the best interests of 
the child. However, neither Article 9 nor Article 10 provides that family 
reunification must always take place on the territory of the State Party 
concerned. Consequently, Article 9(1) does not create an absolute obliga-
tion for the States Parties to allow legal residence to a child or his or her 
parents whenever the maintenance of family unity is not contrary to the 
best interests of the child. 
Yet, before expelling or refusing to admit a child or parent, States Parties 
must consider whether family reunification would also be possible else-
where (section IV.B). If the family can also be together outside the State 
Party, there will be no obligation under Article 9(1) to allow the family to 
reside in its territory. However, if there is no alternative for family life 
outside the State Party and a refusal to allow residence would necessarily 
result in a separation, the option of family reunification within the state’s 
territory will have to be considered. This appears also to be the view taken 
by the Committee on the Rights of the Child.132
130 The expulsion of a legally resident family member will normally be considered by the 
ECtHR as an interference with a negative obligation under Art 8 ECHR, which must meet 
the conditions of Art 8(2) in order to be justified. See section II.B.i.
131 See also Steenbergen et al 1999, 239–40.
132 See CRC General Comment No 6 of 1 September 2005 on the treatment of unaccompa-
nied and separated children outside their country of origin, para 83, available at www.un.org. 
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It is submitted that, where family life cannot be exercised elsewhere 
and legal residence has already been granted, the obligation under Article 
9(1) entails that states are not allowed to terminate such residence and/or 
expel the parent or child. Exceptions to this rule are possible only if it is 
shown that separation would be in the best interests of the child. If, on the 
other hand, the parent or child has not yet been legally admitted, the obli-
gation of Article 10(1) comes into play. In such cases the application for 
admission will have to be considered as prescribed in that article, taking 
into account the question of whether family life is also possible elsewhere. 
Two further issues regarding Articles 9 and 10 CRC are addressed 
below, namely the possibility of exercising family life elsewhere and the 
requirement that applications for family reunification must be dealt with 
in a positive, humane and expeditious manner.
B. The Possibility to Exercise Family Life Elsewhere
It is argued above that the States Parties to the CRC have an obligation to 
consider applications for family reunification in accordance with Article 
10(1) CRC if it is not possible for the applicants to exercise their family life 
elsewhere, notably in the country of origin of (one of) the family mem-
bers. However, this raises the question of when such an impossibility can 
be said to exist. 
In this respect, it is submitted that Articles 9 and 10 CRC do not guaran-
tee a right for children or parents to be reunited in the country of their 
choosing. Such a right would go well beyond what is required to avoid 
separation and would therefore entail an unfounded restriction of the 
power of states to control immigration in accordance with the general 
interest. However, there are situations in which obstacles to reunification 
in the country of origin can clearly be assumed to exist, including situa-
tions where the home state refuses to admit one or more family members, 
or where, if they were to return, the child or parents would risk serious 
human rights violations that would give rise to a claim for international 
protection. 
According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the answer to 
the question of whether family reunification can take place in the country 
of origin should take into account the best interests of the child.133 The 
Committee thus confirmed what was stated above, namely that a child 
should not be returned to the country of origin if this would amount to 
refoulement. It also stated that other (lower-level) risks that the child may 
face in the country of origin, such as the risk of being affected by the indis-
criminate effects of generalised violence, ‘must be given full attention and 
133 ibid, para 82, available at www.un.org. 
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balanced against other rights-based considerations, including the conse-
quences of further separation. In this context, it must be recalled that the 
survival of the child is of paramount importance and a precondition for 
the enjoyment of any other rights’.134
In addition to the above considerations, the Committee has mentioned 
a number of other circumstances that it finds should be taken into account 
to determine whether returning a child to the country of origin would 
be in his or her best interests. To the extent that these are relevant here 
they include the safety, security and other conditions, including socio- 
economic conditions, awaiting the child upon return; the views of the 
child as expressed when exercising his or her right to do so under Article 
12 CRC, and those of the persons caring for the child; the child’s level of 
integration in the host country and the duration of absence from the home 
country; the child’s right ‘to preserve his or her identity, including nation-
ality, name and family relations’ (cf Art 8 CRC) and the ‘desirability of 
continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cul-
tural and linguistic background’ (cf Art 20 CRC).135 It is clear from this 
enumeration that these circumstances may weigh both in favour of or 
against reunification in the country of origin.
Lastly, the CRC Committee has noted that children may exceptionally 
be returned to their home country even though this is not in their best 
interests, provided that a careful balancing has taken place and other 
rights-based considerations support the decision to return. By way of 
example, the Committee mentions situations in which the child consti-
tutes a serious risk to the security of the state or to the society.136 Although 
this argument is understandable from the perspective of protecting the 
general interest, it cannot be sustained as Article 9(1) CRC does not leave 
scope for restrictions to the right set forward therein other than those nec-
essary in the best interests of the child.
C. The Obligation to Treat Requests for Admission in a ‘Positive, 
Humane and Expeditious Manner’
It was submitted above that Article 10(1) CRC applies to situations in 
which a parent or child has not yet been legally admitted to a State Party 
and in which it has been established that family life cannot be exercised 
elsewhere. In such situations, applications for admission made by the 
child or the parent(s) must be dealt with in ‘a positive, humane and expe-
ditious manner’. 
134 ibid.
135 ibid, para 84. 
136 ibid, para 86, available at www.un.org. In this same paragraph the Committee also 
notes that arguments relating to general migration control are not sufficient to override the 
best interests of the child.
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During the drafting process of the CRC the question arose as to whether 
the term ‘positive’ in Article 10(1) contained an element of prejudgment as 
regards the decision to be taken on the application. The representative of 
the United Kingdom believed this to be the case and therefore suggested 
replacing it by ‘objective’. However, the word ‘positive’ was kept in the 
text after the delegate of the United States indicated that it ‘only obliged 
States to act positively and in no way prejudged the outcome of their 
deliberations on questions of family reunification’.137 Given this history, 
it may be assumed that the term ‘positive’ in Article 10(1) must be under-
stood in the sense of ‘actual’, ‘definite’ or ‘effective’ rather than 
‘favourable’.138 This also corresponds with the procedural nature of the 
obligation laid down in this provision. 
To date the Committee on the Rights of the Child has not provided 
much guidance on the requirements stemming from Article 10(1). 
Nevertheless, it has indicated that the protection afforded to separated 
children is hampered in countries where the conditions for family reunifi-
cation are so restrictive as to make such reunification virtually impossible 
to achieve.139 Given that the right of children not to be separated from 
their parents is protected in the CRC, it is submitted that limitations to 
this right should be based on sound reasons and should strike a fair bal-
ance between the general interests and the interests of the applicants. 
Where overly restrictive conditions make family reunification effectively 
impossible, this standard is unlikely to be met. 
As far as procedural guarantees are concerned, it may be derived that 
applications for family reunification should in any case be dealt with 
within a reasonable time period (‘expeditious’). It is also submitted that 
the term ‘humane’ implies that applicants must be able to obtain informa-
tion on the status of their application and, in the event of a rejection, about 
the reasons for it. Lastly, it is observed that nothing in the CRC indicates 
that children should follow their parents to their place of residence rather 
than the other way around.140
D. Article 3 CRC – the Obligation to Let the Best Interests of the Child 
be a Primary Consideration
Article 3(1) CRC prescribes that ‘in all actions concerning children, 
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts 
of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of 
137 Detrick 1992, 206.
138 cp the online Oxford American Thesaurus of Current English at www.oxfordreference.
com. 
139 CRC General Comment No 6 of 1 September 2005, on the treatment of unaccompanied 
and separated children outside their country of origin, para 3, available at www.un.org.
140 Steenbergen et al 1999, 240 and 242.
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the child shall be a primary consideration’. This provision applies not 
only to state actions directly related to the application of the Convention 
(such as a court deciding whether refusal to admit a parent would be con-
trary to Art 9 or 10 CRC), but to all actions concerning children. This 
means that the child’s best interests should form a primary consideration 
in all legislative measures, administrative and judicial decisions concern-
ing the family reunification of children, even if such cases are not within 
the scope of Article 10(1).141
Article 3(1) CRC does not require applications for family reunification 
by children and their parents always to be granted, even if this would be 
in the best interests of the child. In the view of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, the provision functions rather as a general principle, 
requiring state bodies and institutions systematically to consider how 
children’s rights will be affected by their decisions and actions.142 
Accordingly, the Dutch government has taken the position that the inter-
ests of the child are not absolute or always decisive, but that they should 
form the primary consideration and determine the outcome in the event 
of a conflict of interests.143 This interpretation seems compatible with the 
requirements of Article 3(1) CRC. Lastly, Steenbergen et al point out that 
Article 3(1) also functions as a procedural guarantee: where decisions are 
taken that affect children, including decisions concerning family reunifi-
cation, their reasoning should show that the best interests of the child 
have been established and taken into account and how these interests 
have been weighed against other factors.144
E. Articles 3, 9 and 10 CRC in Relation to Integration Requirements
It may be derived from the above that, like Article 8 ECHR, the above pro-
visions of the CRC do not contain an absolute right for parents or children 
to be admitted to the country where one of them resides for the purpose of 
exercising family life. Nevertheless, they do lay down a number of guar-
antees that must be respected by the States Parties in relation to applica-
tions for family reunification. This section examines how these guarantees 
affect the possibility of imposing integration requirements.
141 In determining the best interests of the child in a particular case regard also has to be 
had to Art 12 CRC, which requires due weight to be given to the views of the child in accord-
ance with his or her age and maturity.
142 CRC General Comment No 5 of 27 November 2003 on general measures of implemen-
tation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC/GC/2003/5, 3-4, available at 
www.un.org. 
143 Memorie van Toelichting bij de Goedkeuringswet, Parliamentary Papers II 1992–1993, 22 855, 
No 3, 14, cited in Steenbergen et al 1999, 230–31.
144 Steenbergen et al 1999, 231.
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As indicated above, the core obligation of Articles 9 and 10 CRC is to 
ensure that children are not separated from their parents. With regard to 
applications for family reunification, whether made by a child or a parent, 
it consequently always has to be established whether the child and his or 
her parents can also live together outside the State Party. Thereby the 
standard to be applied is arguably stricter than that prescribed by the 
ECHR and possibly also the ICCPR: apart from the possibility that 
the child will be subjected to persecution or other forms of violence, 
regard also has to be had to other circumstances that may seriously and 
negatively affect the child’s development. Examples of such circum-
stances would probably include the absence of any form of education or 
of special medical or psychological care required by the child. Also to be 
taken into account are the child’s chances of integrating in the society 
where it will be living and of maintaining or building up family relation-
ships.
If it can be established, in a particular case, that the child can also live 
with his or her parents elsewhere and that refusing admission will not 
result in separation, Articles 9 and 10 CRC do not impose any further obli-
gations on the State Party concerned. In this situation, the Convention 
does not preclude permission for family reunification being made depend-
ent on the fulfilment of integration requirements. 
If, on the other hand, the child and his or her parents cannot be reunited 
elsewhere, the guarantee of Article 10(1) CRC comes into play (in admis-
sion cases). This article provides that applications for family reunification 
must be dealt with in a positive, humane and expeditious manner. This is 
a procedural obligation, which at first sight does not affect the possibility 
for the State Party to impose integration requirements. Nevertheless, it 
can be argued that the procedure surrounding such integration require-
ments should not inflict an unnecessary burden on the applicant. This 
may mean, for instance, that the applicant should not be required to 
repeatedly travel long distances in order to visit the embassy or another 
exam location, that course or study materials should be reasonably avail-
able and that exam results should be communicated within a satisfactory 
time limit.
It has also been submitted that, in view of the obligation of States Parties 
not to separate children from their parents, conditions for admission 
should not be such that they render family reunification effectively impos-
sible. This would also be true with regard to integration requirements. 
Earlier in this chapter several factors are mentioned that affect the achiev-
ability of integration conditions, such as the level of knowledge required 
or the availability of preparation facilities (section II.C).
It follows from Article 3(1) CRC that the best interests of the child must 
be taken into consideration in all actions concerning children, including 
legislation as well as administrative and judicial decisions. With regard to 
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integration requirements, the best interests of the child must consequently 
play a role in the legislative process where it is decided to introduce such 
requirements as conditions for admission, as well as in applying these 
requirements in individual cases and in the review conducted by the 
courts. Each of these measures or decisions will need to explain that and 
how the best interests of the child formed a primary consideration. This 
obligation is also not limited to situations coming within the scope of 
Articles 9 and 10 CRC (where the unity of children and parents is at stake), 
but extends to all decisions regarding family reunification, including 
those where admission is denied because of failure to fulfil integration 
requirements. 
Compared to the provisions of the ECHR and the ICCPR discussed ear-
lier in this chapter, the CRC at some points offers different standards with 
regard to admission requirements, including integration requirements, 
for family members. Whereas the former treaties protect the right to fam-
ily life in rather general terms, Articles 9 and 10 CRC specifically oblige 
the States Parties not to separate children from their parents. The criteria 
to be applied to determine whether the child can also live with his or her 
parents in the country of origin are more rigorous than those developed in 
relation to Article 8 ECHR or Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR, reflecting the vital 
importance of the child’s well-being. 
In addition to this increased standard, Articles 3(1) and 10(1) CRC set 
forth some guarantees not explicitly included in the ECHR or the ICCPR. 
These concern the way in which applications for family reunification are 
dealt with by the receiving State Party and the primary significance to be 
attached to the best interests of the child. While the existence of these dif-
ferences does not mean that children and their parents will always be 
entitled to more protection under the CRC than under the other provi-
sions concerning the right to family life, the former does offer an autono-
mous legal framework for examining applications for family reunification 
that States Parties will need to apply, also in relation to implementing and 
applying integration requirements. 
F. Dutch Case Law with Regard to Articles 3, 9 and 10 CRC and 
Integration Requirements
Proceedings before the Dutch courts, including cases regarding the 
removal or admission of non-national children or their parents, have 
called on Articles 3, 9 and 10 CRC with some regularity.145 The interpreta-
tions that have been developed in this case law, where relevant for admis-
145 For an overview of relevant case law see Steenbergen et al 1999, 246–49 (to 1999) and 
Ruitenberg 2003, 60–85, 101–26, 185–90 and 195–99 (to 2001).
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sion cases, are briefly discussed below. So far there have been only two 
occasions on which the above provisions were applied in relation to the 
Act on Integration Abroad. These judgments are considered in section 
IV.F.iii.
i. Dutch Case Law with Regard to Articles 9 and 10 CRC
Dutch courts have not expressly determined that Articles 9(1) and 10 (1) 
CRC are self-executing (een ieder verbindend), to the effect that they can be 
called upon by individuals. Nevertheless, both provisions have been 
applied by the courts on various occasions. With regard to Article 9(1) 
CRC, it has been ruled on several occasions that this provision does not 
cover situations where separation between children and parents results 
from a refusal to grant admission.146 In other cases, it was held that Article 
9(1) does not grant parents a right to remain with their children in a State 
Party147 and does not preclude the application of admission requirements 
(in casu the obligation to obtain a long-term visa) in cases where the inter-
ests of children are involved.148
Concerning Article 10(1) CRC, Dutch policy and legislation on family 
reunification have generally been considered to be in conformity with the 
requirements of this provision.149 Whether these requirements have also 
been respected in the particular case at hand has not been examined.150 
The criterion that applications for family reunification must be dealt with 
in a ‘positive, humane and expeditious manner’ has not been further 
specified.
On several occasions the courts considered that Articles 9 and 10 CRC 
did not contain any obligations extending beyond those contained in 
Article 8 ECHR.151 It is argued above, however, that this statement cannot 
be maintained (section IV.E). In addition to the procedural guarantees laid 
146 eg, District Court of The Hague (Alien Affairs Legal Uniformity Chamber) 25 
September 1997, case no 96/9718, para 11.1; President District Court of The Hague sitting in 
’s-Hertogenbosch 19 December 2006, case nos 06/51734 and 06/51732, LJN: AZ5104, para 
27.
147 District Court of The Hague sitting in Haarlem 29 April 2004, case nos 03/19211, 
03/19517 and 02/24266, para 2.27.
148 District Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam 7 September 2006, case nos 05/18443, 
05/52726 and 06/01750, para 7.10.
149 eg, District Court of The Hague (Alien Affairs Legal Uniformity Chamber) 
25 September 1997, case no 96/9718, para 11.3; District Court of The Hague sitting in 
’s-Hertogenbosch 30 June 2006, case no 05/23256, para 7.
150 For an exception see District Court of The Hague sitting in Haarlem 29 April 2004, case 
nos 03/19211, 03/19517 and 02/24266, para 2.27. In this judgment the court held that ‘it has 
not appeared that the application has not been dealt with in a positive and expeditious man-
ner’.
151 eg, District Court of The Hague (Alien Affairs Legal Uniformity Chamber) 25 
September 1997, case no 96/9718, para 11.3; District Court of The Hague sitting in Haarlem 
29 April 2004, case nos 03/19211, 03/19517 and 02/24266, para 2.27; District Court of The 
Hague sitting in Maastricht 29 December 2010, case nos 09/38308 and 10/10071.
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down in Article 10(1), the CRC also provides a more stringent standard 
for determining whether a child can return to the country of origin. In this 
respect it must be noted that there have also been cases where the Dutch 
courts decided that it had to be established whether the child could join 
the parents outside the Netherlands. Also noteworthy is a recent judg-
ment, where it was held that account had to be taken of a number of fac-
tors, including the child’s integration in the Netherlands, the psychological 
problems suffered by the mother and her (in)capacity to provide a safe 
home for the child in the country of origin.152
ii.  Dutch Case Law with Regard to Article 3 CRC
Dutch case law offers different interpretations of Article 3(1) CRC, both 
with regard to its legal effect (een ieder verbindendheid) and to its contents.153 
According to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (AJD) of the 
Council of State, the highest judicial body to decide in admission cases, 
Article 3(1) CRC merely obliges states to take the best interests of the child 
into account when deciding on applications for family reunification. 
However, as far as the weight to be attached to these interests is con-
cerned, the AJD has held that the provision is insufficiently specific to be 
self-executing and thus to be applied by the courts.154 The AJD also found 
that, given its formulation, Article 3(1) CRC requires the interests of the 
child to be a primary consideration, but allows them to be balanced 
against other interests.
There have been several cases to date in which (district) courts ruled 
decisions taken by the Dutch immigration authorities to be unlawful 
because of their taking insufficient account of the interests of the child.155 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the approach taken by the AJD does not 
entirely do justice to the requirements of Article 3(1) CRC. After all, by 
stating that the best interests of the child must form ‘a primary considera-
tion’, this provision indicates that those interests must be given relatively 
heavy weight and that it is not enough for the State Party simply to men-
tion the best interests of the child in its decision.156 Where those interests 
152 District Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam 25 June 2010, case nos 08/37726 and 
08/37729, LJN: BM9523, para 4.12. In this judgment the court did not apply the CRC directly, 
but assumed that the norms laid down in this Convention were equally applicable under Art 
8 ECHR. 
153 Ruitenberg 2003, 60–85, 101–26, 185–90 and 195–99.
154 eg, AJD 23 September 2004, case no 200404485/1, para 2.1.2; AJD 7 February 2012, case 
no 201103064/1/V2, LJN: BV3716, para 2.3.8. Note that in other cases the AJD decided that 
Art 3(1) CRC was not generally applicable at all; see, eg, AJD 15 February 2007, case no 
200604499/1, LJN: AZ9524, para 2.4.1 and AJD 22 February 2012, case no 201107168/1/A2, 
LJN: BV6578, para 2.4.
155 eg, District Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam 25 June 2010, case nos 08/37726 
and 08/37729, LJN: BM9523, paras 4.11–4.12.
156 cp District Court of The Hague sitting in Zutphen 24 July 2008, case no 07/43969, para 
2.7. 
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do not prevail, this will have to be justified by substantial reasons.157 While 
it is admitted that it may be difficult, in practice, to determine the exist-
ence of sufficient reasoningwithout actually conducting a renewed bal-
ancing test, it is maintained that this is what is required to meet the 
obligation of Article 3(1) CRC.
iii. Dutch Case Law with Regard to the CRC and Integration Requirements
As mentioned above, there have to date been only two cases in which 
Dutch courts ruled on whether the application of the Act on Integration 
Abroad (AIA) was compatible with Articles 3, 9 and 10 CRC.158 In both 
cases the applicants were mothers who sought to join their husbands and 
children in the Netherlands. In the first case the claim concerning the CRC 
was first addressed in appeal, where the AJD considered that ‘to the extent 
that they could be considered self-executing’, the above provisions did 
not entail anything other than that ‘in procedures such as those at issue, 
the interests of the children have to be taken into account’ and that ‘the 
disputed provisions did not contain any norm as to the weight to be 
attached to these interests’. As the situation of the applicant’s children had 
been included in the examination of the claim, no violation was found to 
have occurred.159 This consideration was later repeated in the second 
case.160
Since it was established in the above judgments that family life could 
also have been exercised in the country of origin, it seems unlikely that 
application of the CRC would have led to a different outcome. In the sec-
ond case, the court addressed this issue by considering that the children 
were still very young, that they spoke Romani as well as Dutch and that 
they would be able to attend school in Croatia. Nonetheless, it follows 
from the arguments in the previous subsections that the AJD’s interpreta-
tion of the CRC cannot be followed and that it should have been estab-
lished whether the interests of the children had formed a ‘primary 
consideration’, taking into account the obstacle to family reunification 
resulting from the AIA.
157 See also Ruitenberg 2004, paras 3–5.
158 A claim was also made under Art 10 CRC in District Court of The Hague 21 October 
2009, case no 09/5145, LJN: BK5782; in this case, however, the court found the CRC not to be 
applicable because the applicants had already reached the age of majority.
159 AJD 9 February 2009, case no 200806121/1, para 2.6.1.
160 District Court of The Hague sitting in Maastricht 6 October 2010, case nos 09/33430 
and 10/9629.
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V. THE FAMILY REUNIFICATION DIRECTIVE
A. Object and Purpose of the Directive
The Family Reunification Directive (FRD)161 is an EU directive with its 
legal basis in Article 79(2)(a) TFEU (formerly Art 63(3)(a) TEC). The direc-
tive entered into force on 3 October 2003 and had to be implemented in 
the Member States by 3 October 2005. According to its first article, the 
purpose of the directive is ‘to determine the conditions for the exercise of 
the right to family reunification by third-country nationals residing law-
fully in the territory of the Member States’. Within the scope of the direc-
tive, the term ‘family reunification’ concerns both the entry and residence 
of family members in the EU Member States in order to preserve the fam-
ily unit. The directive moreover applies irrespective of whether the family 
relationship arose before or after the sponsor entered the Member State 
where he or she lawfully resides.
For the purposes of this study, it is interesting to observe that the pre-
amble to the FRD expresses the notion that family reunification is a means 
to enhance the integration of third-country nationals in the Member States 
in both legal and social terms. Reference is made to the Conclusions of the 
1999 Tampere European Council, in which it was stated that ‘a more vig-
orous integration policy’ should aim to grant third-country nationals 
rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens.162 It is also 
stated that family reunification can create socio-cultural stability, which 
‘facilitates the integration of third country nationals and also serves to 
promote economic and social cohesion, a fundamental Community objec-
tive stated in the Treaty’.163
At the same time, however, the directive makes provision for integra-
tion requirements to be imposed before family reunification is granted. 
This reflects a recognition of the idea that family reunification can also 
lead to integration-related problems if newly admitted family members 
have trouble settling in. It thus appears that the drafters of the FRD were 
working with different and contradicting conceptions of the relationship 
between integration and family reunification, one of which is reflected in 
the preamble and the other in the text of the directive.
In November 2011, the European Commission issued a Green Paper 
with the aim of initiating a public debate on certain aspects of the Family 
Reunification Directive, including integration requirements.164 According 
161 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunifica-
tion, [2003] OJ L251/12.
162 Preamble FRD, recital 3.
163 Preamble FRD, recital 4.
164 Green Paper on the right to family reunification of third-country nationals living in the 
European Union (Directive 2003/86/EC), COM(2011) 735 final, 1–2.
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to the Commission, the integration requirement had been ‘one of the most 
controversial and debated requirements during the negotiations’.165 In the 
Green Paper, stakeholders are asked to comment on the effectiveness of 
integration requirements, the need for further definition at the EU level 
and the desirability of pre-entry measures.166 At the time of writing, a 
follow-up to this inquiry had not yet occurred. 
B.  Eligibility for Family Reunification
Sponsors (third-country nationals residing in a Member State) are eligible 
for family reunification if they hold a residence permit issued by a Member 
State with a validity of at least one year and have reasonable prospects of 
obtaining a right of permanent residence. The status of the family mem-
bers is not relevant, but they must be third-country nationals.167 The FRD 
does not apply to asylum seekers who have not yet received a final deci-
sion on their application, to people who have been granted or have 
applied for temporary protection status or to people who have been 
granted or have applied for a subsidiary form of protection.168 The direc-
tive also does not apply to family members of EU citizens, who are instead 
covered by the Residence Directive (section III of chapter 6).169 Member 
States may adopt more favourable provisions concerning the family 
reunification of third-country nationals.170
Article 4(1) FRD determines which family members are eligible for fam-
ily reunification. These are the spouse and minor children (including 
adopted children) of the sponsor and/or spouse. The children must be 
below the age of majority set in the Member State concerned and must not 
be married. Unaccompanied children over the age of 12 can be required to 
meet ‘a condition for integration’, as discussed in more detail below. In 
addition to the above categories, Member States may choose to authorise 
the entry and residence of the family members mentioned in Article 4(2) 
FRD. These are the dependent parents of the sponsor or spouse, provid-
ing they do not enjoy proper family support in the country of origin, and 
the adult unmarried children of the sponsor and/or spouse if they are 
objectively unable to care for themselves on account of their state of 
165 ibid, 4.
166 ibid, 5.
167 Art 3(1) FRD. Note that family reunification of people who are beneficiaries of interna-
tional protection in accordance with the recast Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU) is regu-
lated by that directive, provided the family already existed in the country of origin and the 
family members were present in the same Member State when the application for protection 
was made. The Qualification Directive does not allow the Member States to introduce inte-
gration requirements. See Art 2(j) and 23 Qualification Directive.
168 Art 3(2) FRD.
169 Art 3(3) FRD.
170 Art 3(5) FRD.
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health. Lastly, Member States may choose to authorise the entry and resi-
dence of the unmarried partner with whom the sponsor is in a duly 
attested, stable, long-term relationship or a registered partnership, as well 
as the unmarried minor children (including adopted children) and unmar-
ried, adult but dependent children of that partner.171 
Although Member States are not obliged to extend the right to family 
reunification to the categories of family members mentioned in Article 
4(2) and (3) FRD, those which do so must then allow family reunification 
under the conditions laid down in the directive.172 Article 4(4) FRD restricts 
the possibilities of family reunification in the event of a polygamous mar-
riage. A sponsor can consequently only apply for family reunification 
with one spouse. Additionally, in the event of a polygamous marriage, 
Member States are entitled to limit the family reunification of minor chil-
dren. Articles 4(5) and 4(6) allow certain conditions to be imposed regard-
ing the ages of the family members with whom reunification is requested. 
C.  Conditions for Family Reunification
In principle, applications for family reunification must be made and 
examined while the family members are outside the host Member State.173 
As soon as the application is accepted, the Member State concerned must 
allow the family members to enter its territory and grant those family 
members ‘every facility’ for obtaining the requisite visas.174 The host 
Member State must also grant the family members a renewable residence 
permit for at least one year.175 Thus, once the application for family reuni-
fication has been accepted, the family members are entitled to entry and 
residence for at least one year.
The acceptance of the application, however, is subject to certain 
conditions. Of particular significance to this study is that the FRD 
expressly mentions the possibility of imposing integration requirements. 
The relevant provisions can be found in Article 4(1), final subparagraph, 
and Article 7(2) of the directive.176 Both provisions are discussed in more 
171 Art 4(3) FRD.
172 Art 4(2) and (3) FRD. See also Boeles et al 2009, 192.
173 Art 5(3) FRD
174 Art 13(1) FRD
175 Art 13(2) FRD.
176 Art 4(1), final subparagraph FRD reads:
By way of derogation, where a child is aged over 12 years and arrives independently 
from the rest of his/her family, the Member State may, before authorising entry and resi-
dence under this Directive, verify whether he or she meets a condition for integration 
provided for by its existing legislation on the date of implementation of this Directive.
Art 7(2) FRD reads:
Member States may require third country nationals to comply with integration measures, 
in accordance with national law.
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detail below. It must be noted, however, that the provisions of Article 4(1), 
final subparagraph, are of little practical relevance. This is due to the 
standstill clause, which states that in order to be valid the integration 
conditions had to be provided in the existing national legislation of the 
Member States on the date of implementation of the directive. Only 
Germany fulfilled this requirement.177 The focus of the discussion below 
is, therefore, on Article 7(2) FRD. 
i. The Conditionality of Integration Requirements
It seems clear from the terms of the FRD that the integration requirements 
in Article 4(1), final subparagraph, and Article 7(2) may be imposed as 
conditions for the right to family reunification, implying that a failure to 
fulfil these requirements can lead to the application being refused.178 
Article 7 forms part of Chapter IV, entitled ‘Requirements for the exercise 
of the right to family reunification’. Apart from integration requirements 
Article 7 mentions a number of other conditions – relating to income, 
accommodation and health insurance – that must be met if family reunifi-
cation is to be granted. Evidence that these conditions are met must be 
provided when the application for family reunification is made.179 
The integration requirements may moreover be imposed before family 
reunification is granted. This follows from Article 4(1), final subparagraph 
(‘before authorising entry and residence’) and a contrario from the second 
sentence of Article 7(2) FRD and from Article 15(3) of the Blue Card 
Directive. This also makes it plausible that the integration requirements in 
Article 7(2) FRD may be used as conditions for family reunification and 
not only as a way to improve the integration of those seeking admission 
before they enter the Member State. After all, it would seem rather prema-
ture to start the integration process in the country of origin if the applica-
tion for family reunification could still be denied on other grounds (such 
as a lack of income).
Against this interpretation, it may be argued that the FRD aims to 
enable family reunification in order to create socio-cultural stability (sec-
tion V.A). In remarks submitted to the Court of Justice, the  European 
With regard to the refugees and/or family members of refugees referred to in Article 12 the 
integration measures referred to in the first subparagraph may only be applied once the 
persons concerned have been granted family reunification.
177 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of 
Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, COM(2008) 610 final, 5. According to 
the same report, Cyprus also introduced integration conditions under Art 4(1), final sub-
paragraph, FRD, but only after the implementation deadline. 
178 Unlike several other authors I do not believe that the term ‘integration measures’ can 
be distinguished from ‘integration conditions’, with the former allowing less room for coer-
cive or conditional measures such as an integration test. My arguments on this point are 
explained in detail in section VI.D.v of ch 6.
179 Art 7(1) FRD.
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Commission, relying on this aim, expressed the view that Article 7(2) 
allows Member States to introduce integration requirements to ensure ‘a 
minimum level of integration capacity’ within the Member State con-
cerned, but not to refuse admission to family members who fail to meet 
such requirements.180 In the Commission’s view, therefore, the FRD does 
not allow Member States to pursue a policy of ‘integration through exclu-
sion’ (chapter 3, section II.C.). It is submitted, however, that although the 
aim of the FRD is to enable family reunification, this does not mean that 
requests for admission cannot be made subject to conditions or should 
be granted in each individual case.181 As explained above, the actual 
provisions of the directive indicate that admission can be denied if the 
integration requirements set by Member States are not met. Hence, the 
Commission’s interpretation cannot be followed. 
Meanwhile, Article 7(2) FRD contains an exception for third-country 
nationals who are family members of refugees. This exception applies to 
the spouse and minor children of the sponsor and/or spouse.182 These 
family members may be required to meet integration requirements only 
after family reunification has been granted. It is plausible to assume that, 
in this case, non-compliance with integration requirements cannot result 
in the right to family reunification being denied. This exception can be 
explained by the specific plight of refugee families, who are unable to 
exercise their family life in the country of origin.183 With regard to integra-
tion requirements for children arriving independently of the rest of the 
family, as mentioned in Article 4(1), final subparagraph, an exception for 
children of refugees can be found in Article 10(1) FRD.
ii. The Relationship between Article 4(1), Final Subparagraph and Article 7(2) 
FRD
It may be asked what the relationship is between Article 4(1), final sub-
paragraph and Article 7(2) FRD. At first sight the provisions appear to 
overlap: whereas Article 4(1), final subparagraph, applies specifically to 
children who are over 12 years of age and arrive independently from the 
rest of the family, Article 7(2) apparently covers all family members 
including unaccompanied children. Nevertheless it must be assumed that 
Article 4(1), final subparagraph, is not without significance and that both 
provisions have their own independent meaning. 
180 The remarks were submitted in the case of Mohammed Imran, C-155/11 PPU. The case 
was eventually closed without a decision on the merits, see section V.D. 
181 See also, with regard to Art 4(1), final subpara FRD, CoJ 27 June 2006, C-540/03 [2006] 
ECR I-5769 (Parliament v Council), paras 67–69. 
182 Art 7(2) read in conjunction with Art 12(1) and Art 4(1) FRD.
183 See the preamble to the FRD, recital 8.
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With regard to Article 4(1), final subparagraph, the preamble to the FRD 
explains that the reason why this provision was included was because of 
the assumption that children will integrate more easily at an early age and 
to ensure that they gain the necessary education and language skills at 
school.184 Thus, it can be derived that Article 4(1), final subparagraph, was 
included so as to encourage parents to bring over their children as soon as 
possible rather than waiting until the children are older and may have 
more trouble integrating in the host Member State. If this is the case, how-
ever, it does not appear likely, on the basis of Article 7(2) FRD, that chil-
dren younger than 12 could also be asked to comply with integration 
requirements. It must therefore be assumed that Article 7(2) FRD does not 
apply to children at all.185 
To conclude, it is submitted that the FRD distinguishes three different 
groups for the purpose of imposing integration requirements. Adult fam-
ily members may be required to comply with such requirements (provid-
ing they do not belong to a refugee family) on the basis of Article 7(2) 
FRD. Children who are over 12 years of age and arrive independently 
from the rest of the family may also be asked to comply with integration 
requirements, but only if the Member State concerned has met the stand-
still clause (section V.C above). Lastly, integration requirements may not 
be imposed on children who arrive with their family or are aged 12 or 
younger.
iii. Contents of the Integration Requirements
The Family Reunification Directive does not define what is to be under-
stood by a ‘condition for integration’ or ‘integration measures’ in Articles 
4(1) and 7(2). The same is true with regard to other directives in which 
these terms are used, in particular the Long-term Residents Directive 
(2003/109/EC) and the Blue Card Directive (2009/50/EC). It is therefore 
left to the Member States to determine the exact contents of these require-
ments. This also follows from the fact that Article 7(2) FRD allows Member 
States to impose integration requirements ‘in accordance with national 
law’. 
Nevertheless, some indications as to possible integration measures or 
conditions can be found in the directives. For instance, it becomes clear 
from Article 15(3) of the Long-term Residents Directive (LRD), which was 
adopted only shortly after the FRD, that integration requirements may 
entail the obligation to participate in language courses. The same can be 
184 Preamble FRD, recital 12.
185 For a somewhat different approach, see Hailbronner et al 2010, 232–33, who maintain 
that Art 7(2) FRD does apply to children over 12 years of age. In my view this interpretation 
cannot be followed as it would presumably allow Member States to circumvent the standstill 
clause laid down in Art 4(1), final subparagraph.
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derived from recital 23 of the preamble to the Blue Card Directive (BCD). 
In addition, the legislative documents pertaining to the LRD mention the 
possibility of integration programmes to increase the self-sufficiency of 
newly arrived immigrants, including language training, social orienta-
tion, vocational training and knowledge of the host state’s society, as well 
as integration tests (section VI.D.iii of chapter 6). It was also considered 
that third-country nationals could be asked to pay the costs of the integra-
tion programmes.
On the basis of the above, it may be assumed that integration pro-
grammes and tests designed to improve or test immigrants’ language 
abilities or their knowledge of the host society are in any case covered by 
the provisions of the Family Reunification Directive. Nevertheless, other 
types of integration requirements cannot be excluded in advance. 
iv. Limitations to the Discretion of the Member States
Notwithstanding the above, the FRD also contains certain limitations to 
the discretion of EU Member States to apply integration requirements as a 
condition for family reunification. First of all, in examining an application 
under the directive, Member States must have regard to Articles 5(5) and 
17 FRD. According to the former provision, Member States shall have due 
regard to the best interests of minor children. In addition, Article 17 
obliges Member States, before rejecting an application, to take due account 
of ‘the nature and solidity of the person’s family relationships and the 
duration of his residence in the Member State and of the existence of fam-
ily, cultural and social ties with his/her country of origin’. 
It follows that, for each application, the Member States will need to 
have regard to the particular circumstances of the family members. 
Thereby the interests weighing in favour of family reunification being 
granted will need to be balanced against any grounds for rejecting the 
application.186 Articles 5(5) and 17 FRD reflect, to a large extent, the crite-
ria developed in relation to the right to family life in the ECHR and the 
ICCPR, which are discussed earlier in this chapter. The requirement of 
Article 5(5) also goes some way towards implementing Article 3 CRC, and 
Article 24(2) EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, within the framework of 
the directive. Unlike these provisions, however, the FRD does not require 
the best interests of the child to form a ‘primary consideration’. Instead it 
obliges the Member States to have ‘due regard’ to these interests, which 
would appear a somewhat less demanding criterion.
In addition to the above, the EU Court of Justice (CoJ) ruled in its judg-
ment in Chakroun, which concerned income requirements imposed by the 
Netherlands, that the scope left to Member States to maintain conditions 
186 See also Groenendijk 2006b, 366 and Boeles et al 2009, 186.
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for family reunification under the FRD must be interpreted strictly. 
According to the Court, this follows from the fact that the general rule, as 
laid down in Article 4(1) FRD, is that family reunification should be 
authorised to the family members mentioned in that provision.187 Earlier, 
the Court had already established that the directive went further than the 
provisions on the right to family life in international human rights law, 
which do not grant a right to exercise one’s family life in the country 
where the sponsor resides.188 
It may be claimed, in objecting to the Court’s decision, that, by focusing 
on family reunification as the principal rule the CoJ tends to disregard the 
fact that the FRD allows the right to family reunification to be made sub-
ject to certain conditions. After all, the possibility of imposing these condi-
tions is expressly foreseen by the directive. It may also be recalled that the 
purpose of the directive, as set forth in Article 1, is to determine the condi-
tions under which the right to family reunification is to be exercised. 
There is therefore little in the FRD to suggest that it is the conditions to the 
right of family reunification that need to be interpreted restrictively. 
Nevertheless it is true, as the Court also stated, that the promotion of fam-
ily reunification is stated as an objective in the directive’s preamble. It can 
therefore be accepted that measures taken by Member States should not 
be of such a nature as to undermine this objective. Neither should such 
measures render the right to family reunification illusory and hence 
deprive the directive of its effectiveness.189 
In the case of Chakroun it was argued that the Dutch regulations con-
cerning income requirements were contrary to Article 7(1)(c) FRD, accord-
ing to which the Member States may ask for evidence that the sponsor has 
sufficient resources to maintain him or herself and his or her family mem-
bers without recourse to the social assistance system. The CoJ found that 
Member States are allowed, under Article 7(1)(c) FRD, to set a certain 
amount of income as a reference. However, they may not impose a mini-
mum income level below which all requests for family reunification will 
be automatically refused, without examining the particular circumstances 
and actual financial needs of the applicants. The Court supported this 
interpretation by referring to Article 17 FRD which, as discussed above, 
also requires applications to be examined individually.190 
As far as integration requirements are concerned, the standard imposed 
by Article 7(2) FRD can be seen as less specific than that imposed by 
Article 7(1)(c). As explained above, the directive does not state what is to 
be understood by integration, or how a sufficient level of integration is to 
187 CoJ 4 March 2010, C-578/08, [2010] ECR, p. I-01839 (Chakroun), paras 41–43.
188 Parliament v Council (n 181), para 60.
189 Chakroun (n 187), para 43; see also CoJ 26 April 2012, C-508/10 [2012] ECR 00000 
(Commission v the Netherlands), para 65.
190 Chakroun (n 187), para 48.
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be measured. This implies that Article 7(2) provides few indications for 
the CoJ to find that integration requirements imposed by a Member State 
are contrary to the FRD. Nevertheless, the Chakroun judgment suggests 
that integration requirements, like income requirements, may not be such 
that they automatically exclude all those not complying with them. 
Although Member States are probably allowed to formulate a certain 
level of knowledge or language abilities that applicants ought to achieve, 
they still need to examine applications individually. Thereby regard must 
not only be had to the interests mentioned in Articles 5(5) and 17 FRD, but 
also to the relevance of the integration requirement in the particular case. 
To illustrate the above it may be asked whether, for example, the 
Netherlands can lawfully require an applicant for family reunification to 
pass a Dutch language exam if the person concerned can demonstrate that 
he or she can also find a job working in English. Arguably, this will not be 
the case if it is established that the purpose of the integration requirement 
is to ensure that the applicant can engage in paid labour. However, as 
stated above, it remains up to the Member States to determine what is 
understood by integration and to define the contents of integration 
requirements. Thus, if the Netherlands maintains that language learning 
is meaningful regardless of economic self-sufficiency, the obligation to 
learn some Dutch would most likely fall within the boundaries set by the 
directive.
The requirement that an income or integration requirement must be 
necessary in the individual case is understood here as an element of the 
principle of proportionality, which is a general principle of EU law (chap-
ter 1, section II.B.ii). In a later judgment, concerning the Long-term 
Residents Directive, the CoJ stated in more general terms that national 
measures transposing that directive must respect the principle of propor-
tionality, which means that they must be suitable to achieve the objectives 
pursued and not go beyond what is necessary to attain them.191 Surely, 
this also applies with regard to measures transposing the Family 
Reunification Directive. 
In a report concerning the application of the FRD, the European 
Commission proposed several more specific criteria to determine the 
admissibility and proportionality of integration measures adopted by 
Member States under Article 7(2) FRD. According to the Commission,
the objective of such measures is to facilitate the integration of family members. 
Their admissibility under the Directive depends on whether they serve this 
purpose and whether they respect the principle of proportionality. Their admis-
sibility can be questioned on the basis of the accessibility of [such] courses or 
tests, how they are designed and/or organised (test materials, fees, venue, etc.), 
whether such measures or their impact serve purposes other than integration 
191 Commission v the Netherlands (n 189), para 75.
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(e.g. high fees excluding low-income families). The procedural safeguard to 
ensure the right to mount a legal challenge should also be respected.192
Earlier in this chapter, it is argued that the criteria mentioned by the 
European Commission, such as the accessibility and the costs of integra-
tion courses or tests, are relevant to determine the proportionality of these 
requirements in relation to the right to family life. It seems plausible to 
assume that the same criteria also play a role in determining the propor-
tionality of integration requirements under the Family Reunification 
Directive. It may furthermore be accepted that the purpose of the meas-
ures should indeed be to improve integration. However, as argued above, 
the aim of the integration requirements adopted under Article 7(2) need 
not (only) be to promote the integration of the family members for whom 
admission is sought. Instead, Article 7(2) leaves scope for requirements 
that deny access to those who do not meet the required level of integra-
tion, with the aim of supporting the integration process within the 
Member States.193
Lastly, the provisions of the FRD must be interpreted in such a way as 
to respect the fundamental rights laid down in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and recognised as general principles of EU law.194 
This is recalled in the preamble to the FRD (recital 2) and was confirmed 
by the CoJ in Chakroun.195 The same applies to acts of the Member States 
that come within the scope of EU law (section II.B.ii of chapter 1). From 
the CoJ’s judgment in Parliament v Council, it may be derived that these 
acts include national integration requirements as referred to in Article 
4(1), final subparagraph, and Article 7(2) FRD.196 With regard to the FRD, 
the right to respect for family life is of primary importance. Also relevant 
are the rights of the child, including the obligation to let the best interests 
of the child form a primary consideration, and the prohibition of discrimi-
nation.197 Lastly, integration requirements adopted pursuant to Article 
7(2) FRD will need to respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity as 
well as the right to freedom of religion.198  
192 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of 
Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, COM(2008) 610 final, 7–8. See also the 
Green Paper on the right to family reunification, COM(2011) 735 final, 4, and the European 
Commission’s remarks in the case of Mohammed Imran (n 180).
193 See also para 66 of the Parliament v Council judgment (n 181) where the CoJ held that 
the need to promote integration, as reflected in Art 4(1), final subparagraph, FRD could be 
brought under several of the legitimate aims mentioned in Art 8(2) ECHR.
194 Arts 6(1) and (3) TEU.
195 Chakroun (n 187), para 44.
196 Parliament v Council (n 181), notably para 105. See also Battjes and Vermeulen 2007, 
para 6.
197 See Arts 7, 21 and 24 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. See also the CoJ’s judgment in 
Parliament v Council (n 181), paras 35–37, where it is confirmed that the general principles of 
EU law include the fundamental rights laid down in the ECHR, the ICCPR and the CRC.
198 See Arts 10 and 22 CFR and Art 9 ECHR.
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As mentioned above, Article 5(5) FRD may fall somewhat short of the 
norm laid down in Article 3 CRC (and Art 24(2) CFR) as it does not require 
Member States to let the best interests of the child form a ‘primary consid-
eration’. Other than this, it can be derived from the discussion in this 
chapter and chapters 8 to 10 that the right to family life and the prohibi-
tion of discrimination do not, as such, preclude the introduction of inte-
gration requirements as a condition for family reunification. Nevertheless, 
where the FRD is applicable, Member States must respect these funda-
mental rights not only as a matter of international law, but also as a matter 
of EU law. It may be observed that decisions concerning the scope and 
meaning of these rights may be given by the CoJ, which in principle is not 
legally bound to follow the interpretations provided by other supervisory 
bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights or the UN Human 
Rights Committee.199 
To date, however, the CoJ has not interpreted the above fundamental 
rights in a way that extends beyond the guarantees already laid down in 
the FRD. In particular, the Court found that Article 4(1), final subpara-
graph, FRD respects the right to family life because it does not grant 
Member States a larger margin of appreciation than that available to them 
under Article 8 ECHR. Thereby the Court also recalled that the directive 
requires Member States to balance the interests involved on the basis of 
Articles 5(5) and 17 which, as stated above, largely reflect the standards 
already set by the ECtHR and HRC.200 
D.  Dutch Case Law with Regard to the Family Reunification Directive
The Family Reunification Directive has thus far played only a limited role 
in Dutch case law concerning the Act on Integration Abroad. In one case 
before the District Court of Breda, an applicant for family reunification 
argued that imposing an integration exam as a condition for admission 
was contrary to Article 7(2) FRD. This argument was, however, rejected 
by the court on the grounds that the directive makes express provision for 
integration requirements and that the applicant had not argued why she 
considered the AIA to be unlawful.201 Neither the applicant nor the court 
addressed the question of whether the obligation to pass the integration 
exam was proportionate considering the individual circumstances of the 
case. 
199 Toner 2004, 132–38; Boeles et al 2009, 185.
200 Parliament v Council (n 181), paras 52–71.
201 District Court of The Hague sitting in Breda 13 November 2007, case no 07/18500, para 
2.9. An appeal was raised; however, the question concerning the compatibility of the AIA 
with the Family Reunification Directive was not addressed by the AJD; see AJD 16 May 2008, 
case no 200708934/1.
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In another case, decided in appeal, the Administrative Jurisdiction 
Division (AJD) of the Council of State was asked whether a decision by 
the Dutch authorities to refuse permission for family reunification was in 
breach of Article 5(5) FRD (the obligation to have due regard for the best 
interests of the child). The case involved a mother whose request for 
admission had been denied because she had failed to pass the integration 
exam. Admission had however been granted to her two minor children. 
The AJD found that, assuming that Article 5(5) FRD was applicable, the 
only norm contained in this provision was that the interests of the chil-
dren had to be taken into account, but that nothing could be said about 
the weight to be attached to these interests in a particular case. Arguably 
the obligation to take the best interests of the child into account also 
means that those interests must be given due regard as stated in the FRD; 
if not, the obligation would be rather meaningless. Thus it can be submit-
ted that the AJD did not wrongly interpret the directive. This being said, 
however, it has already been observed that Article 5(5) FRD falls short of 
the standard set by Articles 3 CRC and 24(2) CFR, which require the best 
interests of the child to form a ‘primary consideration’. 
The compatibility of the AIA with the FRD was again contested in a 
case before the District Court of Zwolle in 2011.202 In this case the appli-
cant raised various objections to the AIA, including that the FRD does not 
leave room for integration conditions, that the Dutch authorities had 
failed to make the individual assessment required by the directive and 
that the integration exam abroad does not respect the EU principle of 
proportionality. These objections prompted the District Court to refer a 
number of questions for preliminary ruling to the CoJ. However, the 
applicant was consequently granted admission while the preliminary 
questions were pending. This led the CoJ to decide that it did not need to 
give a ruling.203 
VI. INTERIM CONCLUSION: LEGAL STANDARDS CONCERNING 
INTEGRATION REQUIREMENTS AS A CONDITION FOR FAMILY 
REUNIFICATION
The previous sections investigate the legal standards that can be derived 
from the selected legal instruments concerning the admissibility of inte-
gration requirements as a condition for family reunification. Before apply-
ing these standards to the Dutch Act on Integration Abroad (AIA), it is 
useful to briefly recall the results of this investigation.
Firstly, it was established that each of the investigated instruments con-
tains certain criteria applying to the admission of aliens for the purpose of 
202 District Court of The Hague sitting in Zwolle 31 March 2011, case no 10/9716.
203 Mohammed Imran (n 180).
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family reunification. The Family Reunification Directive grants a right to 
family reunification to third-country nationals coming within its scope. 
While a similar right is not included in the ECHR, ICCPR or CRC, each of 
these treaties may apply to cases involving family reunification in the 
event of certain circumstances. This is specifically the case in situations 
where family life cannot be exercised outside the Contracting State or 
where such exercise would be subject to severe difficulties or entail seri-
ous obstacles to a child’s development.
Yet, even where the above instruments apply, the rights that are granted 
are not absolute. Each leaves scope for the states concerned to regulate the 
entry and residence of family migrants by means of immigration require-
ments. The possibility of requirements relating to integration is expressly 
foreseen in the Family Reunification Directive. The other instruments 
examined do not indicate what kind of immigration requirements may 
be imposed, leaving this to the discretion of the Contracting States. 
Nonetheless, the various treaty provisions set several criteria or condi-
tions with which immigration requirements, including integration 
requirements, must comply.
To start with the criteria set by the FRD, it was established that integra-
tion requirements may not be applied where the person seeking family 
reunification is a minor child or the family member of a refugee. The 
requirements must furthermore be proportionate and must not render the 
right to family reunification illusory or ineffective. The need to apply 
integration requirements must also be assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
whereby regard must be had for the interests mentioned in Articles 5(5) 
and 17 FRD and the general principles of EU law, including the right to 
respect for family life. 
Article 8 ECHR, which protects the right to family life, requires there to 
be a fair balance between the interests of the family and the interests of the 
state. Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR stipulate that integration requirements for 
family reunification meet the criteria of lawfulness and non-arbitrariness. 
Lastly, Articles 3, 9 and 10 CRC require applications for family reunifica-
tion to be treated in a positive, humane and expeditious manner and for 
the best interests of the child to form a primary consideration. It is also 
argued that, in situations where a refusal to admit the applicant would 
cause the parents and the child to be separated, the CRC proscribes 
integration requirements that make family reunification effectively impos-
sible.
Various factors have to be taken into account to determine whether 
integration requirements are in accordance with the above criteria, in par-
ticular the principle of proportionality. The factors to be considered and 
the weight to be attached to each factor may vary somewhat, depending 
on the interpretations provided by the various supervisory bodies. The 
Dutch courts must, however, respect the interpretations provided by the 
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ECtHR and the CoJ, while also giving due regard to the interpretations of 
the HRC and the CRC Committee. 
The main factors identified in the previous sections concern the nature 
of the family relationship, the possibility of exercising family life else-
where, the family’s ties to the host state and the efforts that applicants 
must make to meet the integration requirements. With regard to the latter 
factor, it is argued that this will depend on circumstances such as the costs 
and level of the integration exam or programme, its accessibility, the avail-
ability of preparation facilities and the existence or absence of the possi-
bility for an exemption if, despite the necessary efforts, the applicant does 
not succeed in meeting the integration requirement. Additionally, the 
effectiveness of the integration requirement should be taken into account.
VII. THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE AND  
THE ACT ON INTEGRATION ABROAD
It can be concluded from the previous section that integration require-
ments for family reunification do not, as such, violate the right to family 
life as guaranteed by the provisions discussed in this chapter. Yet, it 
remains to be determined whether the Act on Integration Abroad (AIA) is 
also compatible with the standards set by these provisions. This is exam-
ined below.
A. Preliminary Remark: Family Members Eligible for Admission
Until 1 October 2012, family members eligible for family reunification 
under Dutch immigration law included not only the spouse and minor 
children of the sponsor, but also the unmarried partner and the parents 
and adult children of the sponsor and his or her spouse.204 With the excep-
tion of minor children, the obligation to pass the integration exam abroad 
applied to each of these categories of family members under the same 
conditions. As of 1 October 2012, only the spouse or registered partner 
and minor children belonging to the family can apply for family reunifica-
tion, other family members are not eligible to be admitted (chapter 2, sec-
tion VI.B.i). 
As explained above, the extension of the right to family reunification to 
family members other than the spouse and minor children means that 
applications by these family members are also subject to the provisions of 
the Family Reunification Directive (section V.B). The same is true with 
regard to Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR, which defer to the definition of a 
204 Arts 3.14(b) and 3.24–3.25 Aliens Decree 2000.
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‘family’ in the national law of the Contracting State (section III.A). Article 
8 ECHR applies to the relationships between couples (married or unmar-
ried) and between parents and children. The provision also covers rela-
tionships with other family members when there are ‘additional elements 
of dependence’ (section II.A). Lastly, the scope of application of the CRC 
is limited to the relationship between parents and minor children.
B. The Requirement of Lawfulness
Where a right to family reunification exists in principle, integration 
requirements must meet the condition of lawfulness. This condition is 
expressly laid down in Article 17 of the ICCPR (section III.B). Of late, the 
ECtHR has also begun to examine whether immigration measures are 
‘prescribed by law’, although this criterion did not previously form part 
of the fair balance test that is usually applied in admission cases (section 
II.B.ii). As explained in chapter 2, the existence of a legal basis for applica-
tion of the integration exam abroad has been subject to legal debate in the 
Netherlands. Whereas the Aliens Act 2000 states that a residence permit 
(and hence an entry visa) may be refused if the applicant does not pass the 
exam, the Aliens Decree is formulated in such a way that this possibility is 
precluded in cases involving family reunification. However, it is submit-
ted that, in view of the legislative history of the AIA, the failure to men-
tion the integration exam in the Aliens Decree may be regarded as an 
evident mistake on the part of the legislator. It may therefore be assumed 
that the integration exam abroad has a legal basis in national law. The 
same conclusion was reached, albeit on different grounds, by the 
Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, the highest 
court to decide in immigration cases. 
The Aliens Act and the Aliens Decree provide a description of the con-
tents of the integration exam abroad, as well as of the possibilities for 
exemption. In this respect the legislation can be qualified as sufficiently 
precise and circumscribed, as required under the ICCPR and ECHR. 
Lastly, decisions to refuse applications for family reunification on the 
grounds that the integration requirement has not been met are taken by a 
designated authority (the Aliens Affairs Minister) on a case-by-case 
basis.205 It can therefore be concluded that the integration exam abroad is 
applied in accordance with the requirement of lawfulness. 
205 Art 14 (1) Aliens Act 2000.
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C. The Requirement of a Legitimate Aim
It was established in chapter 3 that the purpose of the AIA is to further the 
integration process in the Netherlands by excluding those immigrants 
who do not meet certain integration standards. For those aliens who are 
eventually admitted, the AIA also aims to facilitate their integration by 
giving them a head start. It can therefore be stated that the objective of the 
AIA is to promote immigrant integration, partly by means of immigration 
control. As argued above, this can be considered a legitimate objective 
under Article 8 ECHR and Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR, as well as for the 
purposes of the Family Reunification Directive.206
It may be observed that the concept of ‘integration’ is still very open 
and leaves room for various definitions. How this concept is filled in is, in 
principle, a matter to be determined by the state concerned, as long as the 
integration objectives remain in accordance with the overall standards set 
by international and EU law. With respect to the Netherlands it has been 
established that, since the mid-1990s, integration policy has consistently 
sought to make immigrants self-sufficient and to promote their participa-
tion in the public domain, in particular in education and the labour 
market. In addition, however, the policy has also been directed towards 
cultural adaptation and, more recently, towards achieving a sense of 
commitment or emotional identification (chapter 3, sections III.A–III.C). 
Especially around the time when the AIA was adopted, when cultural 
adaptation was high on the integration agenda, immigrants were expected 
to become acquainted with ‘Dutch society’ and certain moral values and 
social norms portrayed as pertaining to ‘the Dutch identity’. It is not 
entirely clear whether the latter also implied that these values and norms 
had to be accepted as being morally correct (chapter 3, section III.D.i).
From a legal perspective the above purposes are acceptable in principle, 
provided that immigrants are not asked to agree with particular norms, 
ideas or beliefs. It is argued earlier in this chapter (especially in section 
II.D.i) that requiring agreement or internalisation would amount to a form 
of indoctrination going beyond what can be regarded as legitimate. 
However, the contents of the integration exam abroad show that few of 
the questions contained therein appear to be specifically linked to this 
objective.207 It must therefore be concluded that the above findings on the 
206 See sections II.D.i, III.C and V.C.iv. 
207 With regard to a few questions it could be argued that candidates are asked to take a 
normative stance rather than to produce factual knowledge. See, eg, question 62: ‘Is it impor-
tant to learn Dutch quickly?’ (correct answer: yes), question 92: ‘When should you start look-
ing for work: as soon as possible or at a later date?’ (correct answer: as soon as possible) and 
question 99: ‘In the Netherlands, do you get social security benefits or does your partner 
provide for you?’ (correct answer: your partner provides for you). If the latter question is 
meant to be factual, the answer would be incorrect. It must therefore be assumed that the 
question is a normative one.
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purpose of the AIA do not call for any (far-reaching) alteration of the 
exam. A detailed investigation of the aims of the AIA would normally also 
go beyond the realm of the judiciary.208 The more abstractly formulated 
objectives of promoting integration and controlling immigration gener-
ally support the conclusion that the Act serves a legitimate aim, in partic-
ular before an international court. Consequently, it is primarily up to the 
Dutch legislator to ensure that the objectives pursued by the AIA remain 
within the above limits.
In addition to the integration objectives identified in chapter 3, the 
Dutch government has referred to a number of the legitimate aims of 
Article 8(2) ECHR as being public interests served by the AIA. According 
to this argument, the Act aims to prevent marginalisation of certain seg-
ments of the population, which in turn is necessary to protect the eco-
nomic well-being of the Netherlands, public order and public security 
and the rights and freedoms of others. This reasoning was supported by 
reference to the overrepresentation of ethnic minority groups in crime 
statistics. It was also claimed that marginalisation and segregation could 
cause people to turn their backs on society and be influenced by groups 
tending towards extremism and terrorism. The 9/11 terrorist attacks were 
mentioned in this respect, alongside other incidents of Islamic terrorism 
that occurred in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Western Europe. 
 Lastly, it was stated that there was a real risk of immigrants becoming 
radicalised, adopting anti-Western attitudes and undermining generally 
accepted values such as the equality of the sexes and the freedom of 
expression.209 
With regard to the above argument, it may be accepted that efforts to 
prevent marginalisation, radicalisation and terrorism constitute legitimate 
public interests within the context of Article 8 ECHR (and comparable 
provisions). Yet, as far as the prevention of crime or terrorism is concerned, 
it may be asked to what extent the integration exam abroad is able to 
contribute to these goals. In particular where the prevention of terrorism 
and radicalisation is concerned, it is submitted that the government’s 
arguments are rather speculative. A more substantive motivation, if 
possible based on empirical evidence, would therefore be preferable.
D. Proportionality of the Integration Exam Abroad – Relevant Factors
As mentioned in section VI of this chapter, the proportionality of the obli-
gation to pass the integration exam abroad needs to be assessed on an 
individual basis and cannot be determined on a general level. Nevertheless, 
208 cp Gerards 2002, 42– 46 (on judicial review of legislative aims in equal treatment cases).
209 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 17; Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 
700, No 6, 47–48.
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certain factors relevant to the proportionality assessment can be identi-
fied. These are discussed below. 
i. Level of the Exam
When the AIA was enacted, the Dutch legislator paid particular attention 
to the Act’s compatibility with Article 8 ECHR. The government took the 
view that the right to family life entailed that no one should a priori be 
excluded from the possibility of family reunification. It was consequently 
assumed that the integration exam abroad had to be achievable for every-
one, taking into account that the government would not offer preparation 
facilities and that candidates would have to prepare themselves indepen-
dently. Eventually the level of the exam was set at ‘A1-minus’ (chapter 2, 
section VI.C.i). To ensure that the exam would also be feasible for illiterate 
candidates, it was decided only to test oral skills.210 
The evaluation conducted in 2009 showed that a large majority of can-
didates with little education were indeed able to pass the exam at the first 
attempt.211 This suggests that the level of the exam was not unreasonably 
high. However, no information was available on the chances of illiterate 
candidates. The evaluation also indicated that those with little education 
were less likely to take the exam.212 This may mean that such candidates 
were deterred by the burden of having to prepare for the exam. Still, case 
law of the ECtHR and the Dutch courts suggests that applicants for family 
reunification may, in principle, be required to make serious efforts to meet 
immigration requirements. Therefore, it cannot be concluded from the 
available information that an oral exam at the A1-minus level is dispro-
portionately high. 
On 1 April 2011, however, the level of the integration exam abroad was 
raised to A1 and the exam expanded to include a reading comprehension 
test (section VI.C.ii of chapter 2). To compensate for these changes, the 
study package now includes additional preparatory materials provided 
by the Dutch government. It remains the candidate’s responsibility, how-
ever, to prepare for the exam independently. 
In the government’s view, the higher level of the integration exam 
abroad does not make it impossible for large groups of family members to 
be admitted for family reunification.213 However, this stance appears at 
odds with the fact that the government earlier opted for an oral test, pre-
cisely so as not to exclude illiterate family members. In any case, it is sub-
mitted that the obligation to pass a reading comprehension test imposes 
210 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 17; Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 
700, No 6, 18.
211 Brink et al 2009, 37–38. On the effects of the AIA, see also section VI.D of ch 2.
212 ibid, 37; Odé 2009, 289–90.
213 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 679, 3–4.
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too great a burden on family members who are unable to read and write, 
also given that these persons have most likely not had much formal edu-
cation. As far as the category of illiterate family members is concerned, it 
can be assumed that a reading test makes family reunification effectively 
impossible. To the extent that illiterate family members are not exempted, 
either as a category or on an individual basis (section VII.F), the reading 
test is therefore contrary to Article 7(2) of the Family Reunification 
Directive. The changes to the integration exam also mean that, in indi-
vidual cases, the refusal to admit a family member is more likely to result 
in a violation of the ECHR, ICCPR or CRC. 
ii. Availability of Preparation Facilities 
Another factor influencing the admissibility of the integration exam 
abroad is the availability of preparation facilities, including language 
courses. As explained in chapter 2 (section VI.C.iv), the Dutch govern-
ment has developed a study package that candidates may use to prepare 
for the ‘Knowledge of the Netherlands’ test and the reading comprehen-
sion test. Candidates can also use other study materials and the prepara-
tory courses organised by private parties in several countries of origin, 
while some candidates can travel to the Netherlands on a short-term visa 
to prepare for the exam there. 
Nevertheless, case law on the AIA indicates that there are situations in 
which the available facilities are insufficient. For instance, study materials 
may not be available in a language spoken by the candidate.214 A candi-
date may also not have access to the infrastructure (such as a DVD player 
or the internet) needed to prepare for the exam.215 To date, the Dutch 
courts have taken the stance that it is up to applicants and their family 
members to resolve these difficulties (section II.E.iii). It is submitted, how-
ever, that in circumstances such as the above it would be unreasonable to 
expect an applicant for family reunification to pass the integration exam 
abroad. This would, again, be contrary to the provisions of the Family 
Reunification Directive and increases the risk of a violation of Articles 8 
ECHR, 17 and 23 ICCPR and 9 and 10 CRC.
iii. Accessibility of the Exam
A similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to the accessibility of the 
exam. Under normal circumstances, it would not be unreasonable to 
expect an applicant for family reunification to travel to the Dutch consu-
214 President District Court of The Hague sitting in Middelburg 16 August 2007, case nos 
07/30015 and 07/31032, LJN: BB3524.
215 cp the facts in District Court of The Hague 21 October 2009, case no 09/5145, LJN: 
BK5782.
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late or embassy in the country of origin to take the exam. However, this is 
different if, for instance, travelling is difficult or even impossible because 
of a conflict situation. In this respect, the 2009 evaluation also mentions 
the position of women in Afghanistan who are not allowed to travel inde-
pendently.216 In addition, there may be no exam location in the country of 
origin, as, for example, in Pakistan and Iraq.217 In these cases it must be 
assessed whether the applicant can reasonably be expected to take the 
exam in another country. Where this possibility does not exist, it is again 
submitted that it would be disproportionate to refuse family reunification 
on the sole grounds that the integration requirement has not been met.
iv. Family Members of Former Asylum Seekers
As explained earlier (chapter 2,section VI.B.iii), the AIA does not apply to 
family members of persons holding an asylum permit. However, there are 
several categories of persons under Dutch immigration law who do not 
hold such a permit, but who may nevertheless be unable to exercise their 
family life in the country of origin because of a risk of persecution. These 
are, first of all, individuals granted an asylum permit and who have since 
obtained Dutch nationality. Additionally, a non-asylum-related residence 
permit used to be granted to people who had applied for asylum, but who 
had not received a decision on their application within three years (the 
‘driejarenbeleid’ or three-year-policy). 
Family members of persons in the above categories are not exempted 
from the obligation to pass the integration exam abroad. During the enact-
ment of the AIA, the government stated in relation to these family mem-
bers that account would be taken of possible obstacles to the exercise of 
family life in the country of origin.218 However, no express rule to this 
effect is included in the legislation or policy guidelines concerning the 
integration exam abroad. In individual cases, the circumstance that family 
life cannot be exercised in the country of origin may contribute to the find-
ing that refusal to grant admission for family reunification is contrary to 
the right to family life as protected in the ECHR, ICCPR and CRC. This is 
particularly relevant with regard to applicants not falling within the scope 
of the Family Reunification Directive.219
216 Lodder 2009, 71.
217 ibid, 79.
218 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 9–10; Parliamentary Papers II 2004– 2005, 
29 700, No 6, 36–37.
219 It is as yet unclear whether the FRD also applies to third-country nationals who have 
become EU citizens through naturalisation. 
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v. Effectiveness of the Act on Integration Abroad
One more element playing a role in the proportionality assessment con-
cerns the extent to which the AIA effectively contributes to the aims pur-
sued. In chapter 2 (section VI.D) it was established that the effects of the 
integration exam abroad on the integration capacity of immigrants upon 
their arrival have thus far been rather limited, whereas the long-term 
effects cannot yet be measured.
In order to increase the effectiveness of the AIA, the Dutch government 
decided to raise the level of the exam to A1 and to include a reading test 
(chapter 2, section VI.C.ii). This can be expected to have a positive influ-
ence on the integration of those applicants coming to the Netherlands 
after passing the exam. However, as argued above, the fact that the exam 
has become more difficult also imposes a greater burden on applicants 
and may even exclude people who are illiterate from the possibility of 
family reunification. Overall, therefore, the increased level of the exam is 
not likely to have a positive effect on the AIA’s proportionality.
E. The Obligation to Give Primary Consideration to the Best Interests 
of the Child
During the enactment of the AIA, the issue of its compatibility with the 
CRC was raised in parliament. In this context, the Dutch government 
stated that the introduction of the integration exam abroad would be in 
the best interests of the child. It argued that children’s educational level 
could be adversely affected if their situation at home was not conducive 
to learning the Dutch language, which they need to use as a primary lan-
guage in the Netherlands. In the government’s view, the integration exam 
abroad would be a suitable instrument for reducing the risk of such 
adverse consequences.220 
Clearly, the above argument is not without relevance. Nevertheless, the 
CRC also requires consideration to be given to the best interests of the 
child in the particular case. Therefore, if the government’s argument is to 
be accepted, it has to be established that the integration exam serves the 
interest of the child in the individual case at hand and not just the general 
interests of migrant children living in the Netherlands. Moreover, the 
child’s interest in learning Dutch needs to be weighed against the compet-
ing interest of not being separated from his or her parents or being forced 
to join the parents in another country. 
220 Parliamentary Papers I 2004–2005, 29 700, E, 5.
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F. Exempted Categories and Individual Exemptions
It follows from the above that there are many circumstances affecting the 
compatibility of the integration exam abroad with the right to family life 
or family reunification. To a certain extent, these circumstances have been 
addressed by the creation of general categories of exemption (section 
VI.B.iii of chapter 2). It may be recalled that the AIA does not, for example, 
apply to children below the age of majority (18 years under Dutch law) or 
to those aged 65 or older. Also exempted are family members of people 
who have been granted a residence permit on asylum grounds, which 
includes the family members of (recognised) refugees. 
Both the above exemptions are in conformity with the Family 
Reunification Directive. As the AIA entered into force after the implemen-
tation date of the directive, the standstill clause in Article 4(1), final sub-
paragraph, FRD means that children older than 12 cannot be required to 
pass the integration exam abroad.221 The exemptions can also influence 
the compatibility of the AIA with the ECHR, ICCPR and CRC in individ-
ual cases. For example, the exemption for family members of asylum 
permit holders means that the AIA will not stand in the way of family 
reunification in many cases where the exercise of family life would not be 
possible outside the Netherlands.
In addition to the above categories, the AIA does not apply to appli-
cants who are durably unable to pass the exam owing to a physical or 
mental disability. Also exempted are those who, once in the Netherlands, 
would not be subject to compulsory integration on the grounds that they 
already have sufficient knowledge of Dutch language and society or 
because they are pursuing a relevant form of education. These exemp-
tions ensure that the AIA does not preclude family reunification for those 
unable to take the exam because of disability, and that it does not impose 
an unnecessary burden. In view of the CoJ’s judgment in Chakroun, the 
latter consideration is particularly relevant in relation to the Family 
Reunification Directive.
Even if they do not fall within any of the above categories, applicants 
may still be exempted on the grounds of individual circumstances (chap-
ter 2, section VI.B.iii). This may happen, inter alia, if the applicant has 
failed to pass the integration exam abroad, but refusal of the application 
for family reunification would be eminently unreasonable. This ground 
may be invoked to ensure respect for the right to family life in certain 
cases, in particular where a candidate is unable to pass the exam owing to 
illiteracy. Another ground for individual exemption is that the refusal to 
allow family reunification would violate Article 8 ECHR. Provided that 
221 The AIA entered into force on 15 March 2006, whereas the implementation date of the 
Directive was 3 October 2005. 
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the assessment under Article 8 ECHR is correct, the above exemption 
clause can play an important role to ensure that the integration exam 
abroad respects the right to family life. However, it has been established 
that the Family Reunification Directive contains standards that are gener-
ally more protective than those of the ECHR. Some additional protective 
standards can also be found in the ICCPR and the CRC. These standards 
also need to be taken into account to ensure that the AIA is compatible 
with the right to family life. It is therefore suggested that the existing 
exemption clauses should be expanded so as to ensure compliance with 
the FRD, ICCPR and CRC, as well as with Article 8 ECHR. Lastly, such 
compliance also requires that the existing exemption clauses are not 
applied too rigidly (see again chapter 2, section VI.B.iii).
G. Summary: Compatibility of the Act on Integration Abroad with the 
Right to Family Life and Family Reunification
The previous sections assessed whether the AIA meets the standards set 
by international and EU law in relation to family reunification. On the 
basis of this assessment, it can be concluded that the obligation to pass the 
integration exam abroad is not as such incompatible with these standards. 
Nonetheless, a few remarks deserve to be made. First of all, it was argued 
that the aim of the AIA cannot be to make family migrants internalise par-
ticular norms or values, even if these norms or values are seen as pertain-
ing to ‘the Dutch identity’. While this finding does not call for changes to 
the exam in its current form, it should be taken into account if the curricu-
lum is revised in the future.
Secondly, a number of factors were summed up that are relevant to 
determining the proportionality of the Act in individual cases. In particu-
lar, it was argued that the reading comprehension test makes it effectively 
impossible for illiterate family members to engage in family reunification. 
This test must therefore be considered disproportionate, at least under the 
standards set by the Family Reunification Directive. Other circumstances 
were also mentioned that may also result in a finding of disproportionality, 
either alone or in combination, such as the non-availability of preparation 
facilities or if the sponsor would risk persecution in the country of origin. 
These circumstances need to be assessed in every case, together with other 
factors such as the nature of the family relationship and the ties of the fam-
ily members to the host state. Where children are involved, the best inter-
ests of the child need to be established on a case-by-case basis and must be 
given primary consideration. Thus far the latter standard has not yet been 
duly recognised by the Dutch authorities, including the courts. 
Lastly, the possibilities were examined of being granted an exemption 
from the AIA in situations where the obligation to pass the integration 
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exam abroad conflicts with the right to family life (including the right to 
family reunification in the FRD). Whereas exemptions may be granted on 
the basis of individual circumstances, it was submitted that the existing 
provisions are not formulated in sufficiently broad terms. In particular, 
more scope is needed to ensure respect for the ICCPR, the CRC and the 
FRD.
VIII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
On the basis of the examination in this chapter, it is concluded that the 
protection of family life by international legal instruments is relatively 
limited in situations where family members seek to be reunited across 
national borders. Although the existing standards for protection were 
raised by the adoption of the EU Family Reunification Directive, states, 
including the Netherlands, have retained the competence to make family 
reunification subject to immigration conditions, including requirements 
in the field of integration. 
Integration requirements are imposed with the aim of improving the 
process of immigrant integration within the receiving state, which is in 
principle a legitimate objective. However, these requirements also consti-
tute an obstacle for individuals seeking to be joined by their family mem-
bers in the country where they hold legal residence or of which they are 
nationals. Consequently, persons belonging to transnational families are 
in a less favourable position than those whose family members happen to 
hold the same nationality. Given the increasing ease with which people 
are able to travel and establish and maintain contacts around the world, it 
may be doubted whether this differentiation ought to be upheld. 
In my view, there is a strong argument to be made for legal recognition 
of the fact that family life is an international matter. Such recognition 
would imply that the right to family life includes a right to reunification 
and that restrictions to the latter right ought to be treated as exceptions to 
the rule. This was also the approach taken by the CoJ in the case of 
Chakroun. Arguably, however, such an approach is not as yet required by 
the Family Reunification Directive (which grants a right to family reunifi-
cation only under certain conditions), nor by the various human rights 
treaties examined in this chapter or their interpretations by the respective 
supervisory bodies. 
Recognition of a right to family reunification as part of the right to fam-
ily life does not imply that this right must be all-encompassing or abso-
lute. It is submitted that states may legitimately restrict the scope of the 
right to family reunification on the basis of criteria relating to the nature of 
the family relationship and/or the ties existing between one or more of 
the family members and the state concerned (notably nationality and 
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duration of residence). Limitations to the right to family reunification may 
also be indicated on grounds relating to the general interest, including the 
interest of successful immigrant integration. However, as is already the 
case under the current legal framework in situations where a right to fam-
ily reunification is taken to exist, such limitations must meet the require-
ment of proportionality. This brings me to another argument, which is of 
a more pragmatic nature.
As far as integration requirements are concerned, the example of the 
Dutch Act on Integration Abroad shows that it is difficult to establish the 
effect of such requirements on immigrant integration within the receiving 
state. However, as also recognised by the Dutch government, the effect of 
integration requirements will be less when the requisite level of the skills 
or knowledge is lower.222 In this chapter, it is argued that the various legal 
instruments examined set limits on the efforts that applicants for family 
reunification may be required to make. This is especially true with regard 
to the Family Reunification Directive. Consequently, the effectiveness of 
integration requirements is necessarily limited by the fact that such 
requirements may not impose a disproportionate obstacle in situations 
where a right to family reunification has been established.
Given both the above limitation and the earlier argument about family 
reunification being part of the right to family life, it is suggested that it 
would be better for family reunification not to be made subject to the ful-
filment of integration requirements. Instead, preference ought to be given 
to other measures to ensure that the arrival of family migrants does not 
adversely influence the process of immigrant integration in the host state. 
An example of such a measure is the Integration Act 2007, which is cur-
rently in force in the Netherlands, as well as the Newcomers Integration 
Act 1998 that preceded it. Obviously, however, other measures are possi-
ble.
Clearly, the above suggestion goes beyond what is required by the legal 
standards for family reunification identified in this chapter. Any decision 
to follow this suggestion will therefore be a political rather than a legal 
one. Even so, it was argued above that the said legal standards are not 
always respected by the Act on Integration Abroad in its current form. 
The changes proposed in section VII are therefore needed if the lawful-
ness of the Act is to be guaranteed. 





THIS CHAPTER CONSIDERS integration requirements in relation to the right to freedom of religion. While the connection between integration requirements as admission criteria and religious free-
dom may not be immediately obvious, the inclusion of this chapter was 
prompted by the fact that, at least in the Netherlands, religious servants 
form a specific target group of the Act on Integration Abroad (chapter 2, 
section VI.B.ii). This raises a number of questions, including whether the 
rights of religious servants or congregations may be affected by admission 
requirements such as the integration exam abroad and, if so, under which 
conditions limitations to these rights are allowed. 
The examination conducted in this chapter addresses several provi-
sions protecting the right to freedom of religion, starting with Article 9 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 18 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). As in chap-
ter 4 on the right to family life, regard is given to relevant interpretations 
developed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (HRC). 
In addition to these international provisions, attention is paid to Article 6 
of the Dutch Constitution. With regard to each of the above provisions an 
attempt is made to establish legal criteria for their application in relation 
to integration requirements. Where available and relevant, account is also 
taken of interpretations supplied by the Dutch courts. Afterwards, the Act 
on Integration Abroad is evaluated in the light of the criteria identified.
Another question raised in this chapter is whether religious servants 
may be singled out as a particular target group for the purpose of apply-
ing integration requirements, or whether this constitutes discrimination 
on the grounds of religion. The above provisions regarding freedom of 
religion are therefore considered, together with those protecting the right 
to equal treatment (Arts 14 and 1 Twelfth Protocol ECHR, 2 and 26 ICCPR 
and 1 Dutch Constitution). An assessment of the Act on Integration 
Abroad in relation to this right is included in section VII.E. In view of 
the close connection with the right to freedom of religion, this issue is 
discussed here rather than in the chapters on equal treatment. 
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II. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AS PROTECTED BY ARTICLE 9 OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Article 9(1) ECHR provides that everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. It is specified that ‘this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance’. Limitations to 
the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs are allowed, provided 
they are in conformity with the conditions set out in the second paragraph 
of the Article.
As discussed below, there is still little case law available on the applica-
bility of Article 9 ECHR in cases involving the admission of aliens. 
Nevertheless it is argued that, in certain circumstances, a state’s refusal to 
admit a religious servant because of failure to comply with an integration 
requirement can come within the scope of Article 9 ECHR. The conditions 
under which the freedom of religion may be limited are then assessed in 
order to formulate criteria for defining integration requirements for reli-
gious servants. 
A. Scope of Article 9 ECHR – the Right of Religious Communities to 
Self-organisation and the Admission of Religious Servants
i. Individual and Collective Dimension of the Freedom of Religion
The freedom of religion as protected by Article 9 ECHR comprises various 
elements, including the right of the individual to hold (or not to hold) a 
religion or belief and to act in accordance with this religion or belief, for 
instance through the observance of religious customs or practices (such as 
praying, fasting or wearing a headscarf). Article 9 also protects the right to 
manifest one’s religion or belief in community with others. This ‘collective 
dimension’ of the freedom of religion includes the right of religious con-
gregations to organise themselves and to manifest their religion in organ-
ised settings.1
With regard to the admission of religious servants, it can readily be 
assumed that Article 9 ECHR does not protect the right of a non-national 
to be admitted to a State Party in order to exercise his or her freedom of 
religion on its territory as an individual.2 This follows from the general 
1 For a more elaborate discussion of the scope of Art 9 ECHR see Van Dijk et al 2006, 752–
67 and Harris et al 2009, 428–35.
2 See also ACVZ 2005, 33, Vermeulen 2006, 251 and Kortmann 2008, 435. An exception to 
this rule may exist in case the manifestation of religion or belief is only possible in that State 
Party, eg, in case of pilgrimages or, perhaps, missionary activities.
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assumption that the obligation of states to protect fundamental rights is 
normally limited to persons within their borders and that these 
fundamental rights do not entail an entitlement to exercise them anywhere 
in the world. Confirmation of this view can be found in ECtHR case law 
on the freedom of religion.3
However, the situation described above should be distinguished from 
one in which the admission of a religious servant is requested on behalf of 
a religious community in the receiving state. As mentioned above, the 
right to freedom of religion also has a collective dimension. Subjects of 
this right include ecclesiastical and religious bodies that are considered to 
exercise the right guaranteed by Article 9 ECHR on behalf of their adher-
ents.4 ECtHR case law acknowledges that religious communities tradi-
tionally exist in the form of organised structures and, therefore, that the 
freedom of religion includes the freedom to participate in religious com-
munities. Where the organisation of such communities is concerned, 
Article 9 ECHR must be interpreted in the light of Article 11, which pro-
tects the freedom of association. Thus, religious communities must be 
allowed to operate freely and without unjustified interference from the 
state. The ECtHR regards the autonomous existence of religious commu-
nities as indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and, there-
fore, as being at the heart of the protection afforded by Article 9 ECHR.5 
With regard to the protection afforded to religious communities, the 
Court has recognised that the personality of religious leaders is of impor-
tance to the members of such communities. In this respect it has concluded 
on several occasions that state measures favouring a particular person as 
the leader of a divided religious community were in violation of Article 9 
ECHR.6 It can be inferred from this case law that the organisational auton-
omy of a religious community includes, in principle, the freedom to 
choose its own leadership. This brings us to the question of whether the 
3 See ECtHR 8 November 2007, app no 30273/03 (Perry), para 51; ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 
20 December 2007, app no 25525/03 (El Majjaoui and Stichting Touba Moskee), para 32 and 
ECtHR 12 February 2009, app no 2512/04 (Nolan and K.), para 62. See also the earlier deci-
sions of the European Commission of Human Rights in the cases of Omkarananda and the 
Divine Light Zentrum (EComHR 19 March 1981, app no 8118/77, paras 5 and 6) and Öz 
(EComHR 3 December 1996, app no 32168/96). 
4 As confirmed recently in ECtHR 6 November 2008, app no 58911/00 (Leela Förderkreis e.v. 
and others), para 79. An overview of earlier case law on this topic can be found in Van Dijk et 
al 2006, 764–65.
5 eg, ECtHR 26 October 2000, app no 30985/96 (Hasan & Chaush), para 62; ECtHR 16 
December 2004, app no 39023/97 (Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community), paras 73 
and 93; ECtHR 5 October 2006, app no 72881/01 (The Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army), 
para 58 and ECtHR 31 July 2008, app no 40825/98 (Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas 
and others), paras 60 and 61. 
6 eg, ECtHR 14 December 1999, app no 38178/97 (Serif), para 52; Hasan & Chaush (n 5), 
para 62; ECtHR 13 December 2001, app no 45701/99 (Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and 
others), para 117 and ECtHR 22 January 2009, app nos 412/03 and 35677/04 (The Holy Synod 
of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and others), para 103.
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refusal to admit a religious servant constitutes interference with the free-
dom of religion as protected by Article 9 ECHR or, in other words, whether 
this freedom includes the right to choose a religious leader who does not 
legally reside in the state where the community is based. This question is 
addressed below.
ii. Admission of Religious Servants
a. El Majjaoui and Stichting Touba Moskee: the Question Left  
Unresolved
This issue of the admission of religious servants in relation to the freedom 
of religion came up relatively recently in a decision by the ECtHR Grand 
Chamber in the case of El Majjaoui and Stichting Touba Moskee.7 The facts 
leading up to this case concerned a Dutch religious foundation, the 
Stichting Touba Moskee, that wanted to employ Mr El Majjaoui, a foreign 
national, as a religious minister, but was refused the necessary work per-
mit. Dutch immigration law prescribed that such a permit had to be 
obtained by all employers wishing to employ foreign nationals. The 
requirement applied, in principle, to all labour migrants in the Netherlands 
and was not directed specifically at religious workers. After the case had 
been referred to the Grand Chamber, it was struck out of the list because 
the Dutch authorities decided to grant the work permit after all. 
Unfortunately, although the ECtHR in El Majjaoui made some observa-
tions concerning the scope of the protection granted by Article 9 ECHR, it 
failed to go to the heart of the matter. The Court held that Article 9 ECHR 
does not include a right for religious servants to be granted a work or 
residence permit; hence any requirements that have to be met before such 
a permit is granted do not constitute interference with the freedom of reli-
gion. It added that the Convention does not lay down for the Contracting 
States any given manner for ensuring its effective implementation and 
that the choice as to the most appropriate means of achieving this is in 
principle a matter for the domestic authorities.8 The text of the judgment 
does not indicate whether the ECtHR considered only the existence of a 
right on the part of the applicant or also on the part of the religious foun-
dation.9 In any case, the Court did not address the actual question before 
7 El Majjaoui and Stichting Touba Moskee (n 3).
8 ibid, para 32.
9 On this point, the Court merely confirmed the statement made earlier by the European 
Commission of Human Rights that: ‘[Article 9 ECHR] does not guarantee foreign nationals a 
right to obtain a residence permit for the purposes of taking up employment in a Contracting 
State, even if the employer is a religious organisation’. See El Majjaoui and Stichting Touba 
Moskee (n 3), para 32. The same formulation was used by the EComHR in the cases of 
Omkarananda and the Divine Light Zentrum and Öz (n 3).
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it, which did not concern the right to a work permit but instead the right 
of the religious foundation to appoint Mr El Majjaoui as its minister.10 
This omission was pointed out by three members of the Court in a dis-
senting opinion. While these members agreed that Mr El Majjaoui was 
not, as an individual, entitled to be admitted to the Dutch domestic labour 
market, they stated that
in certain circumstances a measure which results in a religious community 
being prevented from appointing the minister of religion of its choice may con-
stitute an interference with that community’s rights under Article 9, even if the 
minister concerned is a foreign national.11 
According to the dissenters, the Grand Chamber should have examined 
whether the requirements maintained by the Netherlands for the issue of 
a work permit were compatible with the standards set by Article 9 ECHR, 
in particular the state’s duty of neutrality. Thereby regard should have 
been had to ‘the fact that in the choice of a religious minister/pastor/
rabbi/imam much will depend on whether the religious community 
would have confidence in the person concerned’.12
It can be concluded that the ECtHR has not yet recognised that the 
appointment by a religious organisation of a minister from abroad may 
come within the scope of Article 9 ECHR. Nonetheless, the dissenters 
stated that this could be the case ‘in certain circumstances’. It is argued 
below that there are at least two situations in which refusal to admit a 
religious servant from abroad can affect the freedom of a religious com-
munity as protected by Article 9 ECHR. The first situation is that in which 
admission is refused with the specific aim of limiting the freedom of reli-
gion. The second concerns cases in which denying admission makes it 
impossible for the community to continue its religious activities.
b. Omkarananda and Afterwards: Immigration Measures Used to Curb 
the Freedom of Religion
With regard to the argument that refusal to admit a religious servant con-
stitutes an interference with Article 9 ECHR if it is specifically aimed at 
limiting the freedom of religion, support can be found in ECtHR case law 
and the decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights 
(EComHR). In Omkarananda and Öz, the Commission found that
10 Compare the decision in M.F.S. v Bulgaria (ECtHR 12 February 2009 (admissibility deci-
sion), app no 33831/03), where the Court held that the granting of a residence permit was 
normally enough to secure the exercise of family life, but that it had to be examined whether 
this was also true in the case at hand. In doing so, the Court rightfully regarded the residence 
permit as a means to realise the right to family life rather than as a right in itself.
11 El Majjaoui and Stichting Touba Moskee (n 3), dissenting opinion of judges Zupancic, 
Zagrebelsky and Myjer, para 3.
12 ibid, paras 4–5.
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a measure of expulsion does not as such constitute an interference with the 
rights guaranteed by Article 9, unless it can be established that the measure was 
designed to repress the exercise of such rights and stifle the spreading of the 
religion or philosophy of the followers.13 
Both cases concerned religious servants who worked or sought to work 
for religious organisations in the respondent states. In Omkarananda the 
applicant’s residence permit was withdrawn and his deportation sought 
for reasons of public order. Öz concerned a religious servant of Turkish 
nationality who had been granted a residence permit to work for a par-
ticular religious organisation in Germany. The permit expired automati-
cally upon the ending of his employment, after which he sought a new 
permit to work with another religious organisation. This request was 
denied on grounds of general immigration control and foreign policy (as 
the Turkish government had indicated that it wished the applicant to 
return to Turkey).
The Commission’s approach was subsequently adopted by the ECtHR, 
as shown in the Court’s judgments in Perry and Nolan and K. In Perry, the 
applicant (an American citizen) was granted a different residence permit 
that did not allow him to continue the religious activities he had been per-
forming in Latvia for several years.14 A similar situation occurred in Nolan 
and K., where the applicant, who had been working for a religious organi-
sation in Russia, was refused re-entry into that country after travelling 
abroad.15 
In both the above judgments, the ECtHR found that Article 9 ECHR had 
been violated because the measures taken by the state resulted in unjusti-
fied interference with the applicants’ freedom of religion.16 It appeared 
that in both cases the immigration measures had been taken precisely 
with the aim of ending the religious activities of the applicants, which 
were considered by the national authorities as constituting a threat to 
national security or public order. In Nolan and K., the Court repeated the 
criterion formulated by the Commission that 
deportation does not . . . as such constitute an interference with the rights guar-
anteed by Article 9, unless it can be established that the measure was designed 
to repress the exercise of such rights and stifle the spreading of the religion or 
philosophy of the followers. 
Further on, it also stated that 
13 Öz (n 3), para 5 and Omkarananda and the Divine Light Zentrum (n 3).
14 Perry (n 3).
15 Nolan and K. (n 3).
16 See also the Court’s admissibility decision in the case of Lotter and Lotter (ECtHR 6 
February 2003, app no 39015/97) in which the applicants, both Jehovah’s witnesses, com-
plained that the withdrawal of their residence permits because of their religious activities 
constituted an interference with Art 9 ECHR. The case was deemed admissible by the Court, 
but was later struck out of the list.
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in so far as the measure relating to the continuation of the applicant’s residence 
in a given State was imposed in connection with the exercise of the right to freedom 
of religion, such measure may disclose an interference with that right (emphasis 
added).17 
It can be derived from the above case law that immigration measures 
taken against religious leaders constitute interference with Article 9 ECHR 
if their target is to impede religious activities. On the other hand it can be 
assumed that immigration measures taken for other reasons, such as com-
mon crimes committed by the applicant or a lack of income, will not be 
considered interference with the freedom of religion. 
It may also be observed that the above decisions and judgments all con-
cerned claims made by individual religious servants who had already 
been legally resident in the territory of the respondent states.18 It is sub-
mitted that, in such situations, there may be interference with the freedom 
of religion, even with regard to the individual religious leader, because 
termination of the work or residence permit interferes with the exercising 
of religious activities in the respondent state for which permission had 
previously been given.19 As argued above, this is not the case if the reli-
gious servant has not yet been admitted, as there is then normally no rea-
son why he or she should be allowed to practise his or her religion in the 
particular state. However, the latter argument does not apply with regard 
to a religious organisation established in the respondent state. Therefore it 
may be assumed that the criterion formulated, inter alia, in the case of 
Nolan and K. also applies to claims made by religious organisation seeking 
to appoint a foreign national as a religious leader: where it can be shown 
that admission is refused in connection with the exercising of religious 
freedom, such a refusal will come within the scope of Article 9 ECHR. 
It is submitted that the above criterion can be justified from a theoretical 
perspective: it respects the competence of Contracting States to control 
immigration in principle, but provides a correction to ensure that this 
competence is not abused to restrict the freedom of religion. Yet it must be 
noted that the criterion may be more difficult to apply in practice. In par-
ticular there is a risk that states will be able to ‘cover up’ potential viola-
tions of Article 9 ECHR by stating that the refusal of admission was based 
17 Nolan and K. (n 3), para 62.
18 In Öz, Perry and Nolan and K. the applicants were only the individual religious servants 
and not the organisations they worked for. This was different in Omkarananda and the Divine 
Light Zentrum, where the application was made on behalf of the religious servant and his 
community. In Perry, however, the Court reiterated its earlier case law about the right to 
associate under Art 9 ECHR and the importance that members of a religious community 
may attach to the personality of their religious leader, thus apparently also recognising that 
there was a collective interest involved.
19 Compare the ECtHR’s approach to immigration cases under Art 8 ECHR, in which the 
expulsion of legally resident family members is also regarded as an interference with the 
right to family life (as opposed to the expulsion of non-legally resident family members). 
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on reasons not related to religious freedom (but, for instance, to public 
order). In such cases, it may go beyond the (actual or legal) competence of 
the judiciary to establish the real reasons underlying the refusal.20
c. Impossibility for Religious Organisations to Continue their Activities
The second situation in which interference with the freedom of religion 
may be assumed is when the refusal to admit a religious servant would 
effectively prevent the organisation concerned from continuing its reli-
gious activities. This argument was put forward by Vermeulen and 
Aarrass.21 According to these authors, measures not expressly touching 
upon the freedom of religion – such as immigration regulations – do not 
normally come within the scope of Article 9 ECHR unless they have the 
effect, in a particular case, of rendering the exercise of religious freedom 
impossible. This may be the case if a religious organisation is unable to 
find a suitable leader in the country in which it is established and is not 
allowed to bring in someone from abroad.
The above position has not been recognised as such by the ECtHR. 
Nevertheless, some support for it can be found in the Court’s case law. A 
similar criterion appears to have been applied in the judgment in Cha’are 
Shalom ve Tsedek, which concerned a Jewish association prohibited from 
engaging in ritual slaughter. The Court, taking as a point of departure that 
the association was in fact seeking the right to obtain glatt meat, deter-
mined that the slaughter regulations of the respondent state did not con-
stitute an interference with Article 9 ECHR because it was not made 
impossible for ultra-orthodox Jews to eat meat from animals slaughtered 
in accordance with their religious prescriptions. In casu it was established 
that the applicants could also obtain glatt meat from Belgium.22
A comparable approach can also be found in ECtHR case law on the 
right to family reunification under Article 8 ECHR. As discussed in chap-
ter 4 (section II.C.ii), an important consideration in the fair balance test in 
admission cases is whether it would be possible for the family to exercise 
their family life elsewhere, notably in the country of origin. This consid-
eration can be explained by the assumption that a refusal to allow family 
reunification should not make it totally impossible to enjoy family life. In 
cases where the Court found that family life could not reasonably be exer-
cised elsewhere (as, for example, in the case of Rodrigues Da Silva and 
Hoogkamer) it held that denying permission for family reunification 
20 See Gerards 2002, 35–39.
21 Vermeulen and Aarrass 2009, 78–79. See also Vermeulen 2006, 251 and ACVZ 2005, 33.
22 ECtHR 27 June 2000, app no 27417/95 (Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek), paras 80–81. It may be 
remarked that, instead on focusing on the right to eat glatt meat, the Court should have 
examined whether Art 9 ECHR covers the right to ritual slaughter. See Van Dijk et al 2006, 
761.
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resulted in a failure to comply with a positive obligation under Article 8 
ECHR and thus in a violation of that provision.
A problem concerning the above approach is that it may be difficult to 
determine in practice when a religious organisation has no other choice 
but to engage someone from abroad. Such determination will be ham-
pered by state authorities having to exercise restraint in relation to theo-
logical issues in order to maintain a sufficient level of state neutrality.23 It 
is submitted that while the religious organisation may be expected to give 
reasons why it is seeking to employ a particular religious servant, the rea-
sons provided will in principle have to be accepted by the responsible 
state body.
d. Final Remarks Concerning the Scope of Article 9 ECHR
As a final point, mention must be made of the argument put forward by 
Kortmann that the above criterion is too narrow. According to this author, 
generally applicable immigration rules should in principle be interpreted 
so as to respect as much as possible the freedom of religious organisations 
to appoint religious servants from abroad, subject to restrictions based on 
public order or similar grounds.24 This stance appears to be based on the 
assumption that this freedom is in principle covered by the right to free-
dom of religion as protected inter alia by Article 9 ECHR, including when 
refusal to admit a religious servant would not make it impossible to con-
tinue the religious activities of the organisation concerned.
The approach favoured by Kortmann would imply a significant limita-
tion of the legal competence of the Contracting States to the ECHR to con-
trol the immigration of religious servants. At the reverse of the question of 
whether such a limitation would be justified is the question of whether it 
is (still) reasonable to uphold that the opportunities available to religious 
communities to exercise their freedom of religion are in principle limited 
to the state in which they are established and, as far as their leadership is 
concerned, to that state’s community of nationals and legal residents. 
This is a fundamental question that cannot be given a definite answer 
here. Nonetheless, it may be noted that the ECtHR does not appear read-
ily inclined to expand the scope of Article 9 ECHR so as to cover the 
admission of religious servants from abroad. It is submitted that this 
approach is acceptable as long as provision is made for exceptional situa-
tions such as those described above, in which immigration decisions 
are designed to curb the freedom of religion or in which the exercise of 
23 Vermeulen 2006, 251, see also Van Dijk et al 2006, 766 and Harris et al 2009, 430. 
24 Kortmann 2008, 435–36. By way of example the author refers to the grundrechtfreundliche 
(rights-friendly) approach applied by the German Constitutional Court (Bundes­
verfassungsgericht) in a case concerning the admission of a religious leader; see BVerfG 24 
October 2006, 2BvB 1908/03 (Moon).
188 Freedom of Religion
religious activities by a particular community would effectively be ren-
dered impossible.25
B. Limitations to the Freedom of Religion: Article 9(2) ECHR
As mentioned above, limitations to the freedom to manifest religion or 
beliefs are allowed, providing they are in conformity with the conditions 
set out in the second paragraph of Article 9 ECHR. Under this paragraph, 
limitations to the manifestation of religion or belief must be ‘prescribed by 
law’ and be ‘necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals or for the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others’. These conditions are briefly 
discussed here, with particular attention for criteria that may be relevant 
to integration requirements for the admission of religious servants.
The condition that a limitation of the freedom of religion must be ‘pre-
scribed by law’ means it must have a basis in domestic law (including 
international or EU law applicable in the Contracting State). The ECtHR 
has not formulated any procedural requirements concerning the way in 
which national legislation must be adopted (for example, by a democrati-
cally elected body). Nevertheless, if they are to count as ‘law’ within the 
meaning of Article 9(2) ECHR, national rules must meet the requirements 
of ‘accessibility’ and ‘foreseeability’, both of which have been developed 
to a certain extent in ECtHR case law.26
Regarding the legitimate aims mentioned in Article 9(2) ECHR, it has 
been observed that these are relatively few compared to those in similar 
limitation clauses in other Convention articles.27 The aims are all formu-
lated in broad terms, whereby the meaning of ‘protecting public order’ 
does not differ substantially from that of ‘preventing disorder’ in Articles 
25 For a similar conclusion, see the Guidelines for review of legislation pertaining to religion or 
belief, prepared by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the 
OSCE together with the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice 
Commission) of the Council of Europe and published by the OSCE/ODIHR. These guide-
lines state on p 19 that ‘States properly have authority to impose regulations concerning 
entry into their country by foreigners. This typically involves granting visas of differing 
kinds. [. . .] If individuals from particular religious belief backgrounds fall within neutral 
criteria (such as by constituting security risks or likely criminal behaviour), they legitimately 
may be excluded. However, if a State creates purely religion-based categories for exclusion, 
this may be inconsistent with the required religious neutrality of the State. Moreover, since 
such restrictions may make it difficult for a particular belief community to staff its organiza-
tion as it sees appropriate, such restrictions may in fact operate as an intervention in internal 
religious affairs’.
26 Harris et al 2009, 344–48 and Van Dijk et al 2006, 336–39. On the application of the ‘pre-
scribed by law’ criterion in cases concerning Art 9 ECHR, see Harris et al 2009, 435–36 and 
Van Dijk et al 2006, 768.
27 Van Dijk et al 2006, 768.
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8, 10 and 11 ECHR.28 Nonetheless, the ECtHR emphasised in Nolan and K. 
that ‘the exceptions to the freedom of religion listed in Article 9(2) must be 
narrowly interpreted, for their enumeration is strictly exhaustive and 
their definition is necessarily restrictive’.29 In this respect, the Court 
observed that the omission of the aim of protecting national security was 
not accidental but reflected
the primordial importance of religious pluralism as ‘one of the foundations of a 
“democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention’ and the fact that a 
State cannot dictate what a person believes or take coercive steps to make him 
change his beliefs.30 
Although ECtHR case law shows that limitations to the freedom of reli-
gion are not often found to lack justification because of not serving a rele-
vant legitimate aim, the judgment in Nolan and K. demonstrates that this 
possibility cannot be disregarded altogether. 
Notwithstanding the above conditions, the validity of limitations to the 
freedom of religion will largely depend on their level of necessity. 
According to established ECtHR case law, the requirement that a limita-
tion must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ implies that it must serve 
a ‘pressing social need’ and be proportionate in relation to the aim 
pursued. Thereby the reasons adduced by the state to demonstrate the 
measure’s necessity must be relevant and sufficient.31
In connection with the above criteria, regard must be had in cases 
involving the freedom of religion to the requirements of neutrality and 
impartiality that govern the relationship between church and state. The 
ECtHR has repeatedly emphasised the role of the state as a neutral and 
impartial organiser of religious pluralism.32 It may be observed that the 
concept of neutrality is not uniform and can be applied in different ways, 
depending on the national context of the Contracting State.33 Nevertheless, 
interference with Article 9 ECHR will not be considered necessary if, for 
instance, it favours one religious denomination over another or attempts 
to enforce religious unity.34 Also, states should not adopt regulations (such 
as planning provisions) that are directed against minority groups and 
should ensure that education provided to children is sufficiently objective 
and pluralistic and does not amount to indoctrination.35 
Before examining what the above criteria mean in relation to integra-
tion requirements for the admission of religious servants, one more 
28 ibid.
29 Nolan and K. (n 3), para 73, with references to further case law.
30 ibid.
31 Van Dijk et al 2006, 340–41.
32 eg, Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community (n 5 above), para 93.
33 Vermeulen 2010a, 52–57.
34 Van Dijk et al 2006, 770 with references to case law.
35 Harris et al 2009, 431, with references to case law. See also section II.D.i of ch 4.
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remark must be made. As discussed in chapter 4 (section II.B), in cases 
concerning the admission of family members the ECtHR has mainly 
applied the ‘fair balance’ test instead of the ‘necessity’ test of Article 8(2) 
ECHR. The former makes no clear distinction between the question of 
whether the refusal to admit an alien comes within the scope of the right 
concerned and the question of whether a limitation to this right is justi-
fied. Instead, what takes place is a general balancing exercise between the 
interests of the individual applicants (in casu the religious community) 
and the public interests of the host state. In general, application of the ‘fair 
balance’ test leaves more scope for justification to the respondent state 
and hence makes it less likely that a violation of the Convention will be 
found. 
In case law on Article 8 ECHR, the ‘fair balance’ test is usually applied 
in cases involving the admission of family members (which is often con-
sidered by the ECtHR as a (potential) positive obligation on the part of the 
state). It is possible that the Court would take the same approach in cases 
concerning the admission of religious servants. Thus far, however, the 
‘fair balance’ test has not been applied in connection with the freedom of 
religion and the ECtHR has not devised any criteria to this effect. This 
chapter consequently proceeds on the assumption that, where Article 9 is 
applicable, requirements concerning the admission of religious servants 
must be in accordance with Article 9(2). It may be recalled, however, that 
admission cases will not normally come within the scope of Article 9 (sec-
tion II.A); hence, it is not the case that religious servants are in principle 
entitled to admission, whereas family members are not. Rather, both 
under the ‘fair balance’ test of Article 8 and the interpretation of Article 
9(1) proposed above, a primary issue will be whether the admission of the 
alien constitutes the only way in which the right to family life or to reli-
gious freedom can be exercised.
C. Margin of Appreciation 
As explained in chapter 4 (section II.B.iii), the scope of the ECtHR’s 
appraisal of state measures concerning the admission of religious servants 
is influenced by the margin of appreciation left to the respondent state. 
The breadth of this margin depends on a range of factors. As the Court 
regards freedom of religion as being of fundamental importance in a dem-
ocratic society, limitations to this freedom are normally subjected to strict 
scrutiny, especially where ‘the need to secure true religious pluralism’ is 
at stake.36 Nevertheless, there are some areas in which a wider margin 
36 ECtHR 29 August 1996, app no 18748/91 (Manoussakis and others), para 44. See also Van 
Dijk et al 2006, 769 and Arai-Takahashi 2002, 93–100.
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of appreciation is applied, due for instance to the different traditions 
existing between the Contracting States. These include the regulation of 
relations between church and state.37 Finally, as mentioned in chapter 4, 
there are also indications that the Court will grant a wider margin of 
appreciation where immigration or integration policy is concerned.
D. Article 9 ECHR in Relation to Integration Requirements
It appears beyond doubt that a general requirement for all religious serv-
ants appointed by a religious community to comply with integration con-
ditions would come within the scope of the freedom of religion as 
protected by Article 9 ECHR. However, as explained above, this is not 
self-evident where the requirement applies to religious servants who are 
foreign nationals and have not yet been admitted to the state where the 
community is based. In this situation, a state decision to deny admission, 
including when based on failure to comply with an integration require-
ment, will not normally interfere with the religious freedom of the com-
munity, let alone with that of the individual religious servant. It has, 
however, been argued that there are two situations in which such a deci-
sion can nevertheless be covered by Article 9 ECHR.
One of these situations is when it can be established that the decision 
was in fact designed to curb the exercise of religious freedom. General 
immigration measures, such as the work permit requirement in the El 
Majjaoui case that applied to all labour migrants, will not easily fall foul of 
this exception. However this may be different with regard to measures 
specifically addressing religious servants. In this respect it may be recalled 
that religious servants constitute a specific target group of the Dutch Act 
on Integration Abroad because of the presupposed effect of their activities 
on the process of immigrant integration in the Netherlands. It is their 
position within the religious community that is believed to give them a 
certain influence in this integration process, and it is because of this influ-
ence that they are required to know the basics of Dutch language and 
Dutch society. 
Where integration requirements for the admission of religious servants 
are based on arguments such as the above, it seems clear that they are not 
general measures that happen to touch upon the exercise of the freedom 
of religion, but instead measures specifically enacted in connection with 
that freedom. 
Nonetheless, to determine whether integration requirements come 
within the scope of Article 9 ECHR, careful attention must be paid to the 
particular nature of such measures. One element to be taken into account 
37 Harris et al 2009, 437 and – critically – Arai-Takahashi 2002, 95–96.
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is whether, in effect, their aim is to ‘repress’ the exercise of the freedom of 
religion, as stated by the ECtHR in Nolan and K. (section II.A.ii.b). Where 
this is not the case, it must be asked whether less far-reaching aims, such 
as a wish to exercise control over the internal organisation of religious 
communities, are also capable of qualifying a measure as interfering with 
Article 9.38 A second relevant factor is whether the activities that the state 
seeks to control or influence are of an essentially religious nature (such as 
ecclesiastical ceremonies or the interpretation of religious texts) or 
whether they correspond to tasks that can also be performed by secular 
bodies (such as social counselling or the provision of charity). Even 
though the distinction between these types of activities is not always easy 
to make, the freedom of religion is more likely to be affected if the state 
measures concern activities that are clearly of a religious nature.39 On the 
other hand, where the same activities are also performed by secular bod-
ies the question can be raised as to why the measures do not also apply to 
workers employed by those bodies (section VII.E).
The second situation in which, it is argued, admission criteria for reli-
gious servants may interfere with the rights conferred by Article 9 ECHR 
is when a religious community can only continue to exist by appointing a 
servant from abroad. This criterion can be applied equally with regard to 
integration requirements. Thus, whether a refusal of admission because of 
non-compliance with an integration requirement constitutes an interfer-
ence with the freedom of religion will depend on the alternatives availa-
ble to the community to find a religious servant within the country. 
However, the suitability of available candidates is a matter to be decided 
by the religious community itself as the principle of neutrality requires 
state authorities to be reticent on this point. 
If it can be established that the integration requirements imposed by a 
state do in fact constitute a limitation of Article 9 ECHR, it then has to be 
determined whether this limitation can be justified. As explained above, 
this primarily requires there to be a domestic law that prescribes that 
admission can be refused in the event of non-compliance with integration 
requirements. This law must moreover be sufficiently accessible and fore-
seeable. 
As a second condition, the integration requirements must pursue at 
least one of the legitimate aims set out in Article 9(2) ECHR (public safety, 
the protection of public order, health or morals or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others). Whether this condition is met has to be 
38 Of course, states seeking to control the internal organisation of religious communities 
may do this as a way of eventually undermining the existence of a particular religion or 
belief. Examples of such practices, which must clearly be qualified as a form of repression, 
are provided by De Jong (De Jong 2000, 443–51). 
39 The difference made by De Jong between the internal and external activities of religious 
organisations could perhaps be helpful in making this distinction, ibid, 423 and following.
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judged in the light of the integration objectives pursued by the Contracting 
State. However, it is conceivable in principle for integration requirements 
to have been introduced in pursuit of one of the above interests. In this 
regard it may be observed that, despite the restrictive reading proposed 
by the ECtHR (section II.B), the concept of ‘public order’ has been inter-
preted to include more than the prevention of crime or disturbances of the 
physical environment. In the case of Serif, for instance, the respondent 
state (Greece) claimed that, by protecting the authority of a lawfully 
appointed religious leader (mufti), it sought to prevent disputes between 
different religious factions and to protect its international relations with 
Turkey. The ECtHR consequently accepted that the interference at stake 
served the protection of public order.40 It has also been argued, on the 
basis of the Leyla Sahin case concerning the ban on Islamic headscarves at 
Turkish universities, that the concept of public order also includes the 
constitutional principles on which a state is founded (such as the principle 
of secularism in Turkey).41 
In view of the above, it seems plausible that the notion of ‘public order’ 
in Article 9(2) ECHR would also cover integration objectives such as pre-
serving social cohesion (including peaceful relations between different 
religious groups) and ensuring respect for the constitutional principles of 
the state concerned. It is also submitted that religious servants can be 
required to acquaint themselves with existing legal limitations on the free-
dom of religion (such as the right of individuals to leave a religious com-
munity) as a way of ensuring respect for the rights and freedoms of others. 
However, it is clear from the ECtHR’s judgment in Nolan and K. that a 
state may not seek to abolish or restrict religious pluralism or ‘dictate 
what a person believes or take coercive steps to make him change his 
beliefs’ (section II.B; see also section II.D.i. of chapter 4). The aim of the 
‘protection of the economic well-being of the state’, which is often an 
important goal of integration policies, is also not mentioned in the second 
paragraph of Article 9 ECHR. It is therefore doubtful whether an integra-
tion measure solely directed towards economic aims (such as economic 
self-reliance) could constitute a legitimate restriction of the freedom of 
religion.42
Thirdly, it has to be determined whether integration requirements for 
the admission of religious servants are also ‘necessary in a democratic 
40 Serif (n 6), paras 43, 45 and 47.
41 See Vermeulen 2010b, 22–23. According to Vermeulen, the concept of ‘public order’ in 
Art 9(2) ECHR is interpreted extensively by the ECtHR to balance out the equally extensive 
interpretation of the scope of the freedom of religion in Art 9(1).
42 It may be observed that the ‘fair balance’ test applied by the ECtHR under Art 8 ECHR 
does not require immigration requirements for family members to pursue one of the legiti-
mate aims mentioned in the second paragraph of that provision (section II.B.i of ch 4). This 
is one point where the choice for the ‘fair balance’ or the ‘necessity’ test may, therefore, not 
be inconsequential.
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society’. Again, the outcome of this determination will depend to a large 
extent on the particular features of the measure at stake and on the cir-
cumstances of the case. Some remarks can, nevertheless, be made.
As a first requirement, it will have to be established that the integration 
requirements are needed in order to address a ‘pressing social need’. This 
criterion will probably be satisfied if the state can demonstrate the exist-
ence of problems relating to immigrant integration, for instance low levels 
of participation amongst immigrant groups. Still, the ‘necessity’ test also 
requires the interest of the state in addressing these problems to be bal-
anced against the interference with the rights of the religious community. 
This proportionality test needs to be conducted not only in abstracto, but 
also with regard to the particular circumstances of the case. 
The weight to be accorded to the interests of the religious community 
will depend, at least in part, on the extent to which the community is actu-
ally prevented from exercising its rights under Article 9 ECHR. Where it 
has already been established that the admission of a religious servant 
from abroad is the only way for the community to survive, the interfer-
ence will be particularly significant. Other factors that ought to play a role 
in the proportionality assessment include the duration of the interference 
and the efforts required to meet the integration conditions. The latter will 
depend inter alia on the level of knowledge demanded, the costs of the 
integration requirement and the availability of courses or preparation 
materials (see also section II.D of chapter 4). Although in many cases these 
efforts will need to be made by the religious servant seeking admission 
and not by the religious community itself, they represent a hurdle for that 
community in the appointment of its desired leader. 
The integration requirements will also need to constitute a suitable 
measure to achieve the aim pursued. While this criterion is normally not 
explicitly applied by the ECtHR, it is hard to see how a measure can be 
proportionate if it is not effective and therefore does not actually contrib-
ute to realising the interests of the state. With regard to integration require-
ments, it may be established whether the knowledge required is relevant 
and, where evidence is available, whether the requirements have actually 
contributed to reducing integration problems. There is some evidence 
that religious communities do indeed play an important role in the inte-
gration processes of immigrants and that, while safeguarding the cultural 
traditions of migrant groups, they also stimulate the migrants’ social and 
cultural adaptation to the receiving society.43 So far, however, it has not 
been established whether this role of religious communities is also 
enhanced if religious servants have to meet integration requirements 
before being admitted.
43 ACVZ 2005, 26–27. The study concerned the role of migrant churches in the United 
States.
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It is argued above that limitations to the freedom of religion should also 
be in conformity with the neutral and impartial role of the state towards 
religious organisations. This entails, in any case, that integration require-
ments should apply equally to all religious servants, irrespective of their 
denomination. A more difficult question is whether the principle of neu-
trality also means that state authorities should not concern themselves at 
all with the way in which religious servants conduct their tasks. While it 
can be submitted that integration requirements should, at any rate, not 
prescribe how religious servants must fulfil their duties (for example, 
what to preach or how to conduct a religious ceremony), they will nor-
mally not be so far-reaching. Instead, integration requirements will often 
be based on the assumption that a religious servant is not able to properly 
conduct his or her tasks without certain prior knowledge. Whether this is 
acceptable will depend, at least partly, on the type of knowledge required. 
It is argued that the contents of an integration course or exam should steer 
clear of any normative notions concerning religion or religious interpreta-
tions (at least to the extent that these notions do not correspond to legal 
norms). On the other hand, more neutral requirements, such as language 
proficiency, are not necessarily problematic. Here too, however, the ques-
tion may arise as to why such requirements should apply only to religious 
servants.
III. ARTICLE 18 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT  
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is also protected 
by Article 18 ICCPR. The first paragraph of this provision, which closely 
resembles Article 9(1) ECHR, protects ‘the freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of one’s choice, and freedom, either individually or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching’. Under Article 
18(3) ICCPR, limitations to the freedom of religion must be ‘prescribed by 
law’ and ‘necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others’.
This section investigates whether any criteria can be inferred from 
Article 18 ICCPR with regard to integration requirements for the admis-
sion of religious servants in addition to those that stem from Article 9 
ECHR. As explained in chapter 4, the ICCPR is not monitored by an inter-
national court or other body competent to issue binding decisions on the 
interpretation and application of the Covenant. Nevertheless some inter-
pretational guidelines may be obtained from the jurisprudence of the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC), in particular its General Comments 
and Communications issued in individual cases. Additionally, for the 
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purposes of interpretation, regard may also be had to the Declaration on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based 
on Religion or Belief, which was adopted in 1981 by the United Nations 
General Assembly (the ‘1981 Declaration’).44
A. Scope of Article 18 ICCPR 
i. The Right of Religious Communities to Appoint Religious Leaders
Like Article 9 ECHR, Article 18(1) ICCPR protects the right to manifest 
one’s religion or belief, both alone and in community with others. With 
regard to the collective dimension of this right, the HRC has specified that 
this includes the right of religious groups to choose their religious leaders, 
priests and teachers.45 Support for this interpretation can also be found in 
Article 6(g) of the 1981 Declaration. According to the latter provision, the 
freedom of religion includes the freedom ‘to train, appoint, elect or desig-
nate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and 
standards of any religion or belief’. It may therefore be accepted that the 
choosing by a religious community of its own leadership must be consid-
ered a manifestation of religion within the meaning of Article 18(1) ICCPR. 
ii. Admission of Religious Servants
The next question then is whether Article 18(1) ICCPR also contains an 
obligation for the Contracting States to admit a religious servant, either on 
an individual basis or on behalf of a religious community. Although this 
question has not been expressly addressed by the HRC, there is reason to 
assume that such an obligation does not in principle exist. In its General 
Comment on the position of aliens, the HRC took the view that the ICCPR 
‘does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of 
a State party’, and that ‘it is in principle a matter for the State to decide 
who it will admit to its territory’.46 Additionally, during the deliberations 
on the draft (UN) Convention on the elimination of all forms of religious 
intolerance, a proposal to include a reference to the right to bring in 
(religious) teachers from abroad was rejected. This was based on the 
argument that to include the reference would amount to asking states 
to abandon their right to control the admission of foreigners to their terri-
44 General Assembly resolution 36/55, adopted in the 73rd plenary meeting on 25 
November 1981. The relevance of this Declaration for the interpretation of Art 18 ICCPR is 
confirmed in Joseph et al 2004, 501–02.
45 HRC General Comment No 22 on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion (Art 18), adopted on 30 July 1993, ref no CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add.4, para 4.
46 HRC General Comment No 15 on the position of aliens under the Covenant, adopted 
on 11 April 1986, para 5.
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tory.47 These proceedings indicate that the UN Member States recognised 
that the freedom of religion could give rise to claims for admission but, at 
least at the time, did not want to recognise this as a right.48 
Nevertheless, even if Article 18 ICCPR does not include a general right 
to admission for religious servants, the above considerations do not 
exclude the possibility that such a right could exist in exceptional circum-
stances. In the above General Comment the HRC also recognised that ‘in 
certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant 
even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of 
non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for 
family life arise’.49 It is argued that the admission of religious servants 
would come within the scope of Article 18(1) ICCPR in the same situa-
tions as described above in relation to Article 9 ECHR. These are situa-
tions in which immigration decisions are either designed to curb the 
freedom of religion or in which the exercise of religious activities by a 
particular community would effectively be rendered impracticable (sec-
tion II.A.ii.d). These exceptions can therefore be seen as necessary to 
ensure that the right to freedom of religion is effective in practice, as well 
as to protect religious communities against abuse by the state of its pow-
ers in the field of immigration. There are no reasons why these considera-
tions should not also be relevant in the context of the ICCPR.
An additional argument in favour of accepting that admission rights 
may sometimes be covered by the freedom of religion can be based on 
Article 18 ICCPR read in combination with Article 27.50 The latter provi-
sion states that persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minori-
ties shall not be denied the right to profess and practise their own religion 
in community with other members of their group. It may be assumed, 
however, that minority groups in particular may experience difficulties in 
finding religious leaders in the host country because of their size and, in 
the case of immigrant minorities, because they bring with them religious 
convictions that have not been historically present in the host state. 
Consequently, if Article 18(1) ICCPR did not allow the admission of 
religious servants from abroad, this would put minority groups at a 
47 De Jong 2000, 429.
48 According to De Jong, the right to bring in religious teachers from abroad can neverthe-
less be derived from a combination of the right to train religious leaders and the right to 
maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion at the 
national and international levels, both of which are included in the 1981 Declaration (Art 
6(g) and (i)). See De Jong 2000, 429–30. In my view this argument is not convincing as the 
right to maintain cross-border communications is essentially different from the right to enter 
and reside in a state other than that of one’s nationality. 
49 HRC General Comment No 15 on the position of aliens under the Covenant, adopted 
on 11 April 1986, para 5.
50 On the relationship between Arts 18 and 27 ICCPR, see De Jong 2000, 254–57. It is 
assumed here, as argued by De Jong on 268–69, that Art 27 ICCPR applies also to immigrant 
minorities.
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particular disadvantage. To avoid this outcome, it is submitted that Article 
18(1) ICCPR should be read so as to include a right to admission of reli-
gious servants on behalf of minority groups who would otherwise be 
unable to practise their religion. Support for this argument can be found 
in the HRC’s General Comment on Article 18, where it is stated that ‘the 
Committee . . . views with concern any tendency to discriminate against 
any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are newly 
established . . .’.51
B. Limitations to the Freedom of Religion: Article 18(3) ICCPR
If it is accepted that a religious community may, in special circumstances, 
be entitled to bring in a religious servant from abroad, the conditions 
under which limitations to this right may be justified need to be estab-
lished. Under Article 18(3) ICCPR, limitations of the freedom of religion 
must firstly be prescribed by law. They must also be necessary in order to 
protect one of the specified aims: the protection of public safety, order, 
health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedom of others. 
The requirement that limitations must be ‘prescribed by law’ means 
that they must have a basis in the national law of the Contracting State 
concerned. The precise contents of this requirement have not been speci-
fied by the HRC in relation to Article 18 ICCPR; however, it can be 
assumed that the criteria to be applied are similar to those included in the 
requirement of ‘lawfulness’ in Article 17 ICCPR. These criteria are out-
lined in section III.B of chapter 4.52
Concerning the aims enumerated in Article 18(3), the HRC has observed 
that the provision is to be strictly interpreted, meaning that restrictions 
are not allowed on other than the specified grounds even if they would be 
allowed as restrictions to other rights protected in the Covenant.53 National 
security is mentioned as an example in this respect. Thus, like the ECtHR 
(section II.B), the HRC is of the view that measures to protect national 
security may not encroach upon the freedom of religion. Also, Article 
18(3), like Article 9(2) ECHR, does not allow limitations designed to serve 
economic purposes.54 
With regard to the aim of protecting public morals, the HRC has com-
mented that ‘the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophi-
51 HRC General Comment No 22 on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion (Art 18), adopted on 30 July 1993, ref no CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para 2.
52 It may be added that the term ‘prescribed by law’ excludes legislative measures enacted 
by local authorities, see De Jong 2000, 86.
53 HRC General Comment No 22 on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion (Art 18), adopted on 30 July 1993, ref no CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para 8.
54 On the limitation grounds of Art 18(3) ICCPR, see also De Jong 2000, 90–-100 and Joseph 
et al 2004, 508–10.
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cal and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the [freedom of 
religion] for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles 
not deriving exclusively from a single tradition’.55 It is submitted that the 
concept of morals, and therefore also the diversity of traditions reflected 
in this concept, is likely to vary among and even within different societies. 
Nevertheless, the HRC’s comment may be understood as meaning that, 
where it is used to justify limitations to the freedom of religion, the con-
cept of morals must express the actual views on morality existing within a 
society rather than seeking to change those views. Thereby the views of 
minority groups, as well as existing disagreements on the prevailing 
moral norms, will need to be given due regard. Also important to note is 
that Article 18(3) ICCPR (like Art 9(2) ECHR) refers to ‘public morals’ and 
therefore does not allow limitations to the freedom of religion that aim to 
influence the private moral views of individuals. Even so, the concept of 
morals remains a vague notion that is particularly liable to subjective 
interpretations and therefore should be applied with caution.56 
The HRC has stated that, in interpreting the scope of the limitation 
clauses of the ICCPR, the Contracting States ‘should proceed from the 
need to protect the rights guaranteed under the Covenant’ and that limi-
tations ‘must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights 
guaranteed in Article 18’.57 As far as the requirement of necessity is con-
cerned, it was specified that limitations should be applied only for a pur-
pose mentioned in Article 18(3) and must be ‘directly related and 
proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated’.58 Despite 
some slight variations, these criteria do not appear to differ substantially 
from the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ test applied by the ECtHR 
(section II.B). 
The HRC has also stated that limitations to the freedom of religion 
should not discriminate, either in their purpose or in the way they are 
applied. From this it may be derived that, like Article 9(2) ECHR, Article 
18(3) ICCPR stands in the way of limitations that do not apply equally to 
all religious denominations (see again section II.B). However, the HRC’s 
comment is formulated in sufficiently broad terms so as also to cover 
limitations that are discriminatory on grounds other than religion. The 
prohibition of discrimination, in particular on grounds of nationality and 
racial or ethnic origin, is discussed in detail in chapters 8 to 10 of this 
study.
55 HRC General Comment No 22 on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion (Art 18), adopted on 30 July 1993, ref no CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para 8.
56 See also De Jong 2000, 97, who completely rejects the use of ‘public morals’ as a limita-
tion ground.
57 HRC General Comment No 22 on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion (Art 18), adopted on 30 July 1993, ref no CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para 8.
58 ibid.
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C. Article 18 ICCPR in Relation to Integration Requirements
It is concluded that, as far as integration requirements for the admission 
of religious servants are concerned, Article 18 ICCPR does not provide us 
with any standards substantially different from those stemming from 
Article 9 ECHR. Nevertheless some remarks can be made. 
Firstly, it has been asserted that Article 18 read together with Article 27 
ICCPR requires particular attention to be paid to the rights of religious 
minorities. To ensure that these minorities can effectively exercise their 
freedom of religion, it must be accepted that this freedom is infringed by 
a refusal to admit a religious servant while no suitable religious leader is 
available within the Contracting State. National measures concerning 
integration requirements for religious servants need to take this into 
account. 
It is also argued that the concept of ‘public morals’ should be inter-
preted so as to take into account the different views and traditions exist-
ing within the Contracting States. As stated above, it is doubtful whether 
protection of public morals can serve as a relevant limitation ground in 
relation to integration requirements. However, if this is accepted, the 
above standard should be respected. 
Thirdly and finally, it has been established that integration require-
ments that restrict the freedom of religion may not serve a discriminatory 
purpose, nor may they be applied in a discriminatory manner. This stand-
ard concerns not only discrimination between religious communities on 
account of their particular religion, but also discrimination on other 
grounds. 
IV. ARTICLE 6 OF THE DUTCH CONSTITUTION
In the Netherlands, in addition to the guarantees provided in the above 
treaties, the freedom of religion and belief is protected by Article 6 of the 
Dutch Constitution.59 Below it is examined whether this provision con-
tains any relevant criteria concerning the issue addressed in this chapter 
– integration conditions for the admission of religious servants. 
59 Art 6(1) Dutch Constitution reads ‘Ieder heeft het recht zijn godsdienst of levensover-
tuiging, individueel of in gemeenschap met anderen, vrij te belijden, behoudens ieders ver-
antwoordelijkheid volgens de wet’. (‘Everyone is free to manifest his religion or belief, alone 
or in community with others, subject to limitations provided by law’). Art 6(2) Dutch 
Constitution protects the freedom of religion and belief outside buildings and enclosed 
spaces and as such is not relevant to this study.
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A. Scope of Article 6 Dutch Constitution
i. The Right of Religious Communities to Appoint Religious Leaders
Like Articles 9 ECHR and 18 ICCPR, Article 6 of the Dutch Constitution 
protects not only the religious freedom of individuals, but also that of 
collectivities. This can be derived from the first paragraph of the provi-
sion, which refers to the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief ‘indi-
vidually or in community with others’. The collective dimension of the 
freedom of religion in Article 6(1) also covers the right of religious com-
munities to organisational freedom, including the right to choose their 
own leaders, teachers and other personnel.60 Again, it has to be established 
whether this right also applies if the religious leader is a foreign national 
who has not yet been legally admitted to the Netherlands.
ii. Admission of Religious Servants
Thus far, the Dutch courts have not ruled on the above question with 
respect to Article 6(1) of the Constitution. Case law shows that the issue of 
admission of religious servants has come up several times.61 However, the 
right to freedom of religion was either not alluded to at all in these cases 
or addressed only in relation to Articles 9 ECHR and 18 ICCPR. More 
importantly, where the freedom of religion played a role, the courts failed 
to deal with the question of its scope. In several judgments, the refusal to 
admit the religious servant was found to be lawful on the grounds that 
the freedom of religion does not grant religious communities a right to 
appoint a leader without having to comply with the prevailing immigra-
tion conditions.62 On the basis of these decisions it cannot be established 
whether the court found the immigration conditions to constitute justified 
restrictions to the freedom of religion, or whether it considered this free-
dom not to be applicable at all. One exception concerns the judgment of 
the Amsterdam District Court, which expressly decided that – at least in 
the case concerned – Article 9 ECHR did not grant a right of admission 
either to the religious community or to the religious servant himself.
However, the Dutch government subscribes to the argument made 
earlier in this chapter (section II.A.ii.c) that the state may be under an obli-
gation to admit a religious servant in the exceptional case where this is the 
60 Vermeulen 2000, 102–03.
61 See AJD 2 July 1984, case no A-21798 (1982), LJN: AM8224; Pres AJD 2 July 1987, case 
nos R02.87.0624/S42 and R02.87.1133/S90, KG 1987/438; AJD 28 February 2003, case nos 
200206325/1 and 200206347/1, para 2.7.1 and District Court of The Hague sitting in 
Amsterdam 23 March 2007, case no 06/37989, LJN: BA3169, para 6.4.
62 AJD 2 July 1984, case no A-21798 (1982), LJN: AM8224 and AJD 28 February 2003, case 
nos 200206325/1 and 200206347/1, para 2.7.1.
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only way for the religious community to continue its activities. This state-
ment concerns Article 6(1) of the Constitution, as well as the relevant pro-
visions of the ECHR and ICCPR.63 A similar approach to the interpretation 
of Article 6(1) can be found in Dutch case law on matters not concerning 
immigration: in these cases, measures not prima facie affecting the free-
dom of religion are nevertheless considered to come within its scope in 
circumstances where the exercise of this freedom effectively becomes 
impossible.64
In addition to the foregoing, it may be asked whether Article 6(1) of the 
Constitution would also apply to immigration conditions for religious 
servants if it can be established that these conditions were imposed in direct 
connection with the exercise of the freedom of religion or even with the aim 
of repressing such exercise. Here an interesting parallel can be drawn with 
an earlier requirement of Dutch immigration law, which required an imam 
to be ‘suitable to work as a religious servant for the Islamic community 
concerned’. Apparently this condition was introduced to avoid religious 
communities being subject to pressure from foreign states, which could in 
turn lead to cultural, political or religious conflicts within the Netherlands. 
The requirement was upheld by the court, which did not consider it a viola-
tion of Article 18 ICCPR.65 However, this judgment was criticised by vari-
ous authors on the grounds that the criterion of ‘suitability’ enabled the 
authorities to intervene in the appointment of religious servants for reasons 
relating to the content of their religious views or activities. This, it was 
argued, constituted an unjustified interference with the freedom of religion 
as protected inter alia by Article 6(1) of the Constitution.66 
The requirement of ‘suitability’ for imams was eventually abolished. It 
is not clear, however, whether this was motivated by the assumption that 
there was an interference with the constitutionally protected freedom of 
religion. For this reason it cannot be said with certainty that the Dutch 
government has accepted that Article 6(1) also applies to immigration 
conditions imposed specifically in connection with the exercise of reli-
gious freedom.67
63 Parliamentary Papers II 2005–2006, 19 637, No 1051, 4–5. This statement was made in 
reaction to a report issued by the Dutch Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs 
(Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken) concerning an immigration policy for religious 
servants (ACVZ 2005).
64 See Vermeulen 2000, 100–01, with references to case law.
65 AJD 2 July 1984, case no A-21798 (1982), LJN: AM8224.
66 Vermeulen 1992, 127. See also Fernhout and Hofman in their case note on the judgment, 
published in AB 1985, 273.
67 More recently, other requirements for the appointment of non-national religious serv-
ants were also abolished, in particular the obligations to notify vacancies to the CWI (the 
Dutch labour office) and to give priority to religious servants from EU/EEA Member States. 
Again, however, these changes were not expressly motivated on the grounds that the 
requirements interfered with the freedom of religion and more pragmatic reasons were pro-
vided instead. See Government Gazette 2007, 13825.
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Before proceeding to the restriction clause, one more issue has to be 
discussed. This concerns an argument proposed by Vermeulen, to the 
effect that immigration matters do not fall under Article 6(1) of the Dutch 
Constitution because they are specifically addressed in Article 2(2).68 The 
latter provision states that the admission and expulsion of aliens must be 
‘regulated by law’, which means that legislation may be enacted on a sub-
national level as long as there is a basis for it in a law made by the national 
legislator. This requirement is softer than that laid down in Article 6(1) 
which, as discussed below, provides that restrictions to the freedom of 
religion must be laid down in the national legislative act itself. 
The Constitution itself does not state whether measures concerning 
both immigration and religious freedom come under Article 2(2) or Article 
6(1); neither have the Dutch courts ruled on this issue. However, accept-
ing that Article 2(2) is a lex specialis compared to the particular rights and 
freedoms expressed in the Constitution would imply that the government 
is free to act on the entire terrain of admission and expulsion without tak-
ing these rights and freedoms into account. This would be an unlikely 
outcome, also given that Article 2(2) is included in the first chapter of the 
Constitution, which concerns the protection of fundamental rights. It is, 
therefore, more plausible to consider Article 2(2) as the minimum norm 
(whereby regulations concerning the admission and expulsion of aliens 
must always have a basis in a national legislative act) and Article 6(1) as 
the lex specialis (where such regulations touch upon the freedom of reli-
gion, they must be laid down in the national legislative act itself). It is also 
recalled that the Dutch government itself recognised that the admission of 
religious servants may come within the scope of Article 6(1) (see above). 
The restriction clause in the latter provision is briefly addressed in the 
following section. 
B. The Restriction Clause
According to Article 6(1) of the Dutch Constitution, restrictions to the 
freedom of religion are only permitted ‘by law’. This means that such 
restrictions are unconstitutional unless they are laid down in a national 
legislative act (wet in formele zin, adopted by parliament and the govern-
ment acting together as the legislator at the national level). The standard 
set by Article 6(1) is of a formal nature: it determines that only the national 
legislator may restrict the freedom of religion or belief, but it does not 
provide any criteria concerning the content of such restrictions. 
Meanwhile, Article 6(1) does not forbid decisions restricting the freedom 
of religion being taken by administrative bodies (ie the Aliens Affairs 
68 Vermeulen 2006, 253; see also ACVZ 2005, 39.
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Minister). Such decisions must, however, be authorised in a specifically 
formulated national legislative act.
C. Article 6 Dutch Constitution in Relation to Integration 
Requirements
With regard to the scope of the freedom of religion, the above examination 
of Article 6(1) of the Dutch Constitution did not reveal any standards 
other than those proposed in sections II and III. Nevertheless, the Dutch 
government subscribes to the view that refusal to admit a religious serv-
ant constitutes interference with Article 6(1) if admission is sought by a 
religious community that would otherwise be unable to continue its activ-
ities. This stance confirms the argument made earlier with regard to 
Articles 9 ECHR and 18 ICCPR, but which has not (yet) been expressly 
adopted by the ECtHR and the HRC. It also applies when the refusal is 
based on the grounds that the religious servant has failed to comply with 
an integration requirement. On the other hand, it has not been established 
whether integration requirements for religious servants could also come 
within the scope of Article 6(1) of the Dutch Constitution on the grounds 
that they aim to exert control over the exercise of religious freedom.
It follows from the above that it remains unclear as to whether Article 
6(1) of the Constitution could apply in all cases in which a religious com-
munity is denied the right to bring in a religious servant because of non-
compliance with integration requirements, or only in exceptional 
circumstances. When it does apply, however, the standard with regard to 
restrictions is straightforward: the condition that admission is subject to 
fulfilment of integration requirements must be laid down in a national 
legislative act.
V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND EQUAL TREATMENT
Under the provisions discussed above, state actions resulting in interfer-
ence with the freedom of religion are unlawful unless they meet the crite-
ria set out in the respective restriction clauses. In addition, the principle of 
equal treatment prohibits discrimination of persons or groups of persons 
on the grounds of their religion. The legal framework concerning equal 
treatment is discussed in detail in chapter 8, but is also relevant in the 
context of this chapter. It follows from this framework that discrimination 
occurs when religious communities or their members are subject to une-
qual treatment without a reasonable and objective justification. 
Discrimination on the grounds of religion may occur if a distinction is 
made between different religious affiliations, but also if a religious com-
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munity or its members are treated unequally by comparison with persons 
or organisations not belonging to any religion. 
The principle of equal treatment can be found in each of the legal instru-
ments discussed above: in the ECHR in Articles 14 and the Twelfth 
Protocol, in the ICCPR in Articles 2 and 26 and in Article 1 of the Dutch 
Constitution. Articles 14 ECHR and 2 ICCPR are of an accessory nature, 
which means they only apply to treatment coming within the scope of the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed in those treaties. However, this require-
ment has been broadly interpreted by the ECtHR, which applies Article 14 
ECHR to treatment coming ‘within the sphere’ of the other rights of the 
Convention.69 More importantly, the other equal treatment provisions 
apply independently of other rights and freedoms. Integration require-
ments for admission must consequently apply without discrimination on 
the grounds of religion, also when refusal of admission would not come 
within the scope of the freedom of religion.
VI. INTERIM CONCLUSION: LEGAL STANDARDS CONCERNING 
INTEGRATION REQUIREMENTS AS A CONDITION FOR THE 
ADMISSION OF RELIGIOUS SERVANTS
Before proceeding to assess the Dutch Act on Integration Abroad, it is use-
ful to summarise the legal framework presented in the previous sections. 
With regard to each of the provisions examined (Art 9 ECHR, 18 ICCPR 
and 6 Dutch Constitution), the first question asked was whether they 
include a right for religious servants to be admitted to states of which they 
are not nationals. It was argued (section II.A.i) that in principle such a 
right does not exist for individual religious servants seeking admission 
for the purpose of exercising their freedom of religion alone. However, 
this situation is to be distinguished from one in which admission is sought 
by a religious organisation for the purpose of the collective exercise of 
religious freedom, for example in rites or ecclesiastical services. 
Where the latter situation occurs, the freedom of religion also does not 
grant a general right to religious organisations to appoint servants from 
abroad. However, such a right may exist under particular circumstances. 
Firstly, if the appointment of the religious servant is a necessary condition 
for the organisation to be able to continue its activities. This possibility is 
recognised by the Dutch government (section IV.A.ii). It is also supported 
by case law from the Dutch courts and the ECtHR (section II.A.ii.c), where 
a similar approach can be recognised with regard to the freedom of 
religion in non-immigration contexts and the right to family life. Thus, in 
these particular circumstances, integration requirements for religious 
servants constitute interference with the freedom of religion. Nevertheless, 
69 eg, Arnardóttir 2003, 35–36.
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a difficulty with this criterion is that state authorities need to be very 
reticent in judging whether a religious organisation cannot reasonably 
appoint another servant.
Secondly, integration requirements for religious servants may come 
within the scope of the above provisions if they are imposed in connection 
with the exercise of religious freedom. This can be derived from case law 
of the EComHR and the ECtHR; it was argued in section II.A.ii.b that this 
criterion also applies in admission cases. Even so, the exact scope of this 
criterion remains unclear: does it apply only to measures that aim to 
repress the freedom of religious organisations, or also to measures that 
aim to make such organisations subject to state control? With regard to 
integration requirements for religious servants, it was also argued that the 
applicability of the criterion will depend on the type of activities addressed 
by the requirements (section II.D).
In view of the above, it is useful to reiterate that integration require-
ments for the admission of religious servants do not necessarily come 
within the scope of the freedom of religion. Whether they do will have to 
be decided in the light of the particular nature of the measure, as well as 
the circumstances of the case. Only once it has been established that the 
freedom of religion has been limited do the criteria for justifying such lim-
itations come into play.
Both Articles 9(2) ECHR and 18(3) ICCPR require limitations to the free-
dom of religion, in casu integration requirements, to be prescribed by law 
and to be proportionate in relation to an aim mentioned in those provisions 
(sections II.B and III.B). Both articles have been interpreted to exclude 
measures taken in the interests of national security or the economic well-
being of the state. As far as the protection of public morals is concerned, it 
was argued that this aim does not cover the prescription of a particular set 
of morals or the regulation of morality outside the public domain. 
Nevertheless, integration objectives such as the maintenance of social cohe-
sion or respect for constitutional principles can probably be brought under 
the aim of protecting public order or the rights and freedoms of others.
In addition to the requirement of proportionality, limitations to the free-
dom of religion must respect the principle of neutrality. This implies that 
integration requirements may not differentiate between religious organi-
sations (which also follows from the principle of equal treatment) and 
may not be used to impose religious unity. In addition, it was argued that 
such requirements may not prescribe how religious servants are to fulfil 
their tasks, and that the contents of integration programmes or exams 
should steer clear of any normative notions concerning religion or reli-
gious interpretations (section II.D).
Article 6(1) of the Dutch Constitution states that limitations to the free-
dom of religion, regardless of their contents, are allowed, providing they 
are laid down in a specifically formulated national legislative act. 
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Integration requirements, irrespective of whether they constitute a limi-
tation to the freedom of religion, may not amount to a form of discrimina-
tion on the grounds of religion. This means that, where these requirements 
result in the unequal treatment of individuals or religious organisations 
on the grounds of their religion, this distinction must be based on a rea-
sonable and objective justification.
VII. THE ACT ON INTEGRATION ABROAD IN RELATION TO  
THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND THE RIGHT TO EQUAL 
TREATMENT
A. Religious Organisations in the Netherlands and Servants from 
Abroad
As explained above, the right to freedom of religion may be invoked by 
religious organisations seeking to appoint a servant from abroad. In the 
Netherlands there exists a variety of communities and organisations of a 
religious (or spiritual or philosophical) nature. Apart from the more tradi-
tional Christian and Jewish communities, these include various mission-
ary organisations with origins in foreign countries, migrant churches and 
Islamic, Hindu and Buddhist communities. These groups’ activities 
include worship and teaching, as well as more ‘earthly’ activities such as 
management and administration of the organisation.70 In the past, various 
religious organisations have filed requests for the admission of religious 
servants. The number of requests from organisations belonging to ethnic 
minority groups has been rising since the 1950s, while since the 1970s 
growing numbers of Islamic groups have asked for imams and Islamic 
religious teachers to be admitted.71 However, requests for admission have 
also been made by Catholic organisations confronted with an increasing 
lack of priests in the Netherlands.72
While every case has to be judged on its merits, there is no doubt that 
many of the aforementioned groups will count as religious organisations 
entitled to the protection offered by the ECHR, the ICCPR and the Dutch 
Constitution. It then remains to be seen whether the appointment of a 
particular religious servant also falls within a group’s right to self- 
organisation. This will certainly be the case with regard to religious lead-
ers and teachers (sections II.A.i and III.A.i). However, it could be argued 
that the organisational freedom of a religious community also includes 
the right to appoint people in other positions. In any case, the definition of 
‘religious servant’ in Dutch legislation includes leaders and teachers, as 
70 See Hendrickx and De Lange 2004, 16–27; see also ACVZ 2005, 26.
71 ACVZ 2005, 28.
72 Hendrickx and De Lange 2004, 19.
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well as other ecclesiastical personnel (chapter 2, section VI.B.ii). Hence, 
the appointment of persons who are qualified as religious servants (and 
thus subject to the requirement of integration abroad) can surely come 
within the scope of the right to religious self-organisation. 
B. Does the Integration Exam Abroad Form a Limitation of the 
Freedom of Religion?
In principle, the right of religious communities to self-organisation does 
not extend to the appointment of religious servants from abroad; condi-
tions for the admission of these servants do not, therefore, touch upon the 
freedom of religion. This is different, however, in the exceptional case 
where a religious organisation cannot find a suitable religious servant in 
the Netherlands and would be unable to function without one. 
In this respect, Hendrickx and De Lange showed that many religious 
communities in the Netherlands have experienced problems as a result of 
immigration measures preventing them from engaging foreign nationals. 
Some communities have been hampered in the exercise of their religious 
activities, whereas others even felt that their continued existence was 
threatened. One example is that of the Buddharama temple, a Buddhist 
temple that needed a new monk because the current monk was ill and 
required assistance. Without a monk the temple could not continue to 
function. Other examples include Catholic weddings and funerals that 
have been forced to take place without a priest and Moroccan mosques 
that are temporarily or even permanently without an imam.73 
Although these examples date back to before the adoption of the AIA, 
the effects of this Act may be the same. A religious servant who fails to 
pass the integration exam will be denied admission to the Netherlands. 
And even if the exam is eventually passed, the time, money and effort 
required to achieve this result may substantially delay such admission. 
The integration exam abroad can consequently constitute a limitation to 
the freedom of religion in particular circumstances such as those men-
tioned above.
Would it be possible to go further and argue that the obligation to pass 
the integration exam abroad always constitutes a limitation to the free-
dom of religion when applied to religious servants? This argument could 
be made on the grounds that the AIA is a measure that has been specifi-
cally enacted in connection with the exercise of religious freedom. 
Religious servants are not the only category of persons to whom the Act 
applies. However, the reasons why they have been included in its target 
group relate specifically to their position. Unlike family migrants, reli-
73 Hendrickx and De Lange 2004, 98–101.
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gious servants have not been brought under the AIA for the purposes of 
furthering their integration, but because of the role they are expected to 
play, in their capacity as clerics, in the integration process of the members 
of their community (chapter 2, sectionVI.C.ii). With regard to the freedom 
of religion, therefore, the AIA is not a general or neutrally formulated 
measure.
It is unclear, however, whether this also means that the integration 
requirement for religious servants as such limits the freedom of religion. 
As explained above, the criterion to be applied is not yet completely clear. 
On the one hand, it follows from the definition of who is a religious 
servant that the obligation to pass the integration exam is imposed in con-
nection with activities of a religious nature. According to the Dutch gov-
ernment, this term applies specifically to persons for whom activities of a 
religious nature, such as conducting ecclesiastical services, attending mar-
ital or funeral ceremonies and teaching or explaining religious texts, are a 
primary activity. By contrast, those working for a religious organisation, 
but whose tasks are primarily administrative will not be considered to be 
religious servants.74 Thus, the nature of the activities concerned does not 
detract from the conclusion that the AIA affects the freedom of religion.
On the other hand, it would go too far to say that the aim of the AIA is 
to ‘stifle’ or ‘repress’ the free exercise of religion. It may be assumed that 
the obligation to pass the integration exam, also since the level was raised 
on 1 April 2011, does not exert such pressure on religious organisations as 
to amount to repression. However the Act does exert a certain amount of 
control over the exercise of religious freedom, as the conditions set by the 
authorities for the appointment of religious servants relate to the fulfil-
ment of their office. 
Ultimately it would probably go too far, in view of existing ECtHR case 
law (such as Nolan & K.), to argue that the integration exam abroad for 
religious servants as such constitutes a limitation of the freedom of reli-
gion. Nevertheless, it is clear that the specific targeting of the AIA towards 
religious servants is problematic in the light of the role played by the state 
vis-à-vis religious organisations. This matter is addressed again in para-
graph VII.E, concerning the right to equal treatment.
C.  Is the Limitation Justified?
It follows from the above that the integration exam for religious servants 
will not normally raise an issue under Articles 9 ECHR, 18 ICCPR and 6 
Dutch Constitution. Still, in those cases where it does, a denial of admis-
sion on the grounds that the exam has not been passed will need to be 
74 Parliamentary Papers II 2005–2006, 19 637, No 1051, 2–4.
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justified under the respective limitation clauses. This is assessed, in rela-
tion to Articles 9(2) ECHR and 18(3) ICCPR, in sections VII.C.i–VII.C.iii. In 
view of its different requirements, limitations to Article 6(1) Dutch 
Constitution are discussed separately in section VII.C.iv.
i. Prescribed by Law
Both Articles 9(2) and 18(3) ICCPR state that limitations to the freedom of 
religion must be prescribed by law. It is submitted that neither of these 
requirements differs substantially from the requirement of lawfulness in 
Article 17(1) ICCPR. This issue was discussed in section VII.B of chapter 4, 
where it was concluded that the obligation to pass the integration exam 
abroad has a sufficient basis in Dutch law.
ii. Legitimate Aim
To be justified under Articles 9(2) ECHR and 18(3) ICCPR, the integration 
exam abroad must serve one of the interests enumerated in those provi-
sions, namely the protection of public safety, order, health or morals or the 
rights and freedoms of others. Arguably, to the extent that the integration 
exam abroad tests candidates’ knowledge of the constitutional principles 
of the host state, it can be accepted as serving the protection of public 
order or the rights and freedoms of others (cf section II.D). This argument 
was also made by the Dutch government, which stated that religious serv-
ants have a role in determining the attitude of members of their communi-
ties towards the host society. For this purpose, religious servants need to 
be ‘well aware of constitutional freedoms, such as the freedom of religion 
and of expression, and other universal values protected in human rights 
treaties, as well as the existence of other beliefs, homosexuality, the non-
acceptability of honour killings, et cetera’.75 The above aims are also 
reflected in some of the exam questions.76 
As far as the requirement for Dutch language proficiency is concerned, 
it could probably be maintained that this serves to increase social cohe-
sion (by improving communications between different groups in the pop-
ulation) and thus to protect public order.77 However, with regard to the 
argument that integration is necessary in the interests of national security 
(to prevent terrorism and radicalisation, see chapter 4, section VII.C), it 
should be noted that this aim is not mentioned in Article 9(2) ECHR or 
75 Parliamentary Papers I 2004–2005, 29 700, E, 4.
76 eg, question 56: ‘Is homosexuality permitted or punishable by law?’ (correct answer: 
permitted) and question 58: ‘Is female circumcision permitted or punishable by law?’ (cor-
rect answer: punishable by law).
77 See also Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 4 and No 6, 47, where it is stated 
that the AIA aims to prevent the marginalisation of certain population groups.
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18(3) ICCPR.78 It may also be recalled that there is no justification for inte-
gration requirements that ask immigrants to denounce their identity (reli-
gious or otherwise) or to agree with particular views or ideas, even those 
widely held in the host society (see again section VII.C of chapter 4).
iii. Proportionality and Neutrality
To the extent that the above aims are accepted as legitimate, the next ques-
tion is whether the AIA can also be considered proportionate in relation to 
those aims. In section VII.B, it was argued that refusal to admit a religious 
servant only comes within the scope of the freedom of religion if the reli-
gious community has no alternative means of continuing its activities. In 
these cases there will be a very weighty interest on the part of the religious 
community for the servant to be admitted. Consequently, it is argued that 
there will be a violation of Articles 9 ECHR and 18 ICCPR if failure to pass 
the integration exam results in the admission of the religious servant 
being permanently refused or delayed for a substantial period of time.79
Chapter 4 considered a number of factors that are of relevance in deter-
mining whether a religious servant can pass the integration exam abroad 
within a reasonable time and with a reasonable amount of effort. These 
include the accessibility of the exam, the availability of preparation facili-
ties, the costs and the required level of knowledge or skills. What has been 
said about these circumstances in relation to the right to family life is 
equally applicable here. In particular, since the introduction of a reading 
comprehension test on 1 April 2011, the exam can be considered to present 
too great a hurdle for religious servants who are illiterate.
Another factor of relevance for the proportionality test is whether the 
integration exam abroad is an effective instrument to meet the objectives 
of the AIA; in other words whether it has a positive influence on religious 
servants’ contribution to the integration process. Such influence is not 
easy to establish as the complex and abstract nature of this process means 
that the effectiveness of instruments such as the AIA is difficult to meas-
ure and is perhaps also necessarily limited. At the same time, the com-
plexity of this policy field suggests that the effectiveness of the AIA is a 
matter that should not be intensively reviewed by national or interna-
tional courts, but instead one in which a larger margin of appreciation 
should be granted to the national legislator. Nevertheless, it is unfortu-
nate that the effect of the Act with regard to religious servants appears not 
78 This was not duly recognised by the Dutch Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs, see 
ACVZ 2005, 39.
79 What constitutes such a period of time is difficult to say in the abstract, but it is submit-
ted that any period longer than some six months would not be obviously reasonable. 
However, the circumstances of the case may also play a role, for instance a shorter delay 
could also be disproportionate if a community is unable to bring in the religious servant 
before a particularly important religious event or festival. 
212 Freedom of Religion
to have been addressed at all during the 2009 evaluation.80 In the absence 
of empirical data, the need for the integration requirement will be more 
difficult to maintain.
The requirement of neutrality does not raise a problem insofar as the 
AIA applies equally to all religious servants regardless of their faith or 
denomination. It was argued above that the principle of neutrality also 
means that the exam should not contain normative questions concerning 
religious topics or interpretations. In this respect, a problem may arise 
with regard, for example, to questions concerning the institution of mar-
riage, same-sex partnerships or the position of women in the family and 
in society. To ensure compatibility with the freedom of religion, such 
questions should be limited to testing the candidate’s knowledge of legal 
norms (such as the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion or 
equality of men and women). The integration exam abroad appears to be 
in accordance with this requirement.
iv. The Restriction Clause of Article 6(1) Dutch Constitution
To be justified under the restriction clause of Article 6(1), the obligation to 
pass the integration exam abroad must be laid down in a national legisla-
tive act. This criterion is met in Article 16(1)(h) of the Aliens Act 2000, 
which regulates the admission and expulsion of aliens in the Netherlands.81 
This provision states that a request for a residence permit can be denied if 
the applicant does not demonstrate a basic knowledge of the Dutch lan-
guage and Dutch society. It follows from Article 16(1)(h) Aliens Act 2000, 
read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(b) of the Integration Act 2007, that 
religious servants must meet the requirement of integration abroad. The 
AIA is therefore compatible with Article 6(1) of the Dutch Constitution. 
D. Possibilities for Exemption
Just like other aliens who have to pass the integration exam abroad, reli-
gious servants are eligible for exemptions in certain circumstances. In par-
ticular, it may be recalled that the AIA does not apply to applicants who 
are durably unable to pass the exam owing to a physical or mental disabil-
ity, or who already have the required skills and knowledge.82 Both exemp-
tions add to the overall proportionality of the AIA. In addition, religious 
servants may be exempted on an individual basis if refusal of admission 
80 See ch 2, section VI.D.
81 It may be recalled that the AIA amended the Aliens Act 2000 so as to include this condi-
tion; see ch 2, section VI.A.
82 Art 3.71a(2)(c) Aliens Decree 2000 and Art 16 (1)(h) Aliens Act 2000 read in conjunction 
with Art 5 (1)(b)–(f) Integration Act 2007. See also ch 2, section VI.B.iii.
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would be eminently unreasonable or disproportionate in the light of 
exceptional circumstances.83 
The above possibilities for exemption probably suffice to prevent viola-
tions of the right to freedom of religion. Nevertheless, as is already the 
case with regard to the right to family life (section VII.F of chapter 4), it is 
recommended inserting a guideline in the Aliens Circular to the effect that 
admission will not be refused if the integration requirement would be 
contrary to any of the provisions discussed in this chapter. To establish 
whether this is the case, the legal standards formulated earlier need to be 
taken into account.
E. Discrimination on the Grounds of Religion?
Section V of this chapter briefly explained that unequal treatment on the 
grounds of religion amounts to discrimination – and is, therefore, prohib-
ited – if it is not based on a reasonable and objective justification. This may 
concern unequal treatment between different religious affiliations, as well 
as unequal treatment of religious and non-religious groups or persons. 
This subsection focuses on the latter situation, by asking whether it is 
justified that the integration exam abroad applies specifically to religious 
servants. 
As mentioned before, the AIA does not apply only to religious servants. 
However, in principle the Act applies only to aliens seeking admission to 
the Netherlands for a non-temporary residence purpose.84 This can logi-
cally be explained on the grounds that integration only becomes an issue 
if a person is seeking to remain in the Netherlands for a longer period of 
time. Nevertheless, religious servants have been brought under the Act 
despite their residence purpose being qualified as temporary under the 
Aliens Decree.85 In this respect, they are treated unequally compared to 
other aliens with a temporary residence purpose. We have already seen 
that this has been motivated on the grounds that it is not the integration of 
the religious servants themselves that is at issue under the AIA, but the 
role that these servants play in integration matters vis-à-vis the members 
of their religious communities. 
It must then be assessed whether this motivation constitutes sufficient 
justification. This is not easy as the arguments supporting it are often 
expressed in rather abstract terms, referring to ‘the great social interest 
served by the integration of religious servants’ or ‘the nature of [their] 
83 Art 3.71a (2)(d) Aliens Decree 2000 (as at 1 April 2011) and Art 4:84 General 
Administrative Act. See also section VI.B.iii of ch 2.
84 Art 16(1)(h) Aliens Act 2000 read in conjunction with Art 3(1)(a) Integration Act 2007.
85 Art 3.5(2)(d) Aliens Decree 2000.
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function’.86 Still, the government has stated that the task of religious serv-
ants is not limited to answering questions of a purely religious nature. 
Instead, they are also asked for guidance on ‘matters relating to the socio-
economic and socio-cultural integration process of ethnic minorities’.87 
Concrete examples mentioned included issues of everyday life such as 
finding a job, conflicts with neighbours and children dropping out of 
school.88 
It may be argued that religious servants are not the only category of 
persons asked to advise on issues such as the above and who therefore 
play an influential role in the integration process of immigrant communi-
ties. The same can be said, for instance, with regard to teachers, social 
workers, journalists and members of migrant organisations. This argu-
ment was also raised in parliament when religious servants were brought 
under the 1998 Newcomers Integration Act.89 In situations such as the 
above, however, conflicts may arise between religious norms and prac-
tices and the laws of the state.90 The question then arises as to whether a 
state may apply integration measures, such as the AIA, to ensure that reli-
gious servants are aware of the prevailing legal norms and the legally 
established limitations to the freedom of religion. 
It is submitted that this question must in principle be answered in the 
affirmative as states have a relatively large margin of appreciation where 
the area of church-state relations is concerned (section II.C). It follows that 
integration requirements specifically directed towards religious servants 
do not necessarily constitute discrimination on the grounds of religion. 
Arguably, this is also true with regard to the AIA. However, the exam 
should be a suitable measure to achieve the above purpose of informing 
religious servants about the place of religion in the Dutch legal order. As it 
is, most questions in the current test cannot be related to this purpose. The 
same is true with regard to the language test.91 It is therefore proposed 
reconsidering the contents of the test so as to ensure compliance with the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion.
86 See Government Gazette 2001, 247, 9. This regulation first brought religious servants 
within the scope of the integration legislation (the Newcomers Integration Act 1998, see ch 2, 
section V.C.ii). Arguments relating to the freedom of religion and the principle of equal treat-
ment were discussed in some detail in the parliamentary debate preceding this regulation 
(see Parliamentary Papers 27 000); however, this did not stop it from being adopted.
87 Government Gazette 2001, 247, 9, see also Parliamentary Papers I 2004–2005, 29 700, E, 4.
88 Proceedings I 2000–2001, 34-1454.
89 See, esp, Parliamentary Papers II 2000–2001, 27 000, No 6.
90 Another example of a situation where such conflict arises concerns the wearing of reli-
gious clothing (eg, a headscarf) in public functions (eg, by judges or police officers).
91 It could be argued that religious servants need to be able to speak Dutch in order to 
communicate with their followers. However, it has already been put forward that it is not 
very realistic to expect religious servants to learn Dutch at a sufficient level to communicate 
about philosophical questions within a reasonable period of time (Proceedings I 2000–2001, 
34-1450). 
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F. Summary: Compatibility of the Integration Exam Abroad with  
the Right to Freedom of Religion and the Right to Equal  
Treatment
To summarise, the preceding assessment of the AIA leads us to observe 
firstly that the integration exam abroad for religious servants is not gener-
ally irreconcilable with the right to religious freedom. In most cases, 
requests by a religious community to bring in a servant from abroad will 
not be covered by the freedom of religion. Therefore the condition that 
religious servants must first pass the integration exam does not normally 
constitute interference with this freedom.
The right to freedom of religion may, however, be affected in individual 
cases where the religious community needs a servant from abroad to con-
tinue its activities. In such cases, the obligation to pass the integration 
exam abroad will be disproportionate if it has the effect of making the 
admission of the religious servant impossible or of delaying it for a sub-
stantial period of time. This may occur, for instance, in the case of illiterate 
applicants for whom the newly introduced reading comprehension test 
imposes a major obstacle. It needs to be ensured that the possibilities for 
individual exemption are applied in such situations so as to avoid viola-
tions of the right to freedom of religion. 
With regard to the proportionality of the AIA, the effectiveness of the 
integration exam abroad in relation to the Act’s objectives is also a factor 
of significance. So far this effectiveness has not been demonstrated and it 
has been argued that it may be very hard to do so. Given the complexity 
of the issue, the review conducted by national and international courts is 
likely to be less intense and a violation of the freedom of religion is 
unlikely to be found in an individual case on the grounds that the AIA is 
not effective. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the effectiveness of the 
integration exam for religious servants is a topic to be considered by the 
Dutch legislator and should at least have been addressed when the AIA 
was evaluated.
It has been established, regarding the right to equal treatment, that an 
integration exam abroad for religious servants does not amount to a form 
of discrimination on the grounds of religion. While religious servants are 
treated differently from other aliens with a non-temporary residence pur-
pose, this differentiation is justified in principle by the need to protect the 
separation between church and state. However, the existing integration 
exam abroad is not suited to this purpose and needs to be reconsidered. If 
the relevant knowledge cannot be tested in Dutch because doing so would 
require a high level of language proficiency, the exam could be taken in 
the religious servants’ own language.
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VIII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This chapter examines integration requirements for religious servants in 
relation to the right to freedom of religion and the right of religious groups 
and persons to equal treatment. In the course of this examination, two 
main issues were identified.
The first issue concerned the use of integration requirements as an 
immigration condition. If religious servants do not meet the integration 
requirements set by the receiving state, they will be denied admission to 
the territory and will not be able to be engaged by religious communities 
within that state. In this way integration requirements, like other immi-
gration conditions, form a limitation to the freedom of religious servants 
and communities. However, it was established that such limitations nor-
mally fall outside the scope of the freedom of religion, which does not 
include a general right to admission for religious servants or a right for 
religious communities to appoint servants from abroad. 
It follows that states are allowed, in principle, to regulate the admission 
of religious servants by means of integration requirements. Section 
II.A.ii.d discussed the question of whether or not such regulation should 
always be considered a restriction of religious communities’ freedom to 
self-organisation. It was submitted, however, that the current approach is 
acceptable in principle. This position differs somewhat from that taken in 
chapter 4, for the reason that a religious community’s choice for a particu-
lar leader or servant is not normally as exclusive as the relationship exist-
ing between family members, in particular parents and their children. 
Nevertheless, it was also argued that the state’s competence to regulate 
the admission of religious servants may not be used to adopt measures 
that aim either to repress religious communities or effectively inhibit their 
activities. Support for these exceptions can be found in Articles 9 ECHR 
and 6 Dutch Constitution.
The second issue encountered concerned the relationship between the 
concept of integration as defined by the state and the values, norms and 
practices dictated by religious beliefs. In this respect, it was argued that 
integration requirements should steer clear of matters within the religious 
domain. This implies that integration programmes or exams should not 
concern the correctness or validity of religious prescriptions or interpreta-
tions. A fortiori, religious servants may not be asked to subscribe to such 
rules. This condition follows from the principle of state neutrality and 
must be met if limitations to the freedom of religion are to be justified, at 
least under Article 9(2) ECHR. 
Nevertheless, it was also submitted that integration measures may be 
used as an instrument to guard the boundary between the religious 
domain and the secular or neutral domain of the state. To achieve this 
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purpose, religious servants may be asked to become aware of the place of 
religion in the legal order of the receiving state and to acquaint themselves 
with legally established limitations to the freedom of religion. Integration 
requirements complying with this purpose do not go against the principle 
of neutrality. The need to protect the separation of church and state can 
also provide reasonable and objective justification for the unequal treat-
ment occurring when integration requirements are directed specifically 
towards religious servants.





The Right to Free Movement in 
European Union Law
I. INTRODUCTION
UNDER EUROPEAN UNION (previously European Commun­ity) law, nationals of EU Member States have long since had the right to move and reside in a Member State other than that of 
their nationality. This right has traditionally served to enable the free 
movement of persons which, together with the free movement of goods, 
capital and services, underpins the realisation of an internal market as a 
primary objective of the Union.1 However, with the introduction of Union 
citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht, nationals of EU Member States 
obtained the right to free movement independent of economic purposes. 
Together, EU citizenship and the free movement of persons currently pro­
vide the basis on which EU citizens are entitled to move and reside in EU 
Member States, subject to only very limited restrictions. 
This chapter describes the legal framework regarding the right to free 
movement of EU citizens, as well as certain closely related rights. These 
include, first of all, the right of EU citizens to be accompanied by their 
family members. On the basis of this right, these family members are also 
entitled to move and reside in EU Member States regardless of their own 
nationality. Another closely related right is the right to free movement of 
nationals of Member States of the European Economic Area (EEA), which 
is laid down in the Agreement on the European Economic Area (the ‘EEA 
Agreement’).2 For Swiss nationals, a similar right is guaranteed by the 
EC­Switzerland Agreement on the free movement of persons (the 
‘EC­Switzerland Agreement’).3 
Free movement rights have also been granted, at least to some extent, 
to certain categories of third­country nationals under Article 79 TFEU, 
formerly Article 63 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC)). The latter article provides the legal basis for a common EU 
1 See currently Art 3(3) TEU and Art 26(2) TFEU.
2 [1994] OJ L1/3.
3 Agreement between the EC and its Member States, on the one part, and the Swiss 
Confederation, on the other, on the free movement of persons, [2002] OJ L114/6.
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immigration policy, including measures concerning the right of third­
country nationals to move between Member States. This extension of free 
movement rights to third­country nationals is based on a dual rationale. 
One aim is to promote the integration of third­country nationals by giving 
them rights comparable to those of EU citizens, while granting such 
rights to third­country nationals is secondly designed to foster the com­
petitiveness of the EU economy by making the EU an attractive location 
for highly qualified workers.4 This chapter discusses the free movement 
rights granted to third­country nationals by the Long­term Residents 
Directive (LRD) and the Blue Card Directive (BCD).5 The Exchange 
Directive and the Researchers Directive are not taken into account as, 
given the temporary nature of the residence rights granted under these 
directives, they are less relevant for the issue of integration forming the 
object of this study.6
The aim of this chapter is to understand the contents and scope of the 
right of free movement provided for in EU law and of the restrictions 
imposed on the legislative competence of the Netherlands. In particular, it 
will be examined whether the relevant provisions of EU law leave Member 
States room to enact integration requirements, such as those laid down in 
the Dutch Act on Integration Abroad (AIA). At the end of the chapter, the 
AIA is assessed to see whether it respects the rights granted by EU law. 
II. THE RIGHT TO FREE MOVEMENT OF EU CITIZENS
A. Citizenship and Free Movement of Persons in the TFEU
As stated in the introduction, the right of EU citizens to move and reside 
in the Member States is linked to the exercise of economic activities, as 
well as to the status of being an EU citizen. In order to achieve economic 
integration and an internal market, the TFEU guarantees the free move­
ment of workers (Art 45 and the articles that follow), the right of establish­
ment (Art 49 and the articles that follow) and the free movement of 
services (Art 56 and the articles that follow). These provisions allow EU 
citizens to enter and reside in another Member State as a worker, a self­
employed person or a provider of services. The personal scope of these 
treaty provisions has been interpreted broadly so as also to include recipi­
4 Iglesias Sánchez 2009a, 798–99. In addition, the Long­term Residents Directive also men­
tions the attainment of an internal market as an underlying motive of the right to free move­
ment of third­country nationals. See also section VI.B below.
5 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003, [2004] OJ L16/44 and Council 
Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009, [2009] OJ L155/17.
6 Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004, [2004] OJ L375/12 and Council 
Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005, [2005] OJ L289/15.
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ents of services.7 Nevertheless, the right to free movement under the 
above provisions remains tied to the exercise of some kind of economic 
activity. By contrast, Article 21 TFEU grants the right to move and reside 
freely in the territory of the Member States to all EU citizens.8 This provi­
sion was introduced into EU law in the Treaty of Maastricht as part of the 
provisions on EU citizenship. It constitutes the right of free movement as 
a citizenship right, rather than as a corollary to economic freedoms. 
The right to free movement of EU citizens is, nevertheless, subject to 
restrictions. As mentioned, Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU grant the right to 
enter and reside in another Member State only to those (economically 
active) EU citizens coming within the personal scope of these provisions. 
In addition, this right may be limited on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health.9 Under Article 21 TFEU, the right to free move­
ment laid down therein is subject to the conditions and limitations laid 
down in the TEU and the TFEU and the measures adopted to give them 
effect. 
Despite the differences in scope and content of the various treaty provi­
sions, the right of EU citizens to free movement has over time become 
subject to a relatively uniform set of rules and interpretations.10 The condi­
tions governing this right are currently laid down in the Residence 
Directive, which is discussed in the following section.11 First, however, it 
should be noted that, as a result of transitional measures following the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU on 1 January 2007, the free 
movement of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals in the other Member 
States may be subject to restrictions for a limited period of time after their 
accession.12 These restrictions concern the right of access to the labour 
7 Condinanzi et al 2008, 22–23. The personal scope of the provisions on free movement of 
services is also not restricted to EU nationals as it includes third­country nationals who are 
‘posted workers’: persons employed by an undertaking in one Member State and then 
posted in another Member State in order to provide services there. See CoJ 9 August 1994, 
C­43/93 [1994] ECR I­03803 (Vander Elst), para 26. However, it must be noted that the provi­
sion or receipt of services is by definition of a temporary nature, see CoJ 30 November 1995, 
C­55/94 [1995] ECR I­4165 (Gebhard), paras 25–28 and CoJ 19 October 2004, C­200/02 [2004] 
ECR I­9925 (Chen), para 22. This means that the right of residence of service providers and 
recipients is also temporary, which makes it unlikely that this right would be conditioned 
upon fulfilment of integration conditions. The position of service providers and recipients 
(including posted workers) is consequently not addressed separately in this chapter.
8 Some rights of free movement for economically inactive persons already existed before 
the introduction of EU citizenship, see Spaventa 2007, 114. 
9 See Arts 45(3), 52 and 62 TFEU. 
10 Condinanzi et al 2008, 22.
11 Directive 2004/38/EC, [2004] OJ L158/77. This directive replaced the previously exist­
ing patchwork of directives relating to the free movement of EU citizens and their family 
members and to a large extent codified CoJ case law on this topic until the moment of its 
adoption. Boeles et al observed that the Residence Directive does not regulate the right of 
residence of recipients of services under Art 57 TFEU (Boeles et al 2009, 63). See, however, n 7.
12 See Part 1 of Annexes VI and VII to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of 
the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania and the adjustments to the Treaties on which 
the European Union is founded, [2005] OJ L157. The Netherlands has made use of the 
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market and do not affect the right of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals to 
enter and reside in the other Member States.13 The transitional measures 
governing the position of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals are, there­
fore, not of relevance for the purpose of this chapter and so are not dis­
cussed separately.
B. The Residence Directive
With regard to the right of EU citizens to move and reside in the Member 
States, the Residence Directive distinguishes between the rights of exit 
and entry, the right to short­term residence (up to three months), the right 
to residence for more than three months and the right to permanent resi­
dence. Considering the object of this study, the discussion in this section 
focuses on the provisions concerning the acquisition of the right to resi­
dence for more than three months. 
The Residence Directive applies to all Union citizens who move or 
reside in a Member State other than that of which they are a national.14 
According to Article 20(1) TFEU, a Union citizen is every person with the 
nationality of an EU Member State. EU citizens are entitled to stay in 
another Member State for more than three months, subject to the condi­
tions laid down in Article 7(1) of the Residence Directive. Basically, this 
provision grants the right of residence to EU citizens who are economi­
cally active (as workers or self­employed persons) or who have health 
insurance and sufficient resources to ensure that they will not become a 
burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State. Students 
are entitled to residence, provided they have health insurance and can 
assure the host Member State that they will not become a burden on the 
social assistance system. 
With regard to the condition of having sufficient resources, Article 8(4) 
of the directive states that Member States may not require a fixed amount, 
but must take into account the personal situation of the person concerned. 
This provision reflects CoJ case law, according to which exceptions to the 
right to free movement of EU citizens must be interpreted in a restrictive 
opportunity provided for in paras 2 and 7 to continue the transitional measures until 
1 January 2012, after which they were further extended to 1 January 2014. See Parliamentary 
Papers II 2008–2009, 29 407, No 98, 3–4 and Parliamentary Papers II 2011–2012, 29 407, 
No 132, 3.
13 Derogation from the provisions of the Residence Directive relating to entry and resi­
dence is possible only when these provisions ‘cannot be dissociated from those of Regulation 
(EEC) No 1612/68 [on labour market access, KV] whose application is deferred to pursuant 
to paragraphs 2 to 5 and 7 and 8 [. . .], to the extent necessary for the application of [those 
paragraphs]’. See para 9 of Part 1 of Annexes VI and VII to the Act of Accession.
14 Art 3(1) Residence Directive.
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manner.15 More specifically, in the case of Baumbast, the Court found that 
Article 18(1) TEC (now Art 21(1) TFEU) directly confers on all EU citizens 
the right to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States 
and that the conditions and limitations governing the exercise of this right 
must be applied in compliance with the general principles of EU law, in 
particular the principle of proportionality.16 It follows from this judgment 
that the conditions of Article 7(1) Residence Directive may not be applied 
more strictly than is necessary to prevent migrating EU citizens from 
becoming an unreasonable burden on the public finances of the host 
Member State.
Article 27(1) Residence Directive provides that the right of EU citizens 
to reside in the Member States may be restricted on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health. Thus Member States may refuse 
the residence of EU citizens on the basis of one of these exceptions. 
Application of these exceptions must nevertheless be in compliance with 
the conditions and procedural safeguards laid down in Chapter VI of the 
Residence Directive, as well as with the general principles of EU law.17 
Article 27(1) explicitly provides that the specified grounds may not be 
invoked to serve economic ends.
For EU citizens falling within the scope of the Residence Directive, the 
acquisition of the right of residence is subject to no conditions other than 
the above. There is consequently no scope for Member States to make 
these persons’ residence subject to an integration exam abroad, nor to any 
other conditions relating to their integration.
C. Situations not Covered by EU Law?
It follows from the previous sections that every EU citizen is, in principle, 
entitled to reside in another Member State on the basis of the treaty provi­
sions relating to the right of free movement, in particular Article 21 TFEU. 
This right is subject only to limited conditions, which must moreover be 
applied in conformity with the general principles of EU law. It may there­
fore be concluded that, in most cases, the residence of EU citizens in 
another Member State will be a matter of EU law.
Nevertheless, there may be situations in which EU citizens do not meet 
the conditions for exercising the right of free movement under EU law.18 
In such situations it remains within the host Member State’s power to 
15 Boeles et al 2009, 63–64.
16 CoJ 17 September 2002, C­413/99 [2002] OJ C274/2 (Baumbast and R), paras 81, 84 and 
91. See also CoJ 7 September 2004, C­456/02 [2004] OJ C262/7 (Trojani), para 34 and Chen 
(n 7), para 32.
17 Condinanzi et al 2008, 95. This was decided in, eg, CoJ 29 April 2004, C­482/01 and 
493/01 [2004] ECR I­5257 (Orfanopoulos & Oliveri), paras 47 and 90–99.
18 For an example of such a case, see the judgment in Trojani (n 16).
226 The Right to Free Movement in EU Law
grant a right of residence as a matter of national law. This is explicitly pro­
vided for by Article 37 of the Residence Directive, which allows Member 
States to maintain or adopt more favourable national provisions. 
Provided the granting of a national residence right does not come 
within the scope of any other provisions of EU law,19 it must be assumed 
that this right is granted subject to national conditions, possibly including 
conditions of integration. However, as said above, this possibility only 
exists with regard to EU citizens who do not meet the limited conditions 
imposed by the Residence Directive or whose right of residence has been 
terminated on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 
Apart from the fact that this situation will not frequently occur, it is also 
rather unlikely that, under these circumstances, Member States would be 
willing to grant a right of residence under national law. It must be con­
cluded that, although the possibility of imposing integration conditions 
for the admission of EU citizens is perhaps not entirely non­existent, it is 
of little practical relevance.
III. FAMILY MEMBERS OF EU CITIZENS
A.  Free Movement or Family Reunification?
EU law grants the right of residence in the Member States not only to EU 
citizens, but also to their family members. As in the case of EU citizens, 
the provisions relating to the residence of family members are laid down 
in the Residence Directive. However, the rights of family members do not 
have an explicit basis in the TFEU. Instead, these rights derive from the 
right to free movement of EU citizens, with the underlying assumption 
being that EU citizens could be deterred from exercising this right if they 
were not allowed to bring their family members with them.20 In its case 
law concerning the admission of family members, the CoJ has relied not 
only on the provisions of the TFEU and of secondary legislation relating 
to the free movement of EU citizens, but also on the right to family life as 
a general principle of EU law.21 It is concluded that the rights discussed in 
this section are better understood as constituting a right to family reunifi­
cation of EU citizens than as a right to free movement of their family 
19 It may be observed that the CoJ has in the past determined the scope of EU law rather 
expansively. In Trojani, eg, the Court decided that the applicant fell within the personal scope 
of Art 18 TEC and hence of Art 12 TEC, despite the fact that his right of residence had been 
granted under national law. Where, however, the case concerns admission, this implies that 
the applicant does not yet have a right of residence; therefore the reasoning followed in 
Trojani cannot apply. 
20 Spaventa 2007, 30; Boeles et al 2009, 72.
21 Boeles et al 2009, 73–74. See also Vermeulen 2008, 496. 
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members.22 Nevertheless, because of their close relationship to the free 
movement of EU citizens, the rights of family members are discussed in 
this chapter.
The derivative character of the above rights means that family mem­
bers of an EU citizen are only entitled to residence in the Member State in 
which that EU citizen resides.23 Another consequence is that family mem­
bers can only claim a right of residence in situations where refusal to 
admit them would impede the EU citizen’s exercising his or her rights 
and freedoms granted by the TFEU.24 This does not necessarily imply that 
the right to family reunification is limited to situations in which the EU 
citizen has physically moved to a Member State other than that of his 
nationality. In Carpenter, the CoJ accepted that EU citizens are entitled to 
be joined by their family members in their own Member State when they 
provide cross­border services in another Member State.25 Additionally, the 
Court accepted that EU citizens are allowed to be accompanied by their 
family members when they move back to their own country after having 
exercised their right of free movement elsewhere in the EU. This right 
exists irrespective of whether the EU citizen is going to engage in eco­
nomic activity in his or her own Member State upon his or her return.26 
More recently, it has become clear that national measures concerning fam­
ily reunification can also impede the rights of EU citizens outside the free 
movement context. In Ruiz Zambrano, the CoJ formulated as a general 
criterion that Article 20 TFEU ‘precludes national measures which have 
the effect of depriving Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights conferred by virtue of that status’. In that case, the 
Court found that the right of dependent children, who are EU citizens, to 
reside in the territory of the EU can be impeded if a right of residence is 
not granted to their parents or carers (see further section III.E).27
Notwithstanding this case law, there are still wholly or purely internal 
situations, in which the EU national remains in the Member State of his or 
her nationality and the exercise of his or her rights or freedoms granted by 
EU law would not be impeded if the admission of family members were 
to be refused. These situations fall outside the scope of EU law, conse­
quently the EU citizens concerned cannot rely on EU law to claim a right 
to family reunification.28 It is therefore possible (and this is also the case in 
22 cp CoJ 11 December 2007, C­291/05 [2007] ECR I­10719 (Eind), paras 23–24; CoJ 5 May 
2011, C­434/09 [2011] ECR 0000 (McCarthy), para 42 and CoJ (Grand Chamber) 15 November 
2011, C­256/11 [2011] ECR 00000 (Dereci), para 55.
23 cp Art 3(1) Residence Directive.
24 Luijendijk 2005, 156–57; CoJ 27 October 1982, C­35/82 and 36/82 [1982] ECR. 3723 
(Morson & Jhanjan); McCarthy (n 22), para 54.
25 CoJ 11 July 2002, C­60/00 [2002] ECR I­6279 (Carpenter), para 46.
26 CoJ 7 July 1992, C­370/90 [1992] ECR I­4265 (Surinder Singh), para 21; Eind (n 22), paras 
35–38.
27 CoJ (Grand Chamber) 8 March 2011, C­34/09 [2011] ECR 0000 (Ruiz Zambrano), para 44.
28 eg, Morson and Jhanjan (n 24), para 16; CoJ 5 June 1997, C­64/96 and 65/96 [1997] ECR 
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the Netherlands) that, within one Member State, nationals of that state 
who do not exercise the rights granted to them as EU citizens face tougher 
conditions for family reunification than nationals of other Member 
States. This situation is commonly referred to as ‘reverse discrimination’. 
Notwithstanding the arguments made by various authors, neither the CoJ 
nor the EU legislator have as yet accepted that the right to family reunifi­
cation is a general right that comes with the mere status of being an EU 
citizen.29
B. Family Members Entitled to Entry and Residence in the Member 
States
Family members of EU citizens have a right of residence in the Member 
State where the EU citizen resides, regardless of their own nationality. 
This follows logically from the fact that their rights derive from those of 
EU citizens: it is their capacity as family members that matters rather than 
their coming within the personal scope of the treaty provisions on free 
movement. Thus, the definition of who is a ‘family member’ in Article 
2(2) Residence Directive covers EU citizens as well as third­country 
nationals.
Under the Residence Directive, the family members entitled to be 
admitted to the Member State where the EU citizen resides are:
•  the spouse or registered partner (if the legislation of the host Member 
State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage);
•  the children, as well as the children of the partner or spouse, provided 
that they are under 21 or dependent on the parents;
•  the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line, as well as those of 
the spouse or partner.30
The latter category of family members is not taken into account if the EU 
citizen is a student residing under the conditions set out in Article 7(1)(c) 
I­3171 (Uecker and Jacquet), paras 16–20; CoJ (Grand Chamber) 1 April 2008, C­212/06 [2008] 
ECR I­1683 (Government of the French Community and Walloon Government), para 33; McCarthy 
(n 22), para 54; Dereci (n 22), para 60.
29 Toner 2004, 75–77. For a comprehensive argument supporting the elimination of reverse 
discrimination, see Spaventa 2007, 113–34. See also Verschueren 2009 and Walter 2008. The 
issue of reverse discrimination is discussed in more detail in ch 10. 
30 It may be observed that the Residence Directive does not regulate the position of all persons 
entitled to entry and residence as family members of EU citizens since it only applies to family mem-
bers of EU citizens who have moved to another Member State. As discussed in section III.A, a right to 
family reunification may also exist for EU citizens who have not moved to another Member State (cp 
the Carpenter case). It is assumed here that, in such a situation, the conditions governing the entry and 
residence of the family members (and the definition of who is a family member) are in principle the 
same as those laid down in the Residence Directive. 
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of the Residence Directive.31 In that case, dependent relatives in the 
ascending line are covered by the provisions of Article 3(2) of the direc­
tive. According to this Article, the Member States shall ‘facilitate’ the entry 
and residence of certain categories of family members not covered by the 
definition of Article 2(2). The contents of the obligation to ‘facilitate’ entry 
and residence are discussed below (section III.D).
Lastly, the Residence Directive applies irrespective of whether a family 
member who is a third­country national had legal residence in the EU 
before joining the EU citizen. The requirement of previous lawful resi­
dence appeared to follow from the CoJ’s judgment in Akrich, where the 
Court held that the Moroccan spouse of an EU citizen could not ‘repair’ 
his irregular residence status by moving with his wife to another Member 
State.32 However, the Court later dismissed this position in Metock, where 
it concluded that the condition of previous lawful residence was incom­
patible with the Residence Directive.33 In the same judgment the CoJ 
determined that the directive applies irrespective of when or where the 
marriage between the EU citizen and the third­country national took 
place or how the third­country national entered the host Member State.34
C. Conditions for the Entry and Residence of Family Members
The conditions for exercising the right of free movement by family mem­
bers of EU citizens are also laid down in the Residence Directive. These 
conditions may differ depending on whether the family member has the 
nationality of an EU Member State or of a third country.35 The discussion 
in this section again focuses on the conditions for residence of more than 
three months.
Family members of EU citizens are entitled to residence if they accom­
pany or join an EU citizen satisfying the conditions set out in Article 7(1)
(a), (b) or (c) Residence directive (see section II). This condition is the same 
for family members who are EU nationals themselves as for third­country 
nationals.36 Furthermore, as is the case for EU citizens, the right of family 
members to enter and reside in the Member States may be restricted on 
grounds of public policy, public security or public health. Again, however, 
31 See Art 7(4) Residence Directive.
32 CoJ 23 September 2003, C­109/01 [2003] ECR I­9607 (Akrich), para 50. 
33 CoJ (Grand Chamber) 25 July 2008, C­127/08, [2008] ECR I­6241 (Metock and others), 
para 80.
34 ibid, para 99.
35 Of course, a family member who is an EU national may well be entitled to entry and 
residence independently of the person to whose family he or she belongs. This is even more 
likely since the right of free movement is linked to the mere status of being an EU citizen and 
does not necessarily require the exercise of any economic activity. The conditions for exercis­
ing the right of free movement by EU citizens were discussed in section II. 
36 Art 7(1)(d) and (2) Residence Directive.
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such restrictions are subject to compliance with the conditions and proce­
dural safeguards provided in the Residence Directive, as well as with the 
general principles of EU law. The relevant provisions apply regardless of 
the nationality of the family member concerned. 
For persons who are family members of EU citizens within the meaning 
of Article 2(2) Residence Directive, no residence conditions may be 
imposed other than those set out above. For these persons, therefore, 
Member States are not entitled to make admission to their territory 
dependent on integration conditions. The following subsections consider 
the position of family members not falling within the scope of Article 2(2) 
Residence Directive. Section III.D concerns family members coming 
within the scope of Article 3(2) Residence Directive, whereas section III.E 
deals with persons entitled to reside in a Member State because of being 
the primary carers of their children.
D. Article 3(2) Residence Directive: ‘Facilitating’ Entry and Residence
In principle, EU citizens are not entitled to family reunification with fam­
ily members other than those mentioned in Article 2(2) Residence 
Directive. Nevertheless, Article 3(2) Residence Directive contains an obli­
gation for Member States to facilitate, in accordance with their national 
legislation, the entry and residence of persons who are dependants or 
members of the household of EU citizens in the Member State of origin. 
Article 3(2) also covers family members who, because of serious health 
reasons, strictly require to be cared for by the Union citizen, the unmar­
ried partner with whom an EU citizen has a durable and duly attested 
relationship and the dependent parents of EU citizens who are students 
(and the parents of their spouses or partners).37 
Article 3(2) Residence Directive raises the question of what exactly the 
obligation to ‘facilitate’ entry and residence entails and, for the purposes 
of this study, whether this provision allows the admission of family mem­
bers to be made dependent on integration conditions.38 It may be derived 
from the wording of the provision, as well as from its context, that Member 
States are not required to grant those covered by Article 3(2) a right of 
37 Art 7(4) Residence Directive.
38 Before the Residence Directive entered into force, similar obligations were laid down in 
Art 10(2) of Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement 
for workers within the Community (OJ Series I Chapter 1968(II), 475) and Art 1(2) of Council 
Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and resi­
dence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment 
and the provision of services ([1973] OJ L172/14). However these provisions have not been 
subject to interpretation by the CoJ, see Toner 2004, 51. At the time of writing, preliminary 
questions concerning the interpretation of Art 3(2) Residence Directive had been put to the 
CoJ in the case of Rahman (C­83/11). The Conclusions of the Advocate General were deliv­
ered on 27 March 2012.
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entry and residence on the same footing as the family members referred to 
in Article 2(2). Instead, the reference to the national legislations of the 
Member States suggests that it remains up to those states to determine 
whether they choose to grant a right of entry and residence to the family 
members concerned and, if so, under which conditions.39 
Nonetheless, if a request for family reunification is made with regard to 
a person covered by Article 3(2), the Member State concerned has to assess 
this request on an individual basis to see whether a right of entry or resi­
dence may be granted. This clearly follows from the provision itself, 
which states that ‘the host Member State shall undertake an extensive 
examination of the personal circumstances of the persons concerned and 
shall justify any denial of entry or residence to these people’. Additionally, 
the preamble of the directive states that the situation of family members 
not covered by Article 2(2) must be ‘examined by the host Member State 
on the basis of its own national legislation in order to decide whether 
entry and residence could be granted to such persons’.40 
The term ‘facilitate’ suggests that the examination conducted by the 
Member State should, in principle, be aimed at granting a right of entry or 
residence on an individual basis. This implies that due weight must be 
given to the interests of the family and that refusal of entry or residence 
must be based on reasons of sufficient substance. All the circumstances of 
the case have to be taken into account in this respect, in particular the 
family member’s relationship with, and his or her financial or physical 
dependence on the Union citizen. The legislation of a Member State that 
gives effect to Article 3(2) Residence Directive also has to be in conformity 
with EU fundamental rights and with the general principles of EU law. 
Here, the right to respect for family life is of particular relevance.41 While 
this right does not offer any more specific criteria for the implementation 
of Article 3(2) than those set out above, it may serve as additional support 
for a decision in favour of family reunification. 
It may be concluded that Article 3(2) Residence Directive does not, in 
principle, rule out Member States’ competence to make the admission of 
persons covered by this provision dependent on integration conditions. 
However, requests for family reunification must always be assessed on an 
individual basis, with a view to granting a right of entry or residence. 
Thus if a family member does not meet the integration conditions imposed 
by a Member State, his or her request will still have to be individually 
examined to see whether the personal circumstances nevertheless require 
entry or residence to be granted. This examination and the possibility of 
39 See also Toner 2004, 67.
40 Preamble, recital 6.
41 The right to family life is laid down in Art 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It 
is also laid down in Art 8 ECHR and as such constitutes a general principle of EU law on the 
basis of Art 6(3) TEU.
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granting residence have to be provided for in the national legislation of 
the Member State in the form, for example, of a hardship clause. 
E. Additional Residence Rights for Carers: from Baumbast to Ruiz 
Zambrano
As a final observation with regard to the family members of EU citizens, 
attention may be drawn to a series of CoJ judgments that identify new 
rights of residence in addition to those covered by the Residence Directive. 
These judgments concern the rights of children, as well as those of the 
persons responsible for them as their primary carers. 
First, in Baumbast, the Court addressed the position of an EU migrant 
worker’s children who moved with that worker to another Member State 
and enrolled in the local school system. The CoJ decided that, in such cir­
cumstances, the children remained entitled to reside in that Member State 
under Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 to pursue their education, even 
after their parent ceased to be a migrant worker. The Court also held that 
the children were entitled to be accompanied by the other parent, who 
was their primary carer, so that their right of residence would be facili­
tated. With regard to both the children and their carer, the right of resi­
dence was held to exist irrespective of their nationality.42 In the recent 
cases of Ibrahim and Teixeira the CoJ not only confirmed its judgment in 
Baumbast, but also specified that the right of residence of the child’s carer 
is based only on Article 12 Regulation 1612/68 and is not subject to the 
conditions laid down in the Residence Directive.43 In particular, the Court 
held that the right continues to exist even if the parent has insufficient 
resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of 
the host Member State. It did not matter in that respect that, in Ibrahim, the 
parent who was an EU migrant worker had only held that status for less 
than a year. 
In Chen the situation was somewhat different as the child was an EU 
citizen who had a right of residence on the basis of Article 21 TFEU (then 
Art 18 TEC) instead of Article 12 Regulation 1612/68. However, as in 
Baumbast, the Court held that the person who was the child’s primary 
carer (in this case her Chinese mother) was entitled to stay with her 
because otherwise the child’s right of residence could not be effectively 
realised.44 This decision was confirmed in Ruiz Zambrano, where the Court 
decided that a right of residence had to be granted to the father (a 
Columbian national) of two dependent children who had Belgian nation­
42 Baumbast (n 16), paras 63 and 75.
43 CoJ (Grand Chamber) 23 February 2010, C­310/08 [2010] ECR I­01065 (Ibrahim), para 50; 
CoJ (Grand Chamber) 23 February 2010, C­480/08 [2010] ECR I­01107 (Teixeira), paras 66–70.
44 Chen (n 7), para 47. 
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ality and were therefore entitled to reside in the EU on the basis of Article 
20 TFEU.45
The above case law shows that, in addition to the rights governed by 
the Residence Directive, Member States may be obliged to allow the resi­
dence in their territory of EU citizens and third­country nationals on the 
grounds that these persons are the primary carers of children who are EU 
citizens and whose rights would otherwise be impeded. The precise 
extent of this obligation is not yet clear.46 Given the stance taken by the 
CoJ in Ibrahim and Teixeira, however, it seems almost certain that condi­
tions relating to this right of residence (including integration require­
ments) will be considered incompatible with the relevant provisions (Art 
12 Regulation 1612/68 and Art 21 TFEU). It does not seem to be relevant 
in this respect whether the parent was already residing in the Member 
State concerned when the child gained his or her right of residence, pro­
viding the parent is the primary carer and the child is not able to exercise 
his or her right independently.
IV. THE RIGHT TO FREE MOVEMENT OF NATIONALS OF THE EEA 
MEMBER STATES AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS
A third category of persons with free movement rights similar to those of 
EU citizens includes nationals of the States Parties to the Agreement on 
the European Economic Area (the EEA Agreement),47 and the family 
members of those nationals, regardless of their nationality. The EEA 
Agreement, to which both the EU and its Member States are parties, con­
tains provisions on the free movement of workers, the right to establish­
ment and the free movement of services that are substantially the same as 
those laid down in the TFEU (section II).48 On the basis of these provi­
sions, nationals of EEA Member States are entitled to move and reside 
freely in the territories of the EU Member States. Family members of EEA 
nationals are not mentioned in the EEA Agreement. Like the family mem­
bers of EU citizens however (section III), they derive their right of entry 
and residence from the right to free movement of the EEA nationals. 
When the EEA Agreement was signed in 1994, its provisions regarding 
the free movement of persons corresponded to those of the acquis 
45 Ruiz Zambrano (n 27), para 45.
46 See the Conclusions of the Advocate General in the case of Iida, C­40/11. This case con­
cerns a Japanese father who relied on EU law to obtain residence in Germany, in order to be 
able to exercise his visiting rights to his daughter who lived with her mother in Austria.
47 [1994] OJ L1/3. Apart from the 27 EU Member States, the states parties to this Agreement 
are Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. Iceland is currently a candidate Member State of the 
EU, negotiations on accession were opened on 27 June 2010 (see http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement). 
48 See Arts 28 and following, 31 and following and 36 and following of the EEA Agreement.
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communautaire at that moment.49 However, an EEA Joint Committee was 
created with the task of monitoring developments in EU law and incorpo­
rating them into EEA law.50 In December 2007 this Joint Committee 
adopted a Decision incorporating the EU Residence Directive into the 
EEA framework. Consequently, the provisions of this directive are now 
equally applicable to EEA citizens and their family members, provided 
they come within the scope of the free movement provisions in the EEA 
Agreement.51 The Joint Committee also monitors case law of the CoJ and 
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court to ensure the homo­
geneous application of provisions of the EEA Agreement with the corre­
sponding provisions of EU law.52 
A difference between the EEA Agreement and the TFEU is that the for­
mer does not contain any provisions on citizenship comparable to Articles 
20 and 21 TFEU. As a result, EEA nationals are not entitled to free move­
ment merely on the grounds of their nationality. The right to entry and 
residence is therefore available only to EEA nationals who move for the 
purpose of exercising economic activities, as foreseen by the Agreement.53 
Despite the CoJ’s expansive interpretation of the economic free movement 
provisions, it follows that the rights of EEA nationals (and consequently 
those of their family members) are more limited than those of EU citizens. 
This difference may become more significant in the future if free move­
ment rights are increasingly linked to EU citizenship instead of to market 
participation.54 
Where EEA nationals and their family members have a right to enter 
and reside in EU Member States, it follows from the above that the condi­
tions governing these rights are the same as for EU citizens and their fam­
ily members. Consequently, it may be concluded that the admission of 
EEA nationals and their family members who are entitled to free move­
ment may not be conditioned upon the fulfilment of integration condi­
tions. For family members falling within the scope of Article 3(2) Residence 
Directive, the Member States are obliged to facilitate entry and residence 
subject to the conditions discussed in section III.D.55
49 Luijendijk 2005, 155. 
50 Weiss and Wooldridge 2007, 207.
51 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 158/2007 of 7 December 2007, [2008] OJ 
L124/20. The provisions of the directive have been incorporated into Annexes V and VIII to 
the EEA Agreement on the free movement of workers and the right to establishment. 
52 Art 105 EEA Agreement.
53 This is confirmed in the preamble of the above Decision of the EEA Joint Committee 
concerning the Residence Directive. Recital 8 of this preamble states that ‘the concept of 
“Union Citizenship” is not included in the Agreement’. In addition, both Annexes V and VIII 
to the EEA Agreement state that the Residence Directive shall apply ‘to the fields covered by 
those annexes’; in other words, to the free movement of workers and the right to establish­
ment.
54 Luijendijk 2005, 155–56; Hedemann­Robinson 2001, 539–40.
55 It is not entirely clear whether the reference to ‘family members’ in Decision 158/2007 
of the EEA Joint Committee (n 51) also includes the family members meant in Art 3(2) 
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V. SWISS NATIONALS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS
A. Free Movement of Swiss Nationals: the EC-Switzerland Agreement
For Swiss nationals and their family members, the right to free movement 
is regulated by the Agreement between the EC and its Member States on 
the one hand, and the Swiss Confederation on the other, on the free move­
ment of persons (the ‘EC­Switzerland Agreement’).56 This Agreement 
aims, inter alia, to accord to nationals of Switzerland a right of entry and 
residence in the territory of the EU Member States.57 Provisions relating to 
the entry and residence of Swiss nationals and their family members are 
laid down in Articles 3–7 and in Annex I pertaining to the Agreement. 
The right to free movement of Swiss nationals is clearly modelled on 
that of EU citizens and reflects the acquis communautaire as it stood when 
the EC­Switzerland Agreement was signed.58 Article 16(1) provides that
the Contracting Parties shall, in order to attain the objectives pursued by the 
Agreement, take all measures necessary to ensure that rights and obligations 
equivalent to those contained in the legal acts of the EC to which reference is 
made are applied in relations between them. 
It is unclear whether this obligation also concerns the rights and obliga­
tions laid down in the EU Residence Directive. Although this directive 
was adopted after the entry into force of the EC­Switzerland Agreement 
and is not mentioned by it, it replaces a number of directives to which the 
Agreement refers.59 Elements of the Residence Directive that are more 
favourable than those of the EC­Switzerland Agreement include, for 
example, the lack of a housing requirement for the family reunification of 
Swiss workers and a right of family reunification with registered partners. 
Like the EEA Agreement, the EC­Switzerland Agreement does not 
include provisions on citizenship comparable to those of the TFEU. 
The CoJ has also held on several occasions that the objective of the 
Residence Directive who are third­country nationals. According to the Joint Declaration 
attached to the decision, the EEA Agreement does not apply to third­country nationals. An 
exception is made for family members of EEA nationals ‘as their rights are corollary to the 
right of free movement of EEA nationals’, but the term ‘family members’ is not defined. 
Given that the obligation laid down in Art 3(2) Residence Directive also serves to remove 
obstacles for the free movement of EU citizens, it is assumed here that the same obligation 
exists under the EEA Agreement.
56 [2002] OJ L114/6.
57 Art 1(a) and (c) EC­Switzerland Agreement.
58 Luijendijk 2005, 155. See also Art 16(2) of the Agreement which states that, in so far as 
the application of the Agreement involves concepts of Community law, the case law of the 
CoJ prior to the signature of the Agreement shall be taken into account. On this provision, 
see Boillet 2010, 54–58.
59 Boillet 2010, 22.
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EC­Switzerland Agreement is not for Switzerland to join the internal mar­
ket of the EU, with the aim of removing all obstacles to an area of total free 
movement analogous to that provided by a national market. The Court 
therefore determined that ‘the interpretation given to the provisions of 
Community law concerning the internal market cannot be automatically 
applied in analogy to the interpretation of the Agreement, unless there are 
express provisions to that effect laid down by the Agreement itself’.60 
It follows that the right to free movement of Swiss nationals will not 
necessarily develop in the same way as the right to free movement of 
EU citizens. Below, a summary is given of the provisions relating to the 
entry and residence of Swiss nationals and their family as they currently 
stand.
B. The Right to Entry and Residence of Swiss Nationals and their 
Family Members
Swiss nationals are entitled to enter EU Member States if they are in the 
possession of a valid identity card or passport. Family members who are 
not nationals of an EU Member State or Switzerland may require an entry 
visa. However, the Contracting Parties must grant these persons every 
facility for obtaining any necessary visas.61 It is submitted that the issue of 
an entry visa to family members of Swiss nationals may not be subjected 
to any conditions other than those that must be fulfilled in order to qualify 
for entry or residence under the Agreement as this would clearly under­
mine the Agreement’s effectiveness in relation to the stated objective of 
according a right of entry to Swiss nationals.
A right of residence is available to Swiss nationals who qualify as work­
ers, self­employed persons or persons who are not economically active.62 
With the exception of workers employed for a period of less than one year, 
these persons must be granted a residence permit for at least five years.63 
For workers and self­employed persons the only conditions for the issue 
of a residence permit are possession of the document with which they 
60 CoJ 12 November 2009, C­351/08 [2009] ECR I­0000 (Grimme), paras 27 and 29; CoJ 
11 February 2010, C­541/08 [2010] ECR I­0000 (Fokus Invest), paras 27 and 28 and CoJ 15 July 
2010, C­70/09 [2010] ECR I­0000 (Hengartner and Gasser), paras 41 and 42.
61 Art 1(1) of Annex I to the EC­Switzerland Agreement.
62 Art 4 and 6 EC­Switzerland Agreement. A right of residence also exists for providers 
and recipients of services under Art 5 EC­Switzerland Agreement. However, this right exists 
only for the duration of the service and is therefore necessarily temporary. This follows from 
the CoJ’s judgment in Gebhard (n 7), which predates the signing of the EC­Switzerland 
Agreement and is therefore relevant to its interpretation (cp Art 16(2) of the Agreement). As 
stated above, the right to temporary residence is unlikely to be made subject to integration 
conditions. Therefore the residence rights of providers and recipients of services are not dis­
cussed in this chapter. 
63 Arts 6(1), 12(1) and 24(1) of Annex I EC­Switzerland Agreement. 
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entered the EU Member State and proof of their employment or self­
employment. Persons who are not economically active must demonstrate 
that they have sufficient financial means not to have to apply for social 
benefits during their stay and comprehensive health insurance. Students, 
who are also included in the Agreement as not economically active 
persons, must demonstrate that they have sufficient financial means to 
ensure that neither they nor their family members will make any claim for 
social security, that they are registered for a vocational training course at 
an approved establishment and that they have comprehensive health 
insurance.64
Swiss nationals with the right to reside in an EU Member State are enti­
tled to be joined by their family members, regardless of their nationality.65 
Consequently, as for family members of EU and EEA nationals, the right 
of residence of family members of Swiss nationals depends on the exercis­
ing of the right of free movement by those Swiss nationals. According to 
the definition in the EC-Switzerland Agreement, family members are:
•  the spouse and relatives in the descending line, the latter if they are 
under the age of 21 and dependent;
•  dependent relatives in the ascending line of the Swiss national and his 
or  her spouse;
• in the case of a student, the spouse and dependent children.66
With regard to the family members of workers, the EC­Switzerland 
Agreement requires the worker to have adequate housing.67 Other than 
that, the only conditions for the residence of family members of Swiss 
nationals are that they must possess the document with which they 
entered the territory and proof of their family relationship and, if applica­
ble, their dependency.68 
As is the case for EU citizens and their family members (sections II.B 
and III.C), Swiss nationals and their family members may be refused entry 
and residence on the grounds of public policy, public security and public 
health.69 However, it may be concluded from the above that the enacting 
of integration conditions would be contrary to the provisions of the 
EC­Switzerland Agreement on the right of entry and residence of Swiss 
64 Art 24(4) Annex I EC­Switzerland Agreement.
65 Arts 7(d) and 3 of Annex I EC­Switzerland Agreement.
66 Art 3(2) Annex I EC-Switzerland Agreement. It may be observed that this definition is 
more limited than that in the EU Residence Directive as it does not mention persons with 
whom the Swiss national has entered into a registered partnership (section III). As men­
tioned above (section V.A), it is unclear whether the right to family reunification must be 
applied in accordance with the Residence Directive as this directive is not explicitly referred 
to in the Agreement. 
67 Art 3(1) Annex I EC­Switzerland Agreement. Again, it is unclear whether this require­
ment is still valid as it is not included in the Residence Directive.
68 Art 3(3) Annex I EC­Switzerland Agreement.
69 Art 5 Annex I EC­Switzerland Agreement.
238 The Right to Free Movement in EU Law
nationals and their family members. Consequently, such conditions may 
not be imposed on persons coming within the scope of this Agreement. 
C. Other Family Members: the Obligation to Facilitate Entry and 
Residence 
As a final observation, it must be mentioned that Article 3(2) Annex I to 
the EC­Switzerland Agreement contains a clause similar to Article 3(2) 
Residence Directive (section III.D). According to this provision, the 
Contracting Parties have agreed to facilitate the admission of family mem­
bers who do not have a right to free movement, but who are dependent on 
the Swiss national or who lived with that national in the country of origin. 
It is submitted that this ‘obligation to facilitate’ corresponds to that laid 
down in the Residence Directive. This means that EU Member States 
may set conditions (including integration conditions) for the entry and 
residence of the family members covered by this provision, but that 
requests for family reunification must always be subject to an individual 
assessment with a view to granting admission. 
VI. THIRD­COUNTRY NATIONALS WHO ARE LONG­TERM 
RESIDENTS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS
A. The Long-term Residents Directive
One more category of beneficiaries of the right to free movement in the 
EU is that of third­country nationals who have obtained the status of 
‘long­term resident’. Unlike EU citizens, long­term resident third­country 
nationals (‘long­term residents’) do not derive their right of free move­
ment from the provisions of the TFEU on citizenship or the free move­
ment of persons. Instead, a legal basis can be found in the treaty provisions 
concerning policies on border checks, asylum and immigration.70 
Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, Article 61 TEC provided for 
the Council to adopt a number of measures ‘in order to establish progres­
sively an area of freedom, security and justice’. These included measures 
‘in the fields of . . . immigration and safeguarding the rights of third coun­
try nationals’, more specifically measures regarding ‘conditions of entry 
and residence’ and ‘defining the rights and conditions under which 
nationals of third countries who are legally resident in a Member State 
may reside in other Member States’.71 The wording of the relevant provi­
70 Part III, Title V, Chapter 2 TFEU (formerly Part III, Title IV TEC).
71 Arts 61(b) and 63(3) and (4) TEC.
 Long-term Resident Third-country Nationals 239
sions of the TFEU is slightly different, as Articles 67(2) and 79(1) TFEU 
provide for the Union to develop a common immigration policy which is 
fair towards third­country nationals and ensures the fair treatment of 
third­country nationals legally residing in the Member States. For this 
purpose, measures are to be adopted concerning ‘the conditions of entry 
and residence’ and ‘the definition of the rights of third country nationals 
residing legally in a Member State, including the conditions governing 
freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States’.72 Article 
45(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights also provides that the right 
of free movement and residence may be granted, in accordance with the 
Treaties, to third­country nationals who are legally resident in the terri­
tory of a Member State. This illustrates that the right to free movement is 
considered in the EU legal order as a fundamental right, which is availa­
ble to EU citizens but may also be extended to third­country nationals. 
The right of free movement of long­term resident third­country nation­
als is regulated in the Long­term Residents Directive (LRD), which was 
adopted on the basis of Articles 63(3) and (4) TEC.73 The deadline for 
implementing this directive expired on 23 January 2006. The LRD sets out 
both the terms under which third­country nationals must be granted the 
status of long­term resident in a Member State and the conditions govern­
ing the right of residence in another Member State.74 The terms relating to 
the conferral of long­term resident status are not of interest for the pur­
pose of this study as this status can only be obtained after five years of 
legal residence. Instead, the discussion in this chapter focuses on the con­
ditions under which third­country nationals with long­term resident sta­
tus are entitled to enter and reside in another Member State. Although 
more restricted, the right of long­term residents to some extent resembles 
the right of free movement of EU citizens. Like EU citizens, long­term 
residents who move to another Member State are entitled to be joined by 
their family members. Their position is discussed in section VI.E.
B. Objectives 
The LRD thus determines the terms under which long­term residents may 
take up residence in another Member State. The preamble provides some 
information as to the underlying objectives pursued by the directive. 
Recital 2 refers to the Conclusions of the European Council held in 
Tampere in 1999, where it was stated that the legal status of third­country 
72 Art 79(2)(a) and (b) TFEU.
73 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003, [2004] OJ L16/44, as amended by 
Directive 2011/51/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 May 2011, [2011] OJ 
L132/1.
74 Art 1 LRD.
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nationals should be approximated to that of EU citizens and that long­
term residents should be granted a set of uniform rights in the Member 
State where they reside which are as close as possible to those enjoyed by 
EU citizens. As the aim to grant uniform rights is limited to the Member 
State where the third­country national resides, this aim can be understood 
as not referring to the right of free movement between the Member States. 
Nevertheless, the statement regarding the approximation of the legal sta­
tus of third­country nationals to that of EU citizens is framed in general 
terms and may therefore be taken to include EU citizens’ right of free 
movement. 
The preamble furthermore states that the treatment of long­term resi­
dents should be equal to that of citizens of the Union ‘in a wide range of 
economic and social matters’ in order to achieve the integration of those 
long­term residents, which is, in turn, a key element in the fundamental 
EU objective of promoting economic and social cohesion.75 In Commission 
v the Netherlands, the CoJ stated that ‘the principal purpose of [the LRD] is 
the integration of third­country nationals who are settled on a long­term 
basis in the Member States’.76 The legislative history of the LRD shows 
that long­term residents’ right to reside in other Member States is to be 
seen as one of the instruments for such integration.77 Notably, this concept 
of integration differs from that underpinning Dutch integration policy. 
The assumption underlying the LRD would appear to be that the integra­
tion of long­term residents will be furthered by a secure residence status.78 
Nevertheless, as shown below, the directive creates a possibility to make 
the residence of long­term residents conditional upon integration require­
ments. Consequently, like the Family Reunification Directive (chapter 4, 
section V.A), the Long­term Residents Directive incorporates different 
and even contradictory conceptions of integration. Lastly, the preamble 
also indicates that establishing conditions governing the right of long­
term residents to reside in another Member State should also contribute to 
the effective attainment of an internal market as an area in which the free 
movement of persons is ensured and constitute a major factor of mobility 
in the Union’s employment market.79
75 Preamble, recitals 4 and 12. 
76 CoJ 26 April 2012, C­508/10 [2012] ECR 00000 (Commission v the Netherlands), para 66; 
see also CoJ (Grand Chamber) 24 April 2012, C­571/10 [2012] ECR 00000 (Kamberaj), paras 
81, 86 and 90.
77 Iglesias Sánchez 2009a, 799, referring to the Proposal for the Directive, COM (2001) 127 
final, [2001] OJ C240 E24/79. 
78 Groenendijk 2004, 122; see also the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the application of Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents, COM(2011) 585 final, 1.
79 Preamble, recital 18.
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C. The Right of Long-term Residents to Reside in Another Member 
State
Article 14(1) LRD grants third­country nationals who have obtained long­
term resident status in one Member State the right to reside in another 
Member State for a period of more than three months. This right may be 
exercised for the purpose of undertaking an economic activity as an 
employed or self­employed person, for studies or vocational training or 
for other purposes.80 The right of residence in another Member State is not 
granted to posted workers or providers of cross­border services, while 
Member States also remain free to determine, in accordance with their 
national legislation, the conditions concerning the residence of seasonal 
and cross­border workers.81 
The LRD does not contain any provisions relating to the right of long­
term residents to enter the second Member State. Instead, this right can be 
found in Article 21(1) of the Schengen Implementing Convention,82 which 
provides that third­country nationals holding a valid residence permit 
issued by one of the Contracting Parties may move freely in the territory 
of the other Contracting Parties for up to three months. Long­term resi­
dents wishing to take up residence in the second Member State for a 
longer period must apply for a residence permit within those three 
months.83 To be granted a residence permit, the long­term resident must 
meet the conditions set out in Article 15 LRD. Of particular relevance for 
the purpose of this study is the possibility for Member States to require 
third­country nationals to comply with integration measures (Art 15(3) 
LRD). This possibility exists unless the third­country national has already 
had to comply with integration conditions in order to obtain long­term 
resident status in the first Member State.84 In the latter case the long­term 
resident can only be required to attend language courses.85 
80 Art 14(2) LRD. 
81 Art 14(5) LRD. The possibility of instituting a quota for long­term residents coming 
from another Member State, as foreseen by Art 14(4) LRD, is not relevant for the Netherlands 
as no such limitation was included in its national legislation at the time when the directive 
was adopted.
82 [2000] OJ L239/19. 
83 Art 15(1) LRD. According to this provision, Member States may accept applications for 
residence permits made by long-term residents who are still in the first Member State, but 
they are not obliged to do so.
84 See Art 5(2) LRD.
85 The full text of Art 15(3) LRD reads: 
Member States may require third country nationals to comply with integration measures, 
in accordance with national law. 
This condition shall not apply where the third country nationals concerned have been 
required to comply with integration conditions in order to be granted long­term resident 
status, in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 (2).
Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, the persons concerned may be required 
to attend language courses.
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The scope and contents of Article 15(3) LRD are examined in more 
detail in the following subsections. The first questions discussed are 
whether the right of residence in the second Member State depends on the 
long­term resident’s compliance with integration requirements and when 
such requirements may be imposed (before or after residence is granted). 
The other questions are what type of integration requirements may be 
imposed, and whether any limitations to Member States’ discretion fol­
low from the directive or from other rules of EU law. In this connection it 
may be recalled that acts of the Member States that come within the scope 
of application of EU law must be in conformity with fundamental rights 
and other general principles of EU law. Arguably these acts include inte­
gration requirements adopted pursuant to Article 15(3) LRD.86
D. Compliance with Integration Measures as a Condition for 
Residence in the Second Member State: the Meaning of Article 15(3) 
LRD
i. Integration as a Condition for Residence?
The first issue to be addressed is whether it follows from Article 15(3) 
LRD that compliance with integration requirements, as laid down in the 
Member State’s national legislation, is a condition for entitlement to resi­
dence in a second Member State. In this respect, the text of Article 15(3) is 
not very precise as it merely states that ‘Member States may require third 
country nationals to comply with integration measures, in accordance 
with national law’. This does not reveal anything about the consequences 
of such requirements not being fulfilled. However, Article 15 LRD is 
headed ‘Conditions for residence in a second Member State’, whereas 
Article 14(1) LRD clearly states that long­term residents will acquire the 
right to reside in the second Member State ‘provided that the conditions 
set out in this chapter are met’. In addition, it follows from Articles 19(2) 
and 22(1)(b) LRD that Member States may refuse, withdraw or refuse to 
renew a residence permit if the conditions provided for in Articles 14, 15 
and 16 are not or no longer fulfilled. These provisions make it clear that 
non­compliance with the said conditions, including national conditions 
relating to integration, may result in the loss or non­acquisition of the 
right of residence in the second Member State.87 
A different reading of Article 15(3) LRD has been proposed by De Heer, 
who argues that it follows from the overall system and purpose of the 
directive that non­compliance with integration requirements may be 
86 See section V.C.iv of ch 4.
87 See also Iglesias Sánchez 2009a, 800.
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sanctioned by a fine, but cannot result in a loss of residence rights.88 In 
support of this argument, De Heer points out that Member States may 
require compliance with integration requirements as a condition for 
acquisition of long­term resident status, which is the strongest residence 
right granted by the LRD. He concludes that it would be contrary to the 
system of the directive if the same requirement had to be fulfilled (again) 
to obtain residence in the second Member State, while adding that such a 
requirement would also be contrary to the directive’s objective of attain­
ing an internal market.89
In my view these arguments cannot be maintained. Firstly they are not 
compatible with the clear wording of the above provisions (Arts 14(1), 
19(2) and 22(1)(b) LRD), which make it plain that the right to residence is 
conditional upon the fulfilment of integration requirements. Secondly I 
do not believe that the acquisition of long­term resident status must be 
qualified as a ‘stronger’ right than the right to move to a second Member 
State or that these rights in any way overlap. There is, therefore, no reason 
to assume that the same conditions cannot apply to the acquisition of both 
rights, except where this is explicitly stated in the directive (as in Art 15(3), 
second paragraph). Lastly, it is submitted that enacting a right for third­
country nationals to move to another Member State constitutes a step 
towards the further realisation of an internal market, even if this right is 
subject to certain conditions or limitations. Nevertheless, as discussed 
below, the objectives of the LRD (including the attainment of an internal 
market) are not without relevance for the further interpretation of Article 
15(3).
ii. When May Compliance with Integration Requirements be Demanded?
Another matter not expressly stated in the text of Article 15(3) LRD is the 
moment at which a Member State may ask a long­term resident to comply 
with integration requirements. Can such compliance be demanded before 
a residence permit is granted, or only afterwards (as a condition for pre­
serving or prolonging the right of residence)? As shown above, Article 
14(1) LRD states that long­term residents shall acquire the right of resi­
dence in the second Member State if the relevant conditions are met. 
Article 19(2) LRD also provides that a residence permit must be granted 
‘if the conditions in Articles 14, 15 and 16 are met’. This suggests that 
Member States may ask for compliance with integration requirements 
before granting a residence permit. On the other hand, Article 22(1)(b) 
88 De Heer 2007, 278.
89 De Heer also assumes that the consequence of the non­acquisition of residence rights in 
the second Member State is incompatible with the use of the term ‘integration measures’ 
(instead of ‘integration conditions’) in Art 15(3) LRD, first paragraph. This argument is 
addressed in section VI.D.v.
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LRD provides that the residence permit may be withdrawn ‘when the 
conditions of Articles 14, 15 and 16 are no longer met’ (emphasis added). 
This suggests that compliance with the said conditions is something that 
can continue to be required after the residence permit has been granted. 
This could apply, for example, if a long­term resident is asked to partici­
pate in an integration programme or language course. It thus appears that 
Article 15(3) allows LRD long­term residents to be asked to meet integra­
tion requirements, both before and after a right of residence has been 
granted in the second Member State. 
The finding that integration requirements may be imposed before 
residence is granted is, however, subject to an exception. As mentioned 
earlier, third­country nationals who have already had to comply with 
integration requirements to obtain long-term resident status in the first 
Member State can only be asked to attend language courses.90 This require­
ment cannot always be easily fulfilled in a Member State other than the 
one in which the long­term resident is expected to integrate. For instance, 
it may not be feasible in practice to ask a person holding long­term 
resident status in Estonia to take a Dutch course in that country before 
moving to the Netherlands. Arguably, therefore, the exemption in Article 
15(3) LRD implies that long­term residents who have already complied 
with integration requirements in the first Member State cannot be asked 
to meet such requirements again before moving to the second Member 
State. It also follows that, for this group of long­term residents, the acqui­
sition of residence in the second Member State cannot be conditioned 
upon the fulfilment of integration requirements.91
iii. Contents of Integration Requirements
The Long-term Residents Directive does not give an overall definition of 
the terms ‘integration measures’ or ‘integration conditions’. The same is 
true with regard to other directives in which these terms are used, the 
Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC) and the Blue Card Directive 
(2009/50/EC). From the text of Article 15(3) LRD it can be derived that the 
integration requirements referred to in this provision may include, but are 
not limited to attendance at language courses. However, in the absence of 
any further definition, it is left to the Member States to determine the con­
tents of integration requirements. This also follows from the wording of 
90 Art 15(3), second and third paragraphs LRD.
91 As explained in section VI.C, long­term residents are allowed to remain in the second 
Member State for a period of up to three months before a residence permit is granted. 
However, Art 15(1) LRD also obliges long­term residents to apply for a residence permit as 
soon as possible after they have entered the second Member State. It is therefore assumed 
that the Member States cannot expect long­term residents to use the three­month period 
after their arrival to comply with integration requirements (ie to attend language classes) 
before applying for residence.
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Article 15(3) LRD, which states that third­country nationals may be required 
to comply with integration measures ‘in accordance with national law’. 
Considering the many possible understandings of the concept of ‘inte­
gration’ (see chapter 3), ‘integration requirements’ could in principle be 
used to pursue a variety of different objectives. These may include par­
ticipation in the social, economic, cultural or political life of the host soci­
ety, the creation of a sense of commitment to the host country or, for 
example, the promotion of interethnic contacts. Integration requirements 
can also take different forms: long­term residents may be required to par­
ticipate in a course or programme, to provide proof of certain skills or 
knowledge (through an exam or by other means), to attend a ceremony or 
submit a declaration of loyalty.92 At first sight, Article 15(3) LRD and the 
provisions in other directives referring to integration requirements do not 
exclude any of these possibilities. Lastly, these provisions do not indicate 
how the financial and organisational responsibilities for fulfilling integra­
tion requirements are to be divided between the long­term resident and 
the host Member State. In other words, it is not stated who should pay for 
the integration course or exam or whether the host Member State has to 
provide study materials or other facilities. 
The legislative history of the LRD provides some insight into the kind 
of integration requirements foreseen by the negotiating parties.93 It shows 
that the inclusion of integration requirements in the directive was pro­
posed by Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. These Member States 
wanted to create scope in the directive for the integration requirements 
already existing in their national legislation, whereby newly arrived 
immigrants were obliged to follow integration programmes from the 
moment they obtained legal residence. The Netherlands also wanted to 
introduce an obligation for certain groups of third­country nationals to 
pay the costs of the integration programme before being admitted. 
According to these three Member States, such requirements were neces­
sary to promote the full participation and self-sufficiency of third-country 
nationals. It was specified that knowledge of the country and of the lan­
guage of the host Member State were considered essential, including for 
improving the opportunities available to third­country nationals in the 
labour market, in education and in other areas of society, and that integra­
tion programmes could include language training, as well as social orien­
tation and vocational training.94 
92 cp the declaration of loyalty that must be made to obtain Dutch citizenship in the 
Netherlands, see Art 6(2) and 8(1)(e) of the Dutch Nationality Act (Rijkswet op het 
Nederlanderschap).
93 For an extensive overview of this history, see Carrera 2009, 175–83.
94 Council doc. 12271/02 of 23 September 2002. A study conducted by Michalowski in 
2003 shows that, at that time, at least seven EU Member States other than the Netherlands 
had some form of integration programme for immigrants, often focusing on language abili­
ties and sometimes on knowledge of the host society. See Michalowski 2003.
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Another Council document shows that the possibility of an integration 
test was also considered.95 As stated above, the final text of the LRD does 
not mention either integration tests or programmes. However, in the 
absence of any indications to the contrary, it must be assumed that the 
requirements that Member States may impose under Article 15(3) LRD 
include both integration tests and programmes (and payment of the costs 
thereof by the long­term resident). Nevertheless, long­term residents who 
have already complied with integration requirements in the first Member 
State in accordance with Article 5(2) LRD can only be required to attend 
language courses (section VI.C). Council documents show that this excep­
tion was introduced because it was deemed undesirable for third­country 
nationals to have to pass an integration test twice: once to acquire long­
term resident status and again for residence in the second Member State.96 
The limitation of the exception clause to language courses seems some­
what surprising, given that other types of integration courses (such as 
social orientation and vocational training) are not necessarily less coun­
try-specific. Nevertheless, the LRD does not preclude Member States from 
offering such courses to long­term residents on a voluntary basis. 
iv. Limitations to the Discretion of the Member States
In spite of the discretion that the LRD leaves to the Member States to 
determine the contents of integration requirements, a number of limita­
tions can also be identified. These follow both from the directive itself and 
from other instruments and provisions of EU law. Firstly, it can be 
assumed that the terms ‘integration conditions’ and ‘integration meas­
ures’ do not cover requirements already covered by other provisions of 
the LRD, for example those relating to income or public policy and public 
security.97 Although the term ‘integration’ is in itself broad enough to 
include such requirements, such an interpretation would run counter 
to the system of the directive and deprive its other provisions of their 
meaning. 
Secondly, integration requirements cannot be of such a nature as to 
undermine the objective or effectiveness of the LRD.98 It is recalled that 
the purpose of the directive is not only to improve the integration of long­
term residents by granting them a legal status similar to that of EU citi­
zens, but also to contribute to the attainment of an internal market and to 
form a factor of mobility in the Union’s employment market (section 
VI.B). Consequently, integration requirements must not have the effect of 
undermining the free movement of third­country nationals who are long­
95 Council doc. 12624/02 of 9 October 2002, 2. 
96 Council doc. 12624/02 of 9 October 2002, 2. 
97 See Arts 15(2) and 17 LRD.
98 Commission v the Netherlands (n 76), para 65.
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term residents.99 It follows that integration requirements imposed by 
Member States may not be of such a nature that long­term residents can­
not reasonably be expected to comply with them. In addition, integration 
requirements enacted by the Member States will need to respect the EU 
principle of proportionality. While it is up to the Member States to decide 
on the integration objectives pursued, integration requirements thus have 
to meet the criteria of suitability and necessity.100
Although the above criteria necessarily remain rather abstract, they 
could imply, for example, that integration tests must be set at a sufficiently 
low level, that study materials must be easily available or provided by the 
Member State, that long­term residents may not be required to pay high 
fees for integration tests or programmes and that mandatory integration 
programmes may only be of limited duration (see also, with regard to the 
Family Reunification Directive, section V.C.iv of chapter 4). Also, follow­
ing the CoJ’s approach in Baumbast and Chakroun (section II.B above and 
section V.C.iv of chapter 4), an individual assessment will need to be 
made, taking into account the personal circumstances of the applicant 
including factors such as illiteracy, medical problems or a limited learning 
capacity.101 With regard to national integration measures, a possibility for 
exemption will have to be included, for instance in the form of a hardship 
clause. As a final element, the effectiveness of these measures should be 
considered.
Lastly, integration requirements imposed by Member States for exercis­
ing the right of residence in a second Member State must be in conformity 
with fundamental rights, including those laid down in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.102 
Apart from the right to free movement, which is discussed above, relevant 
provisions may be those concerning the freedom of religion, respect for 
cultural, religious and linguistic diversity and the prohibition of discrimi­
nation.103 While the precise content of these provisions clearly lends itself 
to extensive discussion, it seems obvious that long­term residents may not 
be asked to relinquish their religious or cultural identity, to refrain from 
99 See also Peers 2004, 442–43. 
100 Commission v the Netherlands (n 76), para 75.
101 A relevant difference with the situation in Chakroun could be that Art 17 FRD explicitly 
requires individual examination of the application for family reunification, whereas a simi­
lar provision is not included in the LRD. Nevertheless, the CoJ appears in Chakroun to base 
its interpretation not only on Art 17 FRD, but also on the purpose of the directive, the fact 
that it grants a right to family reunification (to which the income requirement constitutes an 
exception) and the right to respect for family life as protected by the CFR and as a general 
principle of EU law (paras 41–47 of the judgment). Consequently, a similar interpretative 
approach could be taken with regard to Art 15(3) LRD on the basis of the purpose of that 
directive, the fact that it grants a right to free movement and Arts 79(2)(b) TFEU and 45 (2) 
CFR.
102 cp Arts 6(1) and (3) TEU. See also Kamberaj (n 76), para 79.
103 See Arts 10, 21 and 22 CFR and Arts 9, 14 and 1 Twelfth Protocol ECHR. The prohibi­
tion of discrimination is addressed in detail in chs 8 to 10.
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speaking their mother tongue or to subscribe to the religious norms pre­
vailing in the host Member State (see also chapter 4, section V.C.iv). 
v. ‘Integration Measures’ Versus ‘Integration Conditions’?
The interpretation of Article 15(3) LRD proposed above has been con­
tested in the literature. In particular, it has been argued that certain limita­
tions to the discretionary power of the Member States to impose 
integration requirements follow from the use of the term ‘integration 
measures’ instead of ‘ integration conditions’. Several authors have stated 
that non­compliance with ‘integration measures’ may not result in a 
refusal of the right of residence in the second Member State.104 Other 
authors, notably Groenendijk, have contended that the term ‘integration 
condition’ allows for a higher level of obligation or responsibility to be 
placed on the long­term resident. According to Groenendijk, provisions 
using the term ‘integration conditions’ allow Member States to require 
immigrants to pass an integration test to demonstrate that they have 
attained knowledge or skills at a certain level. Immigrants may also be 
required to bear the costs of following an integration programme. By con­
trast, the term ‘integration measures’ merely allows Member States to 
require a certain effort on the part of the individual, such as participating 
in language or integration courses.105 Carrera goes even further by saying 
that the term ‘integration measures’ precludes any kind of obligatory 
character or binding effect of the measures to be taken.106
To support these interpretations, the above authors rely on the legisla­
tive history of the Long­term Residents Directive, which shows that the 
term ‘integration conditions’ was favoured by those Member States sup­
porting a restrictive integration policy (notably Austria, Germany and the 
Netherlands).107 These Member States specifically proposed replacing the 
words ‘integration measures’ in Article 15(3) LRD by ‘integration condi­
tions’.108 This proposal was not, however, supported by a majority of the 
delegations and did not make it into the final text of the directive. This led 
the above authors to conclude that Article 15(3) LRD does not allow for 
integration requirements such as those proposed by the three Member 
104 De Heer 2007, 278; Carrera 2009, 195 and Pascouau 2010, 445. 
105 Groenendijk 2004, 122–24; Groenendijk 2006, 224. This argument is repeated by other 
authors, including Brinkmann 2008, 40, Iglesias Sánchez 2009b, 215 and Pascouau 2010, 445–
46. The European Commission, in its report on the application of the LRD (n 78), also sug­
gests that ‘integration measures’ of Art 15(3) differ from the integration conditions of Art 
5(2), in that long­term residents who have already been subject to integration conditions in 
the first Member State can thereafter only be asked to attend language courses (p 7 of the 
report). As explained above, this follows from the text of Art 15(3), second and third para­
graphs, LRD, rather than from the use of the term ‘measures’ as such.
106 Carrera 2009, 195.
107 Groenendijk 2004, 122–24; Carrera 2009, 175–83.
108 See Council doc. 7393/1/03 of 14 March 2003, 5.
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States, notably integration tests or mandatory participation in integration 
programmes.
In my view, there are several reasons why the terms ‘integration meas­
ures’ and ‘integration conditions’ cannot be assumed to have the specific 
meaning proposed by Groenendijk and Carrera. Indeed, the legislative 
history of the LRD indicates that the negotiating parties made a distinc­
tion between the two terms. Still, this can only be a relevant factor of inter­
pretation if this distinction is also expressed in the text of the relevant 
legal instruments. When looking at different language versions of the 
LRD and the other migration directives in which reference is made to inte­
gration requirements, this does not appear to be the case.109 The terms are 
sometimes used interchangeably, whereas at other times they are replaced 
in some language versions by different terms altogether.110 
The legislative history of the LRD or the other Directives furthermore 
does not support the attribution of any specific meaning to ‘integration 
measures’ or ‘integration conditions’. The relevant Council documents do 
not define the contested terms, nor do they explain the reasons why the 
use of either term was supported or rejected by the delegations involved 
in the negotiations. To derive any particular definition from the negotia­
tion process as described above therefore seems somewhat far­fetched. 
The reading proposed by Carrera – that integration measures cannot be of 
an obligatory character – is also hard to reconcile with the text of Article 
15(3) LRD, which states that long­term residents may be required ‘to com­
ply with integration measures’. Besides, if it is accepted that integration 
measures cannot be of a binding nature, it is hard to see why a legal basis 
in the directive would be required at all.
It is thus concluded that the mere use of the term ‘integration measures’ 
or ‘integration conditions’ does not indicate the possible contents of 
the integration requirements to be enacted by the Member States.111 
Nevertheless, as discussed above, Member States’ discretion is restricted 
in several other ways. As a result, integration requirements that impose 
too large a burden on long­term residents are, in my view, contrary to 
Article 15(3) LRD regardless of the wording used in that provision.
109 See also Vermeulen 2010, 95.
110 To give some examples: the term ‘integration conditions’ is used in Art 4(1) FRD in 
some language versions, whereas others refer to an ‘integration criterion’. Furthermore, the 
Spanish version of the LRD uses the term ‘integration measures’ both in Art 5(2) and 15(3) 
first paragraph, whereas all the other language versions use ‘integration conditions’, and 
both the Swedish and Dutch versions of Art 15(3) second paragraph use ‘integration condi­
tions’, while the others use ‘measures’ (even though the Swedish version also uses ‘meas­
ures’ in Art 7(2) FRD). Finally, the German version of Art 33 Qualification Directive uses the 
term ‘integration measures’ where other language versions use terms such as ‘integration 
facilities’, ‘instruments for integration’ or ‘mechanisms of integration’. 
111 See also Van Dam 2008, 71 and 79.
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E. Family Members of Long-term Residents
i.  Definition of ‘Family Members’ in the Long-term Residents Directive
Long­term resident third­country nationals who move to another Member 
State are entitled to be joined or accompanied by their family members, 
subject to the conditions of Article 16 LRD. According to the definition 
provided in Article 2(e) LRD, the term ‘family members’ refers to those 
third­country nationals who reside in the Member State concerned in 
accordance with the Family Reunification Directive (FRD). It must be 
assumed that this definition does not require the family members actually 
to have been granted admission under the FRD, as this would exclude all 
family members who were admitted before the implementation of that 
directive. Since the LRD specifically concerns third-country nationals who 
have resided in a Member State for some time, it may be supposed that in 
many cases these third­country nationals will have family members who 
were already living with them before the FRD came into being.112 
It is, nevertheless, conceivable that the EU legislator wanted the defini­
tion of family members in the LRD to be consistent with other directives, 
notably the FRD. A reasonable interpretation therefore seems to be that 
the reference to the FRD in Article 2(e) LRD indicates which family rela­
tionships are included under the latter directive. The term ‘family mem­
bers’ in the LRD thus covers those family members who are mentioned in 
Article 4 FRD, regardless of when they were admitted. Support for this 
interpretation is found in the Commission proposal for the LRD, where 
Article 4 FRD is explicitly referred to.113 Where the latter article contains 
optional provisions (with regard, for example, to the inclusion of unmar­
ried and registered partners), it is submitted that these must be applied by 
each Member State in the same way with regard to family members of 
long-term residents as for the purposes of allowing family reunification.
ii. The Right to Reside in a Second Member State
As mentioned above, the right of residence of family members in a second 
Member State is regulated by Article 16 LRD. This provision requires, first 
of all, that the family was already constituted in the first Member State.114 
Where this is not the case, the entry and residence of family members in 
the second Member State are subject to the provisions of the Family 
Reunification Directive (FRD), which was discussed in chapter 4.115 Family 
112 The deadline for implementation of the FRD was 3 October 2005, whereas the LRD had 
to be implemented by 23 January 2006. 
113 COM(2001) 127 final, 11.
114 Art 16(1) LRD.
115 Art 16(5) LRD.
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members coming under the Long­term Residents Directive must apply 
for a residence permit within three months of entering the territory of the 
second Member State.116 Conditions relating to their right of residence are 
laid down in Articles 16(4), 17 and 18 LRD. On the basis of these provi­
sions the second Member State may, for example, require evidence of 
sufficient resources or refuse the right of residence on the grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health. 
The LRD does not expressly mention the possibility of imposing inte­
gration requirements. However, Article 16(1) LRD states that family mem­
bers must meet the conditions referred to in Article 4(1) FRD.117 Since 
Article 4(1) mentions the conditions laid down in Chapter IV of the FRD, 
it could be argued that family members who move to a second Member 
State must meet all the conditions of that Chapter, including the integra­
tion requirement laid down in Article 7(2) FRD. However, acceptance of 
this argument would be hard to reconcile with other provisions of the 
LRD, in particular the conditions laid down in Articles 16(4), 17 and 18. 
These conditions overlap, at least in part, with those in Articles 6 and 7(1) 
FRD.118 It is therefore unlikely that Article 16(1) LRD would make the con­
ditions of Chapter IV FRD equally applicable to the family reunification of 
long­term residents who move to a second Member State.
116 Art 16(3) in conjunction with Art 15(1) LRD. As for long­term residents, the right of 
family members to enter the second Member State and to reside there for up to three months 
is based on Art 21 of the Schengen Implementing Convention.  
117 Art 4(1) FRD reads:
The Member States shall authorise the entry and residence, pursuant to this Directive and 
subject to compliance with the conditions laid down in Chapter IV, as well as in Article 16, of 
the following family members:
(a) the sponsor’s spouse;
(b)  the minor children of the sponsor and of his/her spouse, including children adopted 
in accordance with a decision taken by the competent authority in the Member State 
concerned or a decision which is automatically enforceable due to international obli­
gations of that Member State or must be recognised in accordance with international 
obligations;
(c)  the minor children including adopted children of the sponsor where the sponsor has 
custody and the children are dependent on him or her. Member States may authorise 
the reunification of children of whom custody is shared, provided the other party 
sharing custody has given his or her agreement;
(d)  the minor children including adopted children of the spouse where the spouse has 
custody and the children are dependent on him or her. Member States may authorise 
the reunification of children of whom custody is shared, provided the other party 
sharing custody has given his or her agreement.
The minor children referred to in this Article must be below the age of majority set by the 
law of the Member State concerned and must not be married.
By way of derogation, where a child is aged over 12 years and arrives independently from 
the rest of his/her family, the Member State may, before authorising entry and residence 
under this Directive, verify whether he or she meets a condition for integration provided for 
by its existing legislation on the date of implementation of this Directive.
118 Both Art 16(4)(c) LRD and Art 7(1)(b) and (c) FRD set requirements relating to income 
and health insurance, whereas Arts 17–18 LRD and Art 6 FRD provide for exceptions relat­
ing to public policy, public security and public health.
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It is submitted instead that the reference to Article 4(1) FRD aims to 
determine which family members are entitled to move with the long­term 
resident to the second Member State.119 Article 4(1) FRD mentions, in 
short, the spouse and the minor (adopted) children of the sponsor (ie the 
long­term resident) and/or the spouse. It follows that the circle of family 
members who may move to a second Member State is narrower than the 
definition of family members in Article 2(e) LRD, as the latter may also 
cover family members mentioned in Article 4(2) and (3) FRD (in short: 
dependent parents, adult unmarried children and unmarried or regis­
tered partners). However, Article 16(2) LRD provides that the Member 
States may authorise long­term residents to bring along family members 
other than those mentioned in Article 4(1) FRD. The proposed reading of 
Article 16(1) LRD thus results in an interpretation that is consistent with 
the Family Reunification Directive. Under both directives, Member States 
are obliged to admit the spouse and minor (adopted) children (Arts 4(1) 
FRD and 16(1) LRD), whereas they have discretion with regard to the 
admission of other family members (Arts 4(2) and (3) FRD and 16(2) 
LRD). 
A remaining question is whether the second Member State may require 
children of long­term residents, who are over 12 years of age and arrive 
independently of the family, to comply with the integration requirement 
laid down in Article 4(1), final subparagraph, FRD. It is submitted that 
this does indeed follow from Article 16(1) LRD. However, Article 4(1), 
final subparagraph, FRD contains a standstill clause which states that the 
integration requirement must have existed in the legislation of the 
Member State concerned on the date of the implementation of the direc­
tive. Only Germany meets this condition.120 
Oosterom­Staples suggests that family members of long­term residents 
may be subjected to integration requirements when they move to the sec­
ond Member State because Article 15(3) LRD speaks of ‘third country 
nationals’ in general and not of ‘long­term residents’.121 This interpreta­
tion is, however, contradicted by a systematic argument: Article 15 con­
cerns the conditions for free movement of long­term residents, whereas 
their family members are covered by Article 16.122 Where Article 15 is also 
applicable to family members this is explicitly indicated, as in Article 
16(3). It must thus be assumed that the integration requirement of Article 
15(3) applies only to the long­term residents themselves and not to their 
family members. This reading is supported by the preamble to the LRD, 
which states that the right of family members to move to another Member 
State is meant to preserve family unity and to avoid hindering the exercis­
119 See also Boeles et al 2009, 221.
120 See ch 4, section V.C.
121 Oosterom­Staples 2004, 71.
122 See also Van Dam 2008, 76.
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ing of this right by the long­term resident.123 These objectives would be 
hampered if family member could be refused residence on the grounds 
that they failed to comply with integration requirements. It is concluded 
that the right of family members of long­term residents to reside in 
another Member State cannot be conditioned upon the fulfilment of inte­
gration requirements. Member States are not, however, prevented from 
offering integration programmes to family members on a voluntary basis.
iii. Family Members Other than those Referred to in Article 4(1) Family 
Reunification Directive
As mentioned above, Article 16(2) LRD states that Member States may 
authorise the residence on their territory of family members other than 
those referred to in Article 4(1) FRD, provided the family was already 
constituted in the first Member State. Consequently, where the family 
members do not fulfil the conditions of Article 4(1) FRD, it is left to the 
discretion of the second Member State to determine whether a right of 
residence will be granted. It is, nonetheless, submitted that a right of resi­
dence granted pursuant to Article 16(2) LRD may not be conditioned 
upon requirements other than those laid down in that directive. Otherwise, 
if Member States were allowed to set conditions according to their national 
law, this would hamper the development of a common immigration pol­
icy as prescribed by Article 79(1) TFEU. The proposed interpretation is 
also consistent with the system of Article 4 FRD, which provides that a 
Member State may admit additional categories of family members (as 
mentioned in paras 2 and 3 of that provision) under the conditions set 
forth in the Family Reunification Directive. Thus, while Member States 
remain free to deny the right of residence to family members who are not 
included under Article 4(1) FRD, where they do authorise such residence 
this must be on the terms of the LRD and so without imposing integration 
requirements.
VII. THIRD­COUNTRY NATIONALS WHO ARE HOLDERS OF  
AN EU BLUE CARD AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS
A. The Blue Card Directive
Lastly, there is the category of third­country nationals who have been 
issued an EU Blue Card in accordance with the Blue Card Directive (BCD). 
This directive was adopted in 2009 and had to be implemented by the 
Member States by 19 June 2011. Like the Long­term Residents Directive, 
123 Recital 20.
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the Blue Card Directive was adopted on the basis of Articles 63(3)(a) and 
(4) TEC (currently Arts 79(2)(a) and (b) TFEU) and thus forms part of EU 
immigration policy. The objectives of the Blue Card Directive are primar­
ily of an economic nature. The directive was enacted with the aim of mak­
ing the EU more attractive to highly qualified labour migrants from third 
countries in order to address shortages in the European labour market 
and make the European economy more competitive.124 To achieve this 
aim, the BCD regulates the entry and residence (for more than three 
months) of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment, as well as the right of these persons to enter and reside in 
another Member State. It also regulates the entry and residence of their 
family members, both in the first and the second Member State.125 
The rights of entry and residence for EU Blue Card holders and their 
family members are briefly discussed below. Since this chapter concerns 
the right of free movement in EU law, the discussion is limited to the 
rights of entry and residence in the second Member State. The initial 
admission of highly qualified labour migrants and their family members 
is dealt with in the following chapter. The BCD is without prejudice to 
more favourable provisions of bilateral or multilateral agreements con­
cluded between the EU and/or the Member States and one or more third 
countries or of other instruments of EU law.126
B. The Right of EU Blue Card Holders to Enter and Reside in Another 
Member State
The right of EU Blue Card holders to move to another Member State is 
regulated in Article 18 BCD. According to Article 18(1), the right to free 
movement is granted after the person concerned has resided for 18 months 
in the first Member State on the basis of an EU Blue Card. This right may 
be exercised for the purpose of highly qualified employment, as defined 
in Article 2(b) BCD. The right of residence in the second Member State is, 
however, without prejudice to the right of that Member State to determine 
the numbers of highly qualified third-country nationals permitted to enter 
its territory.127
As in the case of long­term residents, the right of EU Blue Card holders 
to enter the second Member State and to reside there for up to three 
months follows from Article 21 of the Schengen Implementing 
Convention.128 Under Article 18(2), however, Blue Card holders (or their 
124 See the preamble of the directive, notably recital 7.
125 Art 1 BCD.
126 Art 4(1) BCD.
127 Art 18(7) in conjunction with Art 6 BCD.
128 On the basis of the Blue Card issued by the first Member State.
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employers) must apply for a Blue Card in the second Member State within 
one month of entry. The issue of the Blue Card is subject to the conditions 
laid down in Article 5 BCD. These conditions mostly relate to the qualifi­
cations for employment, as well as to the protection of public policy, pub­
lic security and public health. Integration requirements are not mentioned. 
It follows that EU Blue Card holders have a right of residence in a sec­
ond Member State, provided they meet the conditions set by the BCD and 
the second Member State has not set a quota. Where such a right exists, 
Member States no longer have the possibility of making the admission 
dependent on integration requirements.
C. The Right of Family Members of EU Blue Card Holders to Enter 
and Reside in Another Member State
The Blue Card Directive also applies to family members of the EU Blue 
Card holder. According to the BCD, ‘family members’ are ‘third country 
nationals as defined in Article 4(1) of Directive 2003/86/EC’ (the ‘Family 
Reunification Directive’).129 As explained above (section VI.E.ii), 
Article 4(1) FRD mentions the spouse and the minor (adopted) children of 
the sponsor (ie the EU Blue Card holder) and/or the spouse. It follows 
that other family members, such as dependent parents and adult children 
or unmarried or registered partners, are not covered by the BCD. The 
same is true for children who do not meet the conditions set out in the 
second and third subparagraphs of Article 4(1) FRD.130
Family members are entitled to accompany or join the EU Blue Card 
holder in the second Member State, provided the family was already con­
stituted in the first Member State.131 Like the Blue Card holders them­
selves, the family members are entitled to enter the second Member State 
and reside there for up to three months on the basis of the residence per­
mit granted by the first Member State.132 However, they (or the Blue Card 
holder) must apply for a residence permit in the second Member State 
within one month of entry.133 The issue of the residence permit is subject to 
a number of conditions to be met by the family members or the Blue Card 
holder, but integration requirements may not be imposed.134 
129 Art 2(f) BCD.
130 As explained above, the final subparagraph of Art 4(1) FRD includes an integration 
requirement for children aged over 12 who arrive independently of the rest of the family. 
However, this requirement is of no relevance to the Dutch situation because of its standstill 
clause. Moreover, discussion of this requirement would be out of place here since it is not 
directly related to the right of residence in the second Member State. 
131 Art 19(1) BCD.
132 Art 21 Schengen Implementing Convention.
133 Art 19(2) BCD.
134 Arts 19(3) and (4) BCD.
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This is different in cases where the family was not already constituted 
in the first Member State. In these cases, the family reunification of the 
Blue Card holder in the second Member State is subject to Article 15 
BCD.135 The latter declares the Family Reunification Directive applicable, 
although with a number of derogations. The possibility of imposing inte­
gration requirements is laid down in Articles 4(1) and 7(2) of the FRD 
(chapter 4, section V). However, it must be observed that, for family mem­
bers of EU Blue Card holders, integration requirements can only be 
applied after family reunification has been granted.136 It follows that the 
BCD does not allow ‘integration abroad’ and that the right to family 
reunification cannot be made conditional upon compliance with integra­
tion requirements. According to the preamble, the purpose of this deroga­
tion is to create favourable conditions for family reunification in order to 
make the EU more attractive for highly qualified third-country nationals. 
It is explicitly stated that the derogation does not preclude Member States 
from maintaining or introducing integration requirements, including lan­
guage learning, for family members of EU Blue Card holders.137 Yet these 
integration requirements can only be imposed after admission and there­
fore fall outside the scope of this study. 
VIII. THE RIGHT TO FREE MOVEMENT AND  
THE ACT ON INTEGRATION ABROAD
The previous sections describe the right of free movement within EU law, 
examining which persons are entitled to move and reside freely within 
the EU Member States and whether this right may be conditioned upon 
fulfilment of integration requirements. Where specific provisions relating 
to integration requirements were found, their contents were examined in 
order to determine more specifically the boundaries of the discretion 
available to the Member States. In the final section of this chapter the find­
ings with regard to the right to free movement are summarised and dis­
cussed. Firstly, however, it is examined whether the Dutch Act on 
Integration Abroad (AIA) is in compliance with this right, as set out in the 
relevant instruments of EU law.
A. Nationals of the Member States of the EU, the EEA and Switzerland 
and their Family Members
Under the Dutch Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet 2000), aliens may be 
required to pass the integration exam abroad if they want to obtain a tem­
135 Art 19(6) BCD.
136 Art 15(3) BCD.
137 Preamble BCD, recital 23.
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porary residence permit (verblijfsvergunning bepaalde tijd regulier).138 
However, persons belonging to the category of ‘Community citizens’ 
(gemeenschapsonderdanen) do not need a residence permit in order to reside 
legally in the Netherlands.139 This category consists of: 
•  nationals of the EU Member States and their family members who are 
entitled to entry and residence in another Member State on the basis of 
the TEC (now TFEU) or EU secondary legislation; 
•  nationals of the Member States of the EEA and their family members 
who are entitled to entry and residence in the EU Member States on the 
basis of the EEA Agreement; and
•  Swiss nationals and their family members who are entitled to reside in 
an EU Member State on the basis of the EC­Switzerland Agreement.140 
Since the above persons do not need a residence permit, they are also not 
required to pass the integration exam abroad. As far as EU citizens and 
their family members are concerned, the right to free movement is thus 
respected. The same is true for nationals of EEA Member States and 
Switzerland and their family members. 
As the category of ‘Community citizens’ is defined by reference to the 
rights of entry and residence granted under the treaties, it is sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate developments such as the adoption of new 
instruments of secondary legislation or the interpretation of existing pro­
visions by the CoJ. By way of example, when the AIA was adopted the 
Dutch government initially proceeded on the assumption that family 
members of EU citizens who were third­country nationals were not enti­
tled to the right of free movement under the Residence Directive unless 
they had already been lawfully admitted to the EU.141 As described in sec­
tion III.B, the CoJ later rejected this stance in Metock. This judgment made 
it clear that third­country nationals who are family members of EU citi­
zens are also ‘Community citizens’ within the meaning of the Aliens Act, 
even if they have not held previous lawful residence in the EU.
i. Family Members not Entitled to the Right of Free Movement
As set out above, the right of free movement under the Residence 
Directive, the EEA Agreement and the EC­Switzerland Agreement is 
available only to certain categories of family members (notably the spouse, 
138 Art 16(1)(h) Aliens Act.
139 Art 8(e) Aliens Act.
140 Art 1(e) Aliens Act.
141 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 17–18. In view of doubts regarding the 
legal position of these third­country nationals, the government eventually decided to wait 
until the CoJ passed judgment in the case of Jia (C­1/05), which was pending at the time. See 
Parliamentary Papers I 2004–2005, 29 700, E, 3. In the end, third­country nationals/family 
members of EU citizens were never brought under the AIA.
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minor children and dependent parents). In addition, the Netherlands is 
also obliged to facilitate the entry and residence of other categories of 
family members who are not entitled to free movement. In this respect the 
Residence Directive mentions: 
•  family members other than those mentioned in Article 2(2) Residence 
Directive who, in the country from which they have come, are depend­
ants or members of the household of the EU citizen, or who because 
of serious health grounds strictly require the personal care of the EU 
citizen; 
•  the partner with whom the EU citizen has a duly attested durable rela­
tionship; and
•  the dependent parents of EU citizens who are students, as well as the 
dependent parents of the spouse or partner (section III.D).
By virtue of Decision No 158/2007 of the EEA Joint Committee, the rele­
vant provisions of the Residence Directive are equally applicable to the 
family members of nationals of the EEA Member States (section IV). With 
regard to family members of Swiss nationals, the obligation to facilitate 
entry and residence applies to those who are dependent on or who lived 
with the Swiss national in the country of origin (section V.C).
It has been argued that integration requirements may be enacted for the 
admission of the above categories of family members, as long as requests 
for family reunification are always subject to an individual assessment 
with the view to granting admission. However, the Dutch government 
has chosen to admit these family members under the same conditions as 
EU citizens (and nationals of an EEA Member State or Switzerland) them­
selves.142 No integration requirements are therefore imposed. 
B. Long-term Residents and their Family Members
Third­country nationals who are long­term residents may move to the 
Netherlands in accordance with the provisions of the Long­term Residents 
Directive. Their right of residence may be conditioned upon fulfilment of 
integration requirements, provided they have not already complied with 
such requirements to obtain long-term resident status in the first Member 
State (section VI.D). Family members of long­term residents may not be 
required to comply with integration requirements, provided the family 
was already constituted in the first Member State.
Here, too, the Dutch legislator has chosen not to make use of the discre­
tion available under the LRD. Long­term residents and their family mem­
bers are exempted from the requirement to obtain a long­term visa and 
142 Arts 8.7(2), (3) and (4) of the Aliens Decree (Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000). 
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hence also from the obligation to pass the integration exam abroad 
(chapter 2, section VI.B.iii). It is observed that the wording of the relevant 
provisions of the Aliens Act does not entirely correspond with that of the 
LRD, as Article 17(1)(h) Aliens Act mentions only the spouse and minor 
children of the long­term resident. This leaves out the minor children of 
the spouse, who are also covered by the LRD providing the spouse has 
custody or shared custody and the children are dependent on him or 
her.143 However, as seen in chapter 2, the AIA does not in any case apply to 
children who have not yet reached the age of majority.
As a matter of Dutch immigration policy, the exemption from the inte­
gration exam abroad is extended to the registered partner of the long­term 
resident, as well as to his or her children.144 This extension is in conformity 
with Article 16(2) LRD, which allows Member States to accept other fam­
ily members of the long-term resident for family reunification under the 
conditions provided in the directive (section VI.E.iii).
C. EU Blue Card Holders and their Family Members
Lastly, the position of EU Blue Card holders and their family members is 
discussed. Under Dutch immigration rules, the residence of EU Blue Card 
holders and their family members is regarded as temporary for the pur­
poses of the integration legislation.145 Since aliens whose residence permit 
is issued for a temporary purpose are not obliged to comply with integra­
tion requirements, either abroad or in the Netherlands, EU Blue Card 
holders and their family members are exempted from the AIA.146 This is in 
conformity with the provisions of the Blue Card Directive (section VII).
IX. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This chapter examines the right of free movement in the law of the 
European Union. For EU citizens, the right to move to other Member 
States (and to bring along their family members) is instrumental to the 
achievement of economic integration within the EU and to the realisation 
of an internal market. At the same time, the right to move and reside freely 
in the Member States forms an essential element of the concept of EU citi­
zenship. Under the existing legal framework, EU citizens and their family 
members are now entitled to reside in any other Member State, subject 
143 Art 16(1) LRD in conjunction with Art 4(1)(d) FRD.
144 Para B1/4.1.1 Aliens Circular (Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000).
145 Art 2.1(1)(a) and (p) Integration Decree (Besluit inburgering).
146 Art 16(1)(h) Aliens Act in conjunction Art 3(1)(a) Integration Act 2007 (Wet inburgering).
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only to limited restrictions, even when their family members are third­
country nationals who did not previously have lawful residence in the 
EU. The situation of nationals of the EEA Member States and Switzerland 
bears a strong resemblance to that of EU citizens. Despite the lack of an 
underlying notion of citizenship, the legal conditions governing their 
right of residence in the Member States are largely similar.
The legal instruments governing the free movement of EU citizens 
and their family members do not foresee the possibility of making their 
right of residence in another Member State subject to integration 
requirements such as those enacted in the Netherlands. In general, the 
only conditions pertaining to the right of free movement are that 
immigrants must attain a certain level of economic self-sufficiency and 
must not pose a threat to the public policy, public security or public health 
in the receiving Member State. No other limitations, including conditions 
intended to select immigrants with a view to their participation in or 
commitment to the receiving society, are allowed. The Member States 
remain competent to regulate the admission of those EU citizens, nationals 
of EEA Member States or Switzerland and family members of the above 
categories who are not entitled to free movement under the legal 
instruments discussed in this chapter. However, the broad scope of the 
right of free movement and the low threshold set for its exercise mean that 
the extent of this competence has been strongly reduced. With regard to 
the admission of EU citizens in particular, the discretion still available to 
the Member States is of very little practical relevance.
For third­country nationals not falling into the above categories, the 
situation is less straightforward. It can still be argued that, as a general 
rule, these third­country nationals are only entitled to reside in the 
Member State to which they have been admitted and do not enjoy a right 
of free movement comparable to that of EU citizens. Nevertheless, a right 
of long­term residence in another Member State is included in both the 
LRD and the BCD. These directives regulate the intra­EU movement of 
third­country nationals who are long­term residents, EU Blue Card hold­
ers and their family members, provided the family was already consti­
tuted in the first Member State. Interestingly, the directives allow the 
Member States to impose integration requirements only for the admission 
of long­term residents. 
It has been argued that Member States’ discretion with regard to inte­
gration requirements for long­term residents is not unlimited: such 
requirements may not undermine the objectives or effectiveness of the 
Long­term Residents Directive and must, moreover, be proportionate. 
This implies that integration requirements enacted by the Member States 
must be such that they can be met by long­term residents with a reasona­
ble amount of effort. Nevertheless, the possibility of imposing integration 
requirements on long­term residents represents an exception to the over­
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all picture emerging from this chapter, which is that the right of free 
movement under EU law cannot be restricted by such conditions. 
In this way a sort of three­step ladder is created: on top are those immi­
grants entitled to free movement without being subjected to integration 
conditions; these include EU citizens, but also EU Blue Card holders and 
their family members. Then come long­term residents, who may be asked 
to comply with integration requirements, but only within the limits set by 
the LRD. Family members of long­term residents may also be placed in 
this category: although they may not be asked to comply with integration 
requirements themselves, their right of residence is dependent on that of 
the long­term resident. Thirdly, there is the category of persons who are 
not entitled to free movement as a matter of EU law and whose admission 
may therefore be subjected to integration requirements determined by the 
individual Member States, subject of course to obligations under interna­
tional law.
It was concluded that the Dutch legislation concerning the integration 
exam abroad is compatible with the right of free movement as regulated 
by EU law. It can even be argued that Dutch legislation is more consistent, 
as it does not impose integration requirements on long­term residents 
seeking to exercise their right of free movement. Nonetheless, a tension 
can be observed between the EU right of free movement and the Dutch 
integration policy, to the extent that the latter is based on a national 
conception of integration. Whereas the AIA identifies knowledge of the 
Dutch language and Dutch society as factors indicative of a person’s 
capacity to integrate in the Netherlands, beneficiaries of the right to free 
movement cannot be required to demonstrate such knowledge in order to 
be admitted.
7 
International Relations and  
Labour Migration
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS CHAPTER DEALS with immigration provisions in interna-tional (often bilateral) agreements between states. Such agreements may be concluded for a variety of reasons, for example to promote 
international trade or other forms of (economic) cooperation, to enhance 
diplomatic relations or to give expression to the ties stemming from a 
colonial past. Included in these agreements there may be a right of resi-
dence for nationals or certain categories of nationals of the Contracting 
States, who are thereby placed in a privileged position vis-à-vis other 
aliens. For the Netherlands, relevant immigration provisions are not only 
to be found in the agreements that it has concluded itself but also in those 
concluded by the EU (and its Member States) with third countries. The 
latter category of agreements is also discussed in this chapter.1
Apart from aliens who benefit from international relations this chapter 
deals with another privileged category of immigrants, namely those 
admitted for the purpose of performing paid labour. Like most states, the 
Netherlands is willing to admit (mostly highly qualified) aliens who can 
compensate for shortages in the labour market and contribute to eco-
nomic growth. However, the admission of labour migrants is not only a 
matter of national law. As seen in the previous chapter, the admission of 
highly qualified labour migrants is regulated at an EU level by the Blue 
Card Directive. Also of relevance are the European Convention on the 
Legal Status of Migrant Workers and the European Social Charter, which 
have been concluded within the framework of the Council of Europe. The 
latter agreement contains a provision concerning family reunification of 
labour migrants. Where the admission of family members is linked to the 
admission of labour migrants or aliens admitted under bilateral agree-
ments, their position is also discussed in this chapter.
1 These agreements include the EEA Agreement and the EC-Switzerland Agreement con-
cerning the free movement of persons. Given, however, the close resemblance between these 
agreements and the provisions of EU law regarding the right to free movement, these agree-
ments are discussed in ch 6.
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Like the previous chapters, this chapter examines the scope of the 
admission rights granted by the above legal instruments, and whether 
those instruments allow for immigrants to be selected on the basis of 
integration-related criteria. 
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY  
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Over time the European Union (often together with the Member States) 
has concluded a large number of agreements, also known as association 
agreements, with third countries.2 Although the relationship between the 
EU (and the Member States) and third countries is governed by public 
international law, the association agreements also form part of the EU 
legal order.3 As such, these agreements are capable of creating rights and 
obligations for the Member States (cf Art 216 (2) TFEU), as well as for indi-
viduals in relation to those Member States.4 Most of the existing associa-
tion agreements do not create any rights of admission for third-country 
nationals to the EU Member States.5 An important exception, however, is 
the Association Agreement between the EEC and Turkey. This Agreement, 
and the decisions adopted to give it effect, is discussed below in section 
II.A. In addition, some potentially relevant provisions are included in the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements concluded with several coun-
tries in the Western Balkans that are, along with Turkey, actual or poten-
tial candidates for membership of the EU. The latter agreements are 
briefly discussed in section II.B. 
A. The Association Agreement between the EEC and Turkey
The Association Agreement between the EEC and Turkey (‘EEC-Turkey 
Agreement’) entered into force in the Netherlands on 1 December 1964.6 
Articles 12–14 of the Agreement provide that the Contracting Parties shall 
be guided by the relevant provisions in the EC Treaty (now the TFEU) 
in order to gradually bring about the free movement of workers and to 
2 The competence for concluding these agreements is laid down in Art 217 TFEU (for-
merly Art 310 TEC). 
3 eg, CoJ 30 April 1974, C-181/73 [1974] ECR 449 (Haegeman), para 5. 
4 Chalmers et al 2010, 652–53, see also Hailbronner 2000, 216–20. 
5 Boeles et al 2009, 92–95 and Wiesbrock 2010, 97–109. The latter author also mentions the 
partnership and cooperation agreements concluded with several former USSR states on the 
basis of Art 133 TEC (now Art 207 TFEU). A full overview of the international agreements 
concluded by the EU can be found in the European Commission’s Treaties Office Database, 
at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do. 
6 [1964] OJ 217/3687 (no English version available), approved by Council Decision 
64/732/EEC of 23 December 1963, [1964] OJ L217/3685.
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eliminate restrictions on the right to establishment and the free movement 
of services. More specific provisions can be found in the Additional 
Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Agreement7 and in the decisions adopted by 
the EEC-Turkey Association Council pursuant to Article 36 of the Protocol. 
A distinction can be made between the legal regime applying to the free 
movement of workers and that applying to the right to establishment.8 
According to Article 41(2) of the Additional Protocol it is up to the 
Association Council, established pursuant to Article 6 of the Agreement, 
to determine the timetable for the progressive abolition of existing restric-
tions on the freedom of establishment. So far, however, the Association 
Council has not acted upon this assignment. With regard to workers, 
Article 36 Additional Protocol provides that the Association Council shall 
take the necessary measures to secure, progressively and in accordance 
with the principles set out in Article 12 of the Association Agreement, 
their free movement between the EU Member States and Turkey. The 
Council has adopted several decisions pursuant to this provision, of 
which Decision 1/80 is most relevant to the topic discussed here. Articles 
6 and 7 of this decision grant Turkish workers and their family members a 
right of access to the labour market that is established gradually after sev-
eral years of lawful employment. 
The EEC-Turkey Agreement and the related instruments do not 
expressly grant Turkish nationals or their family members a right of entry 
or residence in the EU Member States. In the interpretation of the CoJ, 
Articles 6 and 7 of Decision 1/80 grant Turkish workers and their family 
members a right of residence as a corollary to the right of access to the 
labour market, so as not to render the latter right ineffective. However, this 
right of residence exists only after the Member State concerned has per-
mitted the Turkish worker and/or his family members to enter its territory 
and to take up employment there. Consequently, the power of the Member 
States to regulate the entry and initial residence of Turkish workers and 
their family members is unaffected by the said provisions.9 Nevertheless, 
the legal instruments pertaining to the association with Turkey contain a 
number of standstill and non-discrimination clauses that are of relevance 
for the admission of Turkish nationals. These clauses are discussed in the 
following subsections, followed by a brief review of the position of family 
members of Turkish workers and self-employed persons.
7 [1972] OJ L293/4 (English-language version [1977] OJ L361/60).
8 The EEC-Turkey Agreement also concerns the freedom to provide services. However, as 
remarked in the previous chapter, any right of residence deriving from this freedom is by 
definition temporary and thus less relevant to the purposes of this study. The following sec-
tions therefore mention only the right to establishment, even if the legal rules discussed also 
concern the freedom to provide services. 
9 CoJ 16 December 1992, C-237/91 [1992] ECR I-6781 (Kus), para 25; CoJ 17 April 1997, 
C-351/95 [1997] ECR I-2133 (Kadiman), paras 31 and 32; more recently CoJ 24 January 2008, 
C-294/06 [2008] ECR I-203 (Payir and others), para 36.
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i. Standstill Clauses: No New Restrictions for the Admission of Turkish 
Workers and Self-employed Persons
The first paragraph of Article 41 Additional Protocol states that ‘the 
Contracting Parties shall refrain from introducing between themselves 
any new restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services’. A similar standstill clause is laid down in Article 13 of 
Decision 1/80 with regard to the free movement of workers: the Member 
States may not introduce new restrictions on the conditions of access to 
employment applicable to workers and their family members legally resi-
dent and employed in their respective territories. According to the CoJ, 
these provisions prohibit the Contracting Parties from introducing new 
restrictions on the free movement of workers or the freedom of establish-
ment as from the date of entry into force of the respective legal instru-
ments (the Additional Protocol and Decision 1/80).10 The Court has held 
both provisions to be directly effective; Turkish nationals can conse-
quently rely on it before the courts of the Member States.11 
Importantly, the standstill clauses do not, in themselves, grant Turkish 
nationals a right of establishment, access to the labour market or entry or 
residence in the Member States of the EU. The CoJ has repeatedly stressed 
that the provisions pertaining to the EEC-Turkey Association ‘do not 
encroach upon the competence retained by the Member State to regulate 
both the entry into their territory of Turkish nationals and the conditions 
under which they may take up their first employment’.12 Nevertheless, 
when regulating on this matter, Member States may not adopt any rules 
that have the object or effect of making the establishment or employment 
of Turkish nationals subject to stricter conditions than those existing 
before the standstill clauses entered into force.13 In recent case law, the 
CoJ clarified that the scope of the standstill clauses covers not only rules 
relating to the exercise of an economic activity (as an employed or self-
employed person), but also rules relating to the initial admission of 
Turkish nationals to a Member State where they intend to exercise such 
activity. This was decided, with regard to Article 41(1) Additional Protocol, 
in the case of Tum and Dari and, with regard to Article 13 Decision 1/80, in 
Commission v the Netherlands.14 
10 CoJ 11 Ma 2000, C-37/98 [2000] ECR I-2927 (Savas), para 46; CoJ 21 October 2003, 
C-317/01 and 369/01 [2003] ECR I-12301 (Abatay & Sahin), para 74.
11 Savas (n 10), paras 46–54; Kadiman (n 9), para 28.
12 Savas (n 10), paras 58 and 64; Abatay & Sahin (n 10), paras 62–63; CoJ 20 September 2007, 
C-16/05 [2007] ECR I-7415 (Tum & Dari), paras 52 and 58; more recently CoJ 21 January 2010, 
C-462/08 [2010] ECR I-00563 (Bekleyen), paras 35 and 36.
13 Abatay & Sahin (n 10 above), para 66.
14 Tum & Dari (n 12), para 63; CoJ 29 April 2010, C-92/07 [2010] ECR I-03683 (Commission v 
the Netherlands), para 49. In Tum & Dari the Court made the proviso that EU law may not be 
relied upon in cases of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of the persons concerned, see 
para 64.
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As far as Article 13 is concerned, it may be claimed that the CoJ’s judg-
ment in Commission v the Netherlands neglects the wording of this provi-
sion, which expressly mentions ‘workers and their family members legally 
resident and employed in [the Member States]’ (emphasis added). The 
Court supported its decision with the argument that the standstill clause 
of Article 13 is of the same kind as that of Article 41(1) Additional Protocol 
and serves an identical objective; hence both provisions must be inter-
preted in the same way.15 However, it may be argued, conversely, that the 
wording of Article 13 Decision 1/80 specifically indicates that the scope of 
this provision is narrower than that of Article 41(1) Additional Protocol, 
thus denoting that the Contracting Parties were more reluctant to give up 
control over the position of workers than over that of self-employed per-
sons.16 More generally, it may be remarked that there is an obvious tension 
between the CoJ’s stance that the EU Member States remain competent to 
rule on the initial admission of Turkish nationals and its interpretation of 
the standstill clauses, whereby Member States are not allowed to impose 
any new restrictions with regard to such admission. In fact, the CoJ 
appears to have expanded the scope of the relevant legal instruments 
beyond that attributed to them in its earlier case law, without explaining 
the reasons for this expansion.17 
Despite these objections, it is clear from current case law that admission 
criteria adopted by EU Member States may be contrary to the standstill 
clauses of the EEC-Turkey Association. In principle, Member States are 
precluded from adopting any measures that have the object or effect of 
making the admission of Turkish workers or self-employed persons sub-
ject to more restrictive conditions than those applying when the respec-
tive standstill clauses entered into force. Nonetheless, the CoJ has ruled 
that the standstill clauses allow for the enactment of new measures where 
such measures are also applicable to EU citizens. This is derived from 
Article 59 of the Additional Protocol, which provides that Turkey may not 
receive more favourable treatment than that granted by the EU Member 
States to one another under the TFEU. In the CoJ’s view, Article 59 read in 
conjunction with the standstill clauses implies that the admission of 
Turkish workers and self-employed persons may not be subject to new 
obligations that are disproportionate compared with those applying to 
EU citizens.18 
15 See also CoJ 17 September 2009, C-242/06 [2009] ECR I-8465 (Sahin), para 65.
16 As was the case with regard to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU: transi-
tional measures were adopted in this context concerning the right of access to the labour 
market, but not the right of establishment (section II.A of ch 6). Compare also the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements discussed in section II.B.
17 See also Groenendijk 2010, point 3.
18 Sahin (n 15), para 71; Commission v the Netherlands (n 14), para 55. It is recalled that the 
admission of EU citizens is regulated by EU law (the Residence Directive) and is subject only 
to limited conditions, see ch 6, section II.B.
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The Court has also specified that the term ‘restrictions’ in Article 41(1) 
Additional Protocol and Article 13 Decision 1/80 covers both procedural 
and material conditions for admission.19 Moreover, with regard to short-
stay visa requirements, the Court held that these were liable to constitute 
a restriction to free movement not only because denying a visa would pre-
vent such movement altogether, but also because of the ‘additional and 
recurrent administrative and financial burdens’ involved in obtaining a 
visa.20 These considerations suggest that the standstill clauses are equally 
prohibitive of the introduction of integration requirements, such as the 
obligation to pass an integration exam abroad, provided such require-
ments did not already exist in the legislation of the Member State 
concerned. Consequently, such requirements may not be adopted by 
the Member States in relation to Turkish nationals seeking admission for 
the purposes of engaging in economic activity, either as a worker or as a 
self-employed person.
ii. Non-discrimination 
Apart from the standstill clauses, the legal instruments pertaining to the 
EEC-Turkey Association also contain a number of provisions prohibiting 
discrimination between Turkish nationals and nationals of EU Member 
States. Article 9 of the Association Agreement contains a general clause 
that prohibits any kind of discrimination on the grounds of nationality 
within the scope of the Agreement, in accordance with the principle laid 
down in Article 7 EEC Treaty (now Art 18 TFEU). Additionally, Article 10 
of Decision 1/80 prescribes that Member States shall not discriminate 
between Turkish workers and EU workers as regards remuneration and 
other conditions of work.21
It follows from their wording that the scope of the above provisions is 
limited to matters falling within the scope of the Association Agreement 
(Art 9 Agreement) or to remuneration and other conditions of work (Art 
10 Decision 1/80). Hence, for a long time it could be assumed that these 
non-discrimination clauses did not apply to the admission of Turkish 
workers and self-employed persons to the territory of the EU Member 
States. However, as described above, the CoJ has in recent years expanded 
the scope of the legal instruments pertaining to the EEC-Turkey 
Association so as also to cover initial admissions. Given this case law, the 
criteria relating to the admission of Turkish workers and self-employed 
persons would also seem to come within the scope of Article 9 of the 
Association Agreement. Indeed, this was confirmed by the CoJ in 
19 Tum & Dari (n 12), para 69; Sahin (n 15), para 65.
20 CoJ 19 February 2009, C-228-06 [2009] ECR I-1031 (Soysal & Savatli), para 55. This case 
concerned the freedom to provide services.
21 See also Art 37 of the Additional Protocol. 
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Commission v the Netherlands, where the Court considered discriminatory 
the administrative charges levied by the Dutch authorities for the acquisi-
tion and extension of residence permits by Turkish nationals. The Court 
also held that, for Turkish workers, the charges constituted a condition of 
work that was discriminatory and hence contrary to Article 10 of Decision 
1/80.22 
It follows that conditions imposed by EU Member States for the admis-
sion of Turkish workers and persons wishing to avail themselves of the 
freedom of establishment must be compatible with Article 9 Association 
Agreement and Article 10 Decision 1/80. It is not entirely clear from the 
Court’s case law whether this excludes all conditions that are not also 
imposed on EU citizens. In any case, however, the conditions imposed on 
Turkish nationals may not be disproportionate compared to those imposed 
on EU citizens. The proportionality test applied by the CoJ in this respect 
appears to be strict: in Commission v the Netherlands, for example, the Court 
considered the charges levied on Turkish nationals to be disproportionate 
since the difference between these charges and those levied on EU citizens 
was more than minimal.23
The non-discrimination clauses of Article 9 Association Agreement and 
Article 10 Decision 1/80 would consequently seem to limit the compe-
tence of Member States regarding the admission of Turkish nationals even 
further than the standstill clauses discussed in the previous section. 
Effectively, the former oblige Member States to regulate the admission of 
Turkish workers and self-employed persons in the same (or almost the 
same) way as the admission of EU citizens. As described in the previous 
chapter, this leaves very little scope for Member States to impose require-
ments for residence. The possibility of imposing integration requirements 
also appears to be excluded. Lastly, it may be observed that Turkish 
nationals can in all likelihood rely on the non-discrimination clauses vis-
à-vis the Member States. The direct effect of Article 10 of Decision 1/80 
has already been established by the Court.24 With regard to Article 9 of the 
Association Agreement the Court has not yet established that it has direct 
effect; it follows, however, from Commission v the Netherlands that this pro-
vision is sufficiently precise and unconditional to determine whether a 
given condition must be considered discriminatory in a particular case.25
22 Commission v the Netherlands (n 14), para 75. It can be objected that it is stretching the 
term ‘condition of work’ too far to hold that it also covers conditions for admission to the 
territory. However, if such conditions fall outside the scope of Art 10 Decision 1/80, they will 
arguably still be covered by the general non-discrimination clause of Art 9 of the Agreement.
23 Commission v the Netherlands (n 14), para 74. In this case the lowest charges were more 
than two-thirds higher than the charges imposed on EU citizens, a difference which the 
Court did not consider to be ‘minimal’.
24 CoJ 8 May 2003, C-171/01 [2003] ECR I-410 (Wählergruppe Gemeinsam), paras 54–67.
25 Commission v the Netherlands (n 14), paras 75–76, see also Groenendijk 2010, point 7.
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iii. Family Members of Turkish Workers and Self-employed Persons
Attention must also be paid to the position of family members of Turkish 
workers and self-employed persons. The legal instruments adopted in the 
context of the EEC-Turkey Association do not contain a right to family 
reunification. With regard to Decision 1/80, this was confirmed by the CoJ 
in the case of Demirel.26 However, recent case law contains a number of 
indications that the admission of family members of Turkish nationals 
may nevertheless be regulated, at least to a certain extent, by the said 
instruments.
A first indication can be found in the CoJ’s judgment in Abatay & Sahin, 
where the Court stated that 
Decision 1/80 does not make the access to the territory of a Member State of 
family members of a Turkish worker already legally present in that state in 
order to join the rest of the family conditional on the exercise of paid employ-
ment.27 
Here, the Court seems to proceed on the assumption that the admission of 
family members of Turkish workers is subject to the provisions of Decision 
1/80. This was later confirmed in the case of Commission v the Netherlands, 
where the Court found the administrative charges levied on Turkish 
workers and their family members to be contrary to the non-discrimination 
clause of Article 10 of Decision 1/80. The same conclusion was also drawn, 
in the light of Article 9 Association Agreement, with regard to family 
members of Turkish nationals seeking to establish themselves in a Member 
State.28 
Family members of Turkish workers and self-employed persons are not 
mentioned in Article 10 of Decision 1/80, nor indeed in Article 9 of the 
Agreement or Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol. This raises the 
question of why the Court nevertheless found that it could examine 
the conditions relating to the admission of these family members. One 
answer to this question could be that the Court did not consider the posi-
tion of the family members themselves, but instead considered family 
reunification as one of the conditions of work or establishment in respect 
of which Turkish workers and self-employed persons are entitled to be 
treated without discrimination compared with Community nationals. 
This would be reminiscent of the Court’s approach under EU law, whereby 
the right to family reunification is considered to be inherent in the right of 
free movement of EU citizens (chapter 6, section III.A).29 If this is indeed 
26 CoJ 30 September 1987, C-12/86 [1987] ECR 3719 (Demirel), paras 22 and 28.
27 Abatay & Sahin (n 10), para 82.
28 Commission v the Netherlands (n 14), paras 75–76.
29 See also CoJ 29 March 2012, C-7/10 and 9/10 [2012] ECR 00000 (Kahveci & Inan), para 3, 
where the Court confirmed that Art 7 of Decision 1/80 ‘seeks to enable family members to be 
with a migrant worker, with a view to thus furthering, by means of family reunification, the 
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the view taken by the Court, it would also imply that the admission of 
family members of Turkish self-employed persons is a condition of estab-
lishment, to which the standstill clause of Article 41(1) Additional Protocol 
is applicable. With regard to family members of Turkish workers, the 
standstill clause of Article 13 Decision 1/80 applies in any case as family 
members are expressly mentioned in this provision.
As the CoJ did not give reasons for applying the above provisions to 
family members of Turkish workers and self-employed persons, it cannot 
be said with certainty that the above explanation is correct. If it is, this 
would mean another step in the process whereby the position of Turkish 
nationals is increasingly being put on a par with that of EU citizens, as 
well as another limitation to the competence of the EU Member States in 
the field of immigration regulation. Arguably, this expansion is not in 
itself contrary to the objectives of the Association Agreement, which 
include the realisation of the free movement of workers and the right of 
establishment by reference to the EEC Treaty (now TFEU).30 However, as 
the Court itself has held in previous case law, the provisions setting out 
these objectives only constitute programmatic clauses that are incapable 
of directly governing the position of Turkish nationals.31 The implementa-
tion of these provisions is a task for the Association Council, which is a 
common organ of the Contracting Parties and hence cannot be substituted 
by the CoJ.
B. Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the Western Balkan 
Countries
The EU and its Member States have concluded Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements (‘SAAs’) with four countries in the Western 
Balkans, namely Macedonia, Croatia, Albania and Montenegro.32 The 
aims of these association agreements include the promotion of harmoni-
ous economic relations and the gradual development of a free trade.33 At 
the time of writing, Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro were (potential) 
candidate countries, whereas Croatia was an acceding country, expected 
employment and residence of the Turkish worker who is already legally integrated in the 
host Member State’.
30 Arts 12 and 13 of the Association Agreement. 
31 Demirel (n 26), para 23. See also Hailbronner 2000, 229–31.
32 [2004] OJ L84/1 (Macedonia, entry into force on 1 April 2004); [2005] OJ L26/3 (Croatia, 
entry into force on 1 February 2005); [2009] OJ L107/166 (Albania, entry into force on 1 April 
2009) and [2010] OJ L108/3 (Montenegro, entry into force on 1 May 2010). Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements have also been signed with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
however these agreements have not yet entered into force. See http://ec.europa.eu/enlarge-
ment/countries/check-current-status/index_en.htm.  
33 See Art 1 of the respective agreements.
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to join the EU on 1 July 2013. The SAAs contain very few provisions of 
relevance to the admission of nationals of the said countries to the EU 
Member States. In this respect, the agreements are even less ‘generous’ 
than the Europe Agreements concluded with various Central and Eastern 
European countries preceding their accession to the EU in 2004 and 2007.34 
Still, a number of provisions are useful to mention. The contents of each of 
the agreements are largely identical; where relevant differences exist this 
will be stated.
Each of the agreements contains a prohibition of discrimination for work-
ers who are nationals of the respective third countries and legally employed 
in the territory of a Member State.35 This prohibition concerns discrimina-
tion with regard to working conditions, remuneration or dismissal com-
pared to the nationals of the Member State. The wording of the relevant 
provisions strongly indicates that the admission of third-country nationals 
is not included within their scope; in other words, such nationals cannot 
rely on them in order to be granted entry or residence in an EU Member 
State.36 Admittedly, this interpretation is subject to some doubt, given the 
CoJ’s judgment in Commission v the Netherlands (section II.A.ii above), where 
it was held that administrative charges for acquiring a residence permit 
came within the meaning of Article 10 of Decision 1/80 pertaining to the 
EEC-Turkey Agreement. The wording of the latter provisions is similar to 
that of the non-discrimination clauses in the SAAs. However, the meaning 
of these clauses must be assessed in their own context, taking into account 
the object and purpose of the agreements in which they are included.37 In 
this connection it is observed that the objectives of the SAAs are less far-
reaching, where the freedom of movement of workers is concerned, than 
those of the EEC-Turkey Agreement. In particular, the SAAs do not contain 
any clauses comparable to Article 12 of the EEC-Turkey Association 
Agreement, which calls for the progressive realisation of the freedom of 
movement of workers to be guided by the relevant provisions of the EEC 
Treaty (now TFEU). The SAAs moreover do not include a general non- 
discrimination clause, as laid down in Article 9 EEC-Turkey Agreement. 
As regards establishment, the SAAs primarily contain provisions relat-
ing to the establishment of companies from the associated third countries 
in the EU Member States. Such companies are entitled to treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded by the Member States to their own compa-
nies or to any company of any third country, whichever is better.38 The 
34 On these agreements see, eg, Staples 1999, 239–70 and Hailbronner 2000, 239–53.
35 Art 44(1) SAA Macedonia, Art 45(1) SAA Croatia, Art 46(1) SAA Albania and Art 49(1) 
SAA Montenegro. 
36 See also Hailbronner 2000, 241–43 and Hedemann-Robinson 2001, 570–72 with regard 
to similar provisions in the Europe Agreements.
37 eg, CoJ 27 September 2001, C-257/99 [2001] ECR I-6557 (Barkoci & Malik), paras 51–52.
38 Art 48(3) SAA Macedonia, Art 49(3) SAA Croatia, Art 50(3) SAA Albania and Art 53(2) 
SAA Montenegro.
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Contracting Parties have also agreed not to adopt any new regulations or 
measures that would introduce discrimination as regards the establish-
ment or operation of companies of the other party, compared to their own 
companies.39 The SAAs provide for the above provisions eventually to be 
extended to the establishment of natural persons. The modalities for such 
extension are to be determined by the Stabilisation and Association 
Councils, four or five years after the entry into force of the respective 
agreements.40 For Croatia and Macedonia, the relevant dates have already 
passed (1 February 2009 for Croatia, 1 April 2009 for Macedonia); at the 
time of writing, however, no action had yet been taken. Given that the 
relevant articles of the SAAs require implementation by the Stabilisation 
and Association Councils, it must be assumed that these provisions do not 
have direct effect.41 Hence, until action is taken by the Councils, nationals 
of Croatia and Macedonia will not be able to rely on the SAAs to obtain a 
right of establishment in the EU Member States.42 
Each of the SAAs contains a clause stating that
nothing in this Agreement shall prevent the Parties from applying their laws and 
regulations regarding entry and stay, employment, working conditions, estab-
lishment of natural persons and supply of services, provided that, in so doing, 
they do not apply them in such a manner as to nullify or impair the benefits 
accruing to any Party under the terms of a specific provision of this Agreement.43 
With regard to similar clauses in the Europe Agreements, the CoJ held 
that, in any case, rights of entry and residence conferred on third-country 
nationals by those agreements could not be regarded as ‘absolute privi-
leges’ inasmuch as their exercise could be limited by rules of the host 
Member State. On the other hand, such limitations may not be of such a 
nature as to make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the 
rights granted by the agreements.44 For the time being, however, this case 
39 Art 49(2) SAA Croatia, Art 50(2) SAA Albania and Art 53(3) Montenegro. The SAA 
Macedonia only contains an obligation on the part of Macedonia vis-a-vis EU companies, 
see Art 48(2).
40 Art 48(4) SAA Macedonia, Art 49(4) SAA Croatia, Art 50(4) SAA Albania and Art 53(4) 
SAA Montenegro. The provision in the Macedonia Agreement differs from the other provi-
sions in that it requires the SAA Council to examine whether to extend the provisions on 
establishment to natural persons, in the light of the CoJ case law and the situation in the 
labour market.
41 Compare Savas (n 10), paras 39–45, with regard to Art 41(2) Additional Protocol to the 
EEC-Turkey Agreement.
42 A right of residence does exist with regard to ‘key personnel’ of companies from the 
associated countries that are established in an EU Member State, see Art 53 SAA Macedonia 
and the corresponding articles in the other agreements. However, this right of residence is 
by definition temporary (see the relevant provisions) and therefore not relevant for the pur-
poses of this study.
43 Art 62 SAA Macedonia, Art 63 SAA Croatia, Art 64 SAA Albania and Art 66 SAA 
Montenegro.
44 eg, Barkoci & Malik (n 37), para 83; CoJ (Grand Chamber) 16 November 2004, C-327/02 
[2004] ECR I-11055 (Panayotova), para 39.
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law is not relevant in respect of the SAAs because the latter do not (yet) 
grant any admission rights to third-country nationals. 
C. International Agreements Concluded by the EU and the Act on 
Integration Abroad
Having looked at several international agreements concluded at the EU 
level, the AIA is now considered in relation to those agreements. As estab-
lished in section II.B, the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with 
Macedonia, Croatia, Albania and Montenegro do not as yet grant any res-
idence rights to nationals of those countries. Consequently, the power of 
the Dutch authorities to apply the AIA to these nationals remains unaf-
fected. The same cannot be said, however, with regard to Turkish nation-
als who come within the personal scope of the Association Agreement 
between the EEC and Turkey. With regard to these nationals, the standstill 
and non-discrimination clauses of the Association Agreement, the 
Additional Protocol and Decision 1/80 have to be taken into account. 
Until August 2011, Dutch immigration law did not contain a general 
clause to the effect that Turkish nationals were exempted from the integra-
tion exam abroad. However, as explained in chapter 2 (section VI.B.iii), 
such an exemption has since been introduced in response to a judgment of 
the Central Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad van Beroep). The Tribunal 
ruled that Turkish nationals falling under the scope of the EEC-Turkey 
Association Agreement cannot be subjected to compulsory integration 
under the Integration Act 2007 (the integration exam in the Netherlands).45 
Consequently, because the target group of the AIA is linked to that of the 
Integration Act, Turkish nationals were also exempted from the integra-
tion exam abroad.46 The latter decision was based on national law, rather 
than on a finding of incompatibility of the AIA with the EEC-Turkey 
Association Agreement, the Additional Protocol or Decision 1/80. 
However, it follows that these instruments are now also respected.
III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED  
BY THE NETHERLANDS
This section examines a number of bi- and multilateral treaties to which 
the Netherlands is a party and that contain provisions relating to the entry 
and/or residence of aliens. While it has been argued that similar provi-
sions can be found in several other treaties, it would go beyond the scope 
45 Central Appeals Tribunal 16 August 2011, case nos 10/5248, 10/5249, 10/6123 and 
10/6124, LJN: BR4959. 
46 Parliamentary Papers II 2011–2012, 31 143, No 89.
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of this chapter to discuss each of these agreements separately.47 In this 
regard, it is observed that most of these treaties are rarely or never invoked 
in practice. It is also submitted that, at least where the possibility of impos-
ing integration requirements is concerned, the treaties concluded between 
the Netherlands and other Member States of the EU or the EEA do not 
offer any guarantees additional to those already stemming from the TFEU 
and the EEA Agreement (see chapter 6).48 For these reasons, the examina-
tion in this chapter is limited to four agreements with countries that do 
not belong to the EU/EEA and from which relatively high numbers of 
immigrants come to the Netherlands. These are the bilateral treaties con-
cluded with the United States, Japan and Suriname. In addition, the 
European Convention on Establishment, which is mainly relevant in rela-
tion to Turkish nationals, is also considered.
A. The Dutch-American Friendship Treaty
The Dutch-American Friendship Treaty and its Protocol contain limited 
provisions regarding the entry and residence of American nationals in the 
Netherlands.49 In the context of this study the main provision of the Treaty 
is Article II(1), which grants a right of entry and residence in the 
Netherlands to American nationals for two specifically defined purposes. 
These purposes are:
(a)  to trade between the territories of the two Contracting Parties and 
engage in related activities in the area of trade (traders), or 
(b)  to develop and lead the operation of an enterprise in which they have 
invested a substantial amount of capital or if they are actually in the 
process of realising such an investment (entrepreneurs). 
Although the Treaty itself does not make the admission of American 
traders or entrepreneurs subject to any conditions, Article II(4) states that 
the Contracting Parties retain the right to take ‘measures that are neces-
47 For an overview of approximately 30 bilateral treaties concluded by the Netherlands 
and their consequences for Dutch immigration law, see Roelofs 2004.
48 These include the Agreement concerning the Implementation of Articles 55 and 56 of 
the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Benelux Economic Union (Overeenkomst 
inzake de tenuitvoerlegging van de artikelen 55 en 56 van het Verdrag tot instelling van de Benelux 
Economische Unie) and the Agreement on Establishment between the Netherlands and 
Germany (Nederlands-Duits Vestigingsverdrag). The same applies to the Revised Agreement 
between the Netherlands and Switzerland (Gewijzigd Nederlands-Zwitsers Traktaat) in view of 
the EC-Switzerland Agreement on the free movement of persons (ch 6, section V).
49 Treaty concerning Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the United States of America (Verdrag van vriendschap, handel en scheepvaart 
tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika), signed in The Hague 
on 27 March 1956. Treaty Series 1956, 40 and following, entry into force for the Netherlands 
on 5 December 1957. On this treaty, see Steenbergen et al 1999, 369–71; Kuijer and Steenbergen 
2005, 246–48 and Roelofs 2003.
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sary to maintain public order and to protect public health, public morals 
or security’. 
It follows that the above provisions leave scope for introducing immi-
gration requirements, provided these requirements are necessary in order 
to meet one of the aims enumerated in Article II(4). Of particular interest 
in this regard is how the aim of ‘maintaining public order’ is to be under-
stood. If a narrow definition is adopted, it can be argued that this aim 
includes only the prevention of criminal acts. Arguably, however, a 
broader definition of ‘public order’ would also allow for measures in the 
field of integration, including measures aiming to promote social cohe-
sion or to create awareness about the legislation and constitutional struc-
ture of the host state.
From the preamble of the Dutch-American Friendship Treaty it may be 
derived that its primary purpose is to reinforce international relations 
between the US and the Netherlands, rather than to create individual 
immigration rights for Dutch and American nationals. It is consequently 
submitted that the aim of ‘maintaining public order’ must be understood 
in a broad sense, going beyond the mere prevention of criminal acts.50 It 
follows that the admission of American traders and entrepreneurs to the 
Netherlands could, in principle, be made dependent on integration condi-
tions. Such conditions must however be ‘necessary’ for the maintenance 
of public order.51 It is submitted that this implies that the aim pursued 
must have a certain weight and that the integration requirement must be 
reasonably suited to meeting this aim.
According to Article 1 of the Protocol to the Dutch-American Friendship 
Treaty, the spouse and the unmarried, minor children of an American 
national entitled to admission under Article II(1)(a) or (b) of the Treaty 
will also be admitted to the Netherlands if they accompany that national 
or if they join him or her later for the purpose of family reunification. The 
wording of Article 1 of the Protocol does not limit the category of benefi-
ciaries to American nationals; hence, it must be assumed that the entitle-
ment to admission also concerns spouses and children with another 
nationality, subject to the measures referred to in Article II(4).52 
50 This is also the view expressed by the Dutch government during the parliamentary 
deliberations on the ratification of the Treaty. In this debate it was stated that ‘measures to 
maintain public order . . . do not only include incidental government actions for the preven-
tion of imminent threats to that order, but also legislative provisions that have been adopted 
with the aim of enforcing public order in the widest possible meaning of the word’. See 
Parliamentary Papers I 1956–1957, 4338 (R38), No 140a, 2. For a different view, see Roelofs 
2003, 190.
51 As argued in ch 5 (section II.D), integration measures that aim to create awareness 
about legislation or constitutional principles could probably be subsumed under the interest 
of ‘protecting public order’. Presumably, however, the interest of maintaining public order is 
broader and could also cover requirements aiming to promote social cohesion and/or enable 
the participation of immigrants in various aspects of public life.
52 See also Roelofs 2003, 190.
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Article 2 of the Protocol specifies that the provision of Article II(1)(b) 
also applies to American nationals representing an American business or 
entrepreneur and working for that business in a ‘responsible’ position 
(‘key personnel’). Article II(1)(c) of the Treaty provides that admission 
shall also be granted for purposes other than those mentioned under (a) 
or (b), but with respect for the laws of the Contracting State concerning 
the admission and residence of aliens. It follows that the Dutch-American 
Friendship Treaty does not preclude the application of national immigra-
tion rules, including integration requirements, to American nationals who 
are not traders or entrepreneurs within the meaning of Article II(1)(a) and 
(b). Lastly, Article II(2) contains an obligation to facilitate the admission, 
stay and departure of American tourists and other visitors. However, 
because of the temporary nature of their stay, this provision is not relevant 
for the purpose of this study. 
B. The Treaty on Commerce and Navigation between the Netherlands 
and Japan
The Treaty on Commerce and Navigation between the Netherlands and 
Japan (Verdrag van handel en scheepvaart tussen Nederland en Japan) entered 
into force on 9 October 1913.53 The Treaty was suspended during the 
course of the Second World War, but reactivated in 1953.54 In 2008 the 
Administrative Jurisdiction Division (AJD) of the Dutch Council of State 
confirmed that the Treaty was still in force.55 In the same judgments, the 
AJD also confirmed that Article 1(1˚) of the Treaty may be relied upon by 
Japanese nationals seeking to be admitted to the Netherlands. According 
to this provision, Japanese nationals are entitled, where the rights to free 
movement and residence are concerned, to be treated equally to the 
nationals of the most favoured nations. Consequently Japanese nationals 
are entitled to admission under the same conditions as American nation-
als under the Dutch-American Friendship Treaty (section III.A).56 It fol-
lows that a limited right of admission exists for Japanese traders and 
entrepreneurs and for their family members, whereby the latter do not 
need to have Japanese nationality. Nevertheless, it was argued above that 
this right does not preclude the introduction of integration requirements, 
provided those requirements are necessary for maintaining public order 
or for protecting public morals.
53 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1913, 389. An English translation of this treaty was published 
in The American Journal of International Law, Vol 8:3, Supplement Official Documents (July 
1914), 228–36.
54 Roelofs 2004, 150.
55 AJD 8 August 2008, case no 200800099/1 and AJD 8 August 2008, case no 200800100/1.
56 AJD 8 August 2008, case no 200800099/1, para 2.4.2 and AJD 8 August 2008, case no 
200800100/1, para 2.4.2. See also Roelofs 2004, 149.
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C. Agreements between the Netherlands and Suriname
After Suriname’s independence from the Netherlands in 1975, the two 
countries concluded the Agreement concerning residence and establish-
ment (Overeenkomst inzake het verblijf en de vestiging van wederzijdse 
onderdanen).57 This agreement remained in force for five years, until 25 
November 1980. In 1982 it was replaced by the Agreement concerning 
entry and residence (Overeenkomst inzake de binnenkomst en het verblijf van 
wederzijdse onderdanen).58 A protocol to the latter agreement establishes a 
right to family reunification for persons granted residence in the 
Netherlands before 25 November 1980. Considering the time that has 
since passed, however, it may be assumed that this protocol no longer has 
much relevance. It is therefore not discussed any further. 
Annex I to the 1982 Agreement sets out a number of conditions relating 
to the entry and residence of Surinamese nationals, including for the pur-
pose of family reunification. Article 9 of the Agreement states that changes 
to the policy laid down in the Annex should only be effectuated after the 
Surinamese authorities have been notified of these changes and have had 
the opportunity to ask for deliberations. In 2000, however, the District 
Courts’ Aliens Affairs Legal Uniformity Chamber (Rechtseenheidskamer) 
decided that Article 9 of the 1982 Agreement was only binding for the 
Netherlands in its relation to Suriname. The Court pointed out that Article 
8 of the Agreement explicitly affirmed the autonomy of both the 
Netherlands and Suriname with regard to the entry and residence of each 
other’s nationals. Therefore, the Netherlands was not bound by the 
Agreement to grant admission to Surinamese nationals under the condi-
tions set out in Annex I, even if it had altered these conditions without 
following the prescribed procedure of notification.59 
It follows that the 1982 Agreement does not grant any rights of entry or 
residence in the Netherlands to nationals of Suriname. Article 9, however, 
obliges the Netherlands to notify the Surinamese authorities of any 
changes in its immigration policy with regard to Surinamese nationals. It 
is submitted that the introduction of the integration exam abroad, which 
applies to Surinamese applicants for family reunification (and religious 
servants), constitutes such a change (even if in practice nearly all 
Surinamese nationals are exempted on the grounds that they have 
received their primary education in Dutch; see section VI.B.iii of chapter 
2). To the best of my knowledge, no notification has been given. However, 
57 Treaty Series 1975, 133. 
58 Treaty Series 1981, 35, entry into force for the Netherlands on 1 December 1982. On both 
treaties, see Steenbergen et al 1999, 373–78 and Kuijer and Steenbergen 2005, 178.
59 District Court of The Hague (Aliens Affairs Legal Uniformity Chamber), 30 May 2000, 
case no 99/18 S1813, JV 2000/156, paras 24–25.
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it would be up to the Surinamese authorities to decide whether to raise 
this issue with the Netherlands.
D. The European Convention on Establishment
Unlike the treaties discussed in the previous subsections, which are all 
bilateral agreements, the European Convention on Establishment (ECE) 
was concluded within the framework of the Council of Europe.60 With the 
exception of Turkey, all the States Parties to the Convention are also 
Member States of the EU and/or the EEA. While the ECE contains a num-
ber of provisions concerning the entry and residence of nationals of other 
States Parties, these do not grant any rights of free movement additional 
to those already granted under EU law or the EEA Agreement (chapter 6). 
The ECE is therefore only relevant with regard to the position of Turkish 
nationals, who may, in addition, also be covered by the standstill or non-
discrimination provisions of the EEC-Turkey Agreement (section II.A). 
Article 1 ECE obliges the States Parties to the Convention to facilitate 
the entry into their territory by nationals of other States Parties, but only 
for the purpose of temporary visits. In addition Article 2 states that the 
States Parties must facilitate the prolonged or permanent residence of 
nationals of the other Parties on their territories. This obligation only 
exists, however, ‘to the extent permitted by the economic and social con-
ditions’ of the State Party concerned. Article 2 also indicates that the obli-
gation to facilitate prolonged or permanent residence is subject to the 
conditions set out in Article 1, which means that it does not apply if this 
would be contrary to the ordre public or to national security, public health 
or morality. The Protocol to the ECE shows that the application of these 
grounds is subject to national criteria, as is the determination of the eco-
nomic and social conditions that may prevent a State Party from admit-
ting nationals of other Parties for prolonged or permanent residence.61 
Lastly, the Protocol determines that regulations of the States Parties 
governing the admission and residence of aliens ‘shall be unaffected by 
the Convention in so far as they are not inconsistent with it’.62 The formu-
lation used here suggests that this stipulation applies only to regulations 
that already existed when the ECE entered into force. Nevertheless, it is 
clear from Article 2 of the Convention and the explanatory remarks in the 
Protocol that the ECE does not grant nationals of the States Parties a right 
60 Treaty Series 1956, 20 and following, entry into force for the Netherlands on 21 May 1969. 
On this treaty, see Steenbergen et al 1999, 97–102.
61 See Section I(a)(1)-(3) of the Protocol. See also Section III(a), which clarifies that the con-
cept of ordre public is to be understood in a wide sense allowing, eg, the exclusion of nation-
als of another party for political reasons or because they are unable to pay the costs of their 
stay.
62 Section II(a) of the Protocol.
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to be admitted to the territory of another Party, let alone preclude such a 
right from being made subject to integration requirements. Instead, it is 
submitted that the obligation to ‘facilitate’ prolonged or permanent resi-
dence merely requires the States Parties to favourably consider adopting 
legislation allowing nationals of other Parties to apply for long-term resi-
dence, and only in so far as this would not be contrary to the general inter-
ests enumerated in Article 1 (see also section IV.C). In doing so, the States 
Parties must pay due regard to family ties.63 It follows from the above, 
however, that the ECE does not provide a legal basis for an actual right to 
family reunification.
E. International Agreements Concluded by the Netherlands and the 
Act on Integration Abroad
In conclusion, none of the four international agreements examined above 
preclude the introduction of integration requirements for the admission 
of third country nationals per se. The Agreement concerning entry and 
residence between the Netherlands and Suriname does not contain any 
restrictions on the introduction of integration requirements, even if it 
requires the Surinamese authorities to be notified of any such change. 
Some limitations to integration requirements do follow from the Dutch-
American Friendship Treaty and, by consequence, via the ‘most favoured 
treatment’ clause, from the Treaty on Commerce and Navigation with 
Japan. These limitations are, however, limited in scope as they apply only 
to American and Japanese traders and entrepreneurs and their family 
members. It has also been argued that both treaties leave room for integra-
tion measures that are ‘necessary to maintain public order and to protect 
public health, public morals or security’. It is submitted that the AIA 
meets this criterion, at least to the extent that it aims to further the partici-
pation of immigrants in various areas of the public domain (and so to 
improve social cohesion) or to inform them about certain aspects of Dutch 
legislation or the constitutional structure. Whether all elements of the 
integration exam abroad (and in particular the ‘Knowledge of the 
Netherlands’ test) are equally suitable for this purpose is a question that is 
not discussed in detail here. After all, as seen in chapter 2 (section VI.B.i), 
nationals of the United States and Japan are in any case exempted from 
the AIA. It follows that the Act respects the bilateral treaties concluded 
with these countries.
Lastly, it was established that the European Convention on 
Establishment may be of some relevance to the position of Turkish nation-
als. As the Convention does not grant Turkish nationals a right to be 
63 Section III(b) of the Protocol. 
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admitted to the Netherlands, however, it is unlikely that they could rely 
on it before the Dutch courts. In addition, it can be plausibly maintained 
that the integration exam abroad is a measure aiming to contribute to the 
safeguarding of the ordre public, or that is justified in view of the economic 
and social conditions of the Netherlands. It is therefore concluded that, in 
bringing Turkish nationals under the AIA in 2006, the Dutch government 
did not act contrary to its obligation to facilitate their prolonged or perma-
nent residence as required by Article 2 ECE. As explained earlier in this 
chapter section II.C), Turkish nationals are currently exempted from the 
integration exam abroad because this was required by national law.
IV. LABOUR MIGRATION
The final part of this chapter deals with international instruments con-
cerning labour migration to which the Netherlands is a party. As 
announced in the introduction, the first instrument discussed is the EU 
Blue Card Directive concerning the admission of highly qualified labour 
migrants from third countries. Some attention is then paid to the provi-
sions relating to family reunification of labour migrants in the European 
Convention relating to the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (ECMW) and 
the European Social Charter (ESC). The revised ILO Convention (No 97) 
on Migration for Employment is not discussed because it does not contain 
any provisions relating to entry or residence. 
A. The EU Blue Card Directive
The EU Blue Card Directive (BCD) is discussed in chapter 6 in respect of 
the right of free movement in the law of the European Union. It may be 
recalled that the aim of this directive is to make the EU more attractive to 
highly qualified labour migrants from third countries. To this end, the 
directive sets the conditions of entry and residence (for more than three 
months) of third-country nationals in EU Member States for the purpose 
of highly qualified employment, as well as the conditions governing the 
right of EU Blue Card holders to move to another Member State.64 The free 
movement rights of EU Blue Card holders are examined in section VII of 
the previous chapter. This chapter focuses on the conditions under which 
a Blue Card must be issued by the first Member State (section IV.A.i), with 
the conditions for family reunification of EU Blue Card holders, which are 
also laid down in the Blue Card Directive, being discussed in section 
IV.A.ii.
64 Art 1 BCD.
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i.  The EU Blue Card for Highly Qualified Third-country Nationals
The EU Blue Card is a combination of a work and residence permit that 
allows third-country nationals to enter and reside in a Member State and 
take up highly qualified employment there under the terms of the Blue 
Card Directive.65 Article 5 of the directive sets the criteria to be met by 
third-country nationals applying for a Blue Card. The issue of a Blue Card 
is not dependent on fulfilment of integration requirements. Most of the 
criteria relate directly to the residence purpose (for example, a valid work 
contract or binding job offer, proof of relevant higher qualifications and a 
salary above a minimum threshold). In addition, the applicant must have 
valid travel and entry documents and evidence of health insurance and 
must not be considered to pose a threat to public policy, public security or 
public health. 
It follows that the BCD restricts the competence of the Member States to 
set integration requirements for the admission of highly qualified third-
country nationals. Nonetheless, the Blue Card Directive has only limited 
scope. Article 3 BCD mentions several categories of third-country nation-
als who are not covered by the directive. These include persons benefiting 
from various forms of international protection, EU long-term residents 
and family members of EU citizens exercising their right of free move-
ment. Moreover, third country nationals who meet the above criteria can-
not obtain a right of residence without a positive decision from the 
Member State.66 Article 8 BCD sets out a number of grounds on which an 
application for a Blue Card may be refused even if the criteria of Article 5 
are met. These include the availability of workers in prioritised categories 
(such as the national or Community workforce) and the need to ensure 
ethical recruitment in countries of origin. The Member States also remain 
entitled to determine the numbers of third-country nationals admitted for 
the purpose of highly qualified employment.67 Lastly, the directive does 
not preclude the right of the Member States to issue residence permits 
other than an EU Blue Card for any purpose of employment.68 It is, there-
fore, concluded that the extent to which the Blue Card Directive effec-
tively constrains the discretion of the EU Member States with regard to 
the admission of (highly qualified) labour migrants is not very large. 
ii. Family Members of EU Blue Card Holders
Third-country nationals who have been issued an EU Blue Card are enti-
tled to bring along their family members. Article 15 BCD declares that the 
65 Art 2(c) BCD.
66 See also Boeles et al 2009, 231.
67 Art 6 BCD. 
68 Art 3(4) BCD.
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Family Reunification Directive (FRD) is equally applicable to the family 
reunification of Blue Card holders, subject to a number of derogations. 
The conditions set by this directive, in particular the requirements relating 
to integration, are discussed in detail in chapter 6. In the case of family 
members of EU Blue Card holders, however, integration requirements 
may only be applied after the persons concerned have been granted fam-
ily reunification.69 This implies that a residence permit may not be refused 
because of the family members failing to comply with integration require-
ments, which is an important difference from the FRD. This difference is 
explained by the fact that the BCD aims to create an attractive setting for 
highly qualified labour migrants, including favourable conditions for 
family reunification.70 The preamble to the BCD expressly confirms that 
the derogation of Article 15(3) does not preclude Member States from 
maintaining or introducing integration conditions and measures, includ-
ing language learning, for family members of EU Blue Card holders.71 
However, as established in chapter 6, these requirements fall outside the 
scope of this study as they can only be imposed after admission has been 
granted.
B. The European Convention Relating to the Legal Status of Migrant 
Workers
The European Convention relating to the Legal Status of Migrant Workers 
(ECMW) was concluded in the framework of the Council of Europe and 
entered into force for the Netherlands on 1 May 1983.72 The Convention 
has been ratified by several EU Member States, as well as Norway and 
Turkey. In 2006 and 2007 three more countries acceded: Albania, Moldova 
and Ukraine. 
The ECMW does not apply to all migrant workers. Instead its personal 
scope is limited to those nationals of the Contracting Parties who have 
been authorised by another Contracting Party to reside in its territory in 
order to take up paid employment.73 The criteria governing the granting 
of authorisation are not laid down in the Convention; hence, the admission 
of migrant workers is left to the competence of the Contracting Parties. 
However, Article 12 grants migrant workers a right to family reunification. 
This provision grants family members of migrant workers a right to be 
admitted to the territory of the Contracting State where the migrant 
69 Art 15(3) BCD.
70 Preamble of the BCD, recital 23.
71 ibid. 
72 CETS No 93, Treaty Series 1978, 70 and 1983, 45.
73 Art 1(1) ECMW. Those excluded from the scope of the Convention also include frontier 
workers, artists, sailors, persons following an education, seasonal workers and employees of 
a company established outside the host state, see Art 1(2).
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worker is employed. ‘Family members’ within the meaning of Article 12 
are the spouse and the unmarried minor children of the migrant worker, 
the latter as long as they are dependent.74 The Convention does not require 
the family members to have the same nationality as the migrant worker.
The residence right of family members is subject to the same conditions 
as those set by the Convention for migrant workers themselves.75 
According to Article 9 ECMW, migrant workers and their family members 
are entitled to a residence permit for the duration of the employment, but 
this may be withdrawn for reasons of national security, public policy or 
public morals, because the holder refuses to comply with measures pre-
scribed by an official medical authority or if a condition essential to its 
issue or validity is not fulfilled. In the case of family reunification, the 
migrant worker must have normal housing available for the family and 
may be required to meet certain income requirements.76 Lastly, the 
Contracting Parties may impose a waiting period of up to 12 months 
before granting authorisation for family reunification.77 The Convention 
does not, however, leave scope for the Contracting Parties to make family 
reunification dependent on fulfilment of integration requirements.78 
Article 12(1) ECMW states that family members of migrant workers ‘are 
authorised . . . to join the migrant worker in the territory of the Contracting 
Party’ if the conditions for this are met. Given the formulation of this pro-
vision and the fact that the conditions are laid down in the Convention 
itself, it is submitted that Article 12(1) ECMW is self-executing in the sense 
of Article 93 Dutch Constitution (een ieder verbindend). This reading is sup-
ported by the preamble of the Convention, which refers to the ‘rights and 
privileges’ granted to nationals of the Contracting Parties. This means 
that migrant workers and their family members can rely on this provision 
before the Dutch courts. For migrant workers who are nationals of 
Member States of the EU or the EEA the ECMW will be of little relevance, 
as their situation is already governed by more favourable provisions in 
the TFEU and the EEA Agreement (chapter 6).79 However, the Convention 
does create an additional right of family reunification for nationals of 
Albania, Moldova and Ukraine. Lastly, it cannot be excluded that the pro-
visions on family reunification in the ECMW are in some respects more 
favourable than those in the Association Agreement between the EEC and 
Turkey (section II.A). 
74 Art 12(1) ECMW.
75 Art 12(1) ECMW. 
76 Art 12(1) and (2) ECMW. Before imposing income requirements the Contracting Parties 
must send a declaration to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. 
77 Art 12(1) ECMW.
78 See also Groenendijk 2007, 113.
79 Art 32 ECMW provides that the Convention does not preclude more favourable treat-
ment granted by provisions of national law or of any bilateral or multilateral treaties, both 
anterior and posterior. 
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C. The European Social Charter (Revised)
The European Social Charter (ESC), in its revised form, entered into force 
in the Netherlands on 1 July 2006.80 Like the ECMW, the Charter is also a 
Council of Europe instrument.81 The States Parties must agree to be bound 
by at least a certain number of articles of the Charter, including at least six 
of the nine designated articles setting out the most important social 
rights.82 The Netherlands is bound by the entire Charter, subject to two 
reservations that are not relevant for the purpose of this study.83
Article 19 ESC concerns the right of migrant workers and their families 
to protection and assistance. According to paragraph 6 of this article, the 
Contracting Parties undertake ‘to facilitate as far as possible the reunion 
of the family of a foreign worker permitted to establish himself in the ter-
ritory [of those Parties]’. Article 19(10) ESC extends the scope of this obli-
gation to the family reunion of self-employed migrants.84 For the purpose 
of this chapter, the meaning of this provision is analysed and, in particu-
lar, the question of whether it stands in the way of integration require-
ments being imposed on the family reunion of migrant workers.
To begin with, it can be assumed that Article 19(6) ESC does not contain 
a right to admission for family members, nor does it preclude the family 
reunion of migrant workers being made subject to conditions or require-
ments. This follows from the wording of Article 19(6) which states that 
family reunion must be ‘facilitated as far as possible’. This formulation 
allows more scope for the Contracting Parties than if family reunion were 
to be ‘granted’ or ‘allowed’.85 Nevertheless, it is submitted, also on the basis 
of the wording, that Article 19(6) does place an obligation on the Contracting 
States to make an effort to reduce obstacles to family reunion to the mini-
mum required by the public interest. This implies that requirements for 
family reunification are allowed, to the extent that they can be shown to 
serve a public interest and to be necessary to achieve that objective.
Additionally, with regard to integration requirements, the obligation to 
facilitate may be taken to mean that the Contracting States must assist 
80 Treaty Series 2004, 13 and 2006, 128. Before this date the Netherlands was bound by the 
original version of the European Social Charter, the provisions of which are largely similar.
81 CETS No 163.
82 Art A(1) of Part III ESC.
83 These reservations are included in the instrument of acceptance deposited with the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe, see www.conventions.coe.int. 
84 Hence, references in the rest of this section to migrant workers also include self-
employed migrants.
85 See, however, the conclusions of the European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) on 
the Netherlands, in which the Committee refers to the ‘right to family reunion’, as well as to 
migrant workers being ‘entitled’ to be reunited with their spouse. See ECSR Conclusions 
XVII-1 – Netherlands (Kingdom in Europe) and Aruba, 26, available at www.coe.int. It is 
submitted that the Committee’s approach is not supported by the text of the Charter. 
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applicants for family reunion in complying with those requirements by, 
for example, ensuring the availability of preparation materials for an inte-
gration test. The Advisory Division of the Dutch Council of State referred 
to Article 19(6) ESC in support of its stance that the Netherlands should 
supervise the development of suitable course materials for the integration 
exam abroad.86 Article 19(6) can thus be read as calling for a shared respon-
sibility with regard to integration requirements for family reunion, instead 
of placing the responsibility entirely on the migrant workers and their 
family members.
A few remarks can be made with regard to the personal scope of Article 
19(6) ESC. First of all, Article 19(6) applies only to migrant workers who 
are nationals of a Contracting State. With regard to most provisions of the 
Charter a statement to this effect is included in the Appendix. Although 
Article 19 is not included in this statement, its limitation to nationals of 
the Contracting Parties nevertheless follows from the wording of this pro-
vision, which refers to ‘the right of migrant workers and their families to 
protection and assistance in the territory of any other Party’ (emphasis 
added).87 Furthermore, with regard to family members, the Appendix to 
the ESC specifies that Article 19(6) covers at least the worker’s spouse and 
unmarried children, the latter as long as they are minors according to the 
law of the receiving state and dependent on the migrant worker. The fam-
ily members are not required to have the same nationality as the migrant 
worker. 
As far as the family reunion of migrant workers is concerned, it may be 
observed that Article 19(6) ESC does not create any obligations for the 
Contracting Parties beyond those stemming from the TFEU and the EEA 
Agreement (chapter 6, sections II–IV). Nevertheless, the ESC has been 
accepted by a number of countries that are not EU or EEA Member States.88 
With regard to migrant workers who are nationals of these countries, the 
ESC creates an additional obligation. This does not mean, however, that 
individual migrant workers or their family members can also rely on the 
Charter provisions before the Dutch courts. The Appendix to Part III of 
the (revised) ESC states that ‘it is understood that the Charter contains 
legal obligations of an international character, the application of which is 
submitted solely to the supervision provided for in Part IV’. This seems to 
exclude the possibility that the Charter also contains obligations of the 
Contracting Parties vis-à-vis individuals, which could be enforced 
through the courts.89 However, even if this statement in the Appendix is 
86 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 4, 5.
87 See also Steenbergen et al 1999, 106–07 and Wiesbrock 2010, 186.
88 At the time of writing these countries were Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, 
Turkey and Ukraine. See http://conventions.coe.int.
89 Hailbronner 2000, 348.
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not taken to exclude direct effect, the contents of the individual provisions 
are still relevant. The Dutch Central Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad van 
Beroep) has held that most provisions of the ESC contain ‘generally formu-
lated social objectives which the Contracting Parties have bound them-
selves to pursue through their legislation, rather than recognized rights 
which can be relied upon by individuals’.90 As stated above, Article 19(6) 
ESC lays down a duty for the Contracting States to facilitate family reun-
ion for migrant workers. Given the lack of a clearly formulated right and 
the need for the Contracting States to take appropriate measures, it is 
argued that Article 19(6) ESC is not self-executing (een ieder verbindend) 
and does not have direct effect in the Dutch legal order. 
D. Labour Migration and the Act on Integration Abroad
i. Standards Set by International Instruments
The above instruments – the EU Blue Card Directive, the European 
Convention on Migrant Workers and the revised European Social Charter 
– all have a limited personal scope. Nevertheless, each contains some 
standard with regard to integration requirements for certain categories of 
migrant workers or their family members. Such requirements may not be 
imposed as a condition for the admission of applicants for an EU Blue 
Card or their family members, nor for family members of migrant work-
ers falling under the ECMW. With regard to the family reunification of 
migrant workers who are nationals of the Contracting Parties, the revised 
ESC integration requirements are not forbidden; however, their enact-
ment must be in conformity with the obligation to facilitate family reun-
ion as far as possible. The same applies with regard to the family 
reunification of self-employed migrants. It has been submitted that this 
implies that integration requirements must be necessary in order to attain 
a public interest. In addition, where possible, the Contracting Parties must 
share the responsibility of ensuring that the integration requirements can 
be met, for example by guaranteeing the availability of course materials 
or by taking on responsibility for some of the costs. 
ii. The Situation of Labour Migrants and their Family Members under the AIA 
and Compliance with International Instruments
The AIA does not apply to aliens applying for a residence permit for a 
temporary purpose. As a consequence, migrant workers, self-employed 
90 eg, Central Appeals Tribunal 5 December 2003, case no 01/4843 and Central Appeals 
Tribunal 22 December 2008, case nos 08/4535 and 08/4540, para 4.2. A case in which a provi-
sion of the ESC was found to be self-executing is HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986/688 regarding 
Art 6 (4) ESC (the right to strike). 
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migrants and their family members are all in principle exempted from the 
obligation to pass the integration exam abroad.91 This includes applicants 
for an EU Blue Card, and their family members. It follows that the situa-
tion of labour migrants and their family members under the AIA is, in 
principle, compatible with the international instruments examined earlier 
in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, situations may occur in which the above exemptions 
prove to be too narrow. This will be the case when a person qualifies as a 
migrant worker within the meaning of the ECMW or the ESC, but is 
admitted to the Netherlands for a non-temporary residence purpose or 
obtains a permanent residence permit after five years. The ESC, unlike the 
ECMW, does not require a person to have been admitted for the purpose 
of employment in order to qualify as a migrant worker. In the above situ-
ation, family members will be required to pass the integration exam 
unless another exception applies. It seems that this possibility was not 
recognised by the Dutch government when the AIA was adopted.92 
As explained above (section IV.B) Article 12 ECMW fully precludes the 
possibility of integration requirements for the family reunification of 
migrant workers. This provision could be breached if, for example, the 
AIA were to be applied to the family reunification of a Turkish or 
Ukrainian national who has been admitted for the purpose of taking up 
employment and has obtained a permanent residence permit. With regard 
to Article 19(6) ESC, the question arises as to whether the obligation to 
pass the integration exam is necessary to attain a public interest. Given 
the arguments provided by the government (chapter 3, section II.B.ii), it is 
submitted that such an interest has been sufficiently established.93 It has 
been argued, however, that the obligation to facilitate family reunion 
implies that the Netherlands must do more to support family members of 
migrant workers who have to pass the integration exam abroad. One way 
to do this would be by ensuring that adequate and affordable means of 
preparation are available in all the countries where the exam is adminis-
tered and by reducing the costs of the exam. As things stand, the respon-
sibility for taking and passing the exam is left entirely to the migrant 
workers and their family members.
91 Art 16(1)(h) Aliens Act read together with Art 3(1)(a) Integration Act 2007 and Art 2.1(1) 
Integration Decree.
92 See Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 700, No 6, 48–49, where the government states 
that Art 19(6) ESC is respected because labour migrants and their family members are 
exempted from the AIA.
93 The government has also argued that the civic integration exam abroad is justified 
under the restriction clause of Art 31 ESC (Art G revised ESC). See Parliamentary Papers II 
2004–2005, 29 700, No 6, 49. It is submitted that this restriction clause has no relevance with 
regard to Art 19(6) ESC as the latter provision does not contain a right to family reunification 
and the obligation ‘to facilitate’ already allows for restrictions deemed necessary in the pub-
lic interest, see section IV.C above.
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V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This chapter examines a number of international agreements, concluded 
at a European and national level, as well as several legal instruments con-
cerning labour migration. As far as the possibility to impose integration 
requirements is concerned, the most far-reaching standards are found in 
the EEC-Turkey Agreement. According to recent CoJ case law, this agree-
ment leaves no scope for the Netherlands to impose integration require-
ments on the admission of Turkish workers and self-employed persons, 
or their family members. In addition, integration requirements are also 
precluded by the provisions of the Blue Card Directive and Article 12 of 
the ECMW. However, it should be noted that the personal scope of each of 
these instruments is rather limited, with their application being restricted 
to specific categories of economic migrants and/or family members of 
those migrants. Moreover, apart from the BCD, they apply only to immi-
grants (or family members of immigrants) who are nationals of the states 
that are party to the agreement concerned. Apart from EU and EEA 
nationals these are only the nationals of Turkey, Albania, Moldavia and 
Ukraine.
Besides the above instruments, other treaties require the Netherlands 
(and other Contracting Parties) to facilitate the admission of certain cate-
gories of immigrants (Turkish nationals under the ECE, family members 
of labour migrants under the ESC) or even grant them a right of admis-
sion (traders and entrepreneurs under the bilateral agreements with the 
United States and Japan). However, each of these treaties leaves the states 
concerned considerable discretion to make such admission subject to con-
ditions, if this is required by the public interest. The possibility to intro-
duce integration requirements therefore remains largely unaffected, even 
if it is argued that the States Parties to the ESC should, as much as possi-
ble, ensure that responsibility for compliance with these requirements 
does not rest solely with the immigrant family members.
Regarding the AIA, it was recalled that labour migrants and their 
(accompanying) family members are exempted from the obligation to 
pass the integration exam abroad, as are nationals of the United States 
and Japan. Consequently, the Act is largely compatible with the interna-
tional instruments examined in this chapter. Nonetheless, the exemptions 
in national legislation are sometimes narrower than required by the trea-
ties. Article 19(6) ESC also seems to require more efforts to be made by the 
Netherlands to support family members of migrant workers in preparing 
for the integration exam, for instance by increasing the availability of 
preparation materials or reducing the costs of the exam.
On a somewhat more abstract level, it is observed that most of the 
instruments discussed in this chapter broadly pursue two purposes: the 
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admission of immigrants for economic reasons or the reinforcement of 
international relations between states. Unless integration is understood in 
a strictly economic sense (as performing paid labour or being financially 
independent), there is no reason to assume that immigrants who are 
admitted on the above grounds are prima facie more likely to integrate 
successfully than those coming for other purposes. For this reason, it is 
submitted that there are no grounds for arguing that integration require-
ments are not relevant for labour migrants or migrants admitted under 
international agreements. It is also submitted that, in the situations dis-
cussed in this chapter, the alien’s interest in being admitted is less impera-
tive than where admission is sought for the purpose of family reunification 
or to obtain international protection (see also chapter 3, section II.C.i). It 
follows that, in principle, integration requirements may be imposed as a 
means to improve the integration process in the host state.
Nonetheless, the interests of integration need to be balanced against the 
(economic or diplomatic) interests served by admitting labour migrants 
or nationals of befriended states (see also chapter 8). As this chapter has 
shown, the outcome of this balancing exercise is not always the same. 
Another possible reason for introducing integration requirements, espe-
cially in the case of labour migrants, could also be that such requirements 
may help immigrants in performing their work. Requirements regarding 
language proficiency or awareness of social conventions in the host state 
may, for instance, help immigrants to function more easily in the labour 
market (see also chapter 3, section III.D.i). Where this is meant to be the 
purpose of integration requirements, however, such requirements are 
more likely to take the form of facilitative measures (such as an integra-
tion programme or course) than of conditions for admission.
Lastly, this chapter has shown that instruments concerning the admis-
sion of labour migrants and nationals of befriended states often also grant 
a privileged position to family members of these aliens. As the Blue Card 
Directive shows, this may be a way to attract labour migrants from abroad 
so as to promote the economic interest of the host state. In this case, as 
stated above, the decision to introduce integration requirements (or not) 
will depend on a balancing of these economic interests against the inter-
ests of integration. However, apart from the economic interests, regard 
must also be had for the right to respect for family life. In this connection, 
it is submitted that there is no reason why the family reunification of 
labour migrants should be subject to a more favourable regime than that 
existing for other persons. However, as argued in chapter 4, once labour 
migrants (or other immigrants) have built up strong ties to the host state, 
they should be entitled to family reunification in that state. In that situa-
tion, integration requirements should no longer function as grounds for 
the non-admission of family members.

C. Integration Requirements and Equality 
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The Right to Equal Treatment:  
Direct Differential Treatment on 
Grounds of Nationality  
and Residence Purpose 
I. INTRODUCTION
AS EXPLAINED IN chapter 2 (section VI.B) the Act on Integration  Abroad does not apply to all immigrants alike. Whereas some    aliens have to pass the integration exam abroad in order to be 
admitted to the Netherlands, others are exempted from this condition. 
This chapter, together with chapters 9 and 10, investigates how this differ-
ence in treatment should be assessed in relation to the right to equal treat-
ment and the prohibition of discrimination. More specifically the following 
topics are addressed: the differential treatment of immigrants on the 
grounds of their nationality and residence purpose; the indirect differen-
tial treatment of immigrants and their family members on the grounds of 
racial or ethnic origin; and the ‘reverse discrimination’ of Dutch nationals 
who are not entitled to family reunification under EU law. 
A general overview of the legal framework concerning the right to 
equal treatment is provided in section II, followed by an examination in 
sections III and IV of the relevance of nationality and residence purpose 
as criteria for differentiating between immigrants when applying integra-
tion requirements. In the course of this examination several possible 
justifications for making distinctions on these grounds are considered. 
Lastly, in section V, the findings of the previous sections are applied to the 
Act on Integration Abroad. The issue of indirect differential treatment on 
the grounds of race or ethnic origin is discussed separately in chapter 9, 
while the ‘reverse discrimination’ of Dutch nationals is addressed in 
chapter 10.
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK CONCERNING  
THE RIGHT TO EQUAL TREATMENT 
A. The Principle of Equal Treatment 
The principle of equal treatment is generally recognised as a fundamental 
legal principle. This principle is often conveyed by the formula that ‘equal 
situations must be treated in the same way and unequal situations must 
be treated differently to the degree of their inequality’.1 Yet the meaning of 
the equal treatment principle does not lend itself to precise definition. As 
various authors have noted, the requirement for equal situations to be 
treated the same way is of a formal nature and does not tell us when two 
cases are equal or what equal treatment consists of.2 The determination 
that situations are equal or unequal always, therefore, rests on a value 
judgement that is external to the equal treatment principle itself.3 The 
same is true with regard to the question of whether a particular form of 
unequal treatment is nevertheless acceptable because of being based on 
a reasonable justification (section II.C). Because of this ‘normative 
indeterminacy’,4 the equal treatment principle as such provides little 
guidance with regard to the issues addressed in this chapter. Nevertheless, 
the principle has been translated into a number of legal norms, including 
provisions in human rights treaties. Through the formulation and appli-
cation of such norms, the equal treatment principle has gained content. 
The relevant legal provisions are described below.
B. The Right to Equal Treatment – Relevant Legal Provisions
i. International Human Rights Treaties
The most relevant provisions for the Netherlands with regard to equal 
treatment as a human rights norm are laid down in Article 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 26 of the 
1 Vierdag 1973, 7; Loenen 1998, 19; Arnardóttir 2003, 8–9. The formula can be traced back 
to Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea, where it was phrased in a somewhat more complicated way; 
see Gerards 2002, 9. 
2 Vierdag 1973, 8; Gerards 2002, 9. A slightly different view is taken by Loenen, who sup-
ports the characterisation of the equal treatment principle as being of a formal nature, but 
emphasises that when a decision is taken in one particular case, the principle of equal treat-
ment gains substance in that it then prescribes that equal cases must be treated in the same 
way. See Loenen 1998, 19. 
3 Vierdag 1973, 15; Arnardóttir 2003, 13.
4 This term is used by Arnardóttir, see Arnardóttir 2003, 10.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).5 Article 14 
ECHR is of an accessory nature, which means that it can only be invoked 
in combination with one of the substantive rights or freedoms laid down 
in the Convention or its Protocols. For Article 14 to be applicable it is suf-
ficient for the alleged discrimination to come within the ambit of one of 
those rights or freedoms; the finding of a violation is not required.6 Thus, 
where integration requirements for family migrants or religious servants 
are concerned, Article 14 can be relied on in combination with Article 8 
(respect for family life) or Article 9 (freedom of religion). Since 1 April 
2005 the ECHR also contains an autonomous provision on equal treat-
ment in Article 1 of its Twelfth Protocol.7 This article is not accessory to the 
other Convention rights, but extends to any right granted under national 
law. Although case law on Article 1 Twelfth Protocol is still scarce, the 
ECtHR has indicated that its interpretation of this provision will be guided 
by the same concepts and principles that are used to interpret Article 14. 
The only difference will therefore be the variety in scope.8 
The right to equal treatment is also guaranteed in Articles 2(1) and 26 of 
the ICCPR. Like Article 14 ECHR, Article 2(1) guarantees equal treatment 
in relation to the substantive rights and freedoms protected by the 
Covenant. These include the right to respect for family life (Arts 17 and 
23) and the freedom of religion (Art 18). Article 2(1) also applies if the 
substantive right has not been violated.9 Article 26 ICCPR, on the other 
hand, can be invoked independently of the other articles of the Covenant. 
Because of its autonomous character Article 26 ICCPR has often been 
invoked in proceedings before the Dutch courts. 
In addition to the equal treatment rights guaranteed by the ECHR and 
the ICCPR, a prohibition of discrimination specifically on the grounds of 
race is laid down in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD).10 It is argued below (section III.A.ii) that 
the definition of racial discrimination in this Convention does not cover 
differential treatment on the grounds of nationality, which means that the 
CERD is not relevant to the examination conducted in this chapter. Its 
provisions are, however, discussed in more detail in chapter 10.
5 Both provisions are formulated in terms of a prohibition of discrimination instead of a 
right to equal treatment. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that equal treatment 
and non-discrimination are both expressions of the same concept (cp Loenen 1998, 33 and 
Arnardóttir 2003, 6–8).
6 Gerards 2002, 103–06; Van Dijk et al 2006, 1028–31.
7 The Twelfth Protocol entered into force for the Netherlands on 1 April 2005, Treaty Series 
2001, 18 and 2004, 302.
8 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 22 December 2009, app nos 27996/06 and 34836/06 (Sejdić and 
Finci), paras 55–56. On the interpretation of Art 1 Twelfth Protocol ECHR see also Arnardóttir 
2003, 33–35.
9 HRC 9 April 1981, No 35/78 (Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and others v Mauritius), para 9.2 (b) 2 (i) 8.
10 UNTS Vol 660, p 195, Treaty Series 1966, 237 and following, entry into force for the 
Netherlands on 4 January 1969.
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ii. EU Law
The right to equal treatment is also guaranteed by provisions of EU law, in 
particular Articles 18 and 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Both Article 18 TFEU and Article 21(2) of the Charter prohibit any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality within the scope of application 
of the EU Treaties.11 It is generally assumed, however, that these provi-
sions apply only to EU citizens and not to third-country nationals (per-
sons who are not nationals of an EU Member State).12 Several authors 
have argued in recent years that this interpretation is too narrow, espe-
cially since the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a treaty basis for EU leg-
islation concerning third-country nationals in the fields of immigration 
and asylum.13 Yet the EU Court of Justice (CoJ) has so far not appeared 
inclined to adopt a broader reading.14 In this chapter, therefore, Articles 18 
TFEU and 21 (2) of the Charter are not taken further into account. 
Other authors have suggested meanwhile that nationality-based differ-
ential treatment of third-country nationals could possibly be examined 
under the principle of non-discrimination, which has been designated by 
the CoJ as a general principle of EU law.15 Again, however, there are no 
indications that the scope of this principle is broader than that of the non-
discrimination provisions of the TFEU and the Fundamental Rights 
Charter. 
Article 19 TFEU prohibits discrimination on a limited number of 
grounds that are not relevant to the topics raised in this chapter. Article 
21(1) of the Charter, on the other hand, applies to discrimination on ‘any 
ground’. While it can be derived a contrario from Article 21(2) that this 
does not include nationality-based discrimination, it is submitted that 
Article 21(1) does in principle apply to differential treatment on the 
grounds of residence purpose. It may further be recalled that the provi-
sions of the Charter apply to acts of the EU institutions, as well as to acts 
of the Member States, when they implement EU law.16
11 The TFEU and the TEU, see Art 1(2) TFEU. Arts 18 TFEU and 21(2) CFR state that: 
‘Within the scope of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained 
therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited’.
12 eg, Bell 2002, 37–38; De Schutter 2009, 26 and 33 and Chalmers et al 2010, 555.
13 See Boeles 2005 and Hublet 2011.
14 See recently CoJ 4 June 2009, C-22/08 and 23/08 [2009] ECR I-4585 (Vatsouras & 
Koupatantze), para 52. In this judgment the CoJ stated that Art 12 TEC (now Art 18 TFEU) 
concerns discriminatory treatment of EU nationals in relation to other EU nationals and that 
it was not intended to apply to differences in treatment between EU nationals and third-
country nationals.
15 De Schutter 2009, 78–79 and Wiesbrock 2010, 543.
16 Art 51(1) CFR.
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iii. The Dutch Constitution
The right to equal treatment is also laid down in Article 1 of the Dutch 
Constitution, which provides that all who are present in the Netherlands 
shall be treated equally in equal cases and prohibits discrimination on 
‘any ground’.17 Article 1 applies independently of other rights and free-
doms and covers each of the issues discussed in this chapter. However, 
while the scope of this provision is rather broad, its requirements are not 
very specific. More detailed norms regarding equal treatment have been 
laid down in a number of national legislative measures, but these are not 
applicable to the field of immigration policy.18 The relevance of Article 1 of 
the Dutch Constitution is also limited by the fact that the Dutch courts are 
not allowed to assess the constitutionality of legislation at the national 
level.19 As a result, judicial interpretation has added little clarity to the 
meaning of Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution. 
iv. Applicability of the Above Provisions in Admission Cases
Before moving on, it should be noted that the above provisions apply to 
persons who are present on the territory or who are subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the states concerned. Yet the AIA primarily differentiates between 
aliens who have not yet been admitted to the Netherlands and are still in 
the territory of another state. This could mean that these aliens are simply 
not entitled to the right of equal treatment as laid down in the said provi-
sions, or that it should at least first be established whether their request 
for admission falls under Dutch jurisdiction. For the purposes of the pre-
sent chapter, however, this question can be left aside. As Vermeulen has 
already argued, the AIA affects not only aliens seeking to be admitted to 
the Netherlands, but also persons in the Netherlands who have an interest 
in their presence.20 In the context of the AIA, these persons will most often 
be family members and, in a small number of cases, members of a reli-
gious community (chapters 4 and 5). For as long as the alien is unable, 
whether permanently or temporarily, to enter the Netherlands because 
of not passing the integration exam abroad, the family or religious 
community in the Netherlands will be unable to experience their family 
life or exercise their religion in community with that person. This is a 
disadvantage that is not experienced by family members and religious 
17 The Dutch text of Art 1 of the Constitution reads: ‘Allen die zich in Nederland 
bevinden, worden in gelijke gevallen gelijk behandeld. Discriminatie wegens godsdienst, 
levensovertuiging, politieke gezindheid, ras, geslacht of op welke grond dan ook, is niet 
toegestaan’.
18 See notably the Equal Treatment Act (Algemene wet gelijke behandeling), Bulletin of Acts 
and Decrees 1994, 230.
19 Art 120 Dutch Constitution. 
20 Vermeulen 2010a, 103–04.
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communities of persons who do not have to pass the exam. Hence, the 
AIA results in differential treatment of persons both within and outside 
the territory of the Netherlands.
C.  Justification of Differential Treatment
As discussed in the previous section, the right to equal treatment is pro-
tected by a number of different provisions in human rights treaties, EU 
law and the Dutch Constitution. Clearly however, not all differential treat-
ment constitutes a violation of these provisions. Law-making typically 
entails the use of distinctions and categorisations, and it is therefore hard 
to see how a legal system could be maintained without any form of dif-
ferential treatment.21 When, for example, implementing measures in the 
field of education, distinctions may be made between children with and 
without disabilities or with different learning capabilities. Such forms of 
differential treatment are not normally regarded as problematic from a 
legal perspective because they are based on reasons considered accepta-
ble. Consequently, the right to equal treatment only prohibits differential 
treatment that cannot be justified.22
This leads to the question of when justification for differences in treat-
ment can be said to exist. Here a distinction can be made between ‘open’ 
and ‘closed’ provisions containing a right to equal treatment.23 Closed 
provisions prohibit circumscribed forms of differential treatment, for 
example differentiations based on the grounds of sex or disability. They 
prescribe that such treatment is always unjustified, unless it comes under 
an exception explicitly stated in the provision. Open provisions, on the 
other hand, apply to any form of differential treatment, regardless of the 
ground for differentiation. They are also ‘open’ in the sense that they do 
not define the reasons why the differential treatment may be considered 
justified. 
The equal treatment provisions of the ECHR, the ICCPR and the Dutch 
Constitution and Article 21(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
21 Compare the statement of the European Court of Human Rights in ECtHR 23 July 1968, 
app nos 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64 (Belgian Linguistic Case), 
para 10, as well as the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 18 of 10 
November 1989 on non-discrimination. 
22 Another possibility is that differential treatment is considered acceptable because it con-
cerns situations that are not equal. A determination of the comparability of the situations 
concerned normally precedes the question of justification. Often, however, the same circum-
stances may provide grounds for arguing either that there is no unequal treatment because 
there are no equal cases, or that there is unequal treatment which is, however, justified. In the 
example provided above it could be argued, for instance, that children with disabilities can-
not be compared to children without disabilities. This argument would have led to the same 
outcome, namely that the difference in treatment was acceptable. On comparability and jus-
tification, see Gerards 2002, 28–79.
23 Gerards 2002, 16–17.
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are all open provisions: although some of these articles list a number of 
grounds for differentiation, the way in which they are formulated makes it 
clear that these listings are not exhaustive.24 Whether justification exists is 
then left to be determined by the courts or other bodies applying the pro-
visions. For a difference in treatment to be justified, the differentiation will 
generally need to pursue a valid or legitimate aim and to be proportionate 
in relation to that aim. This is known in ECtHR case law as the ‘reasonable 
and objective justification test’.25 Similar criteria have been applied – in 
varying degrees of detail – by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and 
the CoJ in equal treatment cases.26 Importantly, whether a particular 
instance of differential treatment is justified will depend on the review 
that is conducted. This issue is discussed in the following subsection.
D.  Scope of Review and the Relevance of ‘Suspect Grounds’
When a complaint of unjustified differential treatment or discrimination 
is assessed by an international court or other supervisory body, the out-
come of the case will be influenced by the scope of the review. Depending 
on the extent of this review, the respondent state will have more or less 
discretion in determining whether a particular difference in treatment is 
based on a reasonable and objective justification. In ECtHR case law this is 
known as the doctrine of the ‘margin of appreciation’, which plays a role 
in cases concerning Article 14 ECHR as well as in relation to other 
Convention rights.27
In general the extent of the margin of appreciation can be determined 
by a variety of factors, including the nature of the protected rights or 
interests, the aim being pursued and the existence of consensus between 
the Contracting States. These factors are also of relevance in equal treat-
ment cases.28 In addition, a specific factor determining the margin of 
24 With regard to Art 1 Twelfth Protocol ECHR, the Explanatory Report shows that it was 
expressly decided not to add new grounds in comparison with Art 14, both because this was 
considered unnecessary and because it could have given rise to ‘unwarranted a contrario 
interpretations’ as regards discrimination based on grounds not included. See Arnardóttir 
2003, 34.
25 Van Dijk et al 2006, 1041–43. This test was first formulated by the ECtHR in the Belgian 
Linguistic Case (n 21). See also Gerards 2002, 120–64 and Arnardóttir 2003, 42–51.
26 On the approach of the HRC, see Joseph et al 2004, 700–28 and Vandenhole 2005, 46–56. 
On the CoJ, see Gerards 2002, 236–306. Note, however, that Art 21(1) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights only gained legally binding force on 1 December 2009. Case law regard-
ing this particular provision is, therefore, still scarce.
27 Van Dijk et al 2006, 1043–46. On the margin of appreciation in relation to the right to 
family life and the freedom of religion, see section II.B.iii of ch 4 and section II.C of ch 5.
28 Gerards 2002, 169–97. The formula typically used by the Court in Art 14 cases is that 
‘the scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject 
matter and its background’; see, eg, ECtHR 28 November 1984 (Rasmussen v Denmark), para 
40 and ECtHR 11 July 2006 (admissibility decision), app no 8407/05 (Savoia and Bounegru). 
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appreciation in relation to Article 14 ECHR is the ground on which the 
differential treatment is based. The ECtHR has held in various cases that 
differentiations based on certain ‘suspect grounds’, such as sex, race or 
religion, can only be justified by ‘very weighty reasons’.29 This ‘very 
weighty reasons’ test leaves the respondent state little or no margin of 
appreciation, with the cases in which it was applied almost invariably 
resulting in the finding of a violation of the Convention.30 
While the ECtHR has not provided any clear guidelines for deciding 
which differentiation grounds are ‘suspect’ and hence require application 
of the ‘very weighty reasons’ test, some indications can be found in case 
law. In Abdulaziz this determination was based on the existence of com-
mon ground among the Contracting States concerning the importance of 
promoting the equality of the sexes.31 More recently, in the case of Carson 
and others, the Court stated that a high level of protection is needed in rela-
tion to ‘differences [of treatment] based on an inherent characteristic, such 
as gender or racial or ethnic origin’. 32 However, it should also be noted 
that the ‘suspectness’ of a particular ground is not absolute, but may dif-
fer according to the context in which the differentiation is made. This is 
especially clear with regard to nationality as the ground for differentiation 
(section III.B). A second, related remark is that the differentiation ground 
is not the only factor determining the scope of the margin of appreciation. 
A strict review may be indicated even when a suspect differentiation 
ground is lacking, for example when the differential treatment affects a 
particularly important aspect of a Convention right.33 By contrast, the 
strict level of review that would normally follow from the existence of a 
suspect differentiation ground may also be ‘levelled down’ because of the 
disputed measure being taken in a policy area where states traditionally 
have a certain amount of discretion, such as social or economic policy.34 
29 Loenen 1998, 35–44. The term ‘suspect grounds’ is derived from the case law of the US 
Supreme Court. 
30 Gerards 2004, 184. On the ‘very weighty reasons’ test, see Gerards 2002, 197–207 and 
Van Dijk et al 2006, 1046–49.
31 Schokkenbroek 1998. The use of the ‘common ground’ argument for the application of 
the ‘very weighty reasons’ test is also mentioned – and criticised – by Gerards, see Gerards 
2004, 186–88.
32 ECtHR 4 November 2008, app no 42184/05 (Carson and others), para 80.
33 See ECtHR 10 March 2009, app no 45413/07 (Anakomba Yula), para 37. The applicant in 
this case wanted to institute court proceedings in order to ensure the recognition of her 
daughter by the biological father, but was refused financial assistance on the grounds that 
she did not have a residence permit. In relation to the complaint under Art 14 ECHR the 
Court stated that ‘ les questions en jeu devant les tribunaux internes en l’espèce étaient des 
questions graves liées au droit de la famille. Les décisions que les tribunaux allaient rendre 
marqueraient de manière définitive la vie privée et familiale non seulement de la requérante 
elle-même mais de plusieurs autres personnes. Il devrait donc y avoir des raisons particu-
lièrement impérieuses pour justifier une différence de traitement entre personnes possédant 
une carte de séjour et personnes n’en possédant pas, telle la requérante ’.
34 eg, ECtHR 27 November 2007, app no 77782/01 (Luczak), para 52 and Carson and others 
(n 32), para 61. 
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While the doctrine of the margin of appreciation has been developed 
quite elaborately in relation to Article 14 ECHR, differentiations in the 
scope of review are also indicated with regard to other equal treatment 
provisions. With regard to Article 26 ICCPR, the HRC has indicated that 
stricter scrutiny is required when the differential treatment is based on 
one of the grounds expressly mentioned in that provision.35 The CoJ has 
also previously applied variations in its scrutiny of various equal treat-
ment provisions in EU law. These variations could be related to different 
factors, including the differentiation ground at issue.36 With regard to 
Article 21(1) of the EU Charter, it is expected that a similar approach will 
be followed and that the discretion left to the EU institutions and the 
Member States to justify differential treatment will depend on the differ-
entiation ground at stake, as well as on other interests and circumstances 
of the case. 
E.  Formal and Substantive Equality and Indirect Differential 
Treatment 
Lastly, when examining whether a particular legal classification is justi-
fied from an equal treatment perspective, the outcome will depend on 
how ‘equality’ is defined. One distinction that is frequently made in this 
respect is that between formal and substantive equality: the concept of 
formal equality focuses on equal treatment, whereas substantive equality 
is more concerned with obtaining equal results.37 By way of example, 
imagine an integration policy whereby the same integration course is 
offered to all participants, regardless of their skills and previous educa-
tion. In this case there is equal treatment and hence no problems arise 
when viewed from a formal conception of equality. However, a substan-
tive equality approach would be more concerned with enabling all par-
ticipants to reach the same final level. Such an approach would require a 
differentiated course offer, adapted to the varying needs of the partici-
pants. 
Related to the concept of substantive equality is the concept of indirect 
differential treatment. This type of treatment is considered to occur when 
35 Joseph et al 2004, 693; Vandenhole 2005, 113.
36 Gerards 2002, 306–41. The CoJ has in principle applied strict scrutiny with regard to 
distinctions based on the grounds of sex and nationality. However, as noted above, the pro-
hibition of nationality-based discrimination in EU law has thus far not been applied in cases 
involving third-country nationals. As also noted earlier, the relevance of a particular differ-
entiation ground may vary depending on the context. It follows that nationality-based dis-
tinctions may be assessed even more strictly when the purpose of the equal treatment 
provisions is to establish an internal European market than when they concern the right to 
equal treatment as a human rights norm (cp Gerards 2002, 359).
37 Loenen 1998, 19–30; Gerards 2002, 12. On different conceptions of equality, see also 
Arnardóttir 2003, 20–29.
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a measure formulated in neutral terms nevertheless has disproportionate 
effects on a particular group of persons.38 It may be that those effects were 
also foreseen by the legislator and that the neutral formulation is in fact 
meant to disguise a form of differential treatment that would otherwise be 
forbidden.39 However, the concept of indirect differential treatment is cur-
rently mostly effective in combating the unintended adverse effects of 
seemingly neutral measures.40 In the context of open provisions, the use of 
this concept can result in stricter scrutiny being applied if it is established 
that the disputed measure disproportionately affects a group character-
ised by a suspect differentiation ground (section II.D). Additionally, the 
concept of indirect differential treatment can be used to enable the appli-
cation of closed provisions that prohibit differential treatment on a limited 
number of grounds.41 
The understanding that the right to equal treatment also covers situa-
tions of indirect differential treatment may follow directly from the for-
mulation of the legal provision, as is the case with Article 1(1) CERD (‘any 
distinction . . . which has the purpose or effect’) (emphasis added).42 The 
other provisions mentioned in section II.B are less clear in this respect; 
however, the concept of indirect differential treatment has been accepted 
by the ECtHR, the HRC and the CoJ.43 The concept is discussed in more 
detail in chapter 9 in relation to the issue of indirect differential treatment 
on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin.
38 More precisely the concept of indirect differential treatment implies substantive equal-
ity as it is grounded in the recognition that equal treatment may nevertheless lead to une-
qual results. See Gerards 2002, 13. Thereby it should be taken into account that ‘equal’ 
always means ‘equal in relation to a particular ground or characteristic’. The requirement, 
eg, that applicants for a particular job must be proficient in Dutch excludes non-Dutch 
speakers from the range of candidates and therefore prescribes a form of unequal treatment 
(on the grounds of language). The requirement is, however, neutral with regard to ethnicity 
as it does not prescribe differential treatment on this ground. Nevertheless, the effect of the 
requirement may be that it excludes members of ethnic minority groups, in which case indi-
rect differential treatment on the grounds of ethnicity is said to take place. 
39 An example provided by Gerards is that of a literacy requirement that was attached to 
the right to vote in the United States and which served to exclude the black population from 
elections, see Gerards 2002, 24.
40 Loenen 1998, 49–50.
41 Gerards 2004, 180–81.
42 cp General Recommendation No 14 of the CERD Committee on the definition of dis-
crimination (Art 1, para 1), dated 22 March 1993, available at www.ohchr.org. In para 2 the 
Committee states that ‘in seeking to determine whether an action has an effect contrary to 
the Convention, it will look to see whether that action has an unjustifiable disparate impact 
upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’. See also 
Thornberry 2005, 256.
43 On the use of the concept by the ECtHR and the CoJ, see notably Gerards 2002, 113–15 
and 227–28. The HRC uses a definition of discrimination similar to that of Art 1(1) CERD, 
except in respect of the limitation to the race-related grounds, see HRC General Comment 
No 18 on Non-discrimination, para 7 (available at www.ohchr.org). See also Joseph et al 
2004, 693–99 and Vandenhole 2005, 58–59, with references to HRC jurisprudence.
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III. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF 
NATIONALITY
This section examines the legal standards set by the above provisions on 
differential treatment on the basis of nationality, especially in admission 
cases. First, however, a preliminary remark is made about the meaning of 
the term ‘nationality’. In section III.A a distinction is drawn between 
nationality and the related concepts of alienage and national origin. It is 
also argued that nationality – unlike national origin – is not a forbidden 
discrimination ground within the meaning of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Section 
III.B then assesses whether nationality qualifies as a ‘suspect ground’, 
which would imply that differentiations based on this ground will require 
very strong justification. Next, the reasons for justification are discussed 
in section III.C. As the reasons that could be adduced to justify differential 
treatment are in principle unlimited, this chapter focuses on the reasons 
provided by the Dutch government in relation to the AIA. Section III.D 
discusses Dutch case law with regard to differential treatment on the 
grounds of nationality, in particular where the AIA is concerned.
A.  Preliminary Remark: Nationality, Alienage and National Origin
Before examining the legal framework standards set by the above provi-
sions on differential treatment on the basis of nationality, it is useful to 
briefly clarify the meaning of this term. In the following two subsections a 
distinction is drawn between nationality and the related concepts of alien-
age and national origin. It is also argued that nationality – unlike national 
origin – is not a forbidden discrimination ground within the meaning of 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD). 
i. Nationality and Alienage
Differential treatment on the grounds of nationality may take various 
forms. In the first place, a state may differentiate between persons who are 
nationals of that state and persons with the nationality of other states 
(‘aliens’). It is generally accepted under international law that such dis-
tinctions are justified, at least within the context of immigration policy.44 
44 See, eg, the judgments of the ECtHR in Moustaquim (ECtHR 18 February 1991, app no 
12313/86), para 49 and A. and others v the United Kingdom (ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 19 
February 2009, app no 3455/05), para 186. See also Art 3 Fourth Protocol ECHR and Art 12(4) 
ICCPR, which guarantee the right to enter the state of which one is a national and prohibit 
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However, states can also differentiate between aliens of different nation-
alities, as is the case under the Act on Integration Abroad. In this situation 
the differentiation ground is also nationality, but the distinction is not 
between nationals and non-nationals. It is this latter form of differential 
treatment that is investigated in this section. To avoid terminological con-
fusion, however, the first type of differential treatment (between nationals 
and non-nationals) is henceforth referred to as ‘differential treatment on 
the grounds of alienage’. Where mention is made of ‘differential treat-
ment on the ground of nationality’, this refers to a differentiation between 
aliens.
ii. Nationality and National Origin
The term ‘nationality’ can also be confusing because it can be understood 
both as ‘a politico-legal term, denoting membership of a state’, and as a 
‘historico-biological term, denoting membership of a nation’. Nationality 
in the latter sense is a sociological or ethnographical, rather than a legal 
concept.45 For the purposes of this study, however, the term ‘nationality’ is 
used to indicate the legal bond between a person and a state.46 
From a legal perspective the distinction made above is significant 
because, as is submitted here, nationality as a legal status is not included 
in the definition of ‘racial discrimination’ provided in Article 1(1) of the 
CERD.47 While this definition mentions ‘national origin’, this term does 
not refer to the legal bond between a person and a state. Instead, it follows 
from the travaux préparatoires of the Convention that the term ‘national 
origin’ should be understood in conjunction with ‘descent’ and ‘ethnic 
origin’ to indicate nationality in the ethnographical sense. In addition the 
US representative suggested that ‘national origin’ could also refer to a 
person’s previous nationality, thereby apparently referring to legal sta-
tus.48 If accepted, this interpretation could be used, for instance, to cover 
distinctions between persons who obtained their nationality through 
the expulsion of a state’s own nationals; similar rights are not granted to aliens. The latter is 
confirmed in the HRC’s General Comment on the position of aliens under the Covenant, 
which states that ‘The Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to enter and reside in 
the territory of a State party. It is in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will 
admit to its territory’ (HRC General Comment of 11 April 1986, para 5).
45 Schwelb 1966, 1006, citing Weis 1956, 3.
46 cp Art 2(a) of the European Convention on Nationality (ECN), where nationality is 
defined as ‘the legal bond between a person and a State [that] does not indicate the person’s 
ethnic origin’.
47 According to this definition, racial discrimination means ‘any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has 
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an 
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life’.
48 Schwelb 1966, 1007.
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birth and those who received it through naturalisation. For the purposes 
of this chapter, however, national origin as a previous legal status is not 
relevant.
While it follows from the above that Article 1(1) CERD does not refer to 
nationality as a legal status, Article 1(2) CERD states that differentiations 
between nationals and non-nationals do not amount to racial discrimina-
tion. It is submitted that this provision serves to confirm the right of states 
to distinguish between nationals and aliens and to avoid such differentia-
tions being qualified as (indirect) discrimination on the grounds of race, 
descent or ethnic or national origin. Hence, Article 1(2) should not be 
read a contrario so as to bring the distinction between nationals and non- 
nationals (and hence nationality) within the scope of Article 1(1).49 The 
same is true with regard to Article 1(3) CERD, which was introduced to 
allow some of the States Parties to maintain their existing legislation 
regarding, amongst other things, favourable conditions for the reacquisi-
tion of nationality by former nationals, which would otherwise have to be 
classified as discrimination on the grounds of national origin.50 Again, it 
follows that Article 1(3) must not be understood to imply that the CERD 
also covers discrimination on the basis of nationality.
The monitoring body of the CERD, the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD Committee’), has issued a General 
Recommendation on discrimination against non-citizens, in which it 
states that: 
Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or immigra-
tion status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, 
judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not 
applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achieve-
ment of this aim.51
The reference to citizenship led Terlouw to conclude that nationality is a 
differentiation ground covered by the CERD.52 However, regardless of 
whether this was in fact the Committee’s intention, adding nationality in 
49 Nevertheless, Vandenhole observes that the CERD Committee has adopted an increas-
ingly restrictive interpretation of Art 1(2) and has rejected differential treatment of non-
nationals in relation to all but a limited number of human rights (Vandenhole 2005, 90–92). It 
is hard to see how this interpretation can be reconciled with the text of the Convention.
50 Schwelb 1966, 1009–11. Art 1(3) CERD states that ‘nothing in this Convention may be 
interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning national-
ity, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against 
any particular nationality’.
51 CERD Committee General Recommendation No 30 on Discrimination Against Non 
Citizens, dated 1 October 2004, para 4. General recommendations are issued by the 
Committee on the basis of Art 9(2) CERD. Although such recommendations are not binding, 
they do have a certain authority as guidelines for interpreting the Convention.
52 Terlouw 2005, 121–22. This author concludes that the CERD is applicable to the distinc-
tion between aliens of different nationalities under the AIA and that this distinction is con-
trary to the Convention because it lacks sufficient justification. See further section III.C.
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the legal sense as a ground to the definition of racial discrimination would 
be incompatible with the text and history of Article 1 CERD. The same is 
true with regard to immigration status. The General Recommendation 
therefore cannot support the conclusion that differentiations on the 
grounds of nationality should henceforth be brought under the CERD. 
Such differentiations do, however, fall within the scope of the open non-
discrimination provisions of the ECHR, the ICCPR and the Dutch 
Constitution. The following subsections therefore examine the question of 
when the differential treatment of aliens can be said to be based on a rea-
sonable and objective justification. Firstly, however, it will be examined 
whether nationality is a ‘suspect’ differentiation ground, implying that this 
differential treatment would need to be justified by very weighty reasons.
B.  Is Nationality a ‘Suspect Ground’?
Both the ECtHR and the HRC have been asked on a number of occasions 
to decide on complaints concerning differential treatment on the ground 
of nationality.53 As far as the classification of this differentiation ground is 
concerned, these cases have led to varying results. In various judgments 
the ECtHR has stated that distinctions based ‘exclusively on the ground of 
nationality’ must be justified by very weighty reasons in order to be com-
patible with the Convention.54 It follows that, at least in these cases, 
nationality was regarded as a ‘suspect ground’ (section II.D). In other 
cases, however, the Court did not consider a difference in treatment 
between persons of different nationality to require very weighty reasons, 
or even conducted a rather lenient review.55 The HRC meanwhile has 
accepted that nationality is a differentiation ground that can be consid-
ered under Article 26 ICCPR, even if it is not expressly mentioned in that 
provision. It has not, however, commented on the scope of the review to 
be conducted or stated that differentiations based on nationality require 
an additional justification compared to differentiations on other grounds.56 
53 Some of these cases (also) involved a difference in treatment between nationals and 
non-nationals, which was qualified earlier in this chapter as a differentiation on the grounds 
of alienage (section III.A.i). The decisions in these cases will be taken into account insofar as 
they contain considerations that are also relevant to distinctions between non-nationals. On 
the ECtHR’s case law on differential treatment on grounds of nationality see also Lawson 
2005, 124–29. 
54 See ECtHR 16 September 1996, app no 17371/90 (Gaygusuz), para 42; ECtHR 30 
September 2003, app no 40892/98 (Koua Poirrez), para 46; Luczak (n 34), para 48 and ECtHR 
(Grand Chamber) 18 February 2009, app no 55707/00 (Andrejeva), para 87.
55 ECtHR 18 February 1991, app no 12313/86 (Moustaquim), para 49; ECtHR 27 June 1996, 
app no 21794/93 (C. v Belgium), para 38 and ECtHR 28 May 2009, app no 26713/05 (Bigaeva), 
para 40.
56 See, eg, HRC 6 April 1989, no 196/1985 (Gueye), para 9.4 and HRC 29 April 2002, No 
965/2000 (Karakurt), para 8.4. See also Vandenhole 2005, 128–29.
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The ECtHR itself has not explained why it has treated nationality as a 
suspect classification on some occasions, but not on others. Some authors 
have argued that the ‘very weighty reasons’ test does not apply to differ-
entiations between EU citizens and third-country nationals.57 Indeed, it 
seems that this possibility cannot be excluded. A more apparent explana-
tion, however, would be that the variation in the Court’s approach is due 
to the policy context.58 All the cases in which the ‘very weighty reasons’ 
test was applied concerned differentiations in the context of social secu-
rity. By contrast, two of the cases in which the ‘very weighty reasons’ test 
was not used concerned immigration policy.59 The third case concerned 
the right to practise as a lawyer, which, as the Court found, is a profession 
with a certain public interest.60
With regard to differentiations based on nationality in the immigration 
context, Vermeulen argued that the power to control immigration typi-
cally belongs to the sovereign domain of the state. For this reason, states 
have a large margin of appreciation in the field of immigration policy and 
measures adopted in this field are generally not subject to strict scrutiny 
by an international body such as the ECtHR.61 
Some support for this explanation can be found in other ECtHR case 
law. First of all, the Court has repeatedly stressed in immigration cases 
that the Contracting States are entitled to regulate the entry of aliens into 
their territory.62 Moreover, the Court has stated in rather general wording 
that its subsidiary role vis-à-vis the Contracting States is ‘fully applicable 
in the field of immigration’.63 However, there is also evidence that immi-
gration cases do not always involve a (large) margin of appreciation for 
the respondent state. In particular, in Abdulaziz the Court applied the 
‘very weighty reasons’ test despite the fact that the case concerned the 
admission of aliens to the United Kingdom. It did so because it found 
the differential treatment at issue in this case to be based on a suspect 
57 See Schokkenbroek 1998, 22 and Human Rights Watch 2008, 25.
58 See also Gerards 2004, 185–86; Van Dijk et al 2006, 1049 and Vermeulen 2010a, 100.
59 Moustaquim (n 55) and C. v Belgium (n 55). See also the earlier decision of the European 
Commission of Human Rights in the case of X., Y. & Z. v the United Kingdom (EComHR 6 July 
1982, app no 9285/81). In this decision the Commission found that the immigration policy of 
the United Kingdom did not violate Arts 8 and 14 ECHR, despite the fact that it differenti-
ated between Commonwealth citizens and other aliens. It would appear that the Commission 
did not apply very intense scrutiny.
60 Bigaeva (n 55).
61 Vermeulen 2010a, 99–100; in the same vein see Gerards 2004, 185–86.
62 See, eg, ECtHR 28 May 1985, app nos 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81 (Abdulaziz, Cabales 
& Balkandali), para 67 and, more recently, ECtHR 31 July 2008, app no 265/07 (Darren 
Omoregie and others), para 54.
63 ECtHR 12 February 2009 (admissibility decision), app no 33831/03 (M.F.S. v Bulgaria): 
‘La Cour rappelle que le mécanisme de sauvegarde des droits fondamentaux institué par la 
Convention revêt un caractère subsidiaire par rapport aux systèmes nationaux et que ce princ-
ipe s’applique pleinement en matière d’immigration’ (emphasis added).
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ground, in casu sex.64 It follows that the ‘very weighty reasons’ test may 
also apply in cases concerning immigration policy.
Nevertheless it seems that the ‘common ground’ between the 
Contracting States to the ECHR, which led the Court to qualify sex as a 
suspect ground in Abdulaziz (see also section II.D), does not exist with 
regard to differentiations based on nationality, at least not in the immigra-
tion context. For the time being, therefore, it will be assumed that in the 
field of immigration policy nationality is not a suspect classification and 
differentiations on this ground are not in principle subject to the ‘very 
weighty reasons’ test. It is submitted that this approach is acceptable, at 
least where nationality is perceived as a legal bond between a person and 
a state. Nonetheless, a heightened level of scrutiny – and thus strong jus-
tification – may still be required because of factors other than the differen-




As mentioned above, this section does not discuss all possible justifica-
tions for nationality-based distinctions regarding the admission of aliens. 
Instead, the examination is limited to those justifications put forward by 
the Dutch legislator in relation to the Act on Integration Abroad, which is 
briefly described here. The following sections assess whether the reasons 
advanced constitute a legitimate aim and whether the difference in treat-
ment is proportionate in relation to that aim.
It may be recalled that the AIA does not apply to nationals of some eco-
nomically developed, mostly Western countries, including nationals of 
Member States of the EU or EEA (section VI.B.i of chapter 2). With regard 
to the latter group, the Dutch government argued that their exemption 
was required by EU law as these nationals have the right of free move-
ment within the European Union.67 The ensuing difference in treatment 
64 Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali (n 62), para 78.
65 cp Arnardóttir 2003, 151, who argues that a strict review is indicated where nationality 
refers to national origin (see also section III.A.ii), but not necessarily in cases involving dif-
ferential treatment between aliens and nationals or EU citizens. She adds that, in the latter 
type of cases, the strictness of review will more easily be influenced by factors other than the 
differentiation ground. 
66 See section II.B.iii of ch 4. Compare also the judgments of the ECtHR in Anakomba Yula 
(n 33) and Niedzwiecki (ECtHR 25 October 2005, app no 58453/00), para 33. In the latter case 
the Court found a violation of Arts 8 and 14 ECHR in respect of a difference in treatment on 
the grounds of residence status in relation to the granting of child benefits. 
67 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 19. It could be argued that the above 
exemption also concerns the family members of nationals of EU/EEA member states and 
that, in fact, the differentiation ground at stake is not nationality, but whether a person is a 
 Grounds of Nationality 309
was consequently motivated by the aim of ensuring compliance with 
international obligations. 
In addition to this objective several reasons were put forward to justify 
the preferential treatment granted to nationals of non-EU/EEA countries 
such as the United States, Australia and Japan (see again section VI.B.i of 
chapter 2). Some variations exist regarding the formulation of these rea-
sons in subsequent phases of the legislative process.68 Nevertheless, two 
main arguments can be distinguished, and these are used as the basis for 
discussion in this chapter. Firstly, it was submitted that the exemption 
from the AIA applied to ‘a limited number of countries’ which were 
‘comparable to the Netherlands in socio-economic and social terms’. For 
this reason it was expected that immigration from these countries would 
not lead to substantial problems in the sphere of integration and that 
nationals of these countries did not have a strong interest in taking the 
integration exam abroad.69 As a second argument, it was emphasised that 
nationals of the designated countries were already exempted from the 
long-term visa requirement. To make them subject to the AIA would 
therefore make their admission to the Netherlands dependent on prior 
permission, which was not previously the case. The government feared 
that setting conditions for the admission of these nationals would have an 
adverse impact on the ‘foreign and economic relations’ of the Netherlands 
with the countries concerned.70 
On top of the above arguments, the Dutch government also stated that 
the exempted countries did not create any ‘large-scale or uncontrolled’ 
migration influxes.71 While it is not entirely clear how this statement is to 
be understood, it is submitted that the fact that a certain country does 
not generate large numbers of immigrants does not imply that those who 
do come are more likely to integrate. In other words, there is no logical 
connection between the number of immigrants from a particular country 
and the individual integration capacity of each of them. The level of 
beneficiary of the right of free movement within the EU. Although this is a valid argument, 
it is also the case that the right of free movement can only be invoked by persons who are 
nationals of an EU or EEA member state and that the rights of family members derive from 
this right (section III.A of ch 6). It follows that nationality is still a decisive factor with regard 
to the differential treatment concerned. Lastly, although they were not expressly mentioned, 
it may be observed that the exemption on the basis of international obligations also applies 
to Swiss nationals and their family members who are entitled to the right to free movement, 
see Art 16(1)(h) read in conjunction with Art 17(1)(b) and Art 1(e) Aliens Act.
68 Compare Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 19 and Parliamentary Papers II 
2004–2005, 29 700, No 6, 31–32. 
69 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 19 and Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 
29 700, No 6, 32. The first report speaks of ‘a limited number of western (oriented) third 
countries [that are] comparable to European countries in socio-economic, social and political 
terms’.  
70 Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 700, No 6, 32. 
71 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 19 and Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 
29 700, No 6, 32. The first report refers to ‘undesired and unrestrained’ migration influxes’. 
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immigration from a particular country does not, therefore, justify a differ-
ence in treatment with regard to integration requirements. 
The thrust of the government’s argument, however, appears to be 
different: namely that exempting certain nationalities from the AIA does 
not undermine the effect of the integration requirement abroad because 
immigration from the exempted countries is in any event minimal and 
does not have a significant impact on the integration process in the host 
country. Read in this way, the argument concerns the proportionality of 
the difference in treatment rather than its purpose. This issue is addressed 
in more detail in section VI. 
i. Compliance with International Obligations: EU Law and Bilateral 
Agreements
a. Preliminary Remarks: International Obligations and State 
Responsibility 
The question of the extent to which the need to comply with international 
obligation constitutes a reasonable and objective justification for differen-
tial treatment on the ground of nationality is examined below. Firstly, 
however, some brief remarks are made about states’ responsibility under 
public international law for acts that are required by international legal 
instruments, in casu the TFEU and the EU Residence Directive. The ques-
tion of responsibility has come up before the ECtHR on several occasions, 
including in the cases of Matthews and Bosphorus.72 In these cases the 
respondent governments argued that the impugned acts fell outside their 
responsibility as defined by Article 1 ECHR, either because they resulted 
directly from an act of European Community law (Matthews) or because 
they constituted the implementation of an EC regulation that left no dis-
cretion to the Member States (Bosphorus). This raises the question of 
whether a state could, in a similar vein, argue that it is not responsible for 
differences in treatment that result from its legislation because it was 
forced to make these distinctions so as to comply with its international 
obligations. 
It is submitted here that this is not the case. For one, the above argu-
ments were not accepted by the ECtHR. However the position in situa-
tions such as the one at issue here also differs from those in Matthews and 
Bosphorus because the differential treatment is not as such required by 
international agreements. While EU law does indeed impose an obliga-
tion to grant a right of admission to EU nationals without subjecting them 
to integration conditions, it does not require such conditions to be imposed 
72 ECtHR 18 February 1999, app no 24833/94 (Matthews), para 26 and ECtHR (Grand 
Chamber) 30 June 2005, app no 45036/98 (Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim 
Sirketi), para 109. 
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on other aliens. EU Member States may therefore also choose to avoid the 
differential treatment by not imposing integration requirements at all. 
Consequently, the responsibility of these states for the differential treat-
ment is beyond doubt. This reasoning also applies equally in situations 
where the differential treatment results from international obligations 
other than those concerning the EU right of free movement.
Nevertheless, the fact that exempting certain categories of aliens from 
integration requirements is motivated by the desire to comply with inter-
national agreements is not inconsequential. As discussed below, compli-
ance with international obligations has previously been characterised by 
the ECtHR as a legitimate interest that may justify some nationalities 
being given preferential treatment. 
b. International Obligations as a Justification Ground
Formulated in general terms, the purpose of the Act on Integration Abroad 
is to improve the integration of immigrants in the Netherlands. 
Nevertheless, the nationals of certain states are exempted from the condi-
tions imposed by the Act because such exemption is required by interna-
tional agreements. It follows that the purpose of this exemption (and 
hence of the differential treatment) is to ensure compliance with these 
agreements. It is the latter purpose (rather than the purpose of integra-
tion) which must be considered when examining whether the differential 
treatment resulting from the exemption is justified. 
ECtHR Case Law on Obligations of EU Law
In this respect, it is worthwhile mentioning two ECtHR judgments in 
which a difference in immigration rules for EU citizens and third-country 
nationals was found to be based on a reasonable and objective justifica-
tion: Moustaquim and C. v Belgium.73 Both cases involved Moroccan nation-
als who faced deportation from Belgium for reasons of public order and 
who were thereby prevented from continuing the exercise of their family 
life. Both applicants relied on Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, claiming that their 
deportation constituted discrimination because EU nationals in a similar 
situation would not have been deported. However, the Court held that 
the alleged differential treatment was based on a reasonable and objective 
justification because Belgium belonged, together with the other Member 
States of the EU (then the EC), to a ‘special legal order’, which had ‘in 
addition, established its own citizenship’.74 
73 Moustaquim (n 55) and C. v Belgium (n 55).
74 Moustaquim (n 55), para 49 and C. v Belgium (n 55), para 38. The reference to European 
citizenship is made only in C. v Belgium, but was later confirmed in ECtHR 21 June 2011, app 
no 5335/05 (Ponomaryov), para 54.
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The above judgments do not explicitly refer to the existence of interna-
tional obligations; however, the justification for the differential treatment 
relates to the existence of the EU as a legal order. In several other judg-
ments, the ECtHR also accepted that compliance with obligations of EU 
law constitutes a legitimate aim for the purposes of limiting the rights and 
freedoms laid down in the ECHR. In particular, in the aforementioned 
Bosphorus case (concerning Article 1 First Protocol ECHR), the Court 
decided that ‘compliance with legal obligations flowing from [the] mem-
bership of the European Community’ constituted ‘a legitimate interest of 
considerable weight’. It also recognised ‘the growing importance of inter-
national cooperation and of the consequent need to secure the proper 
functioning of international organisations’, in particular in relation to a 
supranational organisation such as the EC.75 Finally, in S.A. Dangeville, the 
ECtHR acknowledged that the purpose of bringing domestic legislation 
into line with an EC directive was ‘clearly a legitimate objective consistent 
with Article 1 Protocol 1’.76 This case also concerned a difference in treat-
ment, which was, however, not examined separately by the Court.
ECtHR Case Law on Bilateral Agreements
The ECtHR has also considered differences in treatment that did not result 
from obligations of EU law, but instead from bilateral agreements con-
cluded by the respondent state. One of these cases, Koua Poirrez, con-
cerned an Ivory Coast national who resided in France, but was denied an 
invalidity pension on the grounds of his nationality. In this respect he was 
treated differently from French nationals or nationals of countries with 
which France had signed a reciprocity agreement. As mentioned above 
(section III.B) the ECtHR applied the ‘very weighty reasons’ test. It then 
concluded that the differential treatment was not based on any ‘objective 
and reasonable justification’.77
In the case of Carson and others, however, the ECtHR did accept a differ-
ence in treatment resulting from the existence of bilateral agreements. 
This case concerned the uprating of pensions paid by the respondent state 
(the United Kingdom) to its nationals who were living abroad. Under 
United Kingdom law, pensions of nationals living in foreign countries 
were only uprated if this was provided for in a bilateral treaty. This led to 
a complaint by a number of pensioners who were living in countries with 
which no agreements had been concluded and claimed that the British 
legislation violated their rights under Article 1 First Protocol and Article 
14 ECHR. The ECtHR found, however, that the applicants were not in a 
relevantly similar position to pensioners living in countries with bilateral 
75 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi (n 72), para 150. 
76 ECtHR 16 April 2002, app no 36677/97 (S.A. Dangeville), para 55.
77 Koua Poirrez (n 54), para 49.
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agreements and hence concluded that there had been no violation of the 
Convention. The following considerations merit being cited at length:
Those living in reciprocal agreement countries are treated differently from those 
living elsewhere because an agreement had been entered into; and an agree-
ment has been entered into because the United Kingdom considered it to be in 
its interests.
States clearly have a right under international law to conclude bilateral social 
security treaties and indeed this is the preferred method used by the Member 
States of the Council of Europe to secure reciprocity of welfare benefits [. . .]. 
Such treaties are entered into on the basis of judgments by both parties as to 
their respective interests and may depend on various factors, among them the 
number of people moving from one country to the other, the benefits available 
under the other country’s welfare scheme, how far reciprocity is possible and 
the extent to which the advantages to be gained by an agreement outweigh the 
additional expenditure likely to be incurred by each State in negotiating and 
implementing it. [. . .] It is the inevitable result of such a process that different 
conditions apply in each country depending on whether or not a treaty has 
been concluded and on what terms.
The Court agrees [. . .] that it would be extraordinary if the fact of entering 
into bilateral arrangements in the social security sphere had the consequence of 
creating an obligation to confer the same advantages on all others living in all 
other countries. Such a conclusion would effectively undermine the right of 
States to enter into reciprocal agreements and their interest in so doing.78
In the above judgments, the ECtHR did not say whether compliance with 
bilateral agreements may be regarded as a legitimate aim as such. In Koua 
Poirrez it merely concluded that the difference in treatment was not based 
on an objective and reasonable justification.79 On the other hand, it may be 
derived from Carson that the aim of the differential treatment was not so 
much compliance with international obligations, but rather the pursuit of 
economic interests that led the British government to enter into these obli-
gations. Although the ECtHR was clearly very reticent in assessing these 
interests, it could nevertheless be the case that the extent to which bilat-
eral agreements can justify a difference in treatment depends, at least 
partly, on the reasons why those agreements were concluded.
Communications of the Human Rights Committee
Back in 1997, the HRC was asked to review a complaint resembling that in 
the Carson case referred to above. This complaint was filed by two former 
Dutch citizens, Mr and Mrs Van Oord, who had emigrated to the United 
States of America, but received their pensions from the Netherlands. The 
amount of these benefits was regulated in a bilateral treaty between the 
Netherlands and the US, which contained less favourable provisions for 
78 Carson and others (n 32), paras 87–89.
79 Koua Poirrez (n 54), para 49.
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the applicants than similar treaties concluded by the Netherlands with 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The applicants, who had in the 
meantime obtained American nationality, claimed that they were subject 
to discrimination on the basis of their nationality as they were treated dif-
ferently from former Dutch nationals who had become Australians, New 
Zealanders or Canadians. However, the HRC found that ‘the categories of 
persons being compared are distinguishable and . . . the privileges at issue 
respond to separately negotiated bilateral treaties which necessarily 
reflect agreements based on reciprocity’. It concluded that the differentia-
tion was based on reasonable and objective criteria and did not amount to 
prohibited discrimination within the meaning of Article 26 ICCPR.80
The Committee later made it clear, however, that the above justification 
did not apply with regard to all forms of differential treatment. This was 
decided in the case of Mr Karakurt, a Turkish national who lived and 
worked in Austria. Unlike Austrian nationals and nationals of other 
Member States of the EEA, Mr Karakurt was not eligible to be a member 
of the work council of the association of which he was an employee. The 
Austrian government expressly claimed that the distinction between EEA 
nationals and other aliens was the result of an international law obligation 
entered into by Austria on the basis of reciprocity, and which pursued the 
legitimate aim of abolishing differences in the treatment of workers within 
the EU (then EC) and EEA Member States.81 However, the HRC found that 
the distinction between aliens of different nationalities was not based on a 
reasonable justification. Thereby it took into account that the differential 
treatment concerned the capacity to stand for election to a work council, 
which had the task of promoting staff interests and supervising compli-
ance with work conditions. The Committee moreover expressly stated 
that no general rule could be drawn from its earlier decision in Van Oord 
to the effect that international agreements as such constitute a sufficient 
justification in relation to Article 26 ICCPR.82
International Obligations: Concluding Observations
The above judgments and communications suggest that the extent to 
which differences in treatment between aliens of different nationalities 
may be justified by international obligations depends, to an important 
extent, on the nature of the right at issue. As the admission of aliens is by 
definition a matter involving different states (the sending and the receiv-
ing states), it is submitted that international obligations may reasonably 
80 HRC 14 August 1997, No 658/1995 (Van Oord), para 8.5.
81 Karakurt (n 56), para 5.5.
82 ibid, para 8.4. In view of a reservation made by Austria, the HRC found that it was pre-
cluded from assessing the difference in treatment between Austrian nationals and aliens. 
This finding was however disputed – rightfully in my view – by two members of the 
Committee, see the partly dissenting opinion of Sir Nigel Rodley and Mr Martin Scheinin.
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play a role in determining the criteria for such admission. Support for this 
view can be found in the ECtHR judgments in Moustaquim and C. v 
Belgium. While both these cases concerned deportation, it is argued that 
there is no relevant difference compared to admission cases. Importantly, 
both judgments also concerned aliens with family ties in Belgium, which 
implies that international obligations can in principle also justify differ-
ences in treatment in the area of family reunification. 
The next question is whether the existence of international obligations 
always constitutes a relevant and sufficient reason to justify differences in 
treatment between aliens of different nationalities. In this respect, it may 
be observed that the judgments in Moustaquim and C. v Belgium concerned 
obligations stemming from EU law. In these judgments, the ECtHR con-
sidered that the EU (then the EC) constitutes a ‘special legal order’ which 
has moreover established its own citizenship. While the Court did not 
clarify the relevance of these remarks, it could be the case that the judg-
ments in Moustaquim and C. v Belgium reflect the fundamental importance 
of the right to free movement in the EU legal order, a right which is cur-
rently linked to the concept of EU citizenship (chapter 6). Additionally, in 
Bosphorus, the Court specifically mentioned the supranational character of 
the EC.83 These remarks raise the question of whether, in the view of the 
ECtHR, the need to comply with international obligations gains added 
weight if those obligations stem from EU law. 
In the absence of a more detailed motivation, it is difficult to say whether 
the ECtHR would have reached the same outcome if the differential treat-
ment in Moustaquim and C. v Belgium had been based on international 
obligations other than EU law, for instance on bilateral agreements. It is 
submitted, however, that such agreements could in principle justify a 
difference in admission criteria for aliens of different nationalities. As the 
ECtHR and HRC acknowledge, bilateral agreements are normally con-
cluded between states on the basis of reciprocity. Consequently a state 
may wish to negotiate a bilateral agreement to secure favourable treat-
ment for its nationals abroad, in return for which it guarantees similar 
treatment to the nationals of the other state party. It is argued that this is a 
legitimate interest, not only in the field of social security, but also in 
respect of immigration. Hence, one of the topics that states may seek to 
address in a bilateral agreement concerns the conditions under which 
they will grant admission to each other’s nationals, including the mainte-
nance of visa or other admission requirements.84 
83 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi (n 72), para 150.
84 In this respect, it may be observed that the Dutch Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs 
proposed concluding reciprocal bilateral agreements on admission with those states whose 
nationals were to be exempted from the Act on Integration Abroad. In the Committee’s view, 
the existence of such agreements could have served as justification for the exemption as 
required by international provisions on the right to equal treatment. See ACVZ 2004a, 33.
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Where a state seeks to negotiate bilateral agreements with the purpose 
of ensuring favourable treatment for its own nationals abroad, the viabil-
ity of such agreements will inevitably depend on the extent to which reci-
procity is possible.85 For this reason, states will conclude bilateral treaties 
with some countries but not with others. In Carson and others, the ECtHR 
held that a state which has entered into a bilateral agreement with another 
state is not thereby obliged to grant the same benefits to nationals of other 
states. According to the Court, ‘such a conclusion would effectively 
undermine the right of States to enter into reciprocal agreements and their 
interest in so doing’.86 Thus it can be concluded that the existence of bilat-
eral agreements to secure favourable treatment by states of each other’s 
nationals in the field of immigration in principle constitutes a reasonable 
and objective justification for the differential treatment resulting from 
such agreements. 
ii. Foreign and Economic Relations
As explained in section III.C, the Dutch government stated that one rea-
son why some nationalities are exempted from the AIA is because the 
Netherlands did not want to thwart its foreign and economic relations 
with the countries concerned. While it is possible for such relations to be 
expressed by means of (bilateral) legal agreements and thus correspond to 
international obligations, this is not necessarily the case. In any case, the 
objective of maintaining good foreign and economic relations can be 
distinguished from the objective, as discussed in the previous subsection, 
of securing advantages for one’s own nationals abroad on the basis of rec-
iprocity. For this reason the former objective is addressed separately here.
In general, the wish to maintain good foreign (diplomatic) and eco-
nomic (eg trade) relations can be accepted as a legitimate state interest. 
This is supported by the ECtHR judgments in Bosphorus and Al-Adsani, in 
which the Court recognised, in general terms, the importance of interna-
tional cooperation and of comity and good relations between states.87 It 
can moreover reasonably be argued that foreign and economic relations 
between states serve other interests which are expressly recognised as 
legitimate aims in the ECHR or ICCPR, such as the economic well-being 
of the state and perhaps also national security and territorial integrity.88
It is also accepted that the foreign and economic relations existing 
between two states can be influenced by many different circumstances, 
85 See also the ECtHR in Carson and others (n 32 a), para 88.
86 ibid, para 89. The same argument was made by Vermeulen, see Vermeulen 2010a, 
104–05.
87 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi (n 72), para 150 and ECtHR 21 
November 2001, app no 35763/97 (Al-Adsani), para 54.
88 eg, Arts 8(2) and 10(2) ECHR and Arts 19(3) and 21 ICCPR.
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including the treatment granted by one state to the nationals of the other 
state in the field of immigration.89 Whether and how the introduction or 
continuation of immigration requirements for nationals of another state 
affect the foreign and economic relations with that state will depend on 
the specificities of the relationship at issue. It must therefore be assumed 
that the state authorities responsible for external relations (for example, 
the Foreign Affairs Minister) have a large margin of appreciation to decide 
whether preferential treatment should be granted to certain nationalities, 
as they are better placed than (international) judiciary bodies to assess the 
effects of those decisions.90 However such preferential treatment is not an 
automatic or necessary consequence of the existence of foreign or eco-
nomic relations. It is consequently submitted that states may be required 
to give reasons why their external relations require them to treat some 
aliens differently from others, whereby it must be assessed whether these 
reasons are not manifestly unfounded. 
Lastly, Kortmann suggested that an exemption from integration require-
ments cannot be justified by the aim of maintaining good foreign and 
economic relations because this aim is not related to the purpose of inte-
gration.91 It is submitted, however, that such a relationship is not necessar-
ily required. Even where there is a general rule to the effect that aliens 
must meet an integration requirement before being admitted, exceptions 
to this rule may be justified if the interest of integration is outweighed by 
the competing interest of maintaining good external relations. Where this 
is the case, it will be the latter interest and not the interest of integration 
that constitutes the (legitimate) aim of the difference in treatment.92 If, 
however, the scope of the exemption(s) is too large, the proportionality of 
the differential treatment may be at issue. This matter is addressed below 
in section III.C.iv.
iii. Comparability of Countries of Origin
The Dutch government provided another justification for the nationality-
based difference in treatment regarding the integration requirement 
89 See also Wiesbrock 2010, 545, who states that ‘the ECtHR is likely to accept the existence 
of strong economic ties between two countries as a legitimate aim for the exemption from 
integration abroad requirements’.
90 cp Vierdag 1973, 24–25. This author argues that the international legal principle of 
‘equality of States’ leaves ‘an enormous discretion to the States in their mutual relations’, 
which is due to ‘the particularized character of the relations of States vis à vis other States in 
international law’. He does not, however, address the consequences which the differentiated 
relations between states may have for the nationals of those states.
91 Kortmann 2009, 24.
92 It may be noted that Kortmann himself conducts a similar reasoning, where he main-
tains that an exemption from the integration requirement can be justified by the need to 
comply with international obligations (Kortmann 2009, 23). Arguably, this exception does 
not serve the purpose of integration either.
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abroad. As described at the beginning of section III.C, the government 
held that some countries of origin were comparable to the Netherlands in 
‘socio-economic, social and political terms’ and therefore there would be 
no major problems concerning integration as far as nationals of those 
countries were concerned.
Considering that the purpose of the integration exam abroad is to 
address problems in the field of immigrant integration, it makes sense to 
apply this requirement only in situations where such problems are 
expected to occur. It is therefore submitted that the above justification 
corresponds to a legitimate aim. It is also, however, subject to a number of 
objections.93
As in the case of the arguments discussed in sections III.C.i and III.C.ii 
(international obligations and foreign and economic relations), the argu-
ment addressed in this subsection provides a justification for differential 
treatment of aliens of different nationalities. Nonetheless, there is a differ-
ence. When an exemption from immigration requirements is created 
because of international obligations or international relations, this exemp-
tion logically applies to nationals of those states to which the obligations 
apply or which are involved in those relations. It follows that, in these 
cases, the differentiation ground of nationality reflects the immigrants’ 
legal membership of an entity (the state) which has negotiated favourable 
immigration conditions on their behalf. On the other hand, when the 
exemption is motivated by the assumed comparability of countries of 
origin, the existence or absence of inter-state relations does not play a role. 
Instead, the differentiation ground of nationality is used here as a ‘proxy’ 
for the capacity to integrate, that is to say for certain personal characteris-
tics of immigrants that are considered to be of relevance for their integra-
tion in the host society.
This brings us to the first problem regarding the justification ground at 
issue. The Dutch government appears to assume that immigrants from 
countries that are comparable to the Netherlands will integrate more eas-
ily into Dutch society. Nationals of these countries are therefore exempted 
from the integration exam abroad. However, that fact that a person has 
the nationality of a particular country does not necessarily imply that he 
or she has also lived in that country and is familiar with its society. On the 
other hand, a person may have lived in an exempted country without 
having its nationality. This can be illustrated by means of an example. In 
the Dutch government’s view, Canada is a country comparable to the 
Netherlands, whereas the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is not. Yet 
Canadians born and bred in the DRC are exempted from the AIA, whereas 
Congolese nationals who have lived all or most of their lives in Canada 
93 Some of the arguments presented below are also made by Walter 2008, 56 and Kortmann 
2009, 23–24.
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are not. It follows that the exemption is both too wide and too narrow. To 
the extent that the comparability of countries of origin is indeed consid-
ered a relevant indicator for integration potential, it would be better there-
fore to use the duration of residence in those countries, instead of 
nationality, as a criterion for exemption. However, as argued below, such 
comparability does not in any case provide a relevant justification.
Insofar as it is possible to identify criteria useful for determining 
whether someone will successfully integrate in another country, the 
nature of those criteria will necessarily depend on the definition of inte-
gration employed. As seen in chapter 3, the concept of ‘integration’ can be 
given various meanings, including, for example, economic self-reliance, 
interaction with persons belonging to different social groups or a sense of 
loyalty or commitment to the host country. However, despite the plurality 
of possible understandings of integration, it is not easily conceivable as to 
how the (social, socio-economic or political) comparability of countries of 
origin to the host country indicate how persons coming from those coun-
tries will fare in the host society. While the criterion as it stands is too 
abstract to be applied, it also does not lend itself to further concretisation. 
On the one hand, this is due to the fact that many features that can be 
identified as characteristics of countries of origin (such as the existence of 
a market economy, a democratic form of government or high levels of 
unemployment) are not connected to the integration of nationals or resi-
dents of those countries elsewhere.94 Arguably, such a connection may 
exist with regard to certain other features, such as social conventions or 
the prevalence of certain languages. Often, however, such characteristics 
will be bound to particular regions or groups of the population and will 
therefore be subject to differentiation not only between, but also within 
countries. 
To illustrate the difficulties surrounding the criterion of comparability, 
mention can be made of two remarks made during the parliamentary 
debate on the Dutch Act on Integration Abroad. With regard to the exemp-
tion for nationals of the United States and Japan, Tiny Kox, a member of 
parliament for the Socialist Party (SP), stated that
First of all not all Americans and Japanese speak good English. Secondly the 
exemption does not apply to many citizens of this world who do speak good 
94 Compare Joppke’s view on the differential treatment under the AIA, where he says that 
‘the cut is between rich and poor countries’ (Joppke 2010, 41). The author does not appear to 
consider this distinction as problematic as (he contends) it does not amount to ‘dubious, 
quasi-racial discrimination’. From a legal perspective, however, the important question is 
whether such a distinction is relevant in view of its purpose. In this connection I would sub-
mit that there is no reason to believe that aliens coming from poor countries will integrate 
less well than those from rich countries. In the same vein, see also Human Rights Watch 
2008, 27 (‘There is no evidence that the declared social and economic level of a country is a 
reliable indicator of the capability, inclination or willingness of a potential individual 
migrant to integrate’).
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English, such as those who are residents of the former British colonies. Thirdly, 
even for immigrants from the United States or other English-speaking countries 
a command of the Dutch language will still be relevant for the purposes of com-
munication in everyday life.95 
In addition Tof Thissen, a member of parliament for the Green party 
(GroenLinks), stated that
At this moment, the United States is torturing people in Afghanistan and in Iraq 
and the death penalty still exists in many American states. Extreme forms of 
poverty also occur in the United States. Yet American citizens do not have to 
pass the integration exam abroad to come to the Netherlands and marry the 
man or woman of their choice, whatever their sexual preference.96
It follows from the above that the ‘comparability of countries of origin’ is 
not a useful criterion for indicating the integration capacity of immigrants 
and cannot be used to justify differences in treatment with regard to inte-
gration requirements. A related disadvantage of this criterion is that it 
carries with it the risk of stereotyping or even stigmatisation of certain 
groups of immigrants. These groups risk being considered as ‘inherently 
unfit for integration’ because of their national background. The existence 
of such stereotypes is not likely to have a positive effect on the integration 
process.97
iv. Final Remarks Concerning Justification
The previous subsections examined the justification grounds presented 
by the Dutch government with regard to the differential treatment of 
aliens under the Act on Integration Abroad. It was established that an 
exemption from integration requirements for certain nationalities can be 
justified in the light of competing interests, including the need to comply 
with EU law or bilateral agreements or to maintain good foreign and eco-
nomic relations with other states. Such competing interests may consti-
tute a legitimate reason to provide for an exception from an otherwise 
generally applicable rule. Nevertheless, as more immigrants are exempted 
from integration requirements, the effect of those requirements will nor-
mally be less. It is submitted that this diminishes the relevance of the inte-
gration measures at stake and consequently the proportionality of the 
differential treatment. This is a factor to be taken into account in deter-
mining whether the differential treatment is justified.98
95 Proceedings I 2005, No 12, 605.
96 Proceedings I 2005, No 12, 601. 
97 Groenendijk 2005, 15.
98 cp the argument made by Vermeulen 2010a on 104–05. Vermeulen concludes here that 
the differential treatment between Dutch nationals and other EU citizens with regard to fam-
ily reunification (the ‘reverse discrimination’ discussed in  chapter 10) is justified. However, 
he says ‘That third country family members of EU citizens are exempted from the [AIA] 
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Lastly, the proportionality of the differential treatment also depends on 
the extent of the disadvantage suffered by those aliens required to comply 
with integration requirements. This disadvantage needs to be balanced 
against the interest served by the differential treatment. Relevant factors 
in determining the extent of the disadvantage include, inter alia, the level 
of an integration exam, the availability of preparation facilities and the 
personal circumstances of the candidates.99 An example of a case where 
the ECtHR considered the interference with the applicant’s right to equal 
treatment disproportionate can be found in the judgment in Luczak.100 In 
Moustaquim, however, the ECtHR did not find there to have been a viola-
tion of Article 14 ECHR, despite the significant interests at stake for the 
applicants.101 This may indicate that the Court attached considerable 
weight to the interest of compliance with EU law and/or that it granted a 
large margin of appreciation because of the immigration context (section 
III.B).
D.  Dutch Case Law 
This section examines whether any further criteria can be derived from 
Dutch case law with regard to integration requirements and the right to 
equal treatment, especially of aliens of different nationalities. It also 
assesses how this case law treats the arguments made in the previous sec-
tions, concerning the justification provided for the differential treatment. 
Thus far two judgments by Dutch district courts have addressed the 
issue of nationality discrimination under the Act on Integration Abroad.102 
must be regarded as a specific exception to the general rule, in practice concerning only a 
very limited number of persons and justified as a consequence of EU law’. It may be derived 
that the argument would not be maintained if the difference in treatment concerned a larger 
number of migrants or even the majority of them (in which case the exemption would 
become the general rule).
99 See also section II.D of ch 4, on the proportionality of integration requirements in rela-
tion to the right to family life.
100 Luczak (n 34), paras 52–60. 
101 In this case the Court concluded that deportation of the applicant would amount to a 
violation of his right to family life as protected by Art 8 ECHR, see Moustaquim (n 55), 
para 46. However, an explicit proportionality test was not conducted regarding the com-
plaint concerning differential treatment.
102 District Court of The Hague sitting in Rotterdam 23 April 2008, case no 07/35128 and 
District Court of The Hague sitting in Utrecht 29 June 2009, case no 08/39827. A complaint 
that the AIA violated the right to equal treatment as protected by the ICCPR was also made 
in  District Court of The Hague sitting in Breda 8 January 2009, case nos 08/9327 and 
08/32918; however, this complaint was not addressed by the court. Finally, in one case the 
court decided that Art 14 ECHR was not applicable because the applicant’s right to family 
life under Art 8 ECHR had not been violated, see District Court The Hague sitting in 
Amsterdam 8 March 2011, case nos 10/23459 and 10/23449. As explained above, such a vio-
lation is not required by the ECtHR (section II.B.i). This part of the judgment was not, how-
ever, addressed in appeal.
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However, the preferential treatment of certain nationalities already existed 
in Dutch immigration legislation before the AIA was introduced, as those 
aliens currently exempted from the integration requirement were already 
exempted from the obligation to obtain a long-stay visa (machtiging tot 
voorlopig verblijf, see section VI.B.i of chapter 2). In 2006, the Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (AJD), the highest court in 
immigration cases, accepted that the latter exemption was justified by the 
need to protect the Dutch economic order and therefore did not violate 
Article 26 ICCPR.103 The same reasoning was later applied by the District 
Courts of Rotterdam and Utrecht in relation to the AIA. Consequently, 
these courts found that the differential treatment regarding the integra-
tion exam abroad was also justified because of the need to protect the 
Dutch economic order. 
Despite the above judgments, it is submitted that the AJD’s reasoning 
with regard to the long-stay visa requirement cannot automatically be 
applied to the requirement of integration abroad. Firstly, the visa require-
ment and the integration requirement are different conditions serving dif-
ferent purposes. In respect of the visa requirement, the AJD found the 
difference in treatment to be justified by the need to protect the Dutch 
economic order. Yet the reasoning provided in this judgment is very brief 
and does not explain what is to be understood by this objective. While it 
may include economic relations with other states, it could also concern 
the need to control the immigration of persons with insufficient resources. 
Arguably, if the AJD meant that the aim of maintaining economic rela-
tions with other states justified an exemption from the visa requirement, 
this would also apply with regard to the integration exam (section III.C.ii). 
However, as already stated, the judgment does not provide clarity on this 
point.
Moreover, even if it could be derived from the AJD’s decision that the 
exemption from the integration requirement serves a legitimate aim, the 
courts should still have assessed whether this aim was also sufficiently 
important to outweigh the disadvantage suffered by the applicants. 
The introduction of the AIA made the conditions for admission to the 
Netherlands more stringent. As a consequence, the difference between 
103 AJD 31 January 2006, case no 200508648/1, para 2.3. Other judgments mention addi-
tional justifications for the difference in treatment with regard to the long-stay visa require-
ment, namely ‘the upholding of foreign relations’, ‘national security’ and ‘[the prevention 
of? KV] illegal immigration’. See District Court of The Hague sitting in Breda 13 November 
2007, case no 07/18500, para 2.6. and District Court of The Hague sitting in Breda 8 April 
2008, case no 07/42458, para 2.7. In one judgment the court also held that in general an 
exemption from the visa requirement could be justified on the basis of international obliga-
tions or even ‘considerations of opportunity’, see District Court of The Hague sitting in 
Rotterdam 21 July 2005, case no 04/49309, para 4.5.8. Lastly, the above judgments of the 
District Court of Breda mention that the differentiation was based on bilateral agreements 
concerning the abolishment of visa requirement for certain countries. However, no further 
details or evidence as to the existence of these agreements were provided. 
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aliens who have to meet these conditions and those who do not has 
become more significant, and the disadvantage experienced by the former 
has become greater.104 It follows that the differential treatment under the 
AIA requires a separate proportionality test, with the additional burden of 
having to pass the integration exam being taken into account.
As a last remark, it is noted that the courts did not apply the ‘very 
weighty reasons’ test in the above judgments.105 As suggested above (sec-
tion III.B), this test does not normally apply in immigration cases when 
the differential treatment is based on nationality. Hence, there is no reason 
to assume that the approach of the Dutch courts at this point is incompat-
ible with the standards of the equal treatment provisions of the ECHR and 
the ICCPR.
IV. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT ON  
THE GROUNDS OF RESIDENCE PURPOSE
The criteria used by states to decide on the admission of aliens are com-
monly connected to the reasons why admission is sought. For instance, 
family members may be expected to demonstrate their family ties to 
someone residing in the host state, whereas labour migrants may be asked 
to show that they have either already found employment or that they are 
capable of doing so within a reasonable time. Criteria such as these dif-
ferentiate between potential immigrants on the grounds of their residence 
purpose.
Residence purpose is not mentioned as a differentiation ground in any 
of the equal treatment provisions discussed in this chapter (section II.B). 
Arguably, however, it counts as ‘any other ground’ or ‘status’ within the 
meaning of those provisions. Consequently distinctions based on resi-
dence purpose must be based on a reasonable and objective justification.106 
At the same time, the reason why someone chooses to move to another 
country is not of such a nature that it must be qualified as a ‘suspect’ 
ground for differentiation. The justification provided will therefore be 
subject to a certain margin of appreciation (section II.D).
As far as integration requirements are concerned, it can readily be seen 
that these may be more relevant in relation to some residence purposes 
than others. Certain categories of immigrants, such as seasonal labour 
migrants, exchange students or au pairs, can reasonably be exempted from 
104 See also Vermeulen 2010a, 101.
105 cp a contrario AJD 3 September 2008, case no 200706325/1 (Verwijsindex Antillianen), 
para 2.11.3.
106 As far as Art 21(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is concerned this applies to 
those distinctions that result from acts of EU institutions or of the Member States when they 
implement EU law, see section II.B.ii.
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integration requirements on account of the temporariness of their stay. 
Less obvious, but not implausible is the argument that certain categories of 
immigrants have a higher capacity for adjustment or participation because 
of their residence purpose. Clearly, the validity of this argument will 
depend on the particular integration objectives pursued. If, for example, 
integration is primarily perceived as a matter of economic participation, it 
may be legitimate to foresee an exemption from integration requirements 
for labour migrants or entrepreneurs. Another possibility is that existing 
family ties in the host country may be considered an important factor in 
preventing social isolation. Thus, where prevention of this is the primary 
integration objective there may be grounds for creating an exemption for 
family migrants.107 Often, however, the objectives pursued by integration 
requirements will be more diverse and complex and it will be less easy to 
connect exemptions to the choice for a particular residence purpose.
Lastly, it could be argued that integration requirements are harmful to 
the economic interests of the host state because they make that state a less 
attractive destination for labour migrants and investors and thus lead to a 
reduction in economic migration. Like the international obligations and 
external relations discussed earlier in this chapter (sections III.C.i and 
III.C.ii), the need to protect the economy does not relate directly to the 
purpose of integration, but represents another, conflicting interest. This 
interest could be put forward to support a more lenient immigration 
regime for (certain groups of) labour migrants, as has been the case with 
the EU Blue Card Directive (section VII of chapter 6 and section IV.A of 
chapter 7). The example of this directive also shows that the same argu-
ment may be used to support an exemption for family members of these 
labour migrants. It is submitted that this argument is valid in principle 
and that exemptions based on the economic interests of the state will nor-
mally fall within its margin of appreciation. Nonetheless, as mentioned 
above (section III.C.iv), the proportionality of such exemptions will 
depend on various factors, including the extent of the disadvantage for 
those who are not exempted and the effectiveness of the integration 
requirement if it is not applied to all immigrants alike.
V. THE RIGHT TO EQUAL TREATMENT AND THE ACT ON 
INTEGRATION ABROAD
In the foregoing it has been discussed to what extent nationality and resi-
dence purpose constitute relevant criteria for deciding which aliens must 
107 For instance, Canadian immigration legislation assesses the ‘adaptability’ of certain 
categories of labour migrants on the basis of a number of factors, including whether the 
person has a relationship with a person living in Canada, see http://www.cic.gc.ca. Note, 
however, that the criterion of adaptability does not apply in relation to family migrants.
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be subjected to integration requirements. This section examines the Act on 
Integration Abroad in the light of the arguments developed in that discus-
sion, with a specific focus on whether the differences in treatment that 
result from this Act are proportionate to the reasons why these distinc-
tions are made. 
A.  Differential Treatment on Grounds of Nationality
The reasons why the AIA differentiates between aliens according to 
their nationality are discussed in section III.C above. It was concluded 
there that the ‘comparability of countries of origin’ argument does not 
constitute a relevant justification for this difference in treatment. It was 
also found, however, that an exemption for certain nationalities may 
be justified by the need to ensure compliance with international obliga-
tions (including both EU law and bilateral agreements) and/or in the 
interests of maintaining good foreign and economic relations with other 
states.
As far as the AIA is concerned, it has already been established that the 
exemption from the integration exam abroad for EU nationals is moti-
vated by obligations of EU law. Similarly, an exemption has to be main-
tained for certain categories of third-country nationals in order to comply 
with bilateral agreements. This is the case notably with regard to certain 
groups of economic migrants from the United States and Japan, who are 
entitled to admission on the basis of the (friendship) treaties concluded 
between these countries and the Netherlands (section III of chapter 7). 
While these treaties have not been expressly mentioned by the Dutch 
government in relation to the differential treatment under the AIA, it is 
submitted that they provide a valid reason for that treatment. 
With regard to other categories of third-country nationals the exemp-
tion from the AIA cannot be justified by reference to international obliga-
tions. It must therefore be assumed that the only (relevant) reason why 
these aliens are exempted from the integration exam abroad is to protect 
the foreign and economic relations of the Netherlands with the countries 
concerned. As argued earlier, these relations in principle constitute a valid 
objective. Nonetheless, where the AIA is concerned, two remarks deserve 
to be made. The first is that the Dutch government has in no way shown 
that the foreign and economic relations of the Netherlands would in fact 
be harmed if the integration exam abroad were to be imposed on nation-
als of the exempted countries. There are no indications that this possibility 
has been discussed with the authorities of the states concerned or that 
negative reactions have been received from abroad. In other words, the 
expected negative influence on the foreign and economic relations of the 
Netherlands has not as yet been confirmed.
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The second remark is that third-country nationals who are exempted 
from the AIA are not exempted from other requirements for residence in 
the Netherlands, such as the income requirement or the condition that 
they must not represent a danger to Dutch public order.108 As they are not 
subject to the obligation to obtain a visa before admission, these third-
country nationals do not need to demonstrate their compliance with the 
said conditions before their arrival. They do, however, have to meet these 
conditions in order to be granted a residence permit once they are in the 
Netherlands. Apparently, these residence conditions are not perceived as 
an obstacle to the Dutch foreign and economic relations. This raises the 
question of why this would be different where integration requirements 
are concerned. Surely, the difference in treatment caused by the AIA 
would be less significant if all aliens who are not exempted on the basis of 
international obligations were obliged to pass the exam at some stage in 
the immigration process, either before or after admission. Arguably this 
would also increase the effectiveness of the integration requirement. This 
latter point is discussed in more detail in section V.C.
B.  Differential Treatment on Grounds of Residence Purpose
In principle, the Act on Integration Abroad is meant to apply only to those 
aliens who are to become permanent or at least long-term residents of the 
Netherlands. For this reason the Act distinguishes between aliens whose 
residence purpose is temporary and those whose residence purpose is 
non-temporary.109 Under Dutch immigration legislation, aliens admitted 
for a non-temporary residence purpose become eligible for a permanent 
residence permit after five years.110 Aliens with a temporary residence 
purpose cannot obtain a permanent residence permit, which means they 
have to leave the Netherlands when the reason for which they were 
admitted ceases to exist. The latter category includes, for example, stu-
dents, interns and au pairs. Given the limited duration of their stay these 
aliens do not have to pass the integration exam abroad before being 
admitted to the Netherlands. As observed in chapter 2 (section VI.B.i), the 
main category of aliens whose residence purpose is qualified as non-tem-
porary and who are therefore subject to integration requirements consists 
of family migrants.111
108 Art 16(1)(c) and (d) Aliens Act. 
109 Art 16(1)(h) Aliens Act read in conjunction with Art 3(1)(a) Integration Act 2007.
110 Art 21(1)(b) Aliens Act.
111 Another numerically important group of non-temporary immigrants consists of per-
sons who have been admitted on asylum grounds. However, international and EU asylum 
law (in particular the principle of non-réfoulement) forbids the admission of these aliens being 
made subject to integration requirements. It is submitted that the non-applicability of the 
AIA to this group is based on an evidently valid and ponderous justification which does not 
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In section IV of this chapter it is argued that exemptions from integra-
tion requirements for immigrants whose stay in the host state will be tem-
porary can readily be seen as justified in view of the objective of those 
requirements. Consequently, the fact that the AIA distinguishes between 
temporary and non-temporary residents is not as such problematic with 
regard to the right to equal treatment. Nevertheless, the Dutch legislation 
shows an important inconsistency where the position of labour migrants 
(and their accompanying family members) is concerned. Under the Act on 
Integration Abroad labour migration is qualified as a temporary residence 
purpose. As a result, labour migrants and their family members do not 
have to pass the integration exam abroad. The Aliens Act, however, desig-
nates labour migration as a non-temporary residence purpose, which 
means that labour migrants and their family members may apply for per-
manent residence after five years.112 In view of this possibility, the exclu-
sion of labour migrants and their family members from the AIA cannot be 
explained by the limited duration of their residence.113 
It follows that the difference in treatment between family migrants and 
labour migrants, both of whom are in principle eligible for permanent 
residence, must be based on an alternative justification. As suggested in 
section IV, one possible argument could be that labour migrants are spe-
cifically admitted to the Netherlands to accede to the labour market. Their 
capacity for economic participation and self-reliance can therefore be 
taken as a given. However, this argument does not explain why not only 
labour migrants, but also their accompanying family members are 
exempted from the integration exam abroad as the admission of family 
require detailed discussion. Meanwhile, the AIA does apply to religious servants despite this 
group not being eligible for permanent residence (section VII.E of ch 5). Given the close con-
nection to the freedom of religion, the inclusion of religious servants under the AIA is dis-
cussed separately in ch 5.
112 This follows from the fact that labour migration is not mentioned as a temporary resi-
dence purpose in Art 3.5(2) of the Aliens Decree.
113 With regard to the foregoing it must be observed that certain categories of labour 
migrants are required to obtain a work permit. From Art 11(1) of the Labour Migration Act 
(Wet arbeid vreemdelingen) it follows that work permits are initially granted for a maximum of 
three years. If, after that period, the work permit is not renewed, the holder will not be able 
to remain in the Netherlands as a labour migrant. This is why labour migrants were origi-
nally excluded from the scope of the Newcomers Integration Act 1998 (ch 2, section IV.D.iv). 
This is explained by Van der Winden 2006, 26–27. The exemption for labour migrants was 
later ‘copy-pasted’ into the Integration Act 2007, see Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 
700, No 3, 7 and No 6, 32–33. However, there is no legal impediment preventing work per-
mits from being extended after the initial three-year period. Moreover some categories of 
labour migrants, notably highly skilled migrants, are exempted from the work permit 
requirement altogether (see Art 3 Labour Migration Act and Art 1-1i Labour Migration 
Decree [Besluit uitvoering Wet arbeid vreemdelingen]). In summary, there is no legal or practical 
rule that necessarily makes the residence of labour migrants temporary. Lastly, as far as fam-
ily members are concerned, it may be observed that the nature of their residence purpose 
(temporary or non-temporary) is determined by reference to that of the principal applicant 
(Art 3.5(2)(a) Aliens Decree).
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members is not conditioned upon labour market participation. Moreover, 
as explained in chapter 3, the objectives of Dutch integration policy are 
not limited to economic participation. This appears clearly from the legis-
lative history of the AIA, where the government states that:
Basic knowledge of the Dutch language and society are so essential to further 
integration in the Netherlands that the lack of it cannot be compensated by, for 
example, work experience in a non-Western society or the perspective of low-
skilled labour in the Netherlands. The consequences of the attraction of immi-
grant labour in the 1960s should present a strong warning in this respect. We 
must prevent the repeated formation in our society of large groups of non-inte-
grated aliens, who work but who are otherwise insufficiently equipped to fully 
participate in our society.114
Lastly, it was suggested above that imposing integration requirements on 
labour migrants and their family members could lead to a reduction in 
labour migration, which could in turn be harmful to the economic inter-
ests of the Netherlands. It was submitted that the protection of these inter-
ests constitutes a legitimate aim, which may justify a difference in 
treatment between labour migrants and family migrants. This argument 
would moreover explain why family members of labour migrants are also 
exempted from integration requirements, as the existence of such require-
ments could make the Netherlands a less attractive destination for the 
labour migrants themselves.115 
The extent to which the wish to protect Dutch economic interests was 
one of the reasons why the Dutch legislator decided to exempt labour 
migrants and their family members from the integration exam abroad is 
not entirely clear. The argument was briefly touched on during the parlia-
mentary discussion of the AIA, however no substantial reasoning was 
provided.116 Similarly, the legislative history does not indicate that the 
economic interests that would be served by exempting labour migrants 
were offset against the interests of their integration. It is therefore submit-
ted that the differential treatment of labour migrants compared to other 
non-temporary migrants (notably family migrants) at least requires addi-
tional reasoning. The fact that labour migrants and their family members 
do not have to pass the integration exam abroad is also relevant with 
regard to the overall proportionality of the AIA. This issue is addressed 
below.
114 Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 700, No 6, 8.
115 Note that, for labour migrants and their family members who are entitled to admission 
on the basis of the EU Blue Card Directive, integration conditions are precluded as a matter 
of EU law (section VII of ch 6 and section IV.A of ch 7). The above argument only applies 
therefore to labour migrants whose admission is regulated by Dutch domestic law. 
116 See Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 700, No 6, 33.
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C.  Scope of the Exemption and Effectiveness of the Integration 
Requirement
As explained above (section III.C.iv), the relevance of integration meas-
ures diminishes if large numbers of immigrants are exempted from those 
measures because of international obligations or external relations. It is, 
therefore, important to establish the share of immigrants to the 
Netherlands that actually has to pass the integration exam abroad. 
Unfortunately, the figures needed to answer this question are not readily 
on hand. Nonetheless, data that are available include the total numbers of 
(legal) immigrants to the Netherlands over the past few years, as well as 
the numbers of immigrants falling within the target group of the AIA. 
A comparison of these figures shows that immigrants required to pass 
the integration exam abroad constituted approximately 15 per cent of the 




2007 80,257 12,258 (15.3%)
2008 102,872 15,025 (14.6%)
2009 104,411 15,773 (15.1%)
2010 110,234 13,679 (12.4%)
1 Figures obtained from Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek), http://
statline.cbs.nl, table Immigratie van niet-Nederlanders; migratiemotief, geboorteland, leeftijd. 
2 Figures taken from the Monitor of the Integration Exam Abroad (Monitor 
Inburgeringsexamen Buitenland) (ch 2, section VI.D). The figures presented concern aliens 
between 18 and 65 years who come to the Netherlands for a residence purpose qualified as 
non-temporary under the Integration Act 2007 and who must be in possession of a long-stay 
visa (machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf ). The figures for 2007–09 include aliens who may still be 
exempted from the integration exam abroad because, for instance, they belong to the family 
of someone holding an asylum permit or because of a medical indication (ch 2, section 
VI.B.iii). From 2010 onwards it was possible to take these exemptions into account, which 
shows that the actual numbers of immigrants having to pass the exam were even lower. 
Obviously, one must be careful when comparing figures from different sources as different 
definitions may have been used. The percentages presented in the table above must there-
fore be regarded as approximations. For the purpose of the argument here, however, they 
present a sufficiently clear picture. 
Earlier in this chapter, it was established that the criteria of nationality 
and residence purpose, which are used to define the target group of the 
AIA, do not constitute relevant indicators of the capacity for integration 
of persons seeking admission to the Netherlands. It must therefore be 
assumed that the risk of integration-related problems also exists with 
330 The Right to Equal Treatment
regard to those aliens who are exempted on these grounds. Given this 
assumption, the fact that 15 per cent or less of all applicants are obliged to 
pass the integration exam abroad raises serious doubts about the propor-
tionality of this difference in treatment.117 After all, it is reasonable to 
expect that the expected positive effect of the AIA on the integration pro-
cess in the Netherlands will be much less significant if the exam is taken 
by only 15,000 immigrants (and not by 85,000 others) than if it is taken by 
all. In this situation, it can be wondered whether the advantage to be 
gained by continuing the integration requirement still outweighs the 
disadvantage caused by the interference with the right to equal treatment. 
In this respect, it is noteworthy that the share of persons having to take 
the integration exam abroad is likely to decrease even further, due to the 
increased level of the exam from 1 April 2011 onwards (section VI.C.ii 
of chapter 2) and the exemption for Turkish nationals (section II.C of 
chapter 7).118 
Notwithstanding the above, it is primarily up to the Dutch legislative 
authorities to determine the weight to be attached to the interest of inte-
gration (and hence to the significance of the AIA, even when limited in 
scope). These authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, which, as 
established earlier in this chapter, is relatively large as far as differentia-
tion on the grounds of nationality or residence purpose is concerned (sec-
tions III.B and IV). It is therefore submitted that the AIA, considered in 
abstracto, is not incompatible with the right to equal treatment as protected 
by national and international human rights norms. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This chapter analyses how differences in treatment in the field of integra-
tion requirements must be assessed in relation to the right to equal treat-
ment. At the beginning of the chapter, a general overview was given of 
the criteria used to determine whether a difference in treatment is com-
patible with the relevant legal instruments. Subsequently, more specific 
criteria were formulated with regard to differences in treatment based on 
nationality or residence purpose. Possible justifications for these kinds of 
differential treatment were also examined.
In respect of differentiations based on nationality it was firstly estab-
lished that, at least in the immigration context, nationality does not qual-
ify as a suspect classification that would significantly narrow the available 
room for justification. Next, different reasons were examined as possible 
117 See also Groenendijk 2011, 28–29.
118 According to the 2011 Monitor of the Integration Exam Abroad, the number of appli-
cants for admission belonging to the target group of the AIA decreased in the second half of 
2011, from 1500 to 1000 applications per month.
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explanations of why states may apply integration requirements to aliens 
of certain nationalities but not to others. Here it was argued that national-
ity does not provide a relevant indicator of a person’s integration capacity. 
However, a difference in treatment between aliens of different nationali-
ties could be justified because of a need to maintain good international 
relations with other states or because of international obligations. The lat-
ter include obligations of EU law, as well as bilateral agreements con-
cluded on the basis of reciprocity. These justification grounds apply 
equally in the case of integration requirements. Nonetheless the criterion 
of a ‘reasonable and objective justification’ implies that the aim pursued 
must be sufficiently important to outweigh the disadvantage suffered by 
aliens who have to meet the requirement on account of the differential 
treatment. States do, however, have a certain margin of appreciation to 
determine whether a particular difference in treatment is proportionate. 
In the context of the Netherlands, this margin is moreover left to the legis-
lator, which means that the review conducted by the courts is not very 
strict. 
Regarding differentiations based on residence purpose it was also 
argued that no suspect classification is at stake. It was furthermore sub-
mitted that distinctions on the grounds of residence purpose may be rele-
vant in connection with integration requirements, in particular where 
only temporary residence is pursued. Potentially a relationship could also 
be drawn between residence purpose and the capacity to integrate; how-
ever, it was submitted that this would only be possible in the case of a 
limited and narrowly formulated definition of integration. Lastly, the eco-
nomic interests of the receiving state could justify an exemption from inte-
gration requirements for labour migrants and their family members. 
Again, the lawfulness of this justification ground depends on a balancing 
of interests, whereby states have a certain margin of appreciation. 
Based on the criteria set out above it was determined that the difference 
in treatment resulting from the AIA must in principle be considered justi-
fied. Nonetheless, two problems were observed. First, as far as the distinc-
tion on the grounds of residence purpose is concerned, insufficient reasons 
were found to explain why labour migrants and their family members are 
exempted from the integration exam abroad. Secondly, as a result of the 
various exemptions created, only a small percentage of those migrating to 
the Netherlands and whose integration cannot be taken for granted are 
required to pass the exam before being admitted. Consequently, the suita-
bility or adequacy of the AIA as a measure to further the integration process 
is impaired. Lastly, with regard to the case law concerning the Act, it was 
remarked that it is not sufficient for Dutch courts to refer to earlier decisions 
concerning the long-stay visa requirement. Instead, the differential treat-
ment under the AIA must be examined separately, with due regard for the 
reasons why these distinctions are made and for their proportionality.
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This chapter also shows that defining the target group of integration 
requirements is a complex process, involving a variety of often competing 
interests. Where states create exemptions – for instance, because of inter-
national obligations or to attract highly skilled labour migrants – immi-
gration policies can give the impression of differentiating between 
‘desirable’ and ‘non-desirable’ or ‘wanted’ and ‘not-so-wanted’ aliens. 
From the perspective of the right to equal treatment, however, such dis-
tinctions are not always problematic. The legal instruments discussed in 
this chapter do not in principle preclude states from refusing admission to 
certain aliens or making their entry subject to conditions in accordance 
with their national interest. Nonetheless, what is required is for these 
distinctions to be made on the basis of objective and neutral criteria and to 
be justified by legitimate and sufficiently weighty interests. 
Where such justification is not provided, there is a risk that the differ-
ence in treatment will be based, at least partly, on subjective criteria or 
prejudice. This risk is particularly pressing in the field of integration pol-
icy because ‘integration’ is in itself a rather abstract concept and often 
used to address perceived or ascribed as well as actual differences between 
groups in the population. Hence, there is a danger that legislative meas-
ures aimed at improving integration will in fact serve to reinforce existing 
stereotypes (‘non-Western aliens are just different from Western aliens’). It 
was remarked earlier in this chapter that such a development is not likely 
to promote relationships between different communities. However, it was 
also established that national and international courts tend to leave a cer-
tain margin of appreciation to the national or legislative authorities when 
examining whether a difference in treatment is justified. While under-
standable in view of considerations of subsidiarity or constitutionally 
divided powers, this margin makes it more difficult to determine whether 
stereotypes or prejudices have – explicitly or implicitly – played a role in 
the enactment of the legislation the courts are asked to assess. The task of 
guarding against the influence of such subjective criteria lies primarily, 
therefore, with the legislator. 
In this respect, as far as the AIA is concerned, it has already been 
observed that no (convincing) explanation has been provided of the 
reasons why labour migrants and their family members are exempted 
from the integration exam abroad. The same is true with regard to third-
country nationals who are not entitled to admission on the basis of inter-
national agreements and whose exemption is based, without any further 
motivation, on the grounds that this is required by the ‘international and 
economic relations of the Netherlands’. More specific and cogent justifica-
tion would be needed to explain the preferential treatment enjoyed by 
these groups. If such justification is not available, these groups ought to 
be brought under the scope of the Act on Integration Abroad, unless the 
difference in treatment is abolished in another way.
9 
The Right to Equal Treatment:  
Indirect Differential Treatment on the 
Grounds of Racial or Ethnic Origin
I. INTRODUCTION
THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER established that the Dutch Act on Integration Abroad distinguishes between different groups of aliens on the basis of their nationality. This chapter investigates 
whether this distinction also amounts to differential treatment on the 
grounds of racial or ethnic origin. Clearly, the Act does not expressly men-
tion racial or ethnic origin as a criterion to determine which aliens must 
pass the integration exam abroad. As asserted earlier however, the right to 
equal treatment also entails protection against indirect discrimination. 
Such discrimination may occur when a certain group of persons is dispro-
portionately affected by a particular measure, even if the measure is not 
directly aimed at that group (section II.D. of chapter 8). 
An important objective of the legal provisions forbidding racial and 
ethnic discrimination is to protect persons against actions or practices 
inspired by racism or ethnic intolerance (section II.E). However, the con-
cept of indirect racial or ethnic discrimination does not presuppose the 
existence of racist intentions or beliefs. Instead, it may be used to render 
visible the unintended effects that an apparently neutral measure – such 
as the Act on Integration Abroad – can have on particular ethnic or racial 
groups and that would have remained invisible if only forms of direct dif-
ferential treatment were addressed. It is for this purpose that the concept 
of indirect discrimination is applied in this chapter.
A general overview of the legal framework concerning the right to equal 
treatment is provided in chapter 8. The current chapter firstly examines the 
legal standards concerning differential treatment on grounds of race and 
ethnic origin and indirect differential treatment (section II). Particular 
attention is paid to the applicability and significance of these standards in 
relation to integration conditions for the admission of (certain groups of) 
aliens. Next, in section III, the legal framework established in section II is 
used to conduct an assessment of the Act on Integration Abroad. 
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II. LEGAL STANDARDS REGARDING INDIRECT DIFFERENTIAL 
TREATMENT ON GROUNDS OF RACIAL OR ETHNIC ORIGIN
This section examines a number of legal norms that prohibit (indirect) dis-
crimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin. Various legal provi-
sions and their applicability to the topic of this study are discussed in 
section II.A. After that, attention is paid to race and ethnic origin as dif-
ferentiation grounds (section II.B), to the concept of indirect differential 
treatment (section II.C), the criteria for justification (section II.D) and the 
scope of review (section II.E). Lastly, in section II.F, some criteria are for-
mulated concerning the prohibition of indirect racial and ethnic discrimi-
nation in relation to integration requirements for the admission of aliens.
A. Relevant Legal Provisions
i. (Inter)national Human Rights Provisions
The equal treatment provisions of the ECHR, the ICCPR and the Dutch 
Constitution are discussed in some detail in chapter 8 (section II.B). It was 
established that each of these instruments contains open provisions on 
equal treatment that forbid discrimination based on any grounds or sta-
tus, including race and ethnic origin.1 Discrimination on the grounds of 
race and ethnic origin is also prohibited under the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (hereafter CERD). The 
CERD prohibits racial discrimination, which is defined in Article 1(1) as: 
Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullify-
ing or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cul-
tural or any other field of public life.
It follows that the CERD does not cover all forms of differential treatment 
on the above grounds, but only those negatively affecting a person’s 
enjoyment of his or her human rights or fundamental freedoms. A list of 
such rights and freedoms is laid down in Article 5 CERD. Although this 
1 See Art 14 (and 1 Twelfth Protocol) ECHR, Arts 2 and 26 ICCPR and Art 1 Dutch 
Constitution. While all these provisions expressly mention ‘race’ as a differentiation ground, 
this term is commonly understood also to include ethnic origin. See, eg, ECtHR 13 December 
2005, app nos 55762/00 and 55974/00 (Timishev), para 56 and various Concluding 
Observations of the HRC cited in Vandenhole 2005, 126–27. Art 1 of the Dutch Constitution 
was adopted with the aim of ensuring compliance with the obligations stemming from the 
CERD (Parliamentary Papers II 1970–1971, 11 051, No 3, 10–11). It must therefore be assumed 
that the term ‘race’ in this provision includes the various racial discrimination grounds men-
tioned in Art 1(1) of that Convention (see below).
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list is non-exhaustive, it may be observed that it does not include a gen-
eral right to be admitted to a state of which one is not a national. Such a 
right is also not mentioned in several important human rights instru-
ments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 
ICCPR and the ECHR. It can therefore be questioned whether the CERD 
also applies to differential treatment in the field of immigration require-
ments. However, as shown in chapters 4 and 5, state measures concerning 
the admission of family migrants and religious servants may in certain 
cases come within the scope of national or international human rights 
obligations. It is therefore submitted that such measures are in principle 
covered by the CERD.2 This outcome is in line with ECtHR case law 
concerning Article 14 ECHR, in which the relationship between the prohi-
bition of discrimination and the enjoyment of other rights and freedoms is 
also construed rather loosely and it is sufficient if the alleged discrim i­
nation comes ‘within the ambit’ of one of the other ECHR provisions 
(section II.B.i of chapter 8). 
Meanwhile several other limitations to the definition of Article 1(1) can 
be found in Articles 1(2), 1(3) and 1(4) CERD. According to these provi-
sions, racial discrimination does not result from unequal treatment 
between citizens and non-citizens, from legal provisions concerning 
nationality, citizenship or naturalisation (provided they do not discrimi-
nate against a particular nationality) or from ‘positive discrimination’ 
measures.
ii. EU Law
Discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnic origin is also addressed 
in various instruments of EU law, in particular Article 19 TFEU and Article 
21(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 19(1) TFEU served 
as the legal basis for the adoption of the EU Racial Equality Directive 
(RED), which affords protection against racial and ethnic discrimination 
in various fields such as employment and education.3 Although the direc-
tive itself states that it does not apply to differences in treatment that are 
based on nationality, it may be argued that this exception does not con-
cern differences amounting to indirect differential treatment on grounds 
of racial or ethnic origin.4 More important, for the purposes of this chap-
ter, is that the directive also does not apply to provisions and conditions 
2 See also General Recommendation No 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, 
dated 1 October 2004, para 9 (available at www.ohchr.org) in which the CERD Committee 
declared that states should ‘ensure that immigration policies do not have the effect of dis-
criminating against persons on the basis of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’. 
This statement confirms that discrimination as defined in Art 1(1) CERD may also occur in 
the context of immigration measures.
3 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000, [2000] OJ L180/22.
4 Busstra 2010, 42–45; De Schutter 2009, 73–75.
336 Racial or Ethnic Discrimination
concerning the entry and residence of third-country nationals and state-
less persons in the territory of Member States.5 As EU nationals in any 
case do not have to comply with integration requirements (chapter 6, sec-
tion II), it must be understood that the RED is of little relevance for the 
examination conducted in this chapter.
On the other hand, Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights is 
not subject to such limitations. This provision prohibits ‘any discrimina-
tion’, including on the grounds of race and ethnic origin.6 The prohibition 
is addressed to the institutions of the European Union, as well as to the 
Member States when they are implementing EU law.7 It follows that, 
within the context of this study, Article 21(1) of the Charter is of relevance 
with regard to integration requirements for third-country nationals who 
apply for family reunification under the Family Reunification Directive 
(FRD) or who move to a second Member State in accordance with the 
Long-term Residents Directive (LRD) (section V of chapter 4 and section 
VI of chapter 6). 
B. Discrimination Grounds
Race and ethnic origin are difficult concepts, which are closely related to 
social and cultural identity. No definition of these concepts is provided in 
any of the legal instruments mentioned above. However, in Timishev, the 
ECtHR stated that: 
Ethnicity and race are related and overlapping concepts. Whereas the notion of 
race is rooted in the idea of biological classification of human beings into sub-
species according to morphological features such as skin colour or facial charac-
teristics, ethnicity has its origin in the idea of societal groups marked by a 
common nationality, tribal affiliation, religious faith, shared language, or cul-
tural and traditional origins and backgrounds.8
It can be derived from this definition, as well as from academic literature 
on the subject, that both race and ethnic origin are socially constructed 
concepts which are based on the presumption that people can be divided 
into distinguishable groups or communities.9 This presumption may be 
5 Art 3(2) Racial Equality Directive. 
6 Unfortunately, the CoJ failed to clarify the scope of this provision in the case of Kamberaj 
(CoJ (Grand Chamber) 24 April 2012, C-571/10 [2012] ECR 00000). In this case, which con-
cerned differential treatment of long-term resident third-country nationals, as compared to 
EU citizens, in respect of housing benefits, the CoJ confirmed that such treatment falls out-
side the scope of the RED (paras 49–50). The question of compatibility with Art 21(1) of the 
Charter was raised by the referring court (para 39) but not addressed by the CoJ.
7 Art 51(1) EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
8 Timishev (n 1), para 55. This definition was repeated (with some slight alterations) in 
ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 22 December 2009, app nos 27996/06 and 34836/06 (Sejdić and 
Finci), para 43.
9 Busstra 2010, 30–32; Bulmer and Solomos 1998, 822; De Schutter 2009, 17–20.
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held by outsiders, as well as by the members of the group themselves. As 
the ECtHR noted in Timishev, racial and ethnic categorisations are 
commonly linked to particular features or characteristics (Busstra uses 
the term ‘proxies’), whereby the term ‘race’ is generally used for categori-
sations on the basis of physiological features (notably skin colour) and 
‘ethnicity’ refers to categorisations based on cultural or sociological char-
acteristics (such as language or religion).10 However, it must be observed 
that such features and characteristics cannot be equated to race or ethnic 
origin, but only form an indication thereof.11 
Given that race and ethnicity refer to perceptions of belonging, rather 
than to actual behaviour or physical features, one particular difficulty in 
the legal context is how a person’s racial or ethnic origin is to be estab-
lished.12 Probably the most reliable way of doing this is by means of self-
identification.13 Alternatively, a person’s racial or ethnic origin can be 
determined by someone else on the basis of the above proxies. Importantly 
however, racial and ethnic classifications are not static, but subject to 
change and contestation.14 It follows that the proxies by which racial and 
ethnic groups are designated cannot be established once and for all, and 
that regard must be had to the particular social context. In this connection 
Busstra pointed out that international human rights law has come to 
recognise an increasing number of characteristics as proxies for race or eth-
nicity, including geographical affiliation and even social origins and class.15
The use of proxies can also be a relevant instrument for establishing 
whether a particular measure leads to a difference in treatment between 
persons on account of their race or ethnic origin. This may be the case, in 
particular, where the applicability of a measure is determined by a crite-
rion that is also a proxy for race or ethnicity. Much will depend, however, 
on the nature of the criterion, as well as on the context in which the meas-
ure is taken. For example where a distinction is based on skin colour, there 
will most likely be differential treatment on the grounds of racial origin as 
skin colour has historically functioned as a proxy for race and is not likely 
10 See also Howard 2008, 11.
11 By way of illustration, if someone wears a djellaba in the context of the Netherlands, this 
indicates that they are of Moroccan ethnic origin. Clearly, however, whereas the fact of wear-
ing a djellaba is a way of dressing, being Moroccan refers to an element of one’s identity. 
A similar example can be given with regard to gender: although wearing a skirt is something 
which (in the European context) is mostly done by women, wearing a skirt is obviously not 
the same as being a woman.
12 See Terlouw 2009, 609–11.
13 cp the CERD Committee’s General Recommendation No 8 of 22 August 1990 on 
Identification with a particular racial or ethnic group (ref no A/45/18), available at www.
ohchr.org. In this recommendation the Committee states that, for the purposes of reporting 
by the State Parties, individuals shall be recognised as belonging to a particular racial or 
ethnic group or groups by means of self­identification unless a justification exists to the con-
trary.
14 Bulmer and Solomos 1998, 822.
15 Busstra 2010, 30–33.
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to be relevant in any other way. On the other hand, the situation often 
becomes more complicated if other criteria are used as grounds for differ-
entiation. In the context of the Netherlands, for example, someone may be 
refused a job because he or she speaks Arabic or because he or she does 
not speak Dutch. In both cases the difference in treatment is based on 
language. However, the fact of speaking Arabic can be taken as a proxy 
for belonging to a particular ethnic group (in other words, Muslims or 
Moroccans). With regard to the fact of not speaking Dutch, such a connec-
tion is much more difficult to make. Yet it may be that this criterion, even 
if not directly indicative of racial or ethnic origin, nevertheless entails 
indirect differential treatment on these grounds. The issue of indirect dif-
ferential treatment is discussed in more detail in section II.C below. 
Several of the legal provisions referred to in section II.A mention national 
origin as a potential differentiation ground, sometimes in addition to race 
and/or ethnic origin. In the previous chapter it is argued that this ground 
refers primarily to nationality as an ethnographical category.16 In this sense, 
the term ‘national origin’ does not differ to any relevant extent from ‘ethnic 
origin’ and therefore does not require separate discussion.17 
C. Indirect Differential Treatment
The concept of indirect differential treatment was briefly introduced in 
the previous chapter (section II.V). In short, indirect differential treatment 
occurs if a measure formulated in neutral terms nevertheless dispropor-
tionately affects a particular group of persons falling under a relevant dif-
ferentiation ground. As mentioned earlier, this effect may be caused 
intentionally, for example where a measure distinguishes between groups 
on account of their nationality in order to circumvent the prohibition of 
discrimination on the ground of race or ethnicity. In the context of the 
legal provisions discussed in this chapter, however, no evidence of dis-
criminatory intent is required: it is the effect rather than the aim of the 
measure that is relevant.18 By using the concept of indirect indiscrimina-
16 See section III.A.ii of ch 8. See also Vierdag 1973, 101 and Vandenhole 2005, 126–27 and 
139–40, who discuss the use of the term ‘national origin’ in legal instruments other than the 
CERD.
17 cp De Schutter 2009, 13, who states that national origin ‘is a concept close to, and at 
times indistinguishable from’ racial and ethnic origin. See also Thornberry 2005, 258, who 
points out that the travaux préparatoires concerning Art 1(1) CERD indicate that there may be 
overlaps between the various grounds mentioned in that provision.
18 See Art 1(1) CERD (‘any distinction . . . which has the purpose or effect’); a similar defi-
nition is used by the HRC, see HRC General Comment no 18 on Non-discrimination, para 7 
(available at www.ohchr.org). See also the judgment of the ECtHR in D.H. and others v the 
Czech Republic (ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 13 November 2007, app no 57325/00), para 194, 
where it was stated that ‘where it has been shown that legislation produces such a discrimi-
natory effect, the Grand Chamber considers that ..., it is not necessary in cases in the educa-
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tion in this way it becomes possible to pursue a more substantive concept 
of equality (see again section II.V of chapter 8) and to address structural 
inequalities including, but not limited to those resulting from a history of 
intentional discrimination.19
In cases of alleged indirect discrimination, it is normally up to the appli-
cant to demonstrate that a particular measure has a disproportionate 
effect on the group to which he or she belongs. If this succeeds, a pre-
sumption of indirect discrimination is thereby established. The burden of 
proof then shifts to the respondent state, which has to show that the dif-
ference in treatment is based on a reasonable and objective justification 
(section II.D).20 The determination of the existence of a disproportionate 
effect is nonetheless a complex issue, which raises many questions. While 
an in-depth examination of these questions goes beyond the scope of this 
study, some of the main difficulties involved are highlighted below.
i. Standard of Proof
A primary issue relating to the establishment of a presumption of indirect 
discrimination is of course the standard of proof that is required. In EU 
law, where the concept of indirect discrimination has been well devel-
oped, different criteria have been devised in this regard. In the field of 
nationality discrimination the CoJ has accepted that indirect differential 
treatment occurs when a particular measure is ‘intrinsically liable’ to 
affect migrant workers more than national workers, for example because 
it differentiates on the basis of geographic elements.21 This is a rather light 
standard, which does not require the applicant to demonstrate that the 
measure has actually produced an adverse effect, but merely that it is, by 
its nature, likely to do so. 
By contrast, in cases of sex discrimination, the Court has asked 
applicants to show that the contested measure has in fact resulted in a 
disadvantage for a substantially higher proportion of the members of one 
sex than the other.22 This criterion requires much stronger evidence of a 
disproportionate effect, which will often involve statistics (see below).23 
tional sphere to prove any discriminatory intent on the part of the relevant authorities’. 
Finally a requirement of discriminatory intent is also lacking in the definition of indirect 
discrimination in Art 2(2)(b) RED.
19 On the concept of indirect discrimination, see also Busstra 2010, 203–04.
20 See, eg, in relation to Art 14 ECHR, Van Dijk et al 2006, 1039–40. See also Henrard 2008.
21 Gerards 2002, 258–60; Tobler 2005, 225–28; Busstra 2010, 214.
22 Schiek 2002, 296; Gerards 2002, 246–48; Tobler 2005, 228–33; Busstra 2010, 214. 
23 The difference between the standards applied by the CoJ can be explained by the fact 
that the abolition of distinctions on the grounds of nationality is directly linked to the pur-
pose of market integration, which constitutes an uncontested fundamental objective of the 
EU. Yet this is or has been less obvious with regard to the promotion of fundamental rights, 
which provides the primary context for the promotion of gender equality. The different 
rationales underlying EU anti-discrimination law are elaborately analysed in Bell 2002.
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Lastly, the Racial Equality Directive states that indirect differential treat-
ment occurs where a particular measure ‘would put persons of a racial or 
ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons’.24 
As explained above (section II.A.ii), this directive is not applicable to the 
issues raised in this chapter. However, from the viewpoint of consistency 
of EU law and in the absence of obvious arguments to the contrary, the 
CoJ may be expected to apply the same criterion when treating cases of 
indirect racial or ethnic discrimination under Article 21(1) of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. It may be derived from the words ‘would put’ 
that the RED does not require evidence of actual adverse effects, but that 
it is sufficient to demonstrate that such effects are liable to occur.25 In this 
respect the standard of proof required by the RED resembles the lighter 
criterion formulated by the CoJ with regard to nationality discrimina-
tion.26 
The above standards for establishing a presumption of indirect discrim-
ination differ primarily with regard to the type of evidence to be adduced.27 
If it is enough for a particular group to risk being disproportionately 
affected, the applicant may rely on qualitative evidence to prove such a 
risk. Such evidence may consist of facts of general knowledge.28 For exam-
ple, it may be submitted that the socio-economic position of Turkish and 
Moroccan communities in the Netherlands is generally less favourable 
than that of the majority population. Where necessary, these facts may be 
complemented or backed up by other materials such as scientific or other 
reports, policy evaluations or judicial decisions.29 In some cases the risk of 
disproportionate effects may also be directly related to the criterion used. 
For instance, a rule that applies only to persons needing a residence per-
mit automatically entails indirect differential treatment on the grounds of 
alienage (section III.A.i of chapter 8).30
Meanwhile, proof of actual disproportionate effects on a particular 
group has to be demonstrated by means of quantitative (statistical) 
evidence. One practical problem relating to this type of proof is that statis-
tical data will not always be available. In addition, the evidence must be 
significant, and this may be problematic if the disputed measure concerns 
24 Art 2(2)(b) RED.
25 Busstra 2010, 219.
26 Schiek assumes that the threshold for evidence of indirect discrimination in the RED is 
‘slightly higher’ than in the original draft, which stated that a measure had to be ‘liable’ to 
produce adverse effects. See Schiek 2002, 296.
27 Busstra 2010, 214.
28 Schiek 2002, 296; Gerards 2002, 260; Tobler 2005, 231.
29 Gerards 2002, 584–85.
30 ibid, 585–86. The author argues that in cases where the criterion is so closely related to 
the indirect differentiation ground, it may be better to assume direct differential treatment. 
This could be a way to prevent situations where ‘neutral’ differentiation criteria are 
employed to ‘cover up’ differences in treatment that are actually based on suspect grounds 
(section II.D of ch 8).
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only a small group.31 The latter problem is not likely to play a role with 
regard to generally applicable legislation. Nevertheless a presumption of 
indirect discrimination is clearly more difficult to demonstrate where sta-
tistical evidence is required. 
Related to the type of proof is the level of disparity that is demanded to 
establish a case of indirect differential treatment. In other words, it must 
be determined when a certain effect can be considered ‘disproportionate’. 
This aspect is particularly relevant where statistical evidence is used or 
required. As discussed above, the RED demands that persons belonging 
to a racial or ethnic group would be put ‘at a particular disadvantage’. 
This term is not further explained. In cases involving differential treat-
ment on the grounds of sex, the CoJ has previously required the percent-
age of women affected to be ‘considerably’ higher than the percentage of 
affected men. Additionally, the Court also accepted that there could be 
indirect differential treatment in the case of a ‘lesser but persistent and 
relatively constant’ level of disparity over a long period of time.32 While 
these criteria provide some indications, they are clearly not very specific. 
As a reference, it could be assumed that a disproportionate effect exists 
when the percentage of persons belonging to a particular racial or ethnic 
group that is disadvantaged by a particular measure is at least 1.5 times as 
high as the percentage of disadvantaged persons not belonging to that 
group.33 As argued below, however, other comparisons are possible. 
Alternatively, especially in cases where significant figures are indetermi-
nate or not available, the statistical information may be looked at in com-
bination with qualitative evidence.34
The case law and comments of the other monitoring bodies (the ECtHR, 
the HRC and the CERD Committee) do not display a clear choice for any 
of the above standards, let alone a further specification of them. In earlier 
cases the ECtHR set a very high standard for evidence of indirect dis-
crimination, which made a presumption thereof almost impossible to 
prove.35 This approach was significantly mitigated, however, in later judg-
ments. In D.H. and others v the Czech Republic, the ECtHR stated that in 
order to ‘guarantee those concerned the effective protection of their rights, 
less strict evidential rules should apply in cases of alleged indirect 
discrimination’.36 In this case it was explicitly accepted that a presumption 
of indirect discrimination could be derived from statistical evidence, 
31 Sjerps 1999, 245–47; Gerards 2002, 580–81; Busstra 2010, 214. 
32 Gerards 2002, 248; Busstra 2010, 218. Both authors refer to the CoJ’s judgment in 
Seymour-Smith, CoJ 9 February 1999, C-167/97 [1999] ECR I-623.
33 As used by the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission (Commissie Gelijke Behandeling), see 
Gerards 2002, 587–88. A similar criterion is mentioned in Busstra 2010, 219 (with further 
references).
34 Gerards 2002, 587–88; Busstra 2010, 219.
35 Arnardóttir 2003, 79–84; Van Dijk et al 2006, 1040–41.
36 D.H. and others v the Czech Republic (n 18), para 187.
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provided the statistics presented were ‘reliable and significant’.37 As to the 
level of disparity, the Court considered in D.H. and others that a presump-
tion of indirect discrimination had been established, considering that the 
disputed education measures had had ‘considerably more impact’ on 
children of Roma origin.38 In the same judgments, however, the ECtHR 
declared that ‘there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evi-
dence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment’ and that ‘the level 
of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion [is] intrinsi-
cally linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made 
and the Convention right at stake’.39 It follows that the type of proof that 
can be accepted as evidence of indirect differential treatment and the 
standard of evidence will vary from case to case. 
It follows that, in EU law as under Article 14 (and 1 Twelfth Protocol) 
ECHR, there is scope to assume a presumption of indirect racial or ethnic 
discrimination in the absence of ‘hard’ statistical evidence proving actual 
adverse effects on persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin. However, 
no very specific evidential standards have been formulated, and what is 
considered sufficient proof may therefore differ from one situation to 
another. In the view of the ECtHR, such differentiations are also required 
because of the varying circumstances of each case.
With regard to the Racial Equality Directive, Busstra proposes applying 
lenient standards when determining the existence of a presumption of 
indirect discrimination so as to maximise the number of situations that 
may be scrutinised under the directive. She argues that this inclusive 
interpretation is balanced by the objective justification test, which is also 
prescribed by the directive and allows for the consideration of interests 
that may validate the difference in treatment.40 This is a useful approach, 
which may also be applied in relation to other non-discrimination norms, 
provided the existence of a possible justification is assessed. The justifica-
tion test and the scope of review to be applied are discussed in sections 
II.D and II.E below.
ii. Which Comparison to Make?
In order to establish whether a racial or ethnic group is disproportionately 
affected by a particular measure, the effects of the measure on that group 
must be compared to the effects on other groups. This raises the question 
of which comparison must be made and which groups are to be com-
37 ibid, para 188. 
38 ibid, para 193. Statistical evidence presented in this case revealed that in the region con-
cerned only 1.8% of non-Roma children were placed in special schools, compared to 50.3% of 
Roma children (para 190). 
39 D.H. and others v the Czech Republic (n 18), para 178; ECtHR 5 June 2008, app no 32526/05 
(Sampanis et autres), para 71.
40 Busstra 2010, 205–06.
 Legal Standards 343
pared.41 Again, this question primarily arises in cases involving statistical 
evidence. 
As far as the identification of relevant groups is concerned, it has been 
argued that the comparison should be made among all persons addressed 
by the disputed measure.42 With regard to immigration requirements, 
however, this criterion does not resolve all the questions that may arise. If 
the requirement applies to all immigrants seeking admission, it could be 
assumed that the comparison must be made within this group, by com-
paring those able to meet the requirement with those unable to do so. Yet, 
as the Dutch Act on Integration Abroad shows, it may also be the case that 
immigration requirements apply only to certain categories of immigrants 
and not to others. If the comparison in such cases is limited to those hav-
ing to meet the requirement, it will be unable to take account of any indi-
rect differential treatment resulting from the criteria used to define the 
target group.43 In this type of situation, therefore, the comparison should 
include all applicants for admission rather than just those who have to 
meet the requirement.44 Even then, however, the comparison will still not 
identify the effects on those who may have wished to apply for admis-
sion, but who refrained from doing so because they knew or believed that 
the requirement would stand in their way. To address this omission, the 
comparison needs also to include all potential immigrants, which in turn 
can make it more difficult to obtain reliable data.45 
41 eg, Loenen 1998, 50–51; Sjerps 1999, 245–46.
42 Busstra 2010, 220–21.
43 In this respect Busstra differentiates between formal and material differences in treat-
ment. The former concern situations in which a difference in treatment is made on one 
ground (eg, nationality), but results in (indirect) differential treatment on another ground 
(eg, race or ethnic origin). Material differences in treatment occur when a particular measure 
applies equally to everyone (eg, the obligation to pay municipal taxes), but nonetheless has 
a different effect on some groups than on others (eg, certain ethnic groups experience a 
greater disadvantage because of their socio-economic position). See Busstra 2010, 206–07. 
44 Both Gerards and Busstra also argued that comparability arguments should not nor-
mally play a role in determining which groups to compare. An example of such an argument 
would be that family migrants and labour migrants are not comparable groups (because, eg, 
integration-related problems occur mostly in relation to family migrants) and therefore the 
comparison should be limited to family migrants. Instead, the argument that labour migrants 
do not experience the same level of integration-related problems should be dealt with in the 
context of the justification test. See Gerards 2002, 248–50 and Busstra 2010, 221–22.
45 As Loenen pointed out, another consequence of restricting the comparison to a limited 
group (eg, the workforce within a particular company or persons actually seeking admis-
sion) is that the finding of indirect differential treatment will depend on the particular (eth-
nic or other) composition of that group and that the outcome may be different if the same 
measure is applied to another group in a similar situation (eg, the workforce within another 
company or persons applying for admission in another country). However, it is submitted 
that, to the extent the concept of indirect differential treatment is used to enable the visibility 
of actual adverse effects, such a consequence would not be problematic. For instance, if per-
sons belonging to ethnic group X migrate to country A but not to country B, an immigration 
requirement adopted by country A will affect that group, whereas the same requirement 
adopted by country B will not. In this situation, country B should arguably not be held 
responsible for the disadvantage suffered by members of group X (cp Loenen 1998, 51, who 
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Once the relevant group of comparators has been identified, the next 
question is which comparison should be made. By way of illustration, we 
can imagine an immigration rule that requires aliens who want to be 
admitted to have a secondary education diploma. The comparison is 
made between all aliens applying for admission (n = 10,000). Of these 
aliens, 1500 belong to ethnic group A, whereas 8500 belong to ethnic 
group B. Admission is refused to 6000 aliens, of whom 1000 belong to eth-
nic group A, on the grounds that they lack the required diploma. These 
figures can be represented as follows:
Table 3. Establishing a presumption of indirect discrimination
Secondary education 
diploma 
No secondary education 
diploma
Ethnic group A 500 1,000 
Ethnic group B 3500 5000 
On the basis of the above information, it can be established that the admis-
sion rate among persons belonging to ethnic group A is one-third (33.3 per 
cent) whereas two-thirds (66.6 per cent) will be denied admission. On the 
other hand, 41.2 per cent of the persons belonging to ethnic group B will 
be admitted and admission will be denied to 58.8 per cent. The next ques-
tion is whether the difference between the groups is significant (which is 
not the case if the 1.5-criterion is used, see section II.C.i). 
Alternatively, it is possible to compare the percentage of persons 
belonging to ethnic group A in the overall pool with their share of the 
group that is admitted. This shows that, although persons belonging to 
ethnic group A constitute 15 per cent of the overall pool (1500 out of 
10000), they only constitute 12.5 per cent of the group that is admitted. By 
contrast, persons belonging to ethnic group B constitute 85 per cent of the 
overall pool and 87.5 per cent of the group that is admitted.46 Hence this 
form of comparison also shows that persons belonging to ethnic group A 
are relatively more affected by the immigration requirement than those 
belonging to ethnic group B, thus leaving the question of when a differ-
ence is sufficiently significant to prove a presumption of indirect discrimi-
nation. 
The above comparison is made between only two groups. In reality, 
however, the ethnic diversity among immigrants seeking admission to a 
uses a different example). Of course, the above argument does not hold if there is reason to 
believe that the immigration requirement is precisely the reason why members of group X 
do not move to country B. As mentioned above, this effect can only be properly measured if 
the group of potential immigrants is also included in the comparison.
46 This type of comparison is proposed by Busstra 2010, 224.
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particular state will normally be much greater, which means that group A 
will not only have to be compared to group B, but also to groups C, D, E 
and so on. If the latter form of comparison is used, it may turn out that 
persons belonging to ethnic groups A, B, C and D all constitute approxi-
mately 25 per cent of the overall pool, while 5 per cent of the group admit-
ted belongs to group A, 7 per cent to group B, 25 per cent to group C and 
63 per cent to group D. In my view, the admission rate of each group in 
this situation needs to be considered separately in relation to the share 
they represent of the overall pool. In the example provided here, this 
would lead to the conclusion that a presumption of indirect discrimina-
tion can be established with regard to ethnic groups A and B, but not with 
regard to ethnic groups C and D.
D.  Justification of Indirect Differential Treatment
It follows from the above that establishing a presumption of indirect racial 
or ethnic discrimination can be a complex undertaking. Once such a pre-
sumption has been established, the next question is whether the differ-
ence in treatment is nevertheless based on an objective and reasonable 
justification. This test requires the differential treatment to pursue a legiti-
mate aim and also to be in a reasonable relationship of proportionality to 
that aim (section II.C of chapter 8). With regard to indirect differential 
treatment, the requirement for a reasonable and objective justification 
moreover entails that the measure must not be intended to distinguish 
between groups of different racial or ethnic origin, even where this is not 
explicitly put forward as a differentiation ground.47 
In cases of indirect differential treatment, the nature of the justification 
provided may also be different than in situations involving direct differ-
ential treatment. The fact that a particular group is disproportionately 
affected by a certain measure may be due to social circumstances that can-
not easily be changed by the legislator (for example, the socio-economic 
position of some ethnic groups may be worse than that of others, which 
means they will be hit harder by a measure that imposes a financial bur-
den). In such situations, the question of justification will not primarily 
concern the aim of the measure or its suitability, but rather whether 
another measure could have been adopted with less adverse effects on the 
group concerned and whether the advantage gained through the measure 
is of sufficient importance to outweigh these effects.48
With regard to the prohibition of racial discrimination in the CERD, it is 
observed that a justification test is not foreseen in the Convention. Article 
47 D.H. and others (n 18), para 195. On the test used by the Court in this judgment, see 
Henrard 2008, 246–47 and Busstra 2010, 226.
48 Gerards 2008, 922; see also Busstra 2010, 229–31.
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1(1) CERD constitutes a ‘closed provision’ (section II.C of chapter 8), 
which implies that differences in treatment falling under its definition of 
racial discrimination are prohibited unless they are covered by one of the 
exceptions of Article 1(2)–(4). Nevertheless, the CERD Committee has 
accepted that differential treatment does not amount to racial discrimina-
tion if it is justified in relation to the objectives and purposes of the 
Convention.49 
Although the Committee’s interpretation goes against the wording of 
Article 1(1) CERD, its approach is not without its merits. In the absence of 
a possibility for justification, the definition of racial discrimination can be 
expected to be interpreted in a restrictive way so as to preclude reasonable 
and legitimate state actions from falling foul of the prohibition laid down 
in the Convention. Such a restrictive interpretation would, however, nec-
essarily limit the scope of the Convention, with the result that protection 
against racial discrimination may not always be available even if the 
action concerned is not based on a reasonable and objective justification. 
The introduction of a justification test thus allows for a more refined 
examination in cases where a difference in treatment is based on grounds 
of racial or ethnic origin.50 It is therefore submitted that the CERD 
Committee’s approach is defensible in view of the purpose of the 
Convention, which is to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and 
manifestations.51 It may also be noted that the acceptance of the possibility 
of justification is in line with the approach taken by the ECtHR with 
regard to racial discrimination under Article 14 ECHR and with the defi-
nition in the Racial Equality Directive.52 
Despite accepting a justification test, the CERD Committee has not yet 
provided detailed criteria for determining whether, in a particular case, a 
difference in treatment is justified in relation to the objectives and pur-
poses of the Convention. However, the Committee has on occasions stated 
that the criteria for differentiation must be applied pursuant to a legiti-
49 CERD Committee General Comment No 14 on the Definition of Discrimination (Art 1, 
para 1), of 22 March 1993. 
50 cp the argument made in section II.C.i  above concerning the need to apply lenient 
standards when establishing a presumption of indirect differential treatment. See also 
Arnardóttir 2003, 146–47. Commenting on the reticence of the ECtHR to treat complaints 
concerning differences in treatment as being based on race (and thus requiring strict scru-
tiny), this author states that ‘the seriousness of the allegation seems to have begun to func-
tion to the detriment of effective protection against such discrimination’. Arguably, if there 
were scope for justification (or, in the case of the ECtHR, for differentiation in the level of 
scrutiny, section II.E), the Court would be more willing to qualify these differentiations as 
instances of potential racial discrimination.
51 cp the preamble to the CERD which reads: ‘The States Parties to this Convention . . . 
resolved to adopt all necessary measures for speedily eliminating racial discrimination in all 
its forms and manifestations, and to prevent and combat racist doctrines and practices in 
order to promote understanding between races and to build an international community 
free from all forms of racial segregation and racial discrimination’. 
52 Art 2(2)(b) RED.
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mate aim and that they must be proportional to the achievement of that 
aim.53
E. Scope of Review 
The issue of the scope of review in equal treatment cases was already 
addressed in a general manner in chapter 8 (section II.D), when it was 
established that the scope of review is determined by various factors, spe-
cifically including the differentiation grounds at stake. Differences in 
treatment that are based on grounds of racial or ethnic origin are gener-
ally held to require strict scrutiny.54 This view finds confirmation in the 
case law of the ECtHR, which has held on various occasions that such 
differentiations constitute a violation of Article 14 ECHR, unless they are 
based on a very strong justification. In several cases, the Court stated that 
where differences in treatment are based on race, colour or ethnic origin, 
‘the notion of objective and reasonable justification must be interpreted as 
strictly as possible’.55 Another formulation used by the Court is that ‘no 
difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent 
on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified in a 
contemporary democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and 
respect for different cultures’.56 Although the latter criterion appears even 
more stringent than the former, the Court itself does not seem to make a 
clear distinction as, in several judgments, both criteria are used alongside 
each other.57 Nevertheless it is clear that the Court considers differentia-
tions based on race or ethnic origin to be a particularly serious form 
of discrimination, which can even amount to inhuman or degrading 
treatment.58 
The importance of the prohibition of racial discrimination is also 
stressed by Article 4(1) ICCPR, which states that this prohibition is one of 
the norms from which no derogation is possible in times of emergency. 
53 Vandenhole 2005, 38.
54 eg, Loenen 1998, 35; Gerards 2002, 85; Arnardóttir 2003, 146.
55 See, eg, ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 16 March 2010, app no 15766/03 (Oršuš and others), 
para 156. 
56 Timishev (n 1), para 58. 
57 See D.H. and others (n 18), paras 176 and 196 and ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 22 December 
2009, app nos 27996/06 and 34836/06 (Sejdić and Finci), para 44. See also para 149 of the 
Grand Chamber judgment in Oršuš and others, where the Court, while expressly referring to 
Timishev, simply stated that ‘very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the 
Court could regard a difference in treatment based exclusively on the ground of ethnic ori-
gin as compatible with the Convention’.
58 See, amongst other judgments, Timishev (n 1), para 56, where the Court qualified racial 
discrimination as ‘a particularly invidious kind of discrimination’. In the Cyprus v Turkey 
case the ECtHR found the discriminatory treatment of Greek Cypriots to be so severe as to 
amount to a violation of Art 3 ECHR (see ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 10 May 2001, app no 
25781/94, paras 306–11.
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Arguably, this supports the view that differentiations on the grounds of 
race or ethnic origin should in principle be subject to intense scrutiny. The 
HRC has also stated that its review will be stricter when a differentiation 
is based on one of the grounds mentioned in Article 26 ICCPR, which 
include race, colour and national origin (section II.D of chapter 8). 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the scope of review should also be 
determined in relation to the nature of the differential treatment and that 
alleged indirect discrimination on grounds of race or ethnic origin will not 
always require an equally strong justification as when the difference in 
treatment is directly based on these grounds.59 One important reason 
underlying the prohibition of racial or ethnic discrimination is the wish to 
combat racism or racist ideologies and the acts or practices resulting from 
them.60 As Howard explains, the concept of racism is ‘based on the belief 
that some races are superior to others’.61 Busstra similarly relates the term 
racism to the belief that persons belonging to a certain group are ‘unreli-
able’ or ‘less intelligent’ than others.62 Racist ideologies and practices are 
therefore inherently contrary to the principles of equality and human dig-
nity that lie at the basis of human rights instruments in general and the 
right to equal treatment in particular.63 However, the link between racism 
and racial discrimination can be assumed much more easily in situations 
where the difference in treatment is directly (and hence intentionally) 
based on racial or ethnic origin. On the other hand, where the difference 
in treatment consists of an unintended disproportionate effect on a par-
ticular racial or ethnic group, it will be more easily justified on the grounds 
of other general interests that are served by the measure at stake (see also 
section II.D). In such cases, a less stringent level of review would be 
indicated.
Support for the above argument can be found in the RED, which leaves 
considerably more scope for justification in situations of indirect differen-
tial treatment than when direct differential treatment is concerned.64 At 
first sight it appears from ECtHR case law that strict scrutiny is also 
required in cases involving indirect differential treatment on grounds of 
59 See also Loenen 1999, 204; Arnardóttir 2003, 124–25 and Gerards 2008, 921. 
60 See, eg, the preamble to the CERD, cited in n 51. See also, amongst other judgments, 
D.H. and others (n 18), para 176: ‘the authorities must use all available means to combat rac-
ism, thereby reinforcing democracy’s vision of a society in which diversity is not perceived 
as a threat but as a source of enrichment’ (emphasis added).
61 Howard 2008, 11–14.
62 Busstra 2010, 30–31 and 34. See also the General Policy Recommendation No 7 of the 
Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which 
defines racism as ‘the belief that a ground such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality 
or national or ethnic origin justifies contempt for a person or group of persons, or the notion 
of superiority of a person or a group of persons’.
63 cp Art 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the preambles to the 
CERD and the ICCPR.
64 Art 2(2) RED. An exception to the prohibition of direct differential treatment is laid 
down in Art 4.
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racial or ethnic origin. However, in Sampanis as well as in Oršuš, the Court 
noted the occurrence of racist incidents involving non-Roma parents who 
did not want their children to be placed in classes with Roma children.65 
In D.H. and others no mention was made of such incidents, but the Court 
referred more generally to the vulnerable and disadvantaged position of 
Roma in Europe, which resulted from ‘a history of rejection and persecu-
tion’ culminating in ‘their attempted extermination by the Nazis, who 
considered them an inferior race’.66 It follows that in these cases the groups 
concerned (in all three cases Roma) were already in a disadvantaged posi-
tion due to earlier racism and/or at a particular risk of being stigmatised 
or excluded from the mainstream society. It is submitted that this social 
context provides a valid reason for applying a stricter level of review, 
even in the absence of a discriminatory intent on the part of the respond-
ent state.67 Arguably, however, ECtHR case law leaves scope for less strict 
scrutiny in situations where there is no evidence of stigmatisation or a 
history of racial intolerance. In this connection it is also noted that the 
findings of a violation of Article 14 ECHR in D.H. and Oršuš were subject 
to considerable controversy within the Court, with as many as eight of the 
seventeen judges stating that no discrimination on the grounds of race 
had occurred in the latter judgment.
F. The Prohibition of Indirect Racial and Ethnic Discrimination in 
Relation to Integration Requirements
i. Effects of Integration Requirements
What can be derived from the above with regard to integration require-
ments for the admission of immigrants? According to the criteria set out 
above, such requirements constitute a form of indirect racial or ethnic dis-
crimination if they have a disproportionate effect on a particular racial or 
ethnic group (or groups) and if no reasonable and objective justification is 
available. In the case of integration requirements this effect can occur in 
various ways. First of all, unless the integration requirement targets all 
immigrants alike, there will be a distinction between those persons or 
65 Sampanis et autres (n 39), para 82; Oršuš and others (n 55), paras 154–55.
66 D.H. and others (n 18), paras 13 and 182. In this judgment the Court also referred to vari-
ous sources confirming the existence of racism and intolerance vis­à­vis Roma, see paras 
54–59.
67 See also Gerards 2002, 88–89 and Hendriks 2008, 66–67. The latter author states that 
systematic forms of racial discrimination cannot be properly eliminated without taking 
account of the particular social circumstances, including disadvantages suffered by particu-
lar groups and the causes thereof, as these circumstances play a role in determining the 
effects of the policy measures and legislation adopted by the state concerned. He warns, 
however, that courts must also be careful not to interpret such circumstances in a wrong 
manner.
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groups of persons who are affected by it and those who are not. In this 
situation the former will experience the disadvantages that come with 
having to meet the requirement, including inter alia the costs of the inte-
gration exam or programme and the time and effort involved in prepara-
tion. A second possible effect, which is particularly likely to occur if the 
integration requirement is enacted as an obligation of result (in other 
words, the obligation to pass an exam or to obtain a certain level of skills 
or knowledge), is that it will be more difficult for some persons or groups 
of persons to achieve this result. This may be due to different factors, 
including for example a lower average level of education or a larger dif-
ference between the native language of the persons concerned and the 
language of the host country. Lastly, it may be the case that certain per-
sons or groups of persons are more heavily affected by the integration 
requirement because they have fewer financial resources. In the latter two 
situations, even if the persons concerned are not precluded from meeting 
the integration requirement altogether, the burden of doing so will be rel-
atively high compared to that faced by others.
ii. Establishing a Presumption of Indirect Discrimination
When determining whether a particular racial or ethnic group is dispro-
portionately disadvantaged by the integration requirement, the question 
arises as to how such an effect can be established. As shown above, the 
requirements regarding evidence and the standard of proof will depend 
to a large extent on the circumstances of the case and on the information 
available; therefore this question cannot easily be answered in the abstract. 
In some situations it may be possible to prove a presumption of indirect 
discrimination on the basis of qualitative evidence. It could be relevant, 
for example, to see whether the case law concerning integration require-
ments in a particular state shows that the applicants in those cases always 
or nearly always belong to the same racial or ethnic group. Alternatively, 
it could be argued, on the basis of assumed facts of general knowledge, 
that the criteria used to delimit the target group of the integration meas-
ure are inherently more likely to affect persons belonging to a particular 
racial or ethnic group. It could be submitted, for instance, that these per-
sons more often belong to transnational families (if the integration require-
ment applies specifically to family migrants), that they often have the 
nationality of one of the countries to which the integration requirement 
applies and/or that they are already in a disadvantaged position which 
makes the burden of having to meet the integration requirement espe-
cially heavy (section II.F.i). Such arguments are not without relevance, 
especially in situations where more specific evidence cannot be obtained. 
They are also, however, rather general, and facts of general knowledge 
may be subject to dispute. Additional evidence will therefore normally be 
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necessary. Given the nature of the issue at stake, there is no reason to 
assume a priori that such evidence cannot be required.
If statistical evidence is used, a relevant comparison must be made. It 
may be observed that, in principle, the group affected by integration 
requirements includes aliens who apply for admission and also persons in 
the host state who have an interest in their being admitted (‘host state 
residents’).68 It is submitted that, in principle, these categories may be 
combined and compared, as a group, to those applicants for admission 
and host state residents who are not affected by the integration require-
ment. Alternatively, the situation of applicants and that of host state resi-
dents may be considered separately if, for instance, data on one of the two 
groups are more difficult to obtain, In that case, however, any presump-
tion of indirect discrimination found will apply only to the category under 
consideration and the effects of the integration requirement will only be 
taken partly into account.
In section II.C.ii, it was argued that the situation of applicants for admis-
sion who have to meet an immigration condition is best compared with 
that of all applicants for admission. This applies also in the case of integra-
tion requirements. In order to demonstrate the deterrent effect of such 
requirements, the comparison should be extended to persons for whom 
the integration requirement constituted a reason not to apply for admis-
sion. In practice, however, identifying this group will be very difficult. As 
far as the group of host state residents is concerned, it is arguably even 
more difficult to determine which groups must be compared. To take the 
situation of family members, one possibility would be to make a compari-
son within the group of persons bringing in a family member from abroad; 
in other words, between those whose incoming family members must 
meet an integration requirement and those for whom this is not the case. 
However, the comparison could also include host state residents who 
enter into a family relationship with someone who is already in the host 
state. While this would make the pool of comparators very large, it is not 
obviously relevant for the purposes of establishing a presumption of indi-
rect discrimination whether family relationships are created within the 
68 Who exactly belongs to the latter group of persons is a question in itself, and one to 
which the answer is not immediately obvious. It is submitted that this group in any event 
includes the family members of aliens who seek admission for the purpose of family reunifi-
cation. Arguably, however, it may also include members of a religious organisation (if the 
person seeking admission is a religious servant) or employers who want to bring in labour 
migrants from abroad, provided of course the granting of admission is made dependent on 
integration requirements. With regard to the latter group it will also make a difference if the 
employer is a large multinational (in which case it will be difficult to maintain that anyone is 
personally affected by the non-admission of a future employee) or a small business with 
only a few employees (eg, a Turkish restaurant seeking to bring in a new chef). Although 
discussing these intricacies here in detail would go beyond the scope of this chapter, they 
clearly illustrate the difficulties involved in proving a presumption of indirect discrimina-
tion. 
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host state or across the border (although this may be a factor to be taken 
into account in the justification phase). The feasibility of the latter com-
parison will depend to a large extent, however, on the availability of evi-
dence concerning family relationships entered into within the host state.
The comparisons proposed above are particularly geared towards prov-
ing a potential discriminatory effect resulting from the fact that the inte-
gration requirement does not apply to all immigrants alike. As explained 
above, however, a discriminatory effect may also arise from the fact that it 
is more difficult for persons belonging to specific racial or ethnic groups 
to meet the requirement because they have fewer resources – educational, 
financial or other – than those belonging to other groups. In order to prove 
this type of effect, making a comparison with persons – applicants for 
admission or host state residents – who have not had to meet the integra-
tion requirement will not be useful. Instead, one reasonable (and probably 
feasible) comparison would be between applicants for admission who are 
able to comply with the integration requirement and those who are not.69 
Beyond this, however, determining whether an integration measure hits 
certain groups harder than others risks becoming a rather complex statis-
tical operation because the burden imposed by such measures will depend 
on a number of variable factors, such as income levels and previous edu-
cation. This will make it difficult to trace the disadvantage caused by the 
integration requirement back to a particular ethnic or racial group. 
iii. Justification 
It was already submitted that, in principle, the aim of improving immi-
grant integration constitutes a legitimate state interest. Another require-
ment of the justification test, in the context of this chapter, is that 
integration measures should not have the objective of distinguishing 
between groups of the population on account of their racial or ethnic ori-
gin. This implies that the definition of integration formulated by the host 
state must, as far as possible, be racially and ethnically neutral, and that 
the fact of belonging to a particular racial or ethnic group should not be 
perceived as an impediment to successful integration. 
The above requirement of neutrality entails that immigrants should not 
be obliged to relinquish their own ethnicity or to identify with the culture 
and/or values of the majority population of the host state. Any require-
ment for a declaration to this effect will consequently be contrary to the 
prohibition of racial or ethnic discrimination, even if the measure is not 
targeted at a specific racial or ethnic group. In addition, it is argued that 
69 If the integration requirement consists of an integration exam, it may also be useful to 
distinguish between applicants who pass the exam at the first attempt and those who need 
repeated attempts.
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integration requirements may not prohibit the use of immigrants’ own 
language. Beyond these kinds of obligations, however, the standards fol-
lowing from the requirement of neutrality become less clear. It remains 
the case that integration conditions will always entail at least a minimum 
level of adaptation to the standards and legislation of the host state, which 
necessarily reflect the values and culture of majority population.70 
Examples include the obligation to learn the language of the host state 
and to respect restrictions on religious clothing in certain areas of public 
life. Determining the acceptability of such obligations will ultimately 
entail a negotiation between the need for unity and integration and the 
interest of ethnic pluralism, which must also take account of the social 
and historical context of the state concerned and whereby states therefore 
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation.
Besides the requirement for integration measures to pursue a legitimate 
and non­discriminatory aim, the reasonable and objective justification test 
also entails that this aim could not have been reached by other means that 
would have produced less of a discriminatory effect and that the disad-
vantage suffered by the racial or ethnic group concerned is not dispropor-
tionate compared to this aim. It has been submitted that this determination 
is normally subject to a certain margin of appreciation on the part of the 
state concerned. Nevertheless, this margin will be forfeited in situations 
where the discriminatory effect of the integration measure concerns a 
group that is already in a disadvantaged position and/or at a particular 
risk of being stigmatised and excluded from mainstream society. One rel-
evant factor to be taken into account in this connection is the nature of the 
public discourse on immigrants and integration in the host state: where 
this discourse is already geared towards exclusion and non-acceptance of 
differences, integration requirements are arguably more likely to reinforce 
rather than help bridge ethnic divides.71
As explained earlier, indirect differences in treatment may not only 
result from integration requirements as such, but also from the fact that 
certain groups of immigrants are exempted from those requirements. 
Chapter 8 shows that such exemptions may have been created for reasons 
not directly related to the aim of improving integration, for example to 
ensure compliance with international law or to protect the economic well-
being of the host state. In this situation, efforts to determine whether the 
integration requirement is justified despite its discriminatory effect must 
also take account of why certain groups are exempted from that require-
ment. Again, the ‘reasonable and objective justification’ test requires these 
reasons to be both legitimate and not designed to distinguish between 
70 Kymlicka 1995, 108–15.
71 On the consequences of public discourse for the political incorporation of immigrants, 
eg, see Bloemraad 2006, 236–42.
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persons on account of their racial and ethnic origin, while there must also 
be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the exemption 
(and the ensuing discriminatory effect) and the interests it is meant to 
serve.72
The above remarks do not concern situations where an integration 
measure is explicitly directed towards a particular ethnic or racial group 
with the aim of improving their position. This is the case where, for 
instance, members of one ethnic group are made to follow a language pro-
gramme on the grounds that this group is especially likely to experience 
problems in the field of integration. Such a distinction could be legally 
justified, subject to certain conditions, as a form of positive discrimina-
tion.73 In such cases, however, the difference in treatment is intentional 
and falls outside the legal framework concerning indirect discrimination 
presented in the above sections. The possibility of positive discrimination 
is not discussed in this study.
III. INDIRECT DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT  
ON GROUNDS OF RACIAL OR ETHNIC ORIGIN  
AND THE ACT ON INTEGRATION ABROAD
The previous section investigates the legal standards stemming from the 
prohibition of indirect racial and ethnic discrimination in relation to inte-
gration requirements for the admission of aliens. These standards are 
currently applied to the Act on Integration Abroad. Arguably, the compat-
ibility with the prohibition of racial and ethnic discrimination constitutes 
one of the most complex legal issues regarding this Act, partly due to the 
fact that the applicable legal framework remains relatively open and 
undefined, as well as to the lack of relevant (statistical) evidence. It is, 
therefore, not possible to draw very strong conclusions. Nevertheless, an 
attempt is made to provide an initial, general assessment serving as a 
basis for further investigations. 
72 In this connection, it may be observed that the CERD Committee has been critical about 
legislation differentiating between EU/EEA nationals and nationals of other countries. The 
Committee has expressed concern about the immigration legislation of Estonia, which 
contained restricted immigration quotas for ‘citizens of most countries in the world, except 
those of the European Union, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland’ (Concluding Observations 
on Estonia dated 19 April 2000, doc no CERD/C/304/Add.98, para 11). Denmark was also 
criticised for not offering subsidised mother-tongue teaching to third-country nationals on a 
par with nationals of EU and EEA countries (Concluding Observations on Denmark, 
2006, GA Doc A/61/18, 55). It is possible that the above measures were adopted to ensure 
compliance with the respective states’ obligations under EU law or the EEA Agreement. In 
the absence of any explanation, however, the relevance of the Committee’s comments for 
other exemptions or preferential treatment concerning EU/EEA nationals cannot be estab-
lished.
73 See, eg, Art 1(4) CERD and Art 5 RED.
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A. Racial or Ethnic Groups Affected by the AIA
As discussed in chapter 2, the target group of the AIA is primarily deter-
mined through the criteria of nationality and residence purpose. In addi-
tion, certain exemptions have been created, including for persons who 
cannot be required, under international obligations, to pass the integra-
tion exam abroad. The Act thus does not directly distinguish between per-
sons on account of their racial or ethnic origin and the target group 
appears to be characterised by a relatively high degree of ethnic diversity, 
both regarding the applicants for admission and their family members in 
the Netherlands.74 Nevertheless, this does not exclude the possibility of 
certain racial or ethnic groups being disproportionately affected by the 
obligation to pass the integration exam abroad. 
It would go beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate whether a 
disproportionate effect can be established with regard to all the different 
ethnic groups represented among immigrants to and in the Netherlands. 
Instead, the examination focuses on the position of the two biggest groups 
of migrant minorities, being persons of Turkish or Moroccan descent. The 
fact that these groups are relatively large also makes it easier to collect 
statistically significant evidence that may serve to prove a presumption of 
indirect discrimination. It is, however, worth mentioning that, as of 
August 2011, persons with Turkish nationality no longer belong to the tar-
get group of the AIA (chapter 2, section VI.B.iii). As far as this group is 
concerned, the analysis in this chapter is thus limited to the situation per-
taining before that time. It is, nonetheless, still illustrative in showing how 
the criteria found in section II of this chapter are to be applied. 
The choice to consider the Turkish and Moroccan minorities as ethnic 
groups raises the question as to how persons can be identified as belong-
ing to these groups and thus as being of Turkish or Moroccan ethnic 
origin. Earlier in this chapter, it was stated that a person’s ethnicity is pref-
erably established by means of self­identification. However, no overview 
of ethnic groups in the Netherlands based on self­identification is availa-
ble. Instead, persons are defined as belonging to an ethnic minority on the 
basis of their country of birth (for first­generation immigrants) or the 
country of birth of their parents (for second-generation immigrants).75 
74 Apart from family migrants, religious servants are also subject to the AIA (section 
VI.B.ii of ch 2); hence, the Act affects not only family members in the Netherlands but also 
religious communities. Numerically, however, religious servants constitute a much smaller 
share of the target group than family migrants. For this reason, the examination in this sec-
tion is restricted to the latter category.
75 In the definitions used by Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek), a 
person is regarded as a second-generation immigrant if at least one of the parents was born 
outside the Netherlands. Second-generation immigrants are assigned to an ethnic minority 
group according to the country of birth of the mother. If the mother was born in the 
Netherlands, the country of birth of the father is used. See http://statline.cbs.nl (table 
Bevolking; generatie, geslacht, leeftijd en herkomstgroepering per 1 januari).
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According to these definitions, the Turkish minority consisted in 2011 
of 388,967 persons, while the Moroccan minority comprised 355,883 
persons.76
Applicants for admission are not registered as belonging to a particular 
ethnic minority. The ethnicity of these applicants can therefore only be 
established indirectly (and hence imprecisely), on the basis of information 
concerning their nationality and/or country of origin or birth.77
The possible discriminatory effect of the AIA on Turkish and Moroccan 
migrant communities has previously been highlighted by the non- 
governmental organisation Human Rights Watch. This organisation also 
asserted that the AIA (indirectly) discriminates against ‘non-Western 
migrants’ on account of their ethnic origin and nationality.78 In the same 
vein, the CERD Committee in 2010 published Concluding Observations 
on the Netherlands, in which it expressed concern that ‘the application of 
the [AIA] results in discrimination on the basis of nationality, particularly 
between so-called “Western” and “non-Western” state nationals’.79 
It was argued in chapter 8 (section III.A.ii) that discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality is not covered by the CERD and does not consti-
tute a form of racial or ethnic discrimination. It follows that a difference in 
treatment between Western and non-Western migrants on account of their 
nationality is not as such incompatible with the CERD and does not come 
within the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, the observations made by 
Human Rights Watch and the CERD Committee raise the question of 
whether non-Western migrants (or non-Western nationals) should be 
qualified as a separate racial or ethnic group.
The answer to this question is not immediately obvious. It may be 
assumed that the term ‘non-Western migrants’ concerns persons who 
come from or are nationals of non-Western countries. However, this 
includes a large diversity of cultures, languages, religions, lifestyles and 
migration patterns. It is therefore not plausible to claim that non-Western 
migrants all belong to a single ethnic group. Still, they may be perceived 
as such within Dutch society. As remarked above (section II.B), race and 
76 See http://statline.cbs.nl (table Bevolking; generatie, geslacht, leeftijd en herkomstgroepering 
per 1 januari). Information is also available on third-generation immigrants (persons of 
whom at least one of the grandparents was born outside the Netherlands); see http:// 
statline.cbs.nl (table Bevolking; niet-westerse derde generatie). This information shows that, in 
2010, there were between 8320 and 8533 third-generation immigrants belonging to the 
Turkish minority and between 5752 and 5858 belonging to the Moroccan minority.
77 See http://statline.cbs.nl (table Migratie: land van herkomst/vestiging, geboorteland en 
geslacht). Information concerning the nationality of applicants for admission is provided by 
the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst), see 
www.ind.nl. Additional information can also be found in the evaluation of the AIA con-
ducted in 2009, see Brink et al 2009 and Lodder 2009.
78 Human Rights Watch 2008, 26–30.
79 Concluding Observations of the CERD Committee concerning the Netherlands, 16 
March 2010, CERD/C/NLC/CO/17–18, para 5.
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ethnic origin are socially constructed concepts that depend on the percep-
tions of outsiders, as well as on those of the members of the group them-
selves. In this connection, it is observed that non-Western migrants (or 
‘non-Western allochthones’) are often regarded as a separate category in 
data compiled by Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek). 
The same category is used to determine the target group of Dutch integra-
tion policy, although other categories increasingly seem to play a role.80 
It has been argued that these categorisations contribute to a process of 
culturalisation that is quite similar to racialisation (ie the construction of a 
racial group).81 It is questionable, however, whether non-Western migrants 
are also regarded as a separate racial group outside this policy context – 
including by themselves. The extent to which a process of racialisation or 
categorisation must have advanced before a particular group of persons 
can be legally qualified as a racial group is also uncertain. 
In the light of the above, it is submitted that the question of whether 
‘non-Western migrants’ constitute a particular racial or ethnic group can-
not be answered within the confines of this study. This would require 
further investigation into the use of this category and the legal definition 
of the terms ‘race’ and ‘ethnic origin’. The assessment conducted below is 
limited to examining the specific position of the Turkish and Moroccan 
migrant communities.
B. A Presumption of Indirect Racial or Ethnic Discrimination?
Does the AIA have a disproportionate effect on persons of Turkish or 
Moroccan ethnic origin? In answering this question, the first issue to be 
examined is whether persons of Turkish or Moroccan origin have a sig-
nificantly higher chance of being confronted with the integration require-
ment abroad as an obstacle to family reunification. This examination looks 
at persons applying to be admitted to the Netherlands, as well as Dutch 
residents seeking to bring in a family member from abroad.
During the legislative process leading up to the adoption of the AIA, it 
was observed that men and women of Turkish and Moroccan origin often 
marry a partner from their country of origin.82 To the extent that family 
migrants from Turkey and Morocco are obliged to pass the integration 
exam abroad, it can be assumed that their family members in the 
80 Parliamentary Papers II 2009–2010, 31 268, No 25 (Integratiebrief ), 15.
81 Schinkel 2008.
82 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 4; Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 
700, No 6, 3–4. All the information I was able to retrieve about the family reunification of 
Dutch residents concerned adult married couples; I was not able to find any information on 
family reunification with children, parents or other relatives. For this reason, only family 
reunification with spouses is examined here. As indicated in section III.A, the qualification 
‘of Turkish or Moroccan origin’ refers to persons who were born or who have at least one 
parent born in Turkey or Morocco. 
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Netherlands are also affected.83 In 2001, five years before the AIA was 
adopted, slightly fewer than 60 per cent of Turkish men and women living 
in the Netherlands and getting married brought in a marriage partner 
from Turkey or Morocco.84 This number subsequently declined quite 
strongly, especially among the second generation. By 2006 it had fallen to 
around 25 per cent and in 2009 to below 20 per cent.85 
When compared to persons belonging to other ethnic groups who also 
bring over a marriage partner from the country of origin, there is no rea-
son to assume that Dutch residents of Turkish or Moroccan origin are 
more frequently affected by the AIA. Arguably, some ethnic groups will 
be affected to a lesser degree because persons belonging to these groups 
often have the nationality of an EU Member State, in which case their 
incoming spouses do not have to pass the integration exam abroad (chap-
ter 6, section III). However, this exemption on the grounds of obligations 
of EU law applies regardless of ethnic origin.86 The effect of this exemp-
tion on the ethnic composition of the group affected by the AIA cannot 
therefore easily be predicted.
Even so, despite the decline in the number of ‘migration marriages’ 
amongst Dutch residents of Turkish or Moroccan origin, these groups still 
marry a partner from the country of origin relatively often compared to 
persons belonging to other ethnic groups. In 2009, for example, the num-
ber of people of Turkish descent marrying a partner from Turkey was 
about five times as high as the number of Surinamese marrying a partner 
from Suriname and about eight times as high as the average number of 
immigrants from Western countries (westerse allochtonen) who married a 
partner from their country of origin. In the same year, the number of peo-
ple of Moroccan descent marrying a partner from the country of origin 
was approximately four times as high as that of Surinamese and roughly 
six times as high as the average for immigrants from Western countries.87 
83 Of course, Dutch residents of Turkish or Moroccan origin will also be affected by the 
AIA if they marry a partner from another country (not being their country of origin) to 
which the Act applies. Unfortunately, the available information is insufficiently specific to be 
able to take this group into account. Nevertheless, an earlier study suggests that this group 
is probably not very large: as at 1 January 2000, only 1.3% of persons of Turkish or Moroccan 
origin married a partner who migrated from a country other than the country of origin. See 
Hooghiemstra 2003, 23.
84 See the table in Annex 2 to Parliamentary Papers II 2004–2005, 29 700, No 6, 55. For 
Moroccan women the percentage was somewhat lower: 51.9%.
85 The figures for 2006 are taken from the 2008 annual report on integration (Jaarrapport 
Integratie), see Table 2.7 of the annex to the report. The figures for 2009 come from the 2010 
report, at 51–53. Both reports were published by Statistics Netherlands and are available at 
www.cbs.nl. 
86 This means, eg, that a French national of Moroccan origin will also be covered by this 
exemption, as will a German national of Turkish origin. 
87 See the 2010 annual report on integration, at 51–53 (n 85). Figures for migration mar-
riages among the native Dutch population are not available, which makes it impossible to 
include this group in the comparison.
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When comparing Dutch residents of Turkish or Moroccan origin and 
other Dutch residents entering into a marriage, persons belonging to the 
former groups are consequently more likely to marry a partner from 
abroad and are thus to be affected by the AIA.88 A presumption of indirect 
ethnic discrimination can, therefore, be established, at least where the 
Turkish and Moroccan communities in the Netherlands are concerned.
Next, it may be asked whether Turks and Moroccans are also overrepre-
sented among immigrants applying for admission to the Netherlands and 
who have to pass the integration exam abroad. As indicated above, one 
problem in answering this question is that figures concerning immigra-
tion to the Netherlands mostly categorise immigrants according to their 
nationality.89 While it may be assumed that, at least in the context of 
Turkish and Moroccan immigrants to the Netherlands, the correlation 
between nationality and ethnicity is rather strong, the information that 
can be gathered from these immigration statistics does not provide a very 
precise picture of the effects of the AIA on different ethnic groups. 
Nevertheless, where large differences are observed, this may still suffice 
to prove that particular groups are disproportionately affected compared 
to others.
The 2009 evaluation of the AIA shows that in 2006, 2007 and 2008 
nationals of Turkey and Morocco constituted the two largest groups 
amongst those who took the integration exam abroad, with figures of 
approximately 21 per cent (Turks) and 15 per cent (Moroccans).90 
Unfortunately, no figures are readily available on the relative share of 
Turkish and Moroccan nationals among the total number of applicants. 
However, the annual reports of the Dutch immigration service (IND) 
show that, in 2007 and 2008, Turkish nationals constituted only 9 per cent 
of all applicants for a long-stay visa (mvv) and 8–9 per cent of all appli-
cants for a residence permit (verblijfsvergunning regulier). For Moroccan 
nationals the figures were 5–6 per cent.91 The reports also show that nei-
ther Turks nor Moroccans are in the top 10 of applicants for asylum, which 
is the main immigration category for which no long-stay visa is required. 
Together, these pieces of information suggest that persons of Turkish or 
Moroccan nationality have a much higher chance of having to pass the 
integration exam abroad than (certain) other categories of aliens seeking 
to be admitted to the Netherlands. This makes it quite likely that a similar 
88 This is not to say that the same conclusion does not also apply to certain other non-
Western immigrant communities (eg, Afghans or Somalis). However, as stated above, the 
examination in this chapter focuses on the position of persons of Turkish and Moroccan 
origin.
89 Although Statistics Netherlands gives immigration figures by country of birth, these 
statistics do not provide the information necessary to determine whether persons do or do 
not fall under the AIA (notably residence purpose).
90 Section VI.D of ch 2.
91 The annual reports of the IND are available at www.ind.nl. 
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effect occurs with regard to persons of Turkish or Moroccan ethnic origin. 
It follows that a presumption of indirect ethnic discrimination also exists 
with regard to persons of Turkish or Moroccan origin who apply for 
admission to the Netherlands.92
Thirdly, it is examined whether persons of Turkish or Moroccan origin 
also have more difficulty passing the integration exam abroad than candi-
dates belonging to other ethnic groups. To this end, the pass rates of 
Turkish and Moroccan exam candidates are compared with the average 
pass rates of all candidates. Again, the available figures only distinguish 
according to the nationality of the candidates and not their ethnicity. They 
do not, therefore, give a very precise indication of the effects on different 
ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the comparison shows that the pass rate of 
Moroccan nationals was consistently higher than the average pass rate 
between 15 March 2006 (when the AIA entered into force) and 30 June 
2010. Throughout this period, the pass rates among Moroccan nationals 
varied between 92 and 95 per cent, whereas the average pass rates varied 
between 87.5 and 90.4 per cent. On the other hand, the comparison shows 
the pass rates of Turkish nationals to have been consistently lower than 
the average pass rates, ranging from 86.5 to 89 per cent.93 The percentage 
of Turkish nationals who do not pass the exam is consequently between 11 
and 13.5 per cent, compared to the average of between 9.6 and 12.5 per 
cent. If the 1.5-criterion is taken as a point of departure (section II.C.i), it 
must be concluded that this difference is not in itself sufficient to establish 
a presumption of indirect ethnic discrimination. This conclusion could be 
revised, however, if the difference continued to exist over a longer period 
of time. 
Lastly, Human Rights Watch claimed that the Turkish and Moroccan 
communities in the Netherlands are disproportionately affected by the 
AIA because their disadvantaged (socio-economic) position makes it 
harder for persons in these groups to bear the costs of the integration 
92 Earlier (section II.F.ii) it was asserted that it will often be too difficult to measure 
whether an integration requirement also has a deterrent effect on certain ethnic or racial 
groups, to the effect that persons belonging to those groups refrain from applying for admis-
sion altogether. Nevertheless, the researchers who conducted the 2009 evaluation of the AIA 
were able to show that the share of Turkish and Moroccan nationals who applied for a long-
stay visa after the AIA entered into force was not significantly lower than before (the per-
centage of Turkish nationals remained at 18%, whereas Moroccans went from 18% to 14%). 
This suggests that any deterrent effect of the AIA on these groups is not very strong. See 
Brink et al 2009, 61–62 and Odé 2009, 289–90.
93 The figures in this section are based on the evaluation of the AIA conducted in 2009 
(Brink et al 2009) and on the Monitor of the Integration Exam Abroad (Monitor inburgerings- 
examen buitenland), see section VI.D of ch 2. These sources concern the period between 15 
March 2006 to 1 September 2008 (the evaluation period), the years 2008 and 2009 and the 
first half of 2010 (the period between 1 September and 31 December 2008 is included in the 
evaluation and in the monitor for 2008). The average pass rate was calculated on the basis of 
the numbers presented in these sources, excluding the results obtained by Turkish and 
Moroccan nationals. 
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exam and of the necessary preparation. The report referred to statistical 
evidence showing, inter alia, that 30 per cent of Turkish and Moroccan 
households live below the poverty line compared to 8 per cent of native 
Dutch households.94 While this evidence is not without significance, a 
more specific comparison is required to establish a presumption of indi-
rect ethnic discrimination on these grounds. In particular, more relevant 
evidence could be obtained by making the comparison between house-
holds seeking to bring in a family member from abroad.95 In the absence 
of such information, a presumption of indirect ethnic discrimination can-
not be assumed. It is submitted, however, that the report by Human 
Rights Watch signals a need for further research into the financial effects 
of the AIA.
i. Evidence of Discriminatory Intent?
Human Rights Watch has also drawn attention to the Turkish and 
Moroccan communities being ‘uppermost in the mind of [Dutch] policy-
makers when the overseas integration test legislation was introduced’.96 
Although not expressly stated, this claim may be understood to suggest a 
discriminatory intent on the part of the Dutch legislator. As explained 
above (section II.C), evidence of discriminatory intent is not necessary to 
establish a presumption of indirect discrimination. For the purpose of this 
chapter, therefore, such evidence can be disregarded. Nevertheless, the 
parliamentary history of the AIA does indeed reveal that the problems 
designed to be resolved by the Act were considered to be especially preva-
lent among certain ethnic groups (in particular Turks, Moroccans and 
other non-Western migrant communities).97 Although it may well be the 
case that some ethnic groups are more affected by particular problems 
(such as high unemployment or elevated crime rates) than others, two 
remarks can be made. 
The first is that care must be taken to ensure that data concerning levels 
of integration are gathered in an ethnically neutral manner.98 Secondly, 
where a correlation is found between, for instance, ethnic background 
and unemployment levels, this does not necessarily imply that ethnicity is 
94 Human Rights Watch 2008, 30–31.
95 As it stands, the evidence provided by Human Rights Watch leaves open the possibility 
that it is mostly ‘richer’ persons within the Turkish and Moroccan communities who engage 
in family reunification, while among the native Dutch those living below the poverty line are 
overrepresented among the group seeking to bring in a partner from abroad. If so, the AIA 
could still affect native Dutch persons to the same extent as (or even more strongly than) 
persons of Turkish or Moroccan origin. 
96 Human Rights Watch 2008, 16–17 and 30. See also Groenendijk 2011, 29.
97 See Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 3, 4–5 and Parliamentary Papers II 2004–
2005, 29 700, No 6, 3 and 5–6. 
98 Schinkel has argued that, in the Netherlands, this is not always the case, see Schinkel 
2008.
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also a causal factor in determining someone’s chances of finding employ-
ment. Other factors may well play a role, including for instance the immi-
grants’ level of education, their financial position, the economic climate in 
the Netherlands at the time of their arrival or prejudices on the part of the 
receiving population. Hence, unless a causal relationship can be estab-
lished (and perhaps even then), ethnic origin should not be one of the 
criteria determining who has to meet an integration requirement and who 
does not.99
C.  Justification 
The issue of potential indirect discrimination on ethnic grounds was not 
raised during the legislative procedure leading to the adoption of the AIA. 
Several years later, in response to the above report by Human Rights 
Watch, the Dutch government denied that Turkish and Moroccan migrant 
communities were disproportionately affected by the Act.100 Consequently, 
no justification for this effect was provided. Nonetheless, it was estab-
lished in the previous subsection that the AIA does have a disproportion-
ate effect on Turkish and Moroccan migrant communities in the 
Netherlands, as well as on persons of Turkish or Moroccan origin who 
apply for admission. The question of whether these effects can be justified 
by a reasonable and objective justification is examined below.
A discriminatory effect of the AIA was shown to exist, first of all, with 
regard to Dutch residents of Turkish or Moroccan origin because these 
people are more likely to marry a partner from the country of origin. The 
discriminatory effect thus results from the greater prevalence among per-
sons of Turkish or Moroccan origin of ‘migration marriages’. This raises 
the question of whether there exists a justification for the fact that the AIA 
applies only to migration marriages and not to marriages where both 
partners already live in the Netherlands.
Such justification is not hard to find. One reason why the AIA applies 
only to immigrants is because it is assumed that they are not proficient in 
Dutch and lack the knowledge about the Netherlands considered neces-
sary for successful integration. It is argued in chapter 3 (section II.B.iii) 
that the AIA also functions as a selection mechanism, to ensure that immi-
grants admitted to the Netherlands have a certain minimum level of 
education. Such a selection mechanism is not needed, however, if both 
partners are already Dutch residents. In other words, the AIA is an immi-
gration requirement, rather than a condition for marriage, which explains 
why only immigrants are affected by it. It is concluded that the discrimi-
99 The issue of intentional discrimination is taken up in more detail in De Vries 2012.
100 Parliamentary Papers II 2007–2008, 29 700, No 56, 4.
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natory effect of the AIA on Dutch residents of Turkish or Moroccan origin 
does not amount to a violation of the prohibition of racial or ethnic dis-
crimination.
Another effect of the AIA, established in section III.B, is that persons of 
Turkish or Moroccan origin who apply to be admitted to the Netherlands 
are more likely than others to have to pass the integration exam abroad. 
Presumably, this effect is primarily caused by the two main criteria used 
to define the target group of the AIA, namely nationality and residence 
purpose (section VI.B.i of chapter 2). Most immigrants of Turkish or 
Moroccan origin who seek admission to the Netherlands are family 
migrants. Moreover, unlike EU citizens and certain third-country nation-
als, Moroccan nationals and (until August 2011) Turkish nationals are not 
exempted from the AIA on the grounds of their nationality.
The previous chapter argues that the difference in treatment, under the 
AIA, of aliens of different nationalities can be considered to serve a legiti-
mate interest (compliance with international obligations and the protec-
tion of the foreign and economic relations of the Netherlands). Regarding 
the distinction on the grounds of residence purpose, the Dutch authorities 
have thus far not adequately explained why the AIA applies primarily to 
family migrants and not to labour migrants.101 Even if such an explanation 
were provided, however, the question would remain as to whether the 
AIA could not be replaced by another measure that would not have a dis-
criminatory effect. Arguably, the current Act could be replaced by an exam 
or an educational requirement that would apply to labour migrants and 
family migrants alike. Alternatively, it would be worthwhile considering 
whether the aim of improving integration could not be furthered by 
integration measures that would apply only after arrival and would not 
constitute a requirement for admission. The advantage of such measures 
is that they could apply to EU citizens and third-country nationals alike. 
Whether the AIA is justified in its current form or should be replaced by 
a measure with less or no discriminatory effect is a question that must be 
answered through a balancing exercise, with regard for the various inter-
ests involved (including the interest of compliance with international law 
and the protection of the external relations of the Netherlands), for the 
(expected) effect of the AIA and of alternative measures in achieving bet-
ter integration results and for whether the discriminatory effect on certain 
ethnic groups can be eradicated fully or only in part. In assessing these 
interests the Netherlands has a certain margin of appreciation, which in 
principle is larger in cases involving indirect differential treatment than 
where direct differential treatment has occurred. Nevertheless, it is argued 
above that there are grounds for stricter scrutiny in situations involving 
alleged indirect ethnic or racial discrimination if the group affected is 
101 Section V.B of ch 8.
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already in a disadvantaged position or is especially vulnerable to stigma-
tisation or exclusion from mainstream society. 
It is submitted in this respect that the position of the Turkish and 
Moroccan migrant minorities in the Netherlands does raise some con-
cerns. Contrary to what the ECtHR stated in D.H. and others regarding the 
Roma population in the Czech Republic (section II.E), Turks and 
Moroccans in the Netherlands do not have a ‘history of rejection and per-
secution’. Incidents of racist violence against these groups, although not 
non-existent, are also relatively uncommon.102 However, compared to the 
majority population, the Turkish and Moroccan communities continue to 
face problems in several areas of socio-economic integration, including 
education, labour market participation and housing.103 As explained 
above (section III.B.i), the Dutch legislator recognised this when the AIA 
was adopted. There also exists a prevalent political discourse in the 
Netherlands that is critical of ‘mass immigration’, ‘un-integrated immi-
grants’ and ‘the “Islamisation” of Dutch society’.104 There seems little 
doubt that this discourse is at least in part directed towards the Turkish 
and Moroccan migrant communities. Lastly, a survey shows that persons 
belonging to these groups indicate that they have experienced discrimina-
tion on account of their ethnic origin.105
Given this situation, it is not unlikely that a measure primarily affecting 
persons of Turkish or Moroccan origin – even in the absence of discrimi-
natory intent – will have the effect of putting these groups at a further 
distance from the majority population, at least in perception. Whether this 
effect will in fact occur as a result of the adoption of the AIA is, of course, 
very difficult to determine. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the position 
of the Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the Netherlands is such that 
the existence of a justification for the disproportionate effect of the inte-
gration exam abroad must be subject to strict scrutiny. It will be up to the 
Dutch authorities in this respect to demonstrate that the objectives of the 
AIA cannot be reached as well (or even better) by means of measures with 
less or no discriminatory effect. If such justification cannot be provided, it 
must be concluded that the differential treatment of Turkish and Moroccan 
immigrants is not reasonably and objectively justified and hence that the 
AIA violates the prohibition of indirect ethnic discrimination.
102 Wagenaar and Van Donselaar 2010, 30–32. The authors noted 148 incidents of racially 
motivated violence (against persons or objects) in 2009, of which 52 were classified as ‘anti­
Islamic’. In 2008 the number of manifestations of ‘anti-Islamic’ violence stood at 89. Turkish 
and Moroccan migrants constitute two of the largest Islamic communities in the Netherlands.
103 See the 2010 annual report on integration (Jaarrapport Integratie), available at www.cbs.nl. 
104 See also Human Rights Watch 2008, 7–11. A primary exponent of this discourse is Geert 
Wilders, the leader of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), which managed to win 24 of the 150 
seats in the Dutch Parliament in the June 2010 general elections.
105 See the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU MIDIS) 2009 (Main 
Results Report) published by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency and available at www.fra.
europa.eu.
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IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This chapter considers the compatibility of integration requirements with 
the prohibition of indirect racial and ethnic discrimination. As explained 
earlier, the concept of indirect discrimination can be used to reveal and 
assess the unintended effects of legislative measures on particular racial 
or ethnic groups. The second section of this chapter examines how this 
concept is to be applied in relation to integration requirements for the 
admission of aliens, with particular regard for the different effects or dis-
advantages that such requirements may produce and how it can be estab-
lished whether those effects amount to a presumption of indirect racial or 
ethnic discrimination. It was argued in this respect that integration 
requirements can amount to indirect differential treatment of persons 
applying for admission, as well as of host state residents. In practice, how-
ever, it can be rather difficult to determine whether a particular measure 
disproportionately affects one or more racial or ethnic groups: qualitative 
evidence often provides insufficient proof, whereas more specific statisti-
cal evidence can be difficult to obtain. 
Another difficulty lies in determining the level of scrutiny to be applied 
by judicial bodies. It was argued that, although differential treatment 
resulting from racism or ethnic intolerance must be strictly reviewed, 
strict scrutiny is not necessarily indicated in situations where the differen-
tial treatment consists of unintended effects. Instead, the level of scrutiny 
needs to be determined in the light of the social context and the existence 
of factors making the specific racial or ethnic group particularly vulnera-
ble to exclusion. It was submitted that such factors played a role in the 
indirect discrimination cases ruled on by the ECtHR concerning the posi-
tion of Roma in the education system. However, no general criteria for 
determining the level of scrutiny in indirect discrimination cases have so 
far been provided. All in all, it can be concluded that the existing legal 
framework concerning indirect racial or ethnic discrimination is not easy 
to apply in practice.
It was nevertheless attempted in section III to evaluate the AIA against 
the background of the above legal framework, with particular regard for 
the position of the Turkish and Moroccan migrant communities in the 
Netherlands and persons of Turkish or Moroccan origin who apply for 
admission. Since there is hardly any information concerning these groups 
that is based on self­identification, use was made of data where persons of 
Turkish or Moroccan origin were identified as such on the basis of their 
nationality or country of birth. These data showed that these groups are 
not disproportionately affected by the AIA in the sense of having lower 
pass rates for the integration exam abroad (although Turks pass less often 
than Moroccans). However, both groups are more likely to have to take 
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the exam than persons belonging to other ethnic groups. Dutch residents 
of Turkish or Moroccan origin are also more likely to be confronted with 
the consequences of the AIA because they are more likely to marry some-
one from abroad than persons belonging to the majority population are. 
The final subsection of this chapter examines whether the above effects 
are nevertheless justified in view of the interests that the AIA aims to pur-
sue and the reasons why the Act was adopted in its current form. Several 
problems were identified in this respect. The first, which was already sig-
nalled in the previous chapter, is that the Dutch legislator has not ade-
quately explained why the AIA does not apply to labour migrants and 
their family members. It is likely, however, that the disproportionate effect 
of the AIA on immigrants of Turkish or Moroccan origin is caused at least 
in part by the fact that the Act applies primarily to family migrants. A sec-
ond problem is that the Dutch legislator has not explored whether the 
aims of the AIA could also have been reached through alternative meas-
ures that would not have had a discriminatory effect on persons of Turkish 
or Moroccan origin. The need to conduct such an investigation is recog-
nised as constituting a very strict requirement, which does not allow the 
Dutch authorities much margin of appreciation. It is argued in this case, 
however, that a high level of scrutiny is indicated because of the already 
vulnerable position of the Turkish and Moroccan migrant communities in 
the Netherlands, which means that they require particular protection 
against indirect ethnic discrimination.
10 
The Right to Equal Treatment:  
‘Reverse Discrimination’ 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
AS EXPLAINED IN chapter 6, EU law operates on the premise that  the right of free movement between EU Member States will be    obstructed if it does not also include a right to family reunifica-
tion. Family members of EU nationals who move to another Member State 
– or who return to their own Member State after having moved within the 
EU – are consequently also entitled to be admitted to that state. This right 
exists regardless of the nationality of those family members or whether 
they have previously had legal residence in the EU. It is subject to very 
limited conditions and does not depend on the fulfilment of integration 
requirements. In addition, it has recently become clear that EU nationals 
can be entitled to family reunification under EU law if refusal to admit 
their family members would impede the exercise of the rights to which 
they are entitled as EU citizens.1
On the other hand, in cases where EU nationals’ enjoyment of their 
rights under the TFEU is not obstructed by a Member State’s national leg-
islation concerning family reunification, that legislation remains applica-
ble (chapter 6, section III.A). Where this legislation imposes more stringent 
conditions for family reunification, such as integration conditions, this 
will result in a disadvantage for those EU nationals who are not entitled to 
family reunification under EU law.2 This situation is commonly referred to 
as ‘reverse discrimination’ because it contrasts with the traditional pat-
tern whereby states treat their own nationals more favourably than 
1 CoJ (Grand Chamber) 8 March 2011, C-34/09 [2011] ECR 0000 (Ruiz Zambrano), see also 
section III.A of ch 6.
2 By way of example, imagine a Dutch and a French national who are both living in the 
Netherlands. Both want to bring over a spouse from Morocco. The situation of the French 
national falls under EU law, which means that the family reunification is not subject to inte-
gration conditions. The situation of the Dutch national, however, is covered by Dutch immi-
gration law, which means that the spouse must pass the integration exam abroad. A situation 
of this sort occurred in the case of McCarthy (CoJ 5 May 2011, C-434/09 [2011] ECR 0000), 
concerning a British national who unsuccessfully sought to rely on EU law to obtain a right 
of residence for her Jamaican husband. See also CoJ (Grand Chamber) 15 November 2011, 
C-256/11 [2012] ECR 00000 (Dereci).
368 Reverse Discrimination
nationals of other states.3 This traditional pattern reflects a notion com-
monly found in political theory, which entails that nationality (or citizen-
ship) corresponds to the highest level of inclusion in a community.4 
The examination in chapter 4 shows that the right to family life does not 
include a general right to family reunification for nationals. Still, to the 
extent that nationality is perceived as a privileged status, reverse discrim-
ination will be seen as problematic because nationals are treated less 
favourably than aliens. Evidence of this perception is found in the parlia-
mentary debate on the AIA, where members of parliament spoke nega-
tively about the Act resulting in ‘discrimination by the Netherlands of its 
own citizens’.5 Nevertheless, it is argued below that there is no legal norm 
requiring states to grant their own nationals a status at least equally strong 
as that granted to aliens (section II). It follows that the unfavourable treat-
ment by a state of its own nationals is in principle subject to the same legal 
standards as other forms of differential treatment (section II of chapter 8). 
Some additional remarks concerning these standards in relation to reverse 
discrimination are made in section III. Subsequently, case law of the Dutch 
courts concerning reverse discrimination in family reunification cases 
is briefly reviewed in section IV. Section V assesses whether the reverse 
discrimination resulting from the AIA is compatible with national and 
international legal standards on the right to equal treatment.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF NATIONALITY:  
A ‘MOST FAVOURED’ STATUS?
Nationality, as a legal status, expresses a formal bond between a person 
and a state (chapter 8, section III.A.ii). As such, the concept of nationality 
is not without relevance in international (human rights) law. Three cate-
gories of legal provisions can be distinguished in this respect.
Firstly, there are provisions that grant specific rights only to nationals. 
These include notably the right to political participation (Art 25 ICCPR)6 
3 To present a complete picture it is noted that, pursuant to the entry into force of the 
Family Reunification Directive, reverse discrimination of ‘non-moving’ EU nationals occurs 
not only in relation to ‘moving’ EU nationals (of the same or a different nationality), but also 
in relation to third-country nationals. While the directive leaves room for integration require-
ments, it also provides guarantees for family reunification that are not available under Dutch 
immigration law, notably through the supervision of the CoJ and the application of general 
principles of EU law (section 5 of ch 4). For an overview of different situations of reverse 
discrimination in relation to family reunification, see Verschueren 2009, 77–78.
4 Bosniak 2006, 3.
5 Proceedings II, 2004–2005, No 60, 3894–95; Proceedings I, 2005–2006, No 13, 662. See also 
Vermeulen, who qualifies reverse discrimination as ‘the most problematic aspect’ of the AIA. 
The author maintains, however, that the difference in treatment is compatible with interna-
tional equality norms (Vermeulen 2010a, 102–04).
6 See also Art 16 ECHR, which states that the provisions concerning freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of association and the prohibition of discrimination do not impede the right of 
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and the right to enter, remain in and leave the state of one’s nationality 
(Art 3 Fourth Protocol ECHR, Art 12 ICCPR and Art 10(2) CRC).7 Secondly, 
there are provisions that guarantee the right to a nationality or protect 
persons from not having a nationality. The right to obtain a nationality 
can be found in Article 24(3) of the ICCPR, Article 7 CRC and Article 4(a) 
of the European Convention on Nationality (ECN).8 Articles 4(b) and (c) 
ECN moreover provide that statelessness shall be avoided and that no 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality. The prevention 
of statelessness is also the object of a number of other treaties, including 
the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.9 A third category of 
provisions consists of those that grant aliens the same rights as nationals. 
This type of provision is included, for example, in the Refugee Convention, 
the UN Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons10 and the European 
Social Charter (with regard to migrant workers). Through these instru-
ments, the legal status of the national is taken as the standard by which 
the status of the alien is defined. 
It follows that nationality is a status to which particular rights are 
attached and to which everyone is entitled. In addition some treaties con-
tain equal treatment clauses requiring certain groups of aliens (refugees, 
stateless persons and migrant workers) to be granted particular rights on 
an equal footing with nationals. However, these rules do not require 
nationality – implicitly or explicitly – to be treated as a ‘most favoured’ 
status, meaning that nationals should always be treated at least equally to 
aliens and prohibiting reverse discrimination. In certain contexts, inter-
national law (other than EU law) also provides for certain privileges to 
be accorded specifically to aliens. This is the case notably with regard to 
diplomats and staff members of international organisations. 
states to restrict the political activities of aliens. It follows, a contrario, that political activities 
conducted by nationals are protected by the Convention. Lastly, Art 3 First Protocol ECHR 
obliges the Contracting States to organise elections so as to ensure the free expression of ‘the 
people’. It is as yet unclear whether this article grants the right to vote only to nationals or 
also to aliens, see Van Dijk et al 2006, 919–21.
7 It may be observed that the relevance of the latter provisions extends beyond the mere 
right to enter and remain as a person’s (lawful) presence in the territory of a state in turn 
makes them eligible for rights other than those mentioned above. See, for instance, Art 2(1) 
ICCPR: ‘Each State party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the pre-
sent Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’. 
Additionally the right to political participation ensures that nationals cannot only passively 
enjoy rights, but may also actively contribute to deciding on the content of those rights and 
the conditions on which they are granted.
8 CETS No 166, Treaty Series 1998, 10 and following, entry into force for the Netherlands 
on 1 March 2000.
9 UNTS Vol 989, 175, Treaty Series 1967, 124 and following, entry into force for the 
Netherlands on 13 December 1975.
10 UNTS Vol 360, 117, Treaty Series 1955, 42 and following, entry into force for the 
Netherlands on 11 July 1962.
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As long as the above provisions are respected, states are of course free 
to award ‘most favoured’ treatment to their own nationals as a matter of 
national law. With regard to the Netherlands, it is noted that a general 
legal norm to this effect is not included in the Dutch Constitution or in 
other legislation. However, when the Integration Act 2007 was enacted 
(section V.D of chapter 2), the Council of State found that it would be con-
trary to the right to equal treatment if (non-moving) Dutch nationals were 
made to pass an integration exam, while other EU nationals would be 
exempted from this obligation. In particular the Council, acting as advi-
sory body to the legislator, found that such a distinction could not be justi-
fied by ‘the mere presence or absence of a Community law context’.11 This 
finding eventually led the Dutch legislator to exempt all Dutch nationals 
from the obligation to pass the integration exam so as to ensure that their 
status was equal to that of other nationals of the EU Member States.12 
The preferential treatment of EU nationals, however, was not considered 
problematic in relation to third-country nationals, even though this differ-
ence in treatment was equally based on obligations stemming from EU 
law. On this point, the Council of State declared that ‘the integration 
requirement for third-country nationals can be justified by the fact that, 
unlike Dutch nationals, they do not have a special relationship with the 
Netherlands’.13 It can be derived that, at least for the purposes of the 
Integration Act 2007, Dutch nationals were in fact accorded a sort of ‘most 
favoured’ status.
Interestingly, however, the Council of State did not address the issue of 
reverse discrimination in its commentary on the proposal for the AIA.14 
Vermeulen suggests that this omission may be due to the presumption 
that the differential treatment under this Act takes place outside the juris-
diction of the Netherlands, as the AIA requires aliens to pass an integra-
tion exam in their home countries. However, he points out that such a 
presumption would be mistaken because the integration exam abroad 
affects family members both in and outside the Netherlands (section 
II.B.iv of chapter 8).15 Still, while Dutch nationals are treated on a par with 
EU nationals with regard to integration obligations, this is not the case in 
respect of the right to family reunification. It is submitted that in this 
11 Parliamentary Papers II 2005–2006, 30 308, No 4, 3–4.
12 For an overview of the legislative process leading up to the Integration Act 2007, in 
particular the discussions concerning the right to equal treatment, see De Vries 2006, 278–81.
13 Parliamentary Papers II 2005–2006, 30 308, No 106, 2. For a good understanding of the 
Council’s position, it may be pointed out that it did not argue that Dutch nationals should 
always be exempted from integration requirements. In fact, the Newcomers Integration Act 
of 1998 also applied to Dutch nationals who had previously lived abroad (section IV.D.iv of 
ch 2). However, the Council of State found that integration obligations could not be imposed 
on (certain groups of) Dutch nationals if EU nationals would be exempted. The argument 
thus criticised the proposed differential treatment rather than the obligation as such.
14 Parliamentary Papers II 2003–2004, 29 700, No 4.
15 Vermeulen 2010a, 103–04.
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respect the Dutch integration legislation is incongruent. However, this in 
itself does not mean that the reverse discrimination of Dutch nationals 
under the AIA is also contrary to the right to equal treatment. Whether 
this is the case must be assessed in the light of the legal standards set out 
in chapter 8 (section II). Below, some remarks are made concerning the 
applicability of these standards in relation to reverse discrimination.
III. THE RIGHT TO EQUAL TREATMENT  
IN SITUATIONS OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
A. Applicability of EU Non-discrimination Provisions 
An overview of various legal provisions guaranteeing the right to equal 
treatment (or the prohibition of discrimination), including several provi-
sions of the TFEU and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Arts 18 and 
19 TFEU and Art 21 CFR), is provided in chapter 8 (section II.B). The 
applicability of the latter provisions is, however, limited to situations 
within the scope of application of EU law. As explained above, the occur-
rence of reverse discrimination results precisely from the fact that many 
EU nationals do not use their right of free movement (and are not impeded 
in the exercise of their citizenship rights) and thus do not establish a con-
nection with EU law. As a consequence, these nationals are also barred 
from invoking the non-discrimination provisions of the TFEU or the 
Charter to obtain a right to family reunification under the same conditions 
as EU nationals who can rely on EU law.16 
This restriction of the scope of EU law mainly to cross-border situations 
and the ensuing phenomenon of reverse discrimination have often been 
criticised in the literature. In particular, it has been argued that, after the 
introduction of EU citizenship and the increasing communitarisation of 
immigration law, it would be inconsistent to continue treating the family 
reunification of certain categories of EU citizens as a matter falling outside 
the scope of EU law.17 However, this alleged inconsistency has not thus far 
been resolved by the EU legislator or the CoJ. Since the provisions of EU 
law on non-discrimination are not applicable, the question remaining is 
whether reverse discrimination by a state of its own nationals is compati-
ble with standards of equal treatment in international law (notably Art 14 
and 1 Twelfth Protocol ECHR) and, for the Netherlands, with Article 1 of 
the Dutch Constitution. 
16 CoJ 25 July 2008, case no C-127/08 [2008] ECR I-6241 (Metock and others), para 78; see 
also Dereci (n 2), paras 70–72.
17 See notably Spaventa 2007, Walter 2008 and Verschueren 2009. 
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B. Differentiation Ground: Migrating Versus Non-migrating EU 
Nationals
As established earlier in this study (chapter 8, section II) differences in 
treatment must be based on a reasonable and objective justification so as 
not to amount to prohibited discrimination. In determining whether such 
a justification exists, states have a margin of appreciation that depends, 
for a large part, on the differentiation ground at stake. As explained in the 
introduction, reverse discrimination entails differential treatment between 
EU nationals who have and those who have not made use of their right to 
free movement. Consequently, it can be said that the differentiation 
ground is whether or not one is a ‘migrating EU national’.18 
Alternatively, it could be argued that reverse discrimination is a form of 
differential treatment on the grounds of nationality as the distinction will 
mainly be between a state’s own nationals and nationals from other EU 
Member States.19 However, the right to family reunification under EU law 
is also available to nationals who return to their own state after having 
exercised the right to free movement elsewhere in the EU (chapter 6, sec-
tion III.A). Conversely, there is as yet no evidence that a right to family 
reunification exists for EU nationals born in a Member State other than 
that of their nationality and who have always lived there.20 Therefore it is 
concluded that nationality constitutes, at most, an indirect differentiation 
ground. In either case, there is no reason to assume that reverse discrimi-
nation must be treated as a suspect classification with little or no room for 
justification (chapter 8, sections II.D and III.B). 
C.  Justification: Compliance with Obligations of EU Law
Reverse discrimination occurs when family members of migrating EU 
nationals are exempted from integration requirements because such 
requirements are not permitted under EU law. Consequently, the reason 
behind this exemption is to ensure that national integration requirements 
do not contravene EU law obligations. In chapter 8 (section III.C.i.b) it is 
argued that this constitutes a reasonable and objective justification for dif-
18 In exceptional cases EU nationals can also engage the right to free movement without 
actually migrating to another Member State, as happened, eg, in the Carpenter case (section 
III.A of ch 6). A right to family reunification under EU law also exists for EU nationals who 
would otherwise be impeded in the exercise of their right to reside in the EU (as in the case 
of Ruiz Zambrano, see again section III.A of ch 6). For the purpose of this chapter, the term 
‘migrating EU nationals’ must be understood also to include these situations.
19 As Walter seems to assume, see Walter 2008, 55–57 and Verschueren 2009, 83.
20 With the exception of children dependent on the care of their parents, see ch 6, section 
III.E.
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ferences in treatment in the field of immigration requirements. Support 
for this argument was found in the ECtHR’s judgment in Moustaquim, 
where the Court held that the differentiation between EU citizens and 
third-country nationals was justified because the EU constitutes a ‘special 
legal order’. 
According to Verschueren, the ECtHR’s reasoning in Moustaquim does 
not apply to differential treatment between EU nationals. In this author’s 
view, EU citizens all belong to the EU special legal order. Hence, he finds 
that their position is not comparable to that of third-country nationals 
even if the EU nationals have not made use of the right to free move-
ment.21 It is submitted, however, that this argument cannot be maintained. 
While the decision in Moustaquim concerned a difference in treatment 
between EU nationals and third-country nationals, the ECtHR found this 
differentiation to be justified because it was based on the need to comply 
with obligations of EU law. Consequently, it was the applicability of EU 
obligations that validated the preferential treatment of EU nationals, 
rather than their nationality as such. The scope of these obligations 
remains to be determined by the EU institutions. As explained above, 
reverse discrimination exists precisely because the EU legal order does 
not apply to certain situations, including the family reunification of non-
migrating EU nationals. From the judgment in Moustaquim, it can there-
fore be derived that such distinctions are compatible with Article 14 
ECHR, provided they are also proportionate.
The Dutch Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs (ACVZ) has argued 
that the Netherlands is not only allowed, but actually obliged to bring 
family members of non-migrating EU nationals under the AIA.22 In the 
Committee’s view, this follows from the fact that the exemption of these 
family members is not required by obligations of EU law. Consequently, 
the right to equal treatment requires them to be treated in the same way as 
others to whom no such obligations apply. 
It is submitted that this is a valid observation, assuming there are no 
alternative reasons – other than compliance with EU law – to justify an 
exemption for family members of non-migrating EU nationals. This raises 
the question, however, of whether it is acceptable for states to create such 
an exemption with the purpose of putting their own nationals in a privi-
leged position. In other words, whether states can enact a more favoura-
ble family reunification régime for their own nationals than for aliens. In 
21 Verschueren 2009, 84. Contrary to what this author states, the ECtHR in Moustaquim did 
not find that the situation of EU nationals was incomparable to that of third-country nation-
als (in other words that they did not constitute equal cases), but that the differential treat-
ment of EU nationals and third-country nationals was based on a reasonable and objective 
justification. By contrast the Court found in the same case that the situation of third-country 
nationals was incomparable to that of Belgian nationals, which made the search for a justifi-
cation unnecessary. See ECtHR 18 February 1991, app no 12313/86 (Moustaquim), para 49. 
22 ACVZ 2004a, 32–33.
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my view, such a distinction can in principle be justified on the grounds 
that nationals have a particular interest in being able to live with their 
own family members in the country of their nationality (section II.C of 
chapter 3). However, this argument applies equally to aliens with strong 
ties to the state concerned, notably through long-term residence.23 It was 
already observed, moreover, that the suitability of integration measures 
will be jeopardised if too many immigrants are exempted from these 
measures on grounds unrelated to their integration capacity (section 
III.C.iv of chapter 8).
IV. DUTCH CASE LAW 
No case law is yet available from the Dutch courts concerning reverse dis-
crimination resulting from the Act on Integration Abroad. Before the AIA 
entered into force, the Roermond District Court ruled on a case concern-
ing reverse discrimination in relation to the obligation to obtain a long-
stay visa. In this case, the court found that the difference in treatment was 
justified by the need to comply with obligations under EU law and that 
the exemption of family members of (migrating) EU nationals from the 
visa requirement constituted a reasonable exception to an overall restric-
tive immigration policy. Accordingly, it was found that there had been no 
violation of the right to equal treatment (Art 26 ICCPR).24 
This judgment suggests that the district court considered compliance 
with EU law as a legitimate objective, which can in principle justify the 
reverse discrimination of non-migrating Dutch nationals. This outcome is 
compatible with the international legal standards concerning equal treat-
ment that were formulated above (section III.C) and earlier in chapter 8. 
Nevertheless, it should again be noted that the integration exam abroad 
imposes a heavier burden on applicants for admission than the visa 
23 Likewise, in the case of Abdulaziz, the respondent state argued that more lenient rules 
for family reunification applied to women with close ties to the United Kingdom so as to 
avoid the hardship that these women would suffer if they were forced to move abroad. In 
the view of the ECtHR this aim was ‘unquestionably legitimate’. Contrary to what was 
argued above, however, the Court found that a relevant relationship to the United Kingdom 
could not be assumed on the grounds of residence alone. See ECtHR 28 May 1985, app nos 
9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81 (Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali), para 88.
24 District Court of The Hague sitting in Roermond 26 October 2004, case no 03/26987, 
LJN: AR3411. See also District Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam 29 April 2009, case 
no 08/6690 and following. The latter case involved a Moroccan national seeking to be admit-
ted to the Netherlands to remain with her Dutch son. She claimed that both she and her son 
were subject to discrimination because she could not obtain a right of residence under EU 
law. The court, however, found that there had been no violation of the right to equal treat-
ment (Art 14 ECHR) as the applicant could have applied for family reunification under 
Dutch law. It is not clear whether the court simply did not consider the difference between 
the conditions for family reunification under EU law and under domestic law, or whether it 
implicitly considered this difference to be justified.  
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requirement alone. The Dutch courts will therefore have to conduct a sep-
arate proportionality test to determine whether reverse discrimination 
with regard to integration requirements is also based on an objective and 
reasonable justification (section III.D of chapter 8). 
V. REVERSE DISCRIMINATION UNDER  
THE ACT ON INTEGRATION ABROAD
It is concluded that the exemption from the AIA for family members of 
migrating EU nationals – including Dutch nationals – serves a legitimate 
objective (to respect the obligations stemming from EU law). What 
remains, then, is the question of whether this exemption and the ensuing 
reverse discrimination of non-migrating Dutch nationals are also propor-
tionate. Regard must be had in this respect for the purpose of the distinc-
tion (compliance with obligations stemming from EU law), as well as for 
the interests served by the integration exam abroad and the unequal treat-
ment endured by non-migrating Dutch nationals.
As discussed above, the Roermond District Court found that the exemp-
tion of family members of migrating EU nationals from the long-term visa 
requirement constitutes a proportionate exception to the general immi-
gration rules. However, the introduction of the integration exam abroad 
raised the threshold for family reunification under Dutch law, thus wid-
ening the gap between those affected by domestic law and those falling 
under the more lenient rules of EU law. This means that the disadvantage 
of being treated differently from migrating EU nationals has become more 
significant. This disadvantage was amplified even further by the increased 
exam requirements introduced on 1 April 2011. 
As already discussed in chapter 8 (section V.C), the scope of the exemp-
tion must be taken into account to determine whether the AIA can still be 
considered a suitable measure for promoting immigrant integration in the 
Netherlands. In this connection, it is observed that the Roermond District 
Court considered preferential treatment of migrating EU nationals to be 
justified as an exception to a generally restrictive immigration policy 
(section IV).25 Arguably, this qualification still applies.26 Nevertheless, as a 
consequence of developments in EU law, the circle of family members 
who are eligible for admission without being subject to integration 
25 A similar reasoning is followed by Vermeulen, who described the exemption from inte-
gration requirements for (third-country) family members of EU nationals as ‘a specific 
exemption to the general rule, in practice concerning only a very limited number of persons 
and justified as a consequence of EU law’. See Vermeulen 2010a, 104.
26 Unfortunately, I have not been able to retrieve figures concerning the number of aliens 
admitted as family members of migrating EU nationals. It is therefore not possible to specify 
the share of total admissions that these family members represent.
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requirements has increased in recent years.27 Family members of migrat-
ing EU nationals are also not the only group of persons exempted from 
the AIA because of international obligations or other reasons not related 
to their integration capacity. The same applies to the migrating EU nation-
als themselves, to the nationals of certain third countries, to labour 
migrants and their family members and, as of August 2011, to Turkish 
nationals (chapter 2, section VI.B.iii). The limited scope of the AIA casts 
doubts on its effectiveness as an integration measure and hence on its pro-
portionality.
Even so, it was also considered earlier that the choices made by the Dutch 
legislator remain within the margin of appreciation granted by the applica-
ble legal standards and therefore do not constitute a violation of the right to 
equal treatment. There is no reason to assume a different outcome in respect 
of the issue of reverse discrimination. The reverse discrimination of non-
migrating Dutch nationals under the AIA can therefore not be regarded as 
unlawful. Nevertheless, this conclusion does not discharge the legislator 
from the responsibility to make a careful assessment of the proportionality 
of the Act, also in the light of new legal or factual developments.
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Following the examination in chapters 8 and 9, this chapter highlights one 
more aspect of the relationship between integration requirements for the 
admission of aliens and the right to equal treatment. The central question 
addressed is whether states may enact integration requirements as a con-
dition for family reunification of their own nationals, while certain groups 
of aliens (in particular migrating EU nationals) are not faced with such 
requirements.
One special element characterising situations of reverse discrimination 
is that the nationals of a state are entitled to fewer rights vis-à-vis that 
state than others who possess a different nationality. This raises questions 
about the meaning attached in that particular state to the (political) con-
cept of nationality (or citizenship) and the relationship between national 
citizenship and citizenship of the EU. In section II it is argued that the way 
in which this relationship has been implemented in different areas of the 
Dutch integration legislation is inconsistent: as far as the integration exam 
in the Netherlands is concerned, the rights of Dutch nationals have been 
equalised with those of (migrating) EU nationals, but this has not hap-
pened with regard to family reunification and the integration exam 
27 In addition to the adoption of the Residence Directive, these developments include CoJ 
case law such as the judgments in Metock and others, Ibrahim, Teixeira and Ruiz Zambrano. For 
further details, see ch 6. The circle of beneficiaries has also increased as a result of the acces-
sion of new Member States to the EU. 
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abroad. If this inconsistency is to be resolved, the Dutch approach towards 
integration will need to be reconsidered, taking into account the existence 
of EU citizenship and the privileged position of EU nationals and their 
family members. A more facilitative and less coercive policy will be less 
likely to run into the barriers raised by EU law and will therefore lend 
itself more easily to being applied to all persons at risk of experiencing 
integration-related problems.
It has also been established that there are no international legal stand-
ards requiring states to grant their own nationals at least the same rights 
as aliens. The question of whether reverse discrimination is lawful must 
therefore be answered on the basis of the general legal framework con-
cerning the right to equal treatment, whereby differential treatment is 
allowed, providing it is based on a reasonable and objective justification. 
Earlier in this study it was concluded that the wish to comply with obli-
gations of EU law can in principle constitute such justification (chapter 8, 
section III.C.i.b). In situations of reverse discrimination, however, states 
must strike a fine balance. On the one hand, they must provide justifica-
tion if certain groups of aliens are treated more favourably than their own 
nationals. On the other hand, there is no self-evident reason why nation-
als should be entitled to family reunification under more lenient condi-
tions than aliens. It was submitted that such preferential treatment could 
be considered lawful because of the close ties that nationals (and long-
term residents) can be assumed to have developed with the state con-
cerned (and that result in a greater interest in their being able to live in 
that state). However, when large groups of immigrants are exempted 
from integration conditions, the effectiveness of those conditions (and 
hence the proportionality of the distinction) will be diminished. 
Notwithstanding the above, the legal standards concerning equal treat-
ment discussed in this study do not state that reverse discrimination in 
the field of integration requirements is either forbidden or required. When 
appraising the various interests concerned, states are entitled to a certain 
amount of discretion. As far as the AIA is concerned, it was concluded 
that the Dutch legislator has not surpassed the boundaries of this discre-
tion. It was also submitted that the interference with the right to equal 
treatment that currently results from the reverse discrimination of non-
migrating Dutch nationals would not be resolved if family members 
of these nationals were henceforth exempted from the AIA, as there 
would then still be a difference in treatment between (migrating and non-
migrating) EU nationals on the one hand and third-country nationals on 
the other. However, the existence of the problem of reverse discrimination 
can be seen as an additional argument in support of an alternative solu-
tion to the existing integration problems in the Netherlands and one that 
does not result – or only to a lesser extent – in differential treatment of 
aliens, Dutch nationals or both.
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Conclusions
UNDER THE ACT on Integration Abroad, integration has become a condition for immigration to the Netherlands. Non-compliance with this condition results in the non-admission of aliens and, 
therefore, in their exclusion from Dutch territory. This study assessed how 
such integration conditions relate to the rights of immigrants as laid down 
in (inter)national immigration law, including the law on fundamental 
rights. In addition, some standards have been formulated regarding the 
contents of integration requirements and the different integration objec-
tives that can be pursued. This chapter considers the findings from the 
various chapters of this study and presents some concluding observa-
tions.
I. INTEGRATION REQUIREMENTS  
AS A CONDITION FOR ADMISSION 
A. Integration as a Ground for Exclusion
Chapter 3 examined how the connection between integration and immi-
gration was conceptualised in the Netherlands. As shown in Chapter 2, 
the adoption of the Act on Integration Abroad followed the enactment, in 
1998, of the Newcomers Integration Act, which obliged certain categories 
of immigrants to participate in integration programmes upon arrival. 
Given this history, it is not surprising that the AIA was at least partly 
defended as an instrument designed to prepare immigrants, before their 
arrival, for further integration in the Netherlands. It was also recognised, 
however, that the Act would function as an instrument of exclusion as its 
application would result in the non-admission of immigrants who did not 
pass the integration exam abroad. The AIA was thus also meant to func-
tion as a selection mechanism, so as to ensure that immigrants are not 
admitted unless they are likely to integrate successfully. This objective 
was qualified as ‘integration through exclusion’.
This objective, meanwhile, still leaves room for different approaches. 
When the AIA was first adopted, its stated purpose was to select immi-
grants on the basis of their willingness to integrate. A consequence of this 
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chosen objective was that the integration exam had to be reasonably feasi-
ble for everyone who was sufficiently motivated. Later, the level of the 
exam was raised and the AIA became more focused on selecting immi-
grants on the basis of their proven ability to learn Dutch, and thus indi-
rectly their learning capacity and previous education. At this stage, 
immigrants no longer had to be only ‘willing’, but also ‘able’. 
It may be argued that whether an exam selects on the basis of motiva-
tion or on linguistic ability is not very significant. After all, in both cases 
the efforts that are required will depend, to a large extent, on the capacity 
of the candidate, and immigrants with stronger learning capacities or 
more education will be able to pass the exam more easily. In addition, the 
determination of the effort that can reasonably be required of immigrants 
necessarily includes an element of arbitrariness. Nevertheless, the choice 
for a selection criterion influences the way in which the integration exam 
is implemented, for instance, with regard to the level of knowledge 
required, the role of the government in providing preparation facilities 
and the possibility of exemptions for candidates who are unable to pass 
despite demonstrated efforts. Ultimately, an exam aiming to select on the 
basis of motivation should take the form of an obligation of effort that 
all immigrants are able to meet. On the other hand, an exam selecting of 
the basis of ability implies acceptance of the fact that some immigrants 
will be unable to fulfil the conditions and will therefore be ineligible for 
admission. 
B. Integration Versus Admission: a Balancing of Interests
It follows from the above that integration requirements are not merely a 
barrier to the entry of non-nationals, but also an instrument to support the 
integration process in the host state. The acceptability of such require-
ments therefore has to be determined through a balancing of interests, 
taking into account their contribution to successful integration (as part of 
the public interest of the host state) and the effects of non-admission on 
individual immigrants, host state residents and/or competing public 
interests. Chapter 3 argued that, in this respect, states have a certain 
amount of discretion to decide on the acceptability of integration require-
ments in case of labour migration and, to a lesser extent, in case of family 
reunification. The analysis in the second part of this book showed that this 
notion is also expressed in the legal instruments regulating the admission 
of aliens in international law. This outcome is discussed in more detail 
below.
As regards admission for the purposes of family reunification, chapter 3 
argued that individuals have a strong interest in being able to enjoy their 
family life in the country with which they have strong ties, through 
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nationality, long-term residence or other relevant factors. As far as the EU 
Member States are concerned, this interest is now expressed in the Family 
Reunification Directive, which grants a right to admission to family mem-
bers of third-country nationals who are eligible to reside in a Member 
State for at least one year. 
In addition, a right to family reunification can exist under international 
human rights law (the ECHR, ICCPR and CRC), in particular in situations 
where the exercise of family life in the country of origin is impossible or 
very difficult. Arguably, international human rights treaties give special 
consideration to family members of persons who were admitted to the host 
state to obtain protection from persecution or inhuman treatment in their 
country of origin. The same applies if the exercise of family life in the coun-
try of origin is thwarted by other barriers, such as severe medical condi-
tions or the presence of children who are rooted in the host state and would 
suffer from displacement. However, under international human rights law, 
the threshold for accepting the existence of such barriers is relatively high. 
A right to family reunification is therefore not easily found to exist.
The existence of a right to family reunification, be it under the Family 
Reunification Directive or – in exceptional circumstances – under interna-
tional human rights treaties, moreover does not imply that this right is 
absolute. With the exception of refugee families, the Family Reunification 
Directive expressly allows the admission of family members to be made 
dependent on the fulfilment of integration requirements. This is also the 
general rule under Article 8 ECHR, Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR and Articles 
9 and 10 CRC. Integration requirements must, however, meet the criteria 
set by the above instruments. In particular, there must be a relationship of 
proportionality between the interest of integration (the public interest of 
the host state) and the interests of the individual family members. This 
proportionality depends on the personal situation of the family members, 
the efforts they must make to meet the integration requirements (which in 
turn depends on factors such as the level of the exam, circumstances in the 
country of origin and so on), and on the necessity and effectiveness of 
those requirements. 
More specifically it was argued that, once a right to family reunification 
has been established, integration requirements will be disproportionate if 
they make the exercise of this right effectively impossible. As said before, 
this will depend in part on the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, to 
return to the distinction made above, it follows that integration require-
ments may reasonably oblige family members to make a certain effort, but 
may not indefinitely exclude them on the grounds of their inability to 
reach a particular level. This implies that the level of integration require-
ments must not be set so high as to exclude persons with little education 
or learning capacities, and that there should be a possibility for individual 
exemptions (for instance, a hardship clause).
 Condition for Admission 381
Another group of aliens who may be faced with integration require-
ments for admission is religious servants. Chapter 5 concluded that the 
right to freedom of religion does not normally include a right of religious 
servants to be admitted to a state of which they are not nationals or a right 
of religious communities to appoint religious servants from abroad. It fol-
lows that, in principle, states preserve full discretion to make the admis-
sion of religious servants dependent on the fulfilment of integration 
requirements and to decide on the contents of those requirements. Two 
exceptions to this rule were nevertheless identified. One concerns the situ-
ation in which refusal to admit a religious servant would effectively pre-
vent the religious community in the host state from continuing its religious 
activities. The second situation is when the decision to refuse admission 
in fact serves to control the exercise of religious freedom. 
Where one of the above situations occurs, it does not automatically fol-
low that the religious servant has an absolute right to be admitted and 
that integration requirements are thereby precluded: limitations to the 
freedom of religion are allowed. It was argued that the public interest of 
integration can provide grounds for such limitations. Nevertheless, the 
limitation clauses of Articles 9 ECHR and 18 ICCPR also require integra-
tion conditions to be proportionate and this will depend on their effective-
ness and on the burden imposed on the religious servant (or on the 
religious community in the host state). Again, it is submitted that such 
conditions may not be such that they cannot reasonably be fulfilled. 
However, substantive criteria for limitation are not included in Article 
6(1) of the Dutch Constitution, by which the freedom of religion is also 
protected. According to this provision, the freedom of religion can always 
be restricted, providing the restriction has been ordered by the national 
legislator.
Several other grounds for the admission of aliens were discussed in 
chapters 6 and 7. The legal instruments examined in these chapters con-
cern immigration for economic purposes (labour migration) and the 
admission of aliens who are nationals of states with which the host state 
maintains friendly diplomatic relations. In many cases these grounds are 
combined, as illustrated, for example, by the EEC-Turkey Association 
Agreement and the Dutch-American Friendship Treaty. Both agreements 
regulate the international movement of certain categories of economically 
active nationals of the Contracting Parties, including workers, entrepre-
neurs and other self-employed persons. Similarly, with regard to the EU, 
the right of free movement was originally limited to EU nationals who 
migrated for economic purposes. Later, however, this right was extended 
to include all EU nationals, a development that was supported by the 
ongoing European integration and the creation of EU citizenship.
Whereas some of the legal instruments discussed in chapters 6 and 7 
do not affect the competence of the Contracting States to introduce 
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integration requirements into their immigration legislation, others make 
such requirements subject to conditions or exclude them altogether. In 
particular, the extent to which states can enact integration requirements is 
greatly limited by the rules of EU law on the right to free movement 
(including the very similar regulations applying to nationals of the EEA 
Member States and Switzerland). Additional limitations stem from the 
EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, the Blue Card Directive and the 
European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers. Other 
instruments, such as the Long-term Residents Directive, the European 
Convention on Establishment or the Dutch-American Friendship Treaty, 
allow states to make the admission of foreign nationals, at least to a cer-
tain extent, subordinate to considerations of integration. It is concluded 
that the balancing act, between the interest of integration and the compet-
ing interests that led to the adoption of the above instruments, such as 
the wish to attract (highly skilled) labour and maintain diplomatic rela-
tions or promote European integration, does not always lead to the same 
outcome.
What causes these different outcomes is primarily a political question 
that has not been addressed in this study. What has been examined, how-
ever, is how the resulting differentiations should be judged in view of the 
right to equal treatment. The results of this assessment are reviewed in the 
following section.
C. Integration and Equality
The overall framework regarding the right to equal treatment in interna-
tional human rights instruments (and the Dutch Constitution) was out-
lined in chapter 8. It was established that integration measures may 
lawfully result in differential treatment of immigrants and/or host state 
residents, provided such differential treatment is based on a reasonable 
and objective justification. Such justification can be taken to exist when a 
group of persons is exempted from integration requirements on the 
grounds that they are less likely to experience problems in the field of 
integration. In most cases, however, a criterion by which this ‘capacity for 
integration’ can be determined will not be easy to find. 
In any case, such a criterion will depend on the particular integration 
objectives being pursued. It was argued that, for example, it would be 
justified to exempt labour migrants from the scope of application of an 
integration measure if the purpose of that measure is to ensure that immi-
grants participate in the labour market or to prevent unemployment. 
Where the integration requirement includes a test of the language of the 
host state, it would also be reasonable to exempt those immigrants who 
can show – through other reliable means – that they are already suffi-
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ciently proficient in this language. A similar ground for exemption is 
included in the AIA (chapter 2, para section VI.B.iii). On the other hand, 
it was concluded that an immigrant’s nationality or the ‘social, socio- 
economic and political comparability of the country of origin’ are not suit-
able criteria to determine the integration capacity of the person concerned.
Besides differences in integration capacity, differences in treatment with 
regard to the application of integration requirements can be justified by 
the existence of competing public interests. Interests already mentioned in 
this connection are the economic interest of the host state (including the 
need to attract labour migrants from abroad), the protection of economic 
and foreign relations with other states and compliance with obligations 
stemming from international law (including EU law and bilateral agree-
ments). It was argued that, at least where the resulting differentiations are 
based on the grounds of nationality or residence purpose, the host state 
has a certain margin of appreciation, meaning that these differentiations 
will not rapidly amount to prohibited discrimination.
Nevertheless, the requirement for a reasonable and objective justifica-
tion entails that differences in treatment must be proportionate. This pro-
portionality will be endangered if a majority of the immigrants entering a 
country are exempted from the obligation to comply with integration 
requirements on grounds not related to their integration capacity. This is 
because, in that situation, the effectiveness of the integration measure will 
be diminished and it will contribute less to the purpose of improving inte-
gration. Consequently, the utility of the integration measure will no longer 
outweigh the difference in treatment that it causes. A problem of this 
nature can occur both with regard to distinctions made between immi-
grants seeking admission (chapter 8) and with regard to the ‘reverse dis-
crimination’ of a state’s own nationals (chapter 10). With regard to the 
latter, it was also noted that the preferential treatment of large groups of 
aliens compared to a state’s own nationals raises questions of a political 
nature about the meaning of nationality (or citizenship) in those states.
Concerning the relationship between integration and equality, attention 
was also paid to the issue of indirect differential treatment, in particular 
on grounds of racial or ethnic origin (chapter 9). When a state includes 
integration requirements in its immigration legislation, it must be aware 
that – even if this is not intended – such legislation may create a greater 
disadvantage for some racial or ethnic groups than for others. If this dis-
advantage is sufficiently strong (amounting to a ‘disproportionate effect’), 
it will result in a presumption of indirect discrimination that must again 
be based on a reasonable and objective justification. In particular, this 
requirement of justification means that the purpose of the integration 
requirement could not have been reached by other measures that would 
have had less or no discriminatory effect. While the host state may have a 
margin of appreciation in this regard, the scope of this margin will depend 
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on the social circumstances of the racial or ethnic group concerned and on 
the risk that it runs of being excluded from mainstream society.
II. INTEGRATION OBJECTIVES AND THE CONTENT OF 
INTEGRATION REQUIREMENTS
A. Concepts of Integration
In addition to integration requirements functioning as instruments to 
control the admission of immigrants, this study also considered the inte-
gration objectives that these requirements are meant to help achieve. 
Traditionally, ‘integration’ is often understood as the coming together of a 
group of persons or the abolition of social, economic and cultural divides 
between different sections of the population in a particular state. 
Understood in this way, integration is a process that involves society as a 
whole. In the context of integration requirements, however, the concept of 
integration refers to something else. Inherent in the idea of such require-
ments is that integration constitutes a standard or norm that immigrants 
must adapt to. This does not exclude the possibility of support being pro-
vided by the government or other institutions of the host state (in the 
form, for example, of preparation facilities); hence, integration require-
ments are not necessarily incompatible with the idea of shared responsi-
bility for the integration process. Nevertheless, they are based on the 
premise that integration refers to certain attitudes, behaviours and/or 
skills on the part of immigrants, the existence of which integration require-
ments are meant to test or enhance.
Notwithstanding this qualification, the concept of integration remains 
open and subject to different interpretations. The description in chapter 3 
of this study showed how the ideal of integration (or citizenship) in the 
Netherlands continued to evolve over time, including after the Act on 
Integration Abroad was adopted. Different elements of this ideal that can 
be distinguished include (economic) self-reliance and participation in var-
ious areas of the public domain, in particular in education and the labour 
market; adaptation to the culture (language, norms and values) of the 
majority population and a psychological or emotional commitment to the 
host state. 
The same chapter assessed these various integration objectives from a 
normative-political perspective, arguing that the aim of integration meas-
ures should not be to make immigrants accept or subscribe to particular 
norms or values or to ensure their exclusive loyalty to the receiving state. 
In addition, it was submitted that purely cognitive requirements, such as 
that immigrants must know about the history, geography or traditions of 
the host state, are of little use unless they serve an underlying purpose, 
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such as political or economic participation in society or the creation of a 
sense of commitment. States may, however, require immigrants to respect 
existing legislation and to contribute to the preservation of the welfare 
state. Cognitive requirements, including the obligation to learn the lan-
guage of the host state, are therefore acceptable if they are directed 
towards these aims. Lastly, states may seek to promote emotional identifi-
cation of immigrants with the host state in order to create a sense of 
belonging and solidarity. Such identification may not (and cannot), how-
ever, be enforced.
B. Legal Standards Concerning Integration Objectives and the 
Contents of Integration Requirements
The analysis in the second part of this study found that the objectives and 
contents of integration requirements are generally not governed by any 
specific legal standards. Where the enactment of integration requirements 
for admission is allowed, most of the relevant legal instruments do not 
state anything other than that such requirements must be aimed at ‘inte-
gration’, at the ‘protection of public order or the rights and freedoms of 
others’ or even more generally that they must be in ‘the public interest’. 
Since a more specific definition of acceptable integration objectives has 
not been provided, the range of objectives that may be pursued is not 
clearly demarcated. 
It was argued, however, that integration requirements must in any case 
respect the boundaries set by human rights treaties. As such, the pursuit 
of social unity or cohesion through integration policies must not include 
the objective of abolishing or restricting religious or ethnic diversity. 
Integration tests or programmes directed towards such objectives have to 
be rejected. Although this criterion may not always be easy to apply in 
practice, it was submitted that integration tests should not in any case 
contain normative questions or prescriptions regarding religious or cul-
tural practices (such as dress codes or conventions concerning relations 
between the sexes), unless these reflect actual legal standards that are in 
themselves compatible with human rights norms. Integration require-
ments must, moreover, respect the freedom of thought, which means that 
immigrants must not be asked to agree with particular values, ideas or 
beliefs and that information conveyed through integration programmes 
or tests (for example, about the constitutional principles of the state or the 
customs and conventions of the host society) must be presented in an 
objective and pluralistic manner so as not to amount to indoctrination.
In chapter 5, some standards were formulated concerning integration 
requirements for religious servants. It was argued that these servants 
must not be asked to answer normative questions relating to the contents 
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of their faith or to comply with instructions regarding the exercise of their 
religious duties. Nonetheless, integration requirements may be used to 
inform religious servants about regulations pertaining to the separation of 
church and state with the aim of protecting this separation. The same 
objective can also provide grounds for imposing integration requirements 
specifically on religious servants as a target group.
The above standards, in particular the condition that integration 
requirements must respect human rights provisions, remain at a rather 
general level. As already stated, more specific legal criteria have not yet 
been formulated. Such criteria are likely, however, to be developed in 
the future, through the adoption of more specific legislative rules (at the 
EU level, for example) or through legal challenges against integration 
measures. 
III. THE ACT ON INTEGRATION ABROAD IN RELATION  
TO (INTER)NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW
One of the purposes of this study was to determine whether the AIA 
respects the right of aliens and Dutch residents as protected by interna-
tional immigration law and the Dutch Constitution. In the course of the 
examination several incompatibilities were identified, which are pre-
sented below.
A first issue concerns the compatibility of the AIA with the right to fam-
ily life and family reunification, which was examined in chapter 4. It was 
argued that the existence of integration requirements is not as such con-
trary to this right. Nevertheless, several features of the AIA were identi-
fied which make it very probable that application of the Act will be 
disproportionate, and hence unlawful, in individual cases or in respect of 
particular groups of aliens. A first element concerns the level of the exam 
(which was increased on 1 April 2011) and the introduction of a reading 
comprehension test, which make the integration requirement reasonably 
impossible to meet for immigrants who are illiterate. Other factors that 
are likely to result in the disproportionality of the requirement (alone or in 
combination) are a lack of adequate preparation facilities, circumstances 
in countries of origin influencing the accessibility of the exam and the fact 
that no exemption has been created for the family members of persons 
who came to the Netherlands in search of international protection, but 
who were granted a residence permit for purposes other than asylum. 
Unless more lenient use is made of the available exemption clauses, there 
will be individual cases in which application of the Act violates interna-
tional human rights treaties (the ECHR, ICCPR and CRC) or the EU 
Family Reunification Directive. This will also occur, more generally, in 
cases involving illiterate applicants. Furthermore, as there is no proce-
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dural guarantee to ensure that due weight is given to the best interests of 
children, which must form a ‘primary consideration’, the AIA does not 
meet the standard set by Article 3 CRC.
Next, it was found that the integration requirement for the admission of 
religious servants is generally compatible with the legal norms concern-
ing the freedom of religion (chapter 5). Nonetheless, a violation may occur 
in exceptional circumstances, if the situation is such that admission of the 
religious servant is necessary to enable a religious community in the 
Netherlands to continue its activities and the burden placed upon the reli-
gious servant by the integration requirement is disproportionate (if, for 
example, the servant is illiterate or there is no access to preparation facili-
ties). To prevent such violations, the application of the AIA to religious 
servants in individual cases should be examined under Article 9 ECHR 
and Article 18 ICCPR. 
Also in chapter 5, it was argued that the fact that religious servants form 
a specific target group of the AIA is not as such contrary to the prohibition 
of discrimination on the grounds of religion. It may be justified to make 
the admission of religious servants dependent on the fulfilment of inte-
gration requirements so as to protect the separation between church and 
state. However, the contents of the integration exam abroad, in its current 
form, are not particularly suited to this purpose. It is therefore recom-
mended reconsidering the contents of the exam for religious servants. 
Bearing in mind the purpose of the exam and the complexity of the sub-
ject at stake, it could be preferable to administer the exam in religious 
servants’ own language.
Chapter 7 argued that application of the integration exam abroad to 
Turkish nationals and their family members is precluded by the standstill 
and non-discrimination clauses of the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, 
its Additional Protocol and Decision 1/80, as interpreted by the CoJ, to the 
extent that they come within the scope of these instruments. Although 
the Dutch legislator has thus far failed to recognise the full meaning of the 
Association Agreement, Turkish nationals have, in the meantime, been 
exempted from the AIA on grounds derived from national law. A similar 
exemption applies to their family members. An incompatibility remains, 
however, as regards the application of the AIA to family members of labour 
migrants who are nationals of Albania, Moldavia, Turkey or Ukraine, as 
these family members are entitled to admission on the basis of the 
European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (ECMW). 
Lastly, Article 19(6) of the revised European Social Charter (ESC) obliges 
the Netherlands to facilitate compliance with the AIA by family members 
of labour migrants who are covered by this agreement, which may be 
understood as an obligation to assist them in preparing for the exam.
As a final issue, the compatibility of the AIA with the right to equal 
treatment was assessed. It was concluded that differentiations on the 
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grounds of nationality and residence purpose do not, as such, amount to 
prohibited discrimination and that the Dutch authorities have generally 
remained within their margin of appreciation inasmuch as the propor-
tionality of the integration requirement is concerned. Nonetheless, the 
Dutch legislator has not convincingly explained why labour migrants and 
their family members are exempted from the obligation to pass the inte-
gration exam abroad. An issue was also raised regarding the possibility of 
indirect discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin. In this connection, 
it is recalled that the legal framework concerning indirect ethnic discrimi-
nation, especially in the immigration context, is far from well-established. 
In particular, no clear standards have so far been developed regarding the 
evidence needed to prove a presumption of indirect discrimination and 
the margin of appreciation to be applied by the courts. The assessment of 
the effects of the AIA is also complicated by the fact that the available sta-
tistical evidence does not specify the ethnic origins of the persons con-
cerned. Nevertheless, on the basis of the existing legal standards and 
factual information, it was concluded that the AIA disproportionately 
affects immigrants of Moroccan (and previously also Turkish) origin and 
that no sufficient justification for this effect has been provided. In the 
absence of such justification and given the already vulnerable position of 
the Turkish and Moroccan migrant communities in the Netherlands, it 
was argued that the AIA does not respect the prohibition of indirect ethnic 
discrimination.
In summary, it is concluded that continuing the AIA in its current form 
presents some problems from a legal perspective. Of these, the issue of 
indirect ethnic discrimination is arguably the most difficult to resolve, as 
this will require at least a thorough reconsideration of the target group. 
From the perspective of equality, extending the AIA to all immigrants 
seeking to be admitted to the Netherlands, or at least to the majority of 
them, is recommended. However, this study has shown that such a broad-
ening of the scope of the Act’s application would run into a variety of 
legal barriers. 
A similar problem exists with regard to the effectiveness of the integra-
tion exam abroad. Chapter 2 established that the effect of the AIA on the 
integration capacity of new immigrants remains rather limited. This fact 
is of both legal and political significance, as the Act’s contribution to suc-
cessful integration is what justifies its infringement on the individual 
interests of immigrants and Dutch residents. The effect of the exam will 
probably become more significant if the level is raised, which is why the 
exam was made more difficult on 1 April 2011. However, this change has 
also increased the probability of the integration requirement constituting 
a disproportionate limitation to the right to family life in individual cases.
A successful integration policy requires legislation that is both effective 
and respectful of the rights of immigrants and Dutch residents. However, 
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the growing body of legal standards governing the admission of immi-
grants means that the legislator’s room for manoeuvre in this field is 
increasingly constrained. As a measure to promote immigrant integration 
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